Actions: Diff-informed queries: phase 3 (non-trivial locations)

actions/ql/lib/codeql/actions/security/ArgumentInjectionQuery.qll

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 private import actions
 private import codeql.actions.TaintTracking
 private import codeql.actions.dataflow.ExternalFlow
+private import codeql.actions.security.ControlChecks
 import codeql.actions.dataflow.FlowSources
 import codeql.actions.DataFlow
 
@@ -65,6 +66,16 @@ class ArgumentInjectionFromMaDSink extends ArgumentInjectionSink {
   override string getCommand() { result = "unknown" }
 }
 
+/**
+ * Gets the event that is relevant for the given node in the context of argument injection.
+ *
+ * This is used to highlight the event in the query results when an alert is raised.
+ */
+Event getRelevantEventInPrivilegedContext(DataFlow::Node node) {
+  inPrivilegedContext(node.asExpr(), result) and
+  not exists(ControlCheck check | check.protects(node.asExpr(), result, "argument-injection"))
+}
+
 /**
  * A taint-tracking configuration for unsafe user input
  * that is used to construct and evaluate a code script.
@@ -88,6 +99,16 @@ private module ArgumentInjectionConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
       run.getScript().getAnEnvReachingArgumentInjectionSink(var, _, _)
     )
   }
+
+  predicate observeDiffInformedIncrementalMode() { any() }
+
+  Location getASelectedSourceLocation(DataFlow::Node source) { none() }
+
+  Location getASelectedSinkLocation(DataFlow::Node sink) {
+    result = sink.getLocation()
+    or
+    result = getRelevantEventInPrivilegedContext(sink).getLocation()
+  }
 }
 
 /** Tracks flow of unsafe user input that is used to construct and evaluate a code script. */

actions/ql/lib/codeql/actions/security/ArtifactPoisoningQuery.qll

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import codeql.actions.DataFlow
 import codeql.actions.dataflow.FlowSources
 import codeql.actions.security.PoisonableSteps
 import codeql.actions.security.UntrustedCheckoutQuery
+import codeql.actions.security.ControlChecks
 
 string unzipRegexp() { result = "(unzip|tar)\\s+.*" }
 
@@ -292,6 +293,16 @@ class ArtifactPoisoningSink extends DataFlow::Node {
   string getPath() { result = download.getPath() }
 }
 
+/**
+ * Gets the event that is relevant for the given node in the context of artifact poisoning.
+ *
+ * This is used to highlight the event in the query results when an alert is raised.
+ */
+Event getRelevantEventInPrivilegedContext(DataFlow::Node node) {
+  inPrivilegedContext(node.asExpr(), result) and
+  not exists(ControlCheck check | check.protects(node.asExpr(), result, "artifact-poisoning"))
+}
+
 /**
  * A taint-tracking configuration for unsafe artifacts
  * that is used may lead to artifact poisoning
@@ -318,6 +329,16 @@ private module ArtifactPoisoningConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
       exists(run.getScript().getAFileReadCommand())
     )
   }
+
+  predicate observeDiffInformedIncrementalMode() { any() }
+
+  Location getASelectedSourceLocation(DataFlow::Node source) { none() }
+
+  Location getASelectedSinkLocation(DataFlow::Node sink) {
+    result = sink.getLocation()
+    or
+    result = getRelevantEventInPrivilegedContext(sink).getLocation()
+  }
 }
 
 /** Tracks flow of unsafe artifacts that is used in an insecure way. */

actions/ql/lib/codeql/actions/security/CodeInjectionQuery.qll

@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ private import codeql.actions.TaintTracking
 private import codeql.actions.dataflow.ExternalFlow
 import codeql.actions.dataflow.FlowSources
 import codeql.actions.DataFlow
+import codeql.actions.security.ControlChecks
+import codeql.actions.security.CachePoisoningQuery
 
 class CodeInjectionSink extends DataFlow::Node {
   CodeInjectionSink() {
@@ -11,6 +13,46 @@ class CodeInjectionSink extends DataFlow::Node {
   }
 }
 
