[test] master_test #1

kernel-patches-bot · 2022-02-15T17:04:46Z

branch: master_test
base:bpf-next
version: edc21dc

Since we've started treating fallocate more like a file write, we should flush the log to disk if the user has asked for synchronous writes either by setting it via fcntl flags, or inode flags, or with the sync mount option. We've already got a helper for this, so use it. [The original patch by Darrick was massaged by Dave to fit this patchset] Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>

Unlike .queue_rq, in .submit_async_event drivers may not check the ctrl readiness for AER submission. This may lead to a use-after-free condition that was observed with nvme-tcp. The race condition may happen in the following scenario: 1. driver executes its reset_ctrl_work 2. -> nvme_stop_ctrl - flushes ctrl async_event_work 3. ctrl sends AEN which is received by the host, which in turn schedules AEN handling 4. teardown admin queue (which releases the queue socket) 5. AEN processed, submits another AER, calling the driver to submit 6. driver attempts to send the cmd ==> use-after-free In order to fix that, add ctrl state check to validate the ctrl is actually able to accept the AER submission. This addresses the above race in controller resets because the driver during teardown should: 1. change ctrl state to RESETTING 2. flush async_event_work (as well as other async work elements) So after 1,2, any other AER command will find the ctrl state to be RESETTING and bail out without submitting the AER. Signed-off-by: Sagi Grimberg <[email protected]>

While nvme_tcp_submit_async_event_work is checking the ctrl and queue state before preparing the AER command and scheduling io_work, in order to fully prevent a race where this check is not reliable the error recovery work must flush async_event_work before continuing to destroy the admin queue after setting the ctrl state to RESETTING such that there is no race .submit_async_event and the error recovery handler itself changing the ctrl state. Tested-by: Chris Leech <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sagi Grimberg <[email protected]>

While nvme_rdma_submit_async_event_work is checking the ctrl and queue state before preparing the AER command and scheduling io_work, in order to fully prevent a race where this check is not reliable the error recovery work must flush async_event_work before continuing to destroy the admin queue after setting the ctrl state to RESETTING such that there is no race .submit_async_event and the error recovery handler itself changing the ctrl state. Signed-off-by: Sagi Grimberg <[email protected]>

Refuse SIDA memops on guests which are not protected. For normal guests, the secure instruction data address designation, which determines the location we access, is not under control of KVM. Fixes: 19e1227 (KVM: S390: protvirt: Introduce instruction data area bounce buffer) Signed-off-by: Janis Schoetterl-Glausch <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]>

Kyle reported that rr[0] has started to malfunction on Comet Lake and later CPUs due to EFI starting to make use of CPL3 [1] and the PMU event filtering not distinguishing between regular CPL3 and SMM CPL3. Since this is a privilege violation, default disable SMM visibility where possible. Administrators wanting to observe SMM cycles can easily change this using the sysfs attribute while regular users don't have access to this file. [0] https://rr-project.org/ [1] See the Intel white paper "Trustworthy SMM on the Intel vPro Platform" at https://bugzilla.kernel.org/attachment.cgi?id=300300, particularly the end of page 5. Reported-by: Kyle Huey <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

The intent has always been that perf_event_attr::sig_data should also be modifiable along with PERF_EVENT_IOC_MODIFY_ATTRIBUTES, because it is observable by user space if SIGTRAP on events is requested. Currently only PERF_TYPE_BREAKPOINT is modifiable, and explicitly copies relevant breakpoint-related attributes in hw_breakpoint_copy_attr(). This misses copying perf_event_attr::sig_data. Since sig_data is not specific to PERF_TYPE_BREAKPOINT, introduce a helper to copy generic event-type-independent attributes on modification. Fixes: 97ba62b ("perf: Add support for SIGTRAP on perf events") Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

Test that PERF_EVENT_IOC_MODIFY_ATTRIBUTES correctly modifies perf_event_attr::sig_data as well. Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

…rchitectures Due to the alignment requirements of siginfo_t, as described in 3ddb3fd ("signal, perf: Fix siginfo_t by avoiding u64 on 32-bit architectures"), siginfo_t::si_perf_data is limited to an unsigned long. However, perf_event_attr::sig_data is an u64, to avoid having to deal with compat conversions. Due to being an u64, it may not immediately be clear to users that sig_data is truncated on 32 bit architectures. Add a comment to explicitly point this out, and hopefully help some users save time by not having to deduce themselves what's happening. Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

Add a check for !buf->single before calling pt_buffer_region_size in a place where a missing check can cause a kernel crash. Fixes a bug introduced by commit 6706384 ("perf/x86/intel/pt: Opportunistically use single range output mode"), which added a support for PT single-range output mode. Since that commit if a PT stop filter range is hit while tracing, the kernel will crash because of a null pointer dereference in pt_handle_status due to calling pt_buffer_region_size without a ToPA configured. The commit which introduced single-range mode guarded almost all uses of the ToPA buffer variables with checks of the buf->single variable, but missed the case where tracing was stopped by the PT hardware, which happens when execution hits a configured stop filter. Tested that hitting a stop filter while PT recording successfully records a trace with this patch but crashes without this patch. Fixes: 6706384 ("perf/x86/intel/pt: Opportunistically use single range output mode") Signed-off-by: Tristan Hume <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

In kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run() we enter an RCU extended quiescent state (EQS) by calling guest_enter_irqoff(), and unmask IRQs prior to exiting the EQS by calling guest_exit(). As the IRQ entry code will not wake RCU in this case, we may run the core IRQ code and IRQ handler without RCU watching, leading to various potential problems. Additionally, we do not inform lockdep or tracing that interrupts will be enabled during guest execution, which caan lead to misleading traces and warnings that interrupts have been enabled for overly-long periods. This patch fixes these issues by using the new timing and context entry/exit helpers to ensure that interrupts are handled during guest vtime but with RCU watching, with a sequence: guest_timing_enter_irqoff(); guest_state_enter_irqoff(); < run the vcpu > guest_state_exit_irqoff(); < take any pending IRQs > guest_timing_exit_irqoff(); Since instrumentation may make use of RCU, we must also ensure that no instrumented code is run during the EQS. I've split out the critical section into a new kvm_riscv_enter_exit_vcpu() helper which is marked noinstr. Fixes: 99cdc6c ("RISC-V: Add initial skeletal KVM support") Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Albert Ou <[email protected]> Cc: Anup Patel <[email protected]> Cc: Atish Patra <[email protected]> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <[email protected]> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <[email protected]> Cc: Paul Walmsley <[email protected]> Tested-by: Anup Patel <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <[email protected]>

Those applications that run in VU mode and access the time CSR cause a virtual instruction trap as Guest kernel currently does not initialize the scounteren CSR. To fix this, we should make CY, TM, and IR counters accessibile by default in VU mode (similar to OpenSBI). Fixes: a33c72f ("RISC-V: KVM: Implement VCPU create, init and destroy functions") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Mayuresh Chitale <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <[email protected]>

The SBI implementation version returned by KVM RISC-V should be the Host Linux version code. Fixes: c62a768 ("RISC-V: KVM: Add SBI v0.2 base extension") Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Atish Patra <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <[email protected]>