+/**
+ * Get the relevant event for the sink in CodeInjectionCritical.ql.
+ */
+Event getRelevantCriticalEventForSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
+  inPrivilegedContext(sink.asExpr(), result) and
+  not exists(ControlCheck check | check.protects(sink.asExpr(), result, "code-injection")) and
+  // exclude cases where the sink is a JS script and the expression uses toJson
+  not exists(UsesStep script |
+    script.getCallee() = "actions/github-script" and
+    script.getArgumentExpr("script") = sink.asExpr() and
+    exists(getAToJsonReferenceExpression(sink.asExpr().(Expression).getExpression(), _))
+  )
+}
+
+/**
+ * Get the relevant event for the sink in CachePoisoningViaCodeInjection.ql.
+ */
+Event getRelevantCachePoisoningEventForSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
+  exists(LocalJob job |
+    job = sink.asExpr().getEnclosingJob() and
+    job.getATriggerEvent() = result and
+    // job can be triggered by an external user
+    result.isExternallyTriggerable() and
+    // excluding privileged workflows since they can be exploited in easier circumstances
+    // which is covered by `actions/code-injection/critical`
+    not job.isPrivilegedExternallyTriggerable(result) and
+    (
+      // the workflow runs in the context of the default branch
+      runsOnDefaultBranch(result)
+      or
+      // the workflow caller runs in the context of the default branch
+      result.getName() = "workflow_call" and
+      exists(ExternalJob caller |
+        caller.getCallee() = job.getLocation().getFile().getRelativePath() and
+        runsOnDefaultBranch(caller.getATriggerEvent())
+      )
+    )
+  )
+}
+
 /**
  * A taint-tracking configuration for unsafe user input
  * that is used to construct and evaluate a code script.
@@ -35,6 +77,18 @@ private module CodeInjectionConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
       exists(run.getScript().getAFileReadCommand())
     )
   }
+
+  predicate observeDiffInformedIncrementalMode() { any() }
+
+  Location getASelectedSourceLocation(DataFlow::Node source) { none() }
+
+  Location getASelectedSinkLocation(DataFlow::Node sink) {
+    result = sink.getLocation()
+    or
+    result = getRelevantCriticalEventForSink(sink).getLocation()
+    or
+    result = getRelevantCachePoisoningEventForSink(sink).getLocation()
+  }
 }
 
 /** Tracks flow of unsafe user input that is used to construct and evaluate a code script. */

actions/ql/lib/codeql/actions/security/CommandInjectionQuery.qll

@@ -3,11 +3,20 @@ private import codeql.actions.TaintTracking
 private import codeql.actions.dataflow.ExternalFlow
 import codeql.actions.dataflow.FlowSources
 import codeql.actions.DataFlow
+import codeql.actions.security.ControlChecks
 
 private class CommandInjectionSink extends DataFlow::Node {
   CommandInjectionSink() { madSink(this, "command-injection") }
 }
 
+/** Get the relevant event for the sink in CommandInjectionCritical.ql. */
+Event getRelevantEventInPrivilegedContext(DataFlow::Node sink) {
+  inPrivilegedContext(sink.asExpr(), result) and
+  not exists(ControlCheck check |
+    check.protects(sink.asExpr(), result, ["command-injection", "code-injection"])
+  )
+}
+
 /**
  * A taint-tracking configuration for unsafe user input
  * that is used to construct and evaluate a system command.
@@ -16,6 +25,16 @@ private module CommandInjectionConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
   predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) { source instanceof RemoteFlowSource }
 
   predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { sink instanceof CommandInjectionSink }
+
+  predicate observeDiffInformedIncrementalMode() { any() }
+
+  Location getASelectedSourceLocation(DataFlow::Node source) { none() }
+
+  Location getASelectedSinkLocation(DataFlow::Node sink) {
+    result = sink.getLocation()
+    or
+    result = getRelevantEventInPrivilegedContext(sink).getLocation()
+  }
 }
 
 /** Tracks flow of unsafe user input that is used to construct and evaluate a system command. */

actions/ql/lib/codeql/actions/security/EnvPathInjectionQuery.qll

@@ -72,6 +72,25 @@ class EnvPathInjectionFromMaDSink extends EnvPathInjectionSink {
   EnvPathInjectionFromMaDSink() { madSink(this, "envpath-injection") }
 }
 