…from TODO list)" This reverts commit b3ec8cd. Revert the second (of 2) commits which disabled scrolling acceleration in fbcon/fbdev. It introduced a regression for fbdev-supported graphic cards because of the performance penalty by doing screen scrolling by software instead of using the existing graphic card 2D hardware acceleration. Console scrolling acceleration was disabled by dropping code which checked at runtime the driver hardware capabilities for the BINFO_HWACCEL_COPYAREA or FBINFO_HWACCEL_FILLRECT flags and if set, it enabled scrollmode SCROLL_MOVE which uses hardware acceleration to move screen contents. After dropping those checks scrollmode was hard-wired to SCROLL_REDRAW instead, which forces all graphic cards to redraw every character at the new screen position when scrolling. This change effectively disabled all hardware-based scrolling acceleration for ALL drivers, because now all kind of 2D hardware acceleration (bitblt, fillrect) in the drivers isn't used any longer. The original commit message mentions that only 3 DRM drivers (nouveau, omapdrm and gma500) used hardware acceleration in the past and thus code for checking and using scrolling acceleration is obsolete. This statement is NOT TRUE, because beside the DRM drivers there are around 35 other fbdev drivers which depend on fbdev/fbcon and still provide hardware acceleration for fbdev/fbcon. The original commit message also states that syzbot found lots of bugs in fbcon and thus it's "often the solution to just delete code and remove features". This is true, and the bugs - which actually affected all users of fbcon, including DRM - were fixed, or code was dropped like e.g. the support for software scrollback in vgacon (commit 973c096). So to further analyze which bugs were found by syzbot, I've looked through all patches in drivers/video which were tagged with syzbot or syzkaller back to year 2005. The vast majority fixed the reported issues on a higher level, e.g. when screen is to be resized, or when font size is to be changed. The few ones which touched driver code fixed a real driver bug, e.g. by adding a check. But NONE of those patches touched code of either the SCROLL_MOVE or the SCROLL_REDRAW case. That means, there was no real reason why SCROLL_MOVE had to be ripped-out and just SCROLL_REDRAW had to be used instead. The only reason I can imagine so far was that SCROLL_MOVE wasn't used by DRM and as such it was assumed that it could go away. That argument completely missed the fact that SCROLL_MOVE is still heavily used by fbdev (non-DRM) drivers. Some people mention that using memcpy() instead of the hardware acceleration is pretty much the same speed. But that's not true, at least not for older graphic cards and machines where we see speed decreases by factor 10 and more and thus this change leads to console responsiveness way worse than before. That's why the original commit is to be reverted. By reverting we reintroduce hardware-based scrolling acceleration and fix the performance regression for fbdev drivers. There isn't any impact on DRM when reverting those patches. Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <[email protected]> Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]> Acked-by: Sven Schnelle <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] # v5.16+ Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected]

This reverts commit 39aead8. Revert the first (of 2) commits which disabled scrolling acceleration in fbcon/fbdev. It introduced a regression for fbdev-supported graphic cards because of the performance penalty by doing screen scrolling by software instead of using the existing graphic card 2D hardware acceleration. Console scrolling acceleration was disabled by dropping code which checked at runtime the driver hardware capabilities for the BINFO_HWACCEL_COPYAREA or FBINFO_HWACCEL_FILLRECT flags and if set, it enabled scrollmode SCROLL_MOVE which uses hardware acceleration to move screen contents. After dropping those checks scrollmode was hard-wired to SCROLL_REDRAW instead, which forces all graphic cards to redraw every character at the new screen position when scrolling. This change effectively disabled all hardware-based scrolling acceleration for ALL drivers, because now all kind of 2D hardware acceleration (bitblt, fillrect) in the drivers isn't used any longer. The original commit message mentions that only 3 DRM drivers (nouveau, omapdrm and gma500) used hardware acceleration in the past and thus code for checking and using scrolling acceleration is obsolete. This statement is NOT TRUE, because beside the DRM drivers there are around 35 other fbdev drivers which depend on fbdev/fbcon and still provide hardware acceleration for fbdev/fbcon. The original commit message also states that syzbot found lots of bugs in fbcon and thus it's "often the solution to just delete code and remove features". This is true, and the bugs - which actually affected all users of fbcon, including DRM - were fixed, or code was dropped like e.g. the support for software scrollback in vgacon (commit 973c096). So to further analyze which bugs were found by syzbot, I've looked through all patches in drivers/video which were tagged with syzbot or syzkaller back to year 2005. The vast majority fixed the reported issues on a higher level, e.g. when screen is to be resized, or when font size is to be changed. The few ones which touched driver code fixed a real driver bug, e.g. by adding a check. But NONE of those patches touched code of either the SCROLL_MOVE or the SCROLL_REDRAW case. That means, there was no real reason why SCROLL_MOVE had to be ripped-out and just SCROLL_REDRAW had to be used instead. The only reason I can imagine so far was that SCROLL_MOVE wasn't used by DRM and as such it was assumed that it could go away. That argument completely missed the fact that SCROLL_MOVE is still heavily used by fbdev (non-DRM) drivers. Some people mention that using memcpy() instead of the hardware acceleration is pretty much the same speed. But that's not true, at least not for older graphic cards and machines where we see speed decreases by factor 10 and more and thus this change leads to console responsiveness way worse than before. That's why the original commit is to be reverted. By reverting we reintroduce hardware-based scrolling acceleration and fix the performance regression for fbdev drivers. There isn't any impact on DRM when reverting those patches. Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <[email protected]> Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]> Acked-by: Sven Schnelle <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] # v5.10+ Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected]

Add a config option CONFIG_FRAMEBUFFER_CONSOLE_LEGACY_ACCELERATION to enable bitblt and fillrect hardware acceleration in the framebuffer console. If disabled, such acceleration will not be used, even if it is supported by the graphics hardware driver. If you plan to use DRM as your main graphics output system, you should disable this option since it will prevent compiling in code which isn't used later on when DRM takes over. For all other configurations, e.g. if none of your graphic cards support DRM (yet), DRM isn't available for your architecture, or you can't be sure that the graphic card in the target system will support DRM, you most likely want to enable this option. In the non-accelerated case (e.g. when DRM is used), the inlined fb_scrollmode() function is hardcoded to return SCROLL_REDRAW and as such the compiler is able to optimize much unneccesary code away. In this v3 patch version I additionally changed the GETVYRES() and GETVXRES() macros to take a pointer to the fbcon_display struct. This fixes the build when console rotation is enabled and helps the compiler again to optimize out code. Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] # v5.10+ Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected]

Commit ceaa762 ("block: move direct_IO into our own read_iter handler") introduced several regressions for bdev DIO: 1. read spanning EOF always returns 0 instead of the number of bytes read. This is because "count" is assigned early and isn't updated when the iterator is truncated: $ lsblk -o name,size /dev/vdb NAME SIZE vdb 1G $ xfs_io -d -c 'pread -b 4M 1021M 4M' /dev/vdb read 0/4194304 bytes at offset 1070596096 0.000000 bytes, 0 ops; 0.0007 sec (0.000000 bytes/sec and 0.0000 ops/sec) instead of $ xfs_io -d -c 'pread -b 4M 1021M 4M' /dev/vdb read 3145728/4194304 bytes at offset 1070596096 3 MiB, 1 ops; 0.0007 sec (3.865 GiB/sec and 1319.2612 ops/sec) 2. truncated iterator isn't reexpanded 3. iterator isn't reverted on blkdev_direct_IO() error 4. zero size read no longer skips atime update Fixes: ceaa762 ("block: move direct_IO into our own read_iter handler") Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>

into HEAD KVM/riscv fixes for 5.17, take #1 - Rework guest entry logic - Make CY, TM, and IR counters accessible in VU mode - Fix SBI implementation version

If we're doing an uncached read of the directory, then we ideally want to read only the exact set of entries that will fit in the buffer supplied by the getdents() system call. So unlike the case where we're reading into the page cache, let's send only one READDIR call, before trying to fill up the buffer. Fixes: 35df59d ("NFS: Reduce number of RPC calls when doing uncached readdir") Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <[email protected]>

Ensure that we initialise desc->cache_entry_index correctly in uncached_readdir(). Fixes: d1bacf9 ("NFS: add readdir cache array") Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <[email protected]>

If we've reached the end of the directory, then cache that information in the context so that we don't need to do an uncached readdir in order to rediscover that fact. Fixes: 794092c ("NFS: Do uncached readdir when we're seeking a cookie in an empty page cache") Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <[email protected]>

audit_log_start() returns audit_buffer pointer on success or NULL on error, so it is better to check the return value of it. Fixes: 3323eec ("integrity: IMA as an integrity service provider") Signed-off-by: Xiaoke Wang <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>

The removal of ima_dir currently fails since ima_policy still exists, so remove the ima_policy file before removing the directory. Fixes: 4af4662 ("integrity: IMA policy") Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>

Commit c2426d2 ("ima: added support for new kernel cmdline parameter ima_template_fmt") introduced an additional check on the ima_template variable to avoid multiple template selection. Unfortunately, ima_template could be also set by the setup function of the ima_hash= parameter, when it calls ima_template_desc_current(). This causes attempts to choose a new template with ima_template= or with ima_template_fmt=, after ima_hash=, to be ignored. Achieve the goal of the commit mentioned with the new static variable template_setup_done, so that template selection requests after ima_hash= are not ignored. Finally, call ima_init_template_list(), if not already done, to initialize the list of templates before lookup_template_desc() is called. Reported-by: Guo Zihua <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Fixes: c2426d2 ("ima: added support for new kernel cmdline parameter ima_template_fmt") Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>

Before printing a policy rule scan for inactive LSM labels in the policy rule. Inactive LSM labels are identified by args_p != NULL and rule == NULL. Fixes: 483ec26 ("ima: ima/lsm policy rule loading logic bug fixes") Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> # v5.6+ Acked-by: Christian Brauner <[email protected]> [[email protected]: Updated "Fixes" tag] Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>

The recv path of secure mode is intertwined with that of crc mode. While it's slightly more efficient that way (the ciphertext is read into the destination buffer and decrypted in place, thus avoiding two potentially heavy memory allocations for the bounce buffer and the corresponding sg array), it isn't really amenable to changes. Sacrifice that edge and align with the send path which always uses a full-sized bounce buffer (currently there is no other way -- if the kernel crypto API ever grows support for streaming (piecewise) en/decryption for GCM [1], we would be able to easily take advantage of that on both sides). [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>

Both msgr1 and msgr2 in crc mode are zero copy in the sense that message data is read from the socket directly into the destination buffer. We assume that the destination buffer is stable (i.e. remains unchanged while it is being read to) though. Otherwise, CRC errors ensue: libceph: read_partial_message 0000000048edf8ad data crc 1063286393 != exp. 228122706 libceph: osd1 (1)192.168.122.1:6843 bad crc/signature libceph: bad data crc, calculated 57958023, expected 1805382778 libceph: osd2 (2)192.168.122.1:6876 integrity error, bad crc Introduce rxbounce option to enable use of a bounce buffer when receiving message data. In particular this is needed if a mapped image is a Windows VM disk, passed to QEMU. Windows has a system-wide "dummy" page that may be mapped into the destination buffer (potentially more than once into the same buffer) by the Windows Memory Manager in an effort to generate a single large I/O [1][2]. QEMU makes a point of preserving overlap relationships when cloning I/O vectors, so krbd gets exposed to this behaviour. [1] "What Is Really in That MDL?" https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/hardware/design/dn614012(v=vs.85) [2] https://blogs.msmvps.com/kernelmustard/2005/05/04/dummy-pages/ URL: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1973317 Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>

We're missing the `f` prefix to have python do string interpolation, so we'd never end up printing what the actual "unexpected" error is. Fixes: ee92ed3 ("kunit: add run_checks.py script to validate kunit changes") Signed-off-by: Daniel Latypov <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Gow <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Brendan Higgins <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <[email protected]>

Leon reported NULL pointer deref with nowait support: [ 15.123761] device-mapper: raid: Loading target version 1.15.1 [ 15.124185] device-mapper: raid: Ignoring chunk size parameter for RAID 1 [ 15.124192] device-mapper: raid: Choosing default region size of 4MiB [ 15.129524] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000060 [ 15.129530] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode [ 15.129533] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page [ 15.129535] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 15.129538] Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ 15.129541] CPU: 5 PID: 494 Comm: ldmtool Not tainted 5.17.0-rc2-1-mainline #1 9fe89d43dfcb215d2731e6f8851740520778615e [ 15.129546] Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. X570 AORUS ELITE/X570 AORUS ELITE, BIOS F36e 10/14/2021 [ 15.129549] RIP: 0010:blk_queue_flag_set+0x7/0x20 [ 15.129555] Code: 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8b 35 e4 e0 04 02 48 8d 57 28 bf 40 01 \ 00 00 e9 16 c1 be ff 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 89 ff <f0> 48 0f ab 7e 60 \ 31 f6 89 f7 c3 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 [ 15.129559] RSP: 0018:ffff966b81987a88 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 15.129562] RAX: ffff8b11c363a0d0 RBX: ffff8b11e294b070 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 15.129564] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 000000000000001d [ 15.129566] RBP: ffff8b11e294b058 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 15.129568] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8b11e294b070 [ 15.129570] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8b11e294b000 R15: 0000000000000001 [ 15.129572] FS: 00007fa96e826780(0000) GS:ffff8b18deb40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 15.129575] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 15.129577] CR2: 0000000000000060 CR3: 000000010b8ce000 CR4: 00000000003506e0 [ 15.129580] Call Trace: [ 15.129582] <TASK> [ 15.129584] md_run+0x67c/0xc70 [md_mod 1e470c1b6bcf1114198109f42682f5a2740e9531] [ 15.129597] raid_ctr+0x134a/0x28ea [dm_raid 6a645dd7519e72834bd7e98c23497eeade14cd63] [ 15.129604] ? dm_split_args+0x63/0x150 [dm_mod 0d7b0bc3414340a79c4553bae5ca97294b78336e] [ 15.129615] dm_table_add_target+0x188/0x380 [dm_mod 0d7b0bc3414340a79c4553bae5ca97294b78336e] [ 15.129625] table_load+0x13b/0x370 [dm_mod 0d7b0bc3414340a79c4553bae5ca97294b78336e] [ 15.129635] ? dev_suspend+0x2d0/0x2d0 [dm_mod 0d7b0bc3414340a79c4553bae5ca97294b78336e] [ 15.129644] ctl_ioctl+0x1bd/0x460 [dm_mod 0d7b0bc3414340a79c4553bae5ca97294b78336e] [ 15.129655] dm_ctl_ioctl+0xa/0x20 [dm_mod 0d7b0bc3414340a79c4553bae5ca97294b78336e] [ 15.129663] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8e/0xd0 [ 15.129667] do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x90 [ 15.129672] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x23/0x50 [ 15.129675] ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90 [ 15.129677] ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90 [ 15.129679] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x23/0x50 [ 15.129682] ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90 [ 15.129684] ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90 [ 15.129686] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 15.129689] RIP: 0033:0x7fa96ecd559b [ 15.129692] Code: ff ff ff 85 c0 79 9b 49 c7 c4 ff ff ff ff 5b 5d 4c 89 e0 41 5c \ c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff \ ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d a5 a8 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 15.129696] RSP: 002b:00007ffcaf85c258 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 [ 15.129699] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fa96f1b48f0 RCX: 00007fa96ecd559b [ 15.129701] RDX: 00007fa97017e610 RSI: 00000000c138fd09 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 15.129702] RBP: 00007fa96ebab583 R08: 00007fa97017c9e0 R09: 00007ffcaf85bf27 [ 15.129704] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007fa97017e610 [ 15.129706] R13: 00007fa97017e640 R14: 00007fa97017e6c0 R15: 00007fa97017e530 [ 15.129709] </TASK> This is caused by missing mddev->queue check for setting QUEUE_FLAG_NOWAIT Fix this by moving the QUEUE_FLAG_NOWAIT logic to under mddev->queue check. Fixes: f51d46d ("md: add support for REQ_NOWAIT") Reported-by: Leon Möller <[email protected]> Tested-by: Leon Möller <[email protected]> Cc: Vishal Verma <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Song Liu <[email protected]>