+/**
+ * Get the relevant event for a sink in EnvPathInjectionCritical.ql where the source type is "artifact".
+ */
+Event getRelevantArtifactEventInPrivilegedContext(DataFlow::Node sink) {
+  inPrivilegedContext(sink.asExpr(), result) and
+  not exists(ControlCheck check |
+    check.protects(sink.asExpr(), result, ["untrusted-checkout", "artifact-poisoning"])
+  ) and
+  sink instanceof EnvPathInjectionFromFileReadSink
+}
+
+/**
+ * Get the relevant event for a sink in EnvPathInjectionCritical.ql where the source type is not "artifact".
+ */
+Event getRelevantNonArtifactEventInPrivilegedContext(DataFlow::Node sink) {
+  inPrivilegedContext(sink.asExpr(), result) and
+  not exists(ControlCheck check | check.protects(sink.asExpr(), result, "code-injection"))
+}
+
 /**
  * A taint-tracking configuration for unsafe user input
  * that is used to construct and evaluate an environment variable.
@@ -108,6 +127,18 @@ private module EnvPathInjectionConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
       exists(run.getScript().getAFileReadCommand())
     )
   }
+
+  predicate observeDiffInformedIncrementalMode() { any() }
+
+  Location getASelectedSourceLocation(DataFlow::Node source) { none() }
+
+  Location getASelectedSinkLocation(DataFlow::Node sink) {
+    result = sink.getLocation()
+    or
+    result = getRelevantArtifactEventInPrivilegedContext(sink).getLocation()
+    or
+    result = getRelevantNonArtifactEventInPrivilegedContext(sink).getLocation()
+  }
 }
 
 /** Tracks flow of unsafe user input that is used to construct and evaluate the PATH environment variable. */

actions/ql/lib/codeql/actions/security/EnvVarInjectionQuery.qll

@@ -126,6 +126,32 @@ class EnvVarInjectionFromMaDSink extends EnvVarInjectionSink {
   EnvVarInjectionFromMaDSink() { madSink(this, "envvar-injection") }
 }
 
+/**
+ * Get the relevant event for a sink in EnvVarInjectionCritical.ql where the source type is "artifact".
+ */
+Event getRelevantArtifactEventInPrivilegedContext(DataFlow::Node sink) {
+  inPrivilegedContext(sink.asExpr(), result) and
+  not exists(ControlCheck check |
+    check
+        .protects(sink.asExpr(), result,
+          ["envvar-injection", "untrusted-checkout", "artifact-poisoning"])
+  ) and
+  (
+    sink instanceof EnvVarInjectionFromFileReadSink or
+    madSink(sink, "envvar-injection")
+  )
+}
+
+/**
+ * Get the relevant event for a sink in EnvVarInjectionCritical.ql where the source type is not "artifact".
+ */
+Event getRelevantNonArtifactEventInPrivilegedContext(DataFlow::Node sink) {
+  inPrivilegedContext(sink.asExpr(), result) and
+  not exists(ControlCheck check |
+    check.protects(sink.asExpr(), result, ["envvar-injection", "code-injection"])
+  )
+}
+
 /**
  * A taint-tracking configuration for unsafe user input
  * that is used to construct and evaluate an environment variable.
@@ -163,6 +189,18 @@ private module EnvVarInjectionConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
       exists(run.getScript().getAFileReadCommand())
     )
   }
+
+  predicate observeDiffInformedIncrementalMode() { any() }
+
+  Location getASelectedSourceLocation(DataFlow::Node source) { none() }
+
+  Location getASelectedSinkLocation(DataFlow::Node sink) {
+    result = sink.getLocation()
+    or
+    result = getRelevantArtifactEventInPrivilegedContext(sink).getLocation()
+    or
+    result = getRelevantNonArtifactEventInPrivilegedContext(sink).getLocation()
+  }
 }
 
 /** Tracks flow of unsafe user input that is used to construct and evaluate an environment variable. */

actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-077/EnvPathInjectionCritical.ql

@@ -21,18 +21,12 @@ import codeql.actions.security.ControlChecks
 from EnvPathInjectionFlow::PathNode source, EnvPathInjectionFlow::PathNode sink, Event event
 where
   EnvPathInjectionFlow::flowPath(source, sink) and
-  inPrivilegedContext(sink.getNode().asExpr(), event) and
   (
     not source.getNode().(RemoteFlowSource).getSourceType() = "artifact" and
-    not exists(ControlCheck check |
-      check.protects(sink.getNode().asExpr(), event, "code-injection")
-    )
+    event = getRelevantNonArtifactEventInPrivilegedContext(sink.getNode())
     or
     source.getNode().(RemoteFlowSource).getSourceType() = "artifact" and
-    not exists(ControlCheck check |
-      check.protects(sink.getNode().asExpr(), event, ["untrusted-checkout", "artifact-poisoning"])
-    ) and
-    sink.getNode() instanceof EnvPathInjectionFromFileReadSink
+    event = getRelevantArtifactEventInPrivilegedContext(sink.getNode())
   )
 select sink.getNode(), source, sink,
   "Potential PATH environment variable injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@).",

actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-077/EnvVarInjectionCritical.ql