This will be used to help make decisions on what to do in misconfigured systems. v2: squash in semicolon fix from Stephen Rothwell Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>

The following crash is observed while handling an IOMMU fault with a recent kernel: kernel tried to execute NX-protected page - exploit attempt? (uid: 0) BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff8c708299f700 PGD 19ee01067 P4D 19ee01067 PUD 101c10063 PMD 80000001028001e3 Oops: Oops: 0011 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 139 Comm: irq/25-AMD-Vi Not tainted 6.15.0-rc1+ #20 PREEMPT(lazy) Hardware name: LENOVO 21D0/LNVNB161216, BIOS J6CN50WW 09/27/2024 RIP: 0010:0xffff8c708299f700 Call Trace: <TASK> ? report_iommu_fault+0x78/0xd3 ? amd_iommu_report_page_fault+0x91/0x150 ? amd_iommu_int_thread+0x77/0x180 ? __pfx_irq_thread_fn+0x10/0x10 ? irq_thread_fn+0x23/0x60 ? irq_thread+0xf9/0x1e0 ? __pfx_irq_thread_dtor+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_irq_thread+0x10/0x10 ? kthread+0xfc/0x240 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ? ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ? ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> report_iommu_fault() checks for an installed handler comparing the corresponding field to NULL. It can (and could before) be called for a domain with a different cookie type - IOMMU_COOKIE_DMA_IOVA, specifically. Cookie is represented as a union so we may end up with a garbage value treated there if this happens for a domain with another cookie type. Formerly there were two exclusive cookie types in the union. IOMMU_DOMAIN_SVA has a dedicated iommu_report_device_fault(). Call the fault handler only if the passed domain has a required cookie type. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org). Fixes: 6aa63a4 ("iommu: Sort out domain user data") Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>

When testing a special config: CONFIG_NETFS_SUPPORTS=y CONFIG_PROC_FS=n The system crashes with something like: [ 3.766197] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 3.766484] kernel BUG at mm/mempool.c:560! [ 3.766789] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 3.767123] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W [ 3.767777] Tainted: [W]=WARN [ 3.767968] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), [ 3.768523] RIP: 0010:mempool_alloc_slab.cold+0x17/0x19 [ 3.768847] Code: 50 fe ff 58 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f e9 93 95 13 00 [ 3.769977] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000013998 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 3.770315] RAX: 000000000000002f RBX: ffff888100ba8640 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 3.770749] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000003 RDI: 00000000ffffffff [ 3.771217] RBP: 0000000000092880 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc90000013828 [ 3.771664] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 00000000ffffffea R12: 0000000000092cc0 [ 3.772117] R13: 0000000000000400 R14: ffff8881004b1620 R15: ffffea0004ef7e40 [ 3.772554] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8881b5f3c000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 3.773061] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 3.773443] CR2: ffffffff830901b4 CR3: 0000000004296001 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 [ 3.773884] PKRU: 55555554 [ 3.774058] Call Trace: [ 3.774232] <TASK> [ 3.774371] mempool_alloc_noprof+0x6a/0x190 [ 3.774649] ? _printk+0x57/0x80 [ 3.774862] netfs_alloc_request+0x85/0x2ce [ 3.775147] netfs_readahead+0x28/0x170 [ 3.775395] read_pages+0x6c/0x350 [ 3.775623] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 3.775928] page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x1bd/0x2a0 [ 3.776247] filemap_get_pages+0x139/0x970 [ 3.776510] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 3.776820] filemap_read+0xf9/0x580 [ 3.777054] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 3.777368] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 3.777674] ? find_held_lock+0x32/0x90 [ 3.777929] ? netfs_start_io_read+0x19/0x70 [ 3.778221] ? netfs_start_io_read+0x19/0x70 [ 3.778489] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 3.778800] ? lock_acquired+0x1e6/0x450 [ 3.779054] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 3.779379] netfs_buffered_read_iter+0x57/0x80 [ 3.779670] __kernel_read+0x158/0x2c0 [ 3.779927] bprm_execve+0x300/0x7a0 [ 3.780185] kernel_execve+0x10c/0x140 [ 3.780423] ? __pfx_kernel_init+0x10/0x10 [ 3.780690] kernel_init+0xd5/0x150 [ 3.780910] ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50 [ 3.781156] ? __pfx_kernel_init+0x10/0x10 [ 3.781414] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 3.781677] </TASK> [ 3.781823] Modules linked in: [ 3.782065] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- This is caused by the following error path in netfs_init(): if (!proc_mkdir("fs/netfs", NULL)) goto error_proc; Fix this by adding ifdef in netfs_main(), so that /proc/fs/netfs is only created with CONFIG_PROC_FS. Signed-off-by: Song Liu <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/[email protected] Acked-by: David Howells <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>

As shown in [1], it is possible to corrupt a BPF ELF file such that arbitrary BPF instructions are loaded by libbpf. This can be done by setting a symbol (BPF program) section offset to a large (unsigned) number such that <section start + symbol offset> overflows and points before the section data in the memory. Consider the situation below where: - prog_start = sec_start + symbol_offset <-- size_t overflow here - prog_end = prog_start + prog_size prog_start sec_start prog_end sec_end | | | | v v v v .....................|################################|............ The report in [1] also provides a corrupted BPF ELF which can be used as a reproducer: $ readelf -S crash Section Headers: [Nr] Name Type Address Offset Size EntSize Flags Link Info Align ... [ 2] uretprobe.mu[...] PROGBITS 0000000000000000 00000040 0000000000000068 0000000000000000 AX 0 0 8 $ readelf -s crash Symbol table '.symtab' contains 8 entries: Num: Value Size Type Bind Vis Ndx Name ... 6: ffffffffffffffb8 104 FUNC GLOBAL DEFAULT 2 handle_tp Here, the handle_tp prog has section offset ffffffffffffffb8, i.e. will point before the actual memory where section 2 is allocated. This is also reported by AddressSanitizer: ================================================================= ==1232==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7c7302fe0000 at pc 0x7fc3046e4b77 bp 0x7ffe64677cd0 sp 0x7ffe64677490 READ of size 104 at 0x7c7302fe0000 thread T0 #0 0x7fc3046e4b76 in memcpy (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe4b76) #1 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__init_prog /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:856 #2 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__add_programs /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:928 #3 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__elf_collect /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3930 #4 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object_open /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8067 #5 0x00000040f176 in bpf_object__open_file /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8090 #6 0x000000400c16 in main /poc/poc.c:8 #7 0x7fc3043d25b4 in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x35b4) #8 0x7fc3043d2667 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x3667) #9 0x000000400b34 in _start (/poc/poc+0x400b34) 0x7c7302fe0000 is located 64 bytes before 104-byte region [0x7c7302fe0040,0x7c7302fe00a8) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7fc3046e716b in malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe716b) #1 0x7fc3045ee600 in __libelf_set_rawdata_wrlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xb600) #2 0x7fc3045ef018 in __elf_getdata_rdlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xc018) #3 0x00000040642f in elf_sec_data /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3740 The problem here is that currently, libbpf only checks that the program end is within the section bounds. There used to be a check `while (sec_off < sec_sz)` in bpf_object__add_programs, however, it was removed by commit 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program sections to support overriden weak functions"). Add a check for detecting the overflow of `sec_off + prog_sz` to bpf_object__init_prog to fix this issue. [1] https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md Reported-by: lmarch2 <[email protected]> Link: https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md Fixes: 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program sections to support overriden weak functions") Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <[email protected]>

As shown in [1], it is possible to corrupt a BPF ELF file such that arbitrary BPF instructions are loaded by libbpf. This can be done by setting a symbol (BPF program) section offset to a large (unsigned) number such that <section start + symbol offset> overflows and points before the section data in the memory. Consider the situation below where: - prog_start = sec_start + symbol_offset <-- size_t overflow here - prog_end = prog_start + prog_size prog_start sec_start prog_end sec_end | | | | v v v v .....................|################################|............ The report in [1] also provides a corrupted BPF ELF which can be used as a reproducer: $ readelf -S crash Section Headers: [Nr] Name Type Address Offset Size EntSize Flags Link Info Align ... [ 2] uretprobe.mu[...] PROGBITS 0000000000000000 00000040 0000000000000068 0000000000000000 AX 0 0 8 $ readelf -s crash Symbol table '.symtab' contains 8 entries: Num: Value Size Type Bind Vis Ndx Name ... 6: ffffffffffffffb8 104 FUNC GLOBAL DEFAULT 2 handle_tp Here, the handle_tp prog has section offset ffffffffffffffb8, i.e. will point before the actual memory where section 2 is allocated. This is also reported by AddressSanitizer: ================================================================= ==1232==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7c7302fe0000 at pc 0x7fc3046e4b77 bp 0x7ffe64677cd0 sp 0x7ffe64677490 READ of size 104 at 0x7c7302fe0000 thread T0 #0 0x7fc3046e4b76 in memcpy (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe4b76) #1 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__init_prog /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:856 #2 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__add_programs /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:928 #3 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__elf_collect /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3930 #4 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object_open /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8067 #5 0x00000040f176 in bpf_object__open_file /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8090 #6 0x000000400c16 in main /poc/poc.c:8 #7 0x7fc3043d25b4 in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x35b4) #8 0x7fc3043d2667 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x3667) #9 0x000000400b34 in _start (/poc/poc+0x400b34) 0x7c7302fe0000 is located 64 bytes before 104-byte region [0x7c7302fe0040,0x7c7302fe00a8) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7fc3046e716b in malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe716b) #1 0x7fc3045ee600 in __libelf_set_rawdata_wrlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xb600) #2 0x7fc3045ef018 in __elf_getdata_rdlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xc018) #3 0x00000040642f in elf_sec_data /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3740 The problem here is that currently, libbpf only checks that the program end is within the section bounds. There used to be a check `while (sec_off < sec_sz)` in bpf_object__add_programs, however, it was removed by commit 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program sections to support overriden weak functions"). Add a check for detecting the overflow of `sec_off + prog_sz` to bpf_object__init_prog to fix this issue. [1] https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md Fixes: 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program sections to support overriden weak functions") Reported-by: lmarch2 <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <[email protected]> Link: https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]

[BUG] There is a syzbot report that the ASSERT() inside write_dev_supers() got triggered: assertion failed: folio_order(folio) == 0, in fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:3858 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:3858! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 6730 Comm: syz-executor378 Not tainted 6.14.0-syzkaller-03565-gf6e0150b2003 #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:write_dev_supers fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:3858 [inline] RIP: 0010:write_all_supers+0x400f/0x4090 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:4155 Call Trace: <TASK> btrfs_commit_transaction+0x1eda/0x3750 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:2528 btrfs_quota_enable+0xfcc/0x21a0 fs/btrfs/qgroup.c:1226 btrfs_ioctl_quota_ctl+0x144/0x1c0 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3677 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:906 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xf1/0x160 fs/ioctl.c:892 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f5ad1f20289 </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [CAUSE] Since commit f93ee0d ("btrfs: convert super block writes to folio in write_dev_supers()") and commit c94b734 ("btrfs: convert super block writes to folio in wait_dev_supers()"), the super block writeback path is converted to use folio. Since the original code is using page based interfaces, we have an "ASSERT(folio_order(folio) == 0);" added to make sure everything is not changed. But the folio here is not from any btrfs inode, but from the block device, and we have no control on the folio order in bdev, the device can choose whatever folio size they want/need. E.g. the bdev may even have a block size of multiple pages. So the ASSERT() is triggered. [FIX] The super block writeback path has taken larger folios into consideration, so there is no need for the ASSERT(). And since commit bc00965 ("btrfs: count super block write errors in device instead of tracking folio error state"), the wait path no longer checks the folio status but only wait for the folio writeback to finish, there is nothing requiring the ASSERT() either. So we can remove both ASSERT()s safely now. Reported-by: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>