@@ -22,26 +22,15 @@ import codeql.actions.security.ControlChecks
 from EnvVarInjectionFlow::PathNode source, EnvVarInjectionFlow::PathNode sink, Event event
 where
   EnvVarInjectionFlow::flowPath(source, sink) and
-  inPrivilegedContext(sink.getNode().asExpr(), event) and
   // exclude paths to file read sinks from non-artifact sources
   (
     // source is text
     not source.getNode().(RemoteFlowSource).getSourceType() = "artifact" and
-    not exists(ControlCheck check |
-      check.protects(sink.getNode().asExpr(), event, ["envvar-injection", "code-injection"])
-    )
+    event = getRelevantNonArtifactEventInPrivilegedContext(sink.getNode())
     or
     // source is an artifact or a file from an untrusted checkout
     source.getNode().(RemoteFlowSource).getSourceType() = "artifact" and
-    not exists(ControlCheck check |
-      check
-          .protects(sink.getNode().asExpr(), event,
-            ["envvar-injection", "untrusted-checkout", "artifact-poisoning"])
-    ) and
-    (
-      sink.getNode() instanceof EnvVarInjectionFromFileReadSink or
-      madSink(sink.getNode(), "envvar-injection")
-    )
+    event = getRelevantArtifactEventInPrivilegedContext(sink.getNode())
   )
 select sink.getNode(), source, sink,
   "Potential environment variable injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@).",

actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-094/CodeInjectionCritical.ql

@@ -22,15 +22,8 @@ import codeql.actions.security.ControlChecks
 from CodeInjectionFlow::PathNode source, CodeInjectionFlow::PathNode sink, Event event
 where
   CodeInjectionFlow::flowPath(source, sink) and
-  inPrivilegedContext(sink.getNode().asExpr(), event) and
-  source.getNode().(RemoteFlowSource).getEventName() = event.getName() and
-  not exists(ControlCheck check | check.protects(sink.getNode().asExpr(), event, "code-injection")) and
-  // exclude cases where the sink is a JS script and the expression uses toJson
-  not exists(UsesStep script |
-    script.getCallee() = "actions/github-script" and
-    script.getArgumentExpr("script") = sink.getNode().asExpr() and
-    exists(getAToJsonReferenceExpression(sink.getNode().asExpr().(Expression).getExpression(), _))
-  )
+  event = getRelevantCriticalEventForSink(sink.getNode()) and
+  source.getNode().(RemoteFlowSource).getEventName() = event.getName()
 select sink.getNode(), source, sink,
   "Potential code injection in $@, which may be controlled by an external user ($@).", sink,
   sink.getNode().asExpr().(Expression).getRawExpression(), event, event.getName()

actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-349/CachePoisoningViaCodeInjection.ql

@@ -18,30 +18,13 @@ import codeql.actions.security.CachePoisoningQuery
 import CodeInjectionFlow::PathGraph
 import codeql.actions.security.ControlChecks
 
-from CodeInjectionFlow::PathNode source, CodeInjectionFlow::PathNode sink, LocalJob job, Event event
+from CodeInjectionFlow::PathNode source, CodeInjectionFlow::PathNode sink, Event event
 where
   CodeInjectionFlow::flowPath(source, sink) and
-  job = sink.getNode().asExpr().getEnclosingJob() and
-  job.getATriggerEvent() = event and
-  // job can be triggered by an external user
-  event.isExternallyTriggerable() and
+  event = getRelevantCachePoisoningEventForSink(sink.getNode()) and
   // the checkout is not controlled by an access check
   not exists(ControlCheck check |
     check.protects(source.getNode().asExpr(), event, "code-injection")
-  ) and
-  // excluding privileged workflows since they can be exploited in easier circumstances
-  // which is covered by `actions/code-injection/critical`
-  not job.isPrivilegedExternallyTriggerable(event) and
-  (
-    // the workflow runs in the context of the default branch
-    runsOnDefaultBranch(event)
-    or
-    // the workflow caller runs in the context of the default branch
-    event.getName() = "workflow_call" and
-    exists(ExternalJob caller |
-      caller.getCallee() = job.getLocation().getFile().getRelativePath() and
-      runsOnDefaultBranch(caller.getATriggerEvent())
-    )
   )
 select sink.getNode(), source, sink,
   "Unprivileged code injection in $@, which may lead to cache poisoning ($@).", sink,