After ieee80211_do_stop() SKB from vif's txq could still be processed. Indeed another concurrent vif schedule_and_wake_txq call could cause those packets to be dequeued (see ieee80211_handle_wake_tx_queue()) without checking the sdata current state. Because vif.drv_priv is now cleared in this function, this could lead to driver crash. For example in ath12k, ahvif is store in vif.drv_priv. Thus if ath12k_mac_op_tx() is called after ieee80211_do_stop(), ahvif->ah can be NULL, leading the ath12k_warn(ahvif->ah,...) call in this function to trigger the NULL deref below. Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address dfffffc000000001 KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f] batman_adv: bat0: Interface deactivated: brbh1337 Mem abort info: ESR = 0x0000000096000004 EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000 CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 [dfffffc000000001] address between user and kernel address ranges Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] SMP CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 978 Comm: lbd Not tainted 6.13.0-g633f875b8f1e #114 Hardware name: HW (DT) pstate: 10000005 (nzcV daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : ath12k_mac_op_tx+0x6cc/0x29b8 [ath12k] lr : ath12k_mac_op_tx+0x174/0x29b8 [ath12k] sp : ffffffc086ace450 x29: ffffffc086ace450 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 1ffffff810d59ca4 x26: ffffff801d05f7c0 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 000000004000001e x23: ffffff8009ce4926 x22: ffffff801f9c0800 x21: ffffff801d05f7f0 x20: ffffff8034a19f40 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: ffffff801f9c0958 x17: ffffff800bc0a504 x16: dfffffc000000000 x15: ffffffc086ace4f8 x14: ffffff801d05f83c x13: 0000000000000000 x12: ffffffb003a0bf03 x11: 0000000000000000 x10: ffffffb003a0bf02 x9 : ffffff8034a19f40 x8 : ffffff801d05f818 x7 : 1ffffff0069433dc x6 : ffffff8034a19ee0 x5 : ffffff801d05f7f0 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000001 x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : dfffffc000000000 x0 : 0000000000000008 Call trace: ath12k_mac_op_tx+0x6cc/0x29b8 [ath12k] (P) ieee80211_handle_wake_tx_queue+0x16c/0x260 ieee80211_queue_skb+0xeec/0x1d20 ieee80211_tx+0x200/0x2c8 ieee80211_xmit+0x22c/0x338 __ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0x7e8/0xc60 ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0xc4/0xee0 __ieee80211_subif_start_xmit_8023.isra.0+0x854/0x17a0 ieee80211_subif_start_xmit_8023+0x124/0x488 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x160/0x5a8 __dev_queue_xmit+0x6f8/0x3120 br_dev_queue_push_xmit+0x120/0x4a8 __br_forward+0xe4/0x2b0 deliver_clone+0x5c/0xd0 br_flood+0x398/0x580 br_dev_xmit+0x454/0x9f8 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x160/0x5a8 __dev_queue_xmit+0x6f8/0x3120 ip6_finish_output2+0xc28/0x1b60 __ip6_finish_output+0x38c/0x638 ip6_output+0x1b4/0x338 ip6_local_out+0x7c/0xa8 ip6_send_skb+0x7c/0x1b0 ip6_push_pending_frames+0x94/0xd0 rawv6_sendmsg+0x1a98/0x2898 inet_sendmsg+0x94/0xe0 __sys_sendto+0x1e4/0x308 __arm64_sys_sendto+0xc4/0x140 do_el0_svc+0x110/0x280 el0_svc+0x20/0x60 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x104/0x138 el0t_64_sync+0x154/0x158 To avoid that, empty vif's txq at ieee80211_do_stop() so no packet could be dequeued after ieee80211_do_stop() (new packets cannot be queued because SDATA_STATE_RUNNING is cleared at this point). Fixes: ba8c3d6 ("mac80211: add an intermediate software queue implementation") Signed-off-by: Remi Pommarel <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/ff7849e268562456274213c0476e09481a48f489.1742833382.git.repk@triplefau.lt Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>

SMC consists of two sockets: smc_sock and kernel TCP socket. Currently, there are two ways of creating the sockets, and syzbot reported a lockdep splat [0] for the newer way introduced by commit d25a92c ("net/smc: Introduce IPPROTO_SMC"). socket(AF_SMC , SOCK_STREAM, SMCPROTO_SMC or SMCPROTO_SMC6) socket(AF_INET or AF_INET6, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_SMC) When a socket is allocated, sock_lock_init() sets a lockdep lock class to sk->sk_lock.slock based on its protocol family. In the IPPROTO_SMC case, AF_INET or AF_INET6 lock class is assigned to smc_sock. The repro sets IPV6_JOIN_ANYCAST for IPv6 UDP and SMC socket and exercises smc_switch_to_fallback() for IPPROTO_SMC. 1. smc_switch_to_fallback() is called under lock_sock() and holds smc->clcsock_release_lock. sk_lock-AF_INET6 -> &smc->clcsock_release_lock (sk_lock-AF_SMC) 2. Setting IPV6_JOIN_ANYCAST to SMC holds smc->clcsock_release_lock and calls setsockopt() for the kernel TCP socket, which holds RTNL and the kernel socket's lock_sock(). &smc->clcsock_release_lock -> rtnl_mutex (-> k-sk_lock-AF_INET6) 3. Setting IPV6_JOIN_ANYCAST to UDP holds RTNL and lock_sock(). rtnl_mutex -> sk_lock-AF_INET6 Then, lockdep detects a false-positive circular locking, .-> sk_lock-AF_INET6 -> &smc->clcsock_release_lock -> rtnl_mutex -. `-----------------------------------------------------------------' but IPPROTO_SMC should have the same locking rule as AF_SMC. sk_lock-AF_SMC -> &smc->clcsock_release_lock -> rtnl_mutex -> k-sk_lock-AF_INET6 Let's set the same lock class for smc_sock. Given AF_SMC uses the same lock class for SMCPROTO_SMC and SMCPROTO_SMC6, we do not need to separate the class for AF_INET and AF_INET6. [0]: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.14.0-rc3-syzkaller-00267-gff202c5028a1 #0 Not tainted syz.4.1528/11571 is trying to acquire lock: ffffffff8fef8de8 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: ipv6_sock_ac_close+0xd9/0x110 net/ipv6/anycast.c:220 but task is already holding lock: ffff888027f596a8 (&smc->clcsock_release_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: smc_clcsock_release+0x75/0xe0 net/smc/smc_close.c:30 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (&smc->clcsock_release_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x19b/0xb10 kernel/locking/mutex.c:730 smc_switch_to_fallback+0x2d/0xa00 net/smc/af_smc.c:903 smc_sendmsg+0x13d/0x520 net/smc/af_smc.c:2781 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:718 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:733 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0xaaf/0xc90 net/socket.c:2573 ___sys_sendmsg+0x135/0x1e0 net/socket.c:2627 __sys_sendmsg+0x16e/0x220 net/socket.c:2659 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #1 (sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.}-{0:0}: lock_sock_nested+0x3a/0xf0 net/core/sock.c:3645 lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1624 [inline] sockopt_lock_sock net/core/sock.c:1133 [inline] sockopt_lock_sock+0x54/0x70 net/core/sock.c:1124 do_ipv6_setsockopt+0x2160/0x4520 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:567 ipv6_setsockopt+0xcb/0x170 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:993 udpv6_setsockopt+0x7d/0xd0 net/ipv6/udp.c:1850 do_sock_setsockopt+0x222/0x480 net/socket.c:2303 __sys_setsockopt+0x1a0/0x230 net/socket.c:2328 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2334 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2331 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xbd/0x160 net/socket.c:2331 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3163 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3282 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3906 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x249e/0x3c40 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5228 lock_acquire.part.0+0x11b/0x380 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5851 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x19b/0xb10 kernel/locking/mutex.c:730 ipv6_sock_ac_close+0xd9/0x110 net/ipv6/anycast.c:220 inet6_release+0x47/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:485 __sock_release net/socket.c:647 [inline] sock_release+0x8e/0x1d0 net/socket.c:675 smc_clcsock_release+0xb7/0xe0 net/smc/smc_close.c:34 __smc_release+0x5c2/0x880 net/smc/af_smc.c:301 smc_release+0x1fc/0x5f0 net/smc/af_smc.c:344 __sock_release+0xb0/0x270 net/socket.c:647 sock_close+0x1c/0x30 net/socket.c:1398 __fput+0x3ff/0xb70 fs/file_table.c:464 task_work_run+0x14e/0x250 kernel/task_work.c:227 resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:50 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:114 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/entry-common.h:329 [inline] __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:207 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x27b/0x2a0 kernel/entry/common.c:218 do_syscall_64+0xda/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:89 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: rtnl_mutex --> sk_lock-AF_INET6 --> &smc->clcsock_release_lock Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&smc->clcsock_release_lock); lock(sk_lock-AF_INET6); lock(&smc->clcsock_release_lock); lock(rtnl_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by syz.4.1528/11571: #0: ffff888077e88208 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#10){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:877 [inline] #0: ffff888077e88208 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#10){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __sock_release+0x86/0x270 net/socket.c:646 #1: ffff888027f596a8 (&smc->clcsock_release_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: smc_clcsock_release+0x75/0xe0 net/smc/smc_close.c:30 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 11571 Comm: syz.4.1528 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc3-syzkaller-00267-gff202c5028a1 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/12/2025 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x116/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_circular_bug+0x490/0x760 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2076 check_noncircular+0x31a/0x400 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2208 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3163 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3282 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3906 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x249e/0x3c40 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5228 lock_acquire.part.0+0x11b/0x380 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5851 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x19b/0xb10 kernel/locking/mutex.c:730 ipv6_sock_ac_close+0xd9/0x110 net/ipv6/anycast.c:220 inet6_release+0x47/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:485 __sock_release net/socket.c:647 [inline] sock_release+0x8e/0x1d0 net/socket.c:675 smc_clcsock_release+0xb7/0xe0 net/smc/smc_close.c:34 __smc_release+0x5c2/0x880 net/smc/af_smc.c:301 smc_release+0x1fc/0x5f0 net/smc/af_smc.c:344 __sock_release+0xb0/0x270 net/socket.c:647 sock_close+0x1c/0x30 net/socket.c:1398 __fput+0x3ff/0xb70 fs/file_table.c:464 task_work_run+0x14e/0x250 kernel/task_work.c:227 resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:50 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:114 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/entry-common.h:329 [inline] __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:207 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x27b/0x2a0 kernel/entry/common.c:218 do_syscall_64+0xda/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:89 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f8b4b38d169 Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffe4efd22d8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000001b4 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00000000000b14a3 RCX: 00007f8b4b38d169 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000001e RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007f8b4b5a7ba0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 000000114efd25cf R10: 00007f8b4b200000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f8b4b5a5fac R13: 00007f8b4b5a5fa0 R14: ffffffffffffffff R15: 00007ffe4efd23f0 </TASK> Fixes: d25a92c ("net/smc: Introduce IPPROTO_SMC") Reported-by: [email protected] Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=be6f4b383534d88989f7 Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Wenjia Zhang <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

When i2c-cros-ec-tunnel and the EC driver are built-in, the EC parent device will not be found, leading to NULL pointer dereference. That can also be reproduced by unbinding the controller driver and then loading i2c-cros-ec-tunnel module (or binding the device). [ 271.991245] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000058 [ 271.998215] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 272.003351] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 272.008485] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 272.011022] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 272.015207] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 3859 Comm: insmod Tainted: G S 6.15.0-rc1-00004-g44722359ed83 #30 PREEMPT(full) 3c7fb39a552e7d949de2ad921a7d6588d3a4fdc5 [ 272.030312] Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC [ 272.034233] Hardware name: HP Berknip/Berknip, BIOS Google_Berknip.13434.356.0 05/17/2021 [ 272.042400] RIP: 0010:ec_i2c_probe+0x2b/0x1c0 [i2c_cros_ec_tunnel] [ 272.048577] Code: 1f 44 00 00 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 53 48 83 ec 10 65 48 8b 05 06 a0 6c e7 48 89 44 24 08 4c 8d 7f 10 48 8b 47 50 4c 8b 60 78 <49> 83 7c 24 58 00 0f 84 2f 01 00 00 48 89 fb be 30 06 00 00 4c 9 [ 272.067317] RSP: 0018:ffffa32082a03940 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 272.072541] RAX: ffff969580b6a810 RBX: ffff969580b68c10 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 272.079672] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000282 RDI: ffff969580b68c00 [ 272.086804] RBP: 00000000fffffdfb R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 272.093936] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffffc0600000 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 272.101067] R13: ffffffffa666fbb8 R14: ffffffffc05b5528 R15: ffff969580b68c10 [ 272.108198] FS: 00007b930906fc40(0000) GS:ffff969603149000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 272.116282] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 272.122024] CR2: 0000000000000058 CR3: 000000012631c000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 [ 272.129155] Call Trace: [ 272.131606] <TASK> [ 272.133709] ? acpi_dev_pm_attach+0xdd/0x110 [ 272.137985] platform_probe+0x69/0xa0 [ 272.141652] really_probe+0x152/0x310 [ 272.145318] __driver_probe_device+0x77/0x110 [ 272.149678] driver_probe_device+0x1e/0x190 [ 272.153864] __driver_attach+0x10b/0x1e0 [ 272.157790] ? driver_attach+0x20/0x20 [ 272.161542] bus_for_each_dev+0x107/0x150 [ 272.165553] bus_add_driver+0x15d/0x270 [ 272.169392] driver_register+0x65/0x110 [ 272.173232] ? cleanup_module+0xa80/0xa80 [i2c_cros_ec_tunnel 3a00532f3f4af4a9eade753f86b0f8dd4e4e5698] [ 272.182617] do_one_initcall+0x110/0x350 [ 272.186543] ? security_kernfs_init_security+0x49/0xd0 [ 272.191682] ? __kernfs_new_node+0x1b9/0x240 [ 272.195954] ? security_kernfs_init_security+0x49/0xd0 [ 272.201093] ? __kernfs_new_node+0x1b9/0x240 [ 272.205365] ? kernfs_link_sibling+0x105/0x130 [ 272.209810] ? kernfs_next_descendant_post+0x1c/0xa0 [ 272.214773] ? kernfs_activate+0x57/0x70 [ 272.218699] ? kernfs_add_one+0x118/0x160 [ 272.222710] ? __kernfs_create_file+0x71/0xa0 [ 272.227069] ? sysfs_add_bin_file_mode_ns+0xd6/0x110 [ 272.232033] ? internal_create_group+0x453/0x4a0 [ 272.236651] ? __vunmap_range_noflush+0x214/0x2d0 [ 272.241355] ? __free_frozen_pages+0x1dc/0x420 [ 272.245799] ? free_vmap_area_noflush+0x10a/0x1c0 [ 272.250505] ? load_module+0x1509/0x16f0 [ 272.254431] do_init_module+0x60/0x230 [ 272.258181] __se_sys_finit_module+0x27a/0x370 [ 272.262627] do_syscall_64+0x6a/0xf0 [ 272.266206] ? do_syscall_64+0x76/0xf0 [ 272.269956] ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x79/0x90 [ 272.274836] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x55/0x5d [ 272.279887] RIP: 0033:0x7b9309168d39 [ 272.283466] Code: 5b 41 5c 5d c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d af 40 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 8 [ 272.302210] RSP: 002b:00007fff50f1a288 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139 [ 272.309774] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000058bf9b50f6d0 RCX: 00007b9309168d39 [ 272.316905] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000058bf6c103a77 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 272.324036] RBP: 00007fff50f1a2e0 R08: 00007fff50f19218 R09: 0000000021ec4150 [ 272.331166] R10: 000058bf9b50f7f0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 272.338296] R13: 00000000fffffffe R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 000058bf6c103a77 [ 272.345428] </TASK> [ 272.347617] Modules linked in: i2c_cros_ec_tunnel(+) [ 272.364585] gsmi: Log Shutdown Reason 0x03 Returning -EPROBE_DEFER will allow the device to be bound once the controller is bound, in the case of built-in drivers. Fixes: 9d230c9 ("i2c: ChromeOS EC tunnel driver") Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> # v3.16+ Signed-off-by: Andi Shyti <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

ktest recently reported crashes while running several buffered io tests with __alloc_tagging_slab_alloc_hook() at the top of the crash call stack. The signature indicates an invalid address dereference with low bits of slab->obj_exts being set. The bits were outside of the range used by page_memcg_data_flags and objext_flags and hence were not masked out by slab_obj_exts() when obtaining the pointer stored in slab->obj_exts. The typical crash log looks like this: 00510 Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000010 00510 Mem abort info: 00510 ESR = 0x0000000096000045 00510 EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits 00510 SET = 0, FnV = 0 00510 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 00510 FSC = 0x05: level 1 translation fault 00510 Data abort info: 00510 ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000045, ISS2 = 0x00000000 00510 CM = 0, WnR = 1, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 00510 GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 00510 user pgtable: 4k pages, 39-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000104175000 00510 [0000000000000010] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000, pud=0000000000000000 00510 Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000045 [#1] SMP 00510 Modules linked in: 00510 CPU: 10 UID: 0 PID: 7692 Comm: cat Not tainted 6.15.0-rc1-ktest-g189e17946605 #19327 NONE 00510 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) 00510 pstate: 20001005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT +SSBS BTYPE=--) 00510 pc : __alloc_tagging_slab_alloc_hook+0xe0/0x190 00510 lr : __kmalloc_noprof+0x150/0x310 00510 sp : ffffff80c87df6c0 00510 x29: ffffff80c87df6c0 x28: 000000000013d1ff x27: 000000000013d200 00510 x26: ffffff80c87df9e0 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000001 00510 x23: ffffffc08041953c x22: 000000000000004c x21: ffffff80c0002180 00510 x20: fffffffec3120840 x19: ffffff80c4821000 x18: 0000000000000000 00510 x17: fffffffec3d02f00 x16: fffffffec3d02e00 x15: fffffffec3d00700 00510 x14: fffffffec3d00600 x13: 0000000000000200 x12: 0000000000000006 00510 x11: ffffffc080bb86c0 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : ffffffc080201e58 00510 x8 : ffffff80c4821060 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000055555556 00510 x5 : 0000000000000001 x4 : 0000000000000010 x3 : 0000000000000060 00510 x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffffffc080f50cf8 x0 : ffffff80d801d000 00510 Call trace: 00510 __alloc_tagging_slab_alloc_hook+0xe0/0x190 (P) 00510 __kmalloc_noprof+0x150/0x310 00510 __bch2_folio_create+0x5c/0xf8 00510 bch2_folio_create+0x2c/0x40 00510 bch2_readahead+0xc0/0x460 00510 read_pages+0x7c/0x230 00510 page_cache_ra_order+0x244/0x3a8 00510 page_cache_async_ra+0x124/0x170 00510 filemap_readahead.isra.0+0x58/0xa0 00510 filemap_get_pages+0x454/0x7b0 00510 filemap_read+0xdc/0x418 00510 bch2_read_iter+0x100/0x1b0 00510 vfs_read+0x214/0x300 00510 ksys_read+0x6c/0x108 00510 __arm64_sys_read+0x20/0x30 00510 invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x54/0xe8 00510 do_el0_svc+0x44/0xc8 00510 el0_svc+0x18/0x58 00510 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x104/0x130 00510 el0t_64_sync+0x154/0x158 00510 Code: d5384100 f9401c01 b9401aa3 b40002e1 (f8227881) 00510 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- 00510 Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception 00510 SMP: stopping secondary CPUs 00510 Kernel Offset: disabled 00510 CPU features: 0x0000,000000e0,00000410,8240500b 00510 Memory Limit: none Investigation indicates that these bits are already set when we allocate slab page and are not zeroed out after allocation. We are not yet sure why these crashes start happening only recently but regardless of the reason, not initializing a field that gets used later is wrong. Fix it by initializing slab->obj_exts during slab page allocation. Fixes: 21c690a ("mm: introduce slabobj_ext to support slab object extensions") Reported-by: Kent Overstreet <[email protected]> Tested-by: Kent Overstreet <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <[email protected]> Acked-by: Kent Overstreet <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>

Running lib_ubsan.ko on arm64 (without CONFIG_UBSAN_TRAP) panics the kernel: [ 31.616546] Kernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: test_ubsan_out_of_bounds+0x158/0x158 [test_ubsan] [ 31.646817] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 179 Comm: insmod Not tainted 6.15.0-rc2 #1 PREEMPT [ 31.648153] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) [ 31.648970] Call trace: [ 31.649345] show_stack+0x18/0x24 (C) [ 31.650960] dump_stack_lvl+0x40/0x84 [ 31.651559] dump_stack+0x18/0x24 [ 31.652264] panic+0x138/0x3b4 [ 31.652812] __ktime_get_real_seconds+0x0/0x10 [ 31.653540] test_ubsan_load_invalid_value+0x0/0xa8 [test_ubsan] [ 31.654388] init_module+0x24/0xff4 [test_ubsan] [ 31.655077] do_one_initcall+0xd4/0x280 [ 31.655680] do_init_module+0x58/0x2b4 That happens because the test corrupts other data in the stack: 400: d5384108 mrs x8, sp_el0 404: f9426d08 ldr x8, [x8, #1240] 408: f85f83a9 ldur x9, [x29, #-8] 40c: eb09011f cmp x8, x9 410: 54000301 b.ne 470 <test_ubsan_out_of_bounds+0x154> // b.any As there is no guarantee the compiler will order the local variables as declared in the module: volatile char above[4] = { }; /* Protect surrounding memory. */ volatile int arr[4]; volatile char below[4] = { }; /* Protect surrounding memory. */ There is another problem where the out-of-bound index is 5 which is larger than the extra surrounding memory for protection. So, use a struct to enforce the ordering, and fix the index to be 4. Also, remove some of the volatiles and rely on OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR() Signed-off-by: Mostafa Saleh <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>

Ido Schimmel says: ==================== fib_rules: Fix iif / oif matching on L3 master device Patch #1 fixes a recently reported regression regarding FIB rules that match on iif / oif being a VRF device. Patch #2 adds test cases to the FIB rules selftest. ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

…pages Alison reports an issue with fsdax when large extends end up using large ZONE_DEVICE folios: [ 417.796271] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000b00 [ 417.796982] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 417.797540] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 417.798123] PGD 2a5c5067 P4D 2a5c5067 PUD 2a5c6067 PMD 0 [ 417.798690] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 417.799178] CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 1515 Comm: mmap Tainted: ... [ 417.800150] Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE [ 417.800583] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 [ 417.801358] RIP: 0010:__lruvec_stat_mod_folio+0x7e/0x250 [ 417.801948] Code: ... [ 417.803662] RSP: 0000:ffffc90002be3a08 EFLAGS: 00010206 [ 417.804234] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000200 RCX: 0000000000000002 [ 417.804984] RDX: ffffffff815652d7 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffffff82a2beae [ 417.805689] RBP: ffffc90002be3a28 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 417.806384] R10: ffffea0007000040 R11: ffff888376ffe000 R12: 0000000000000001 [ 417.807099] R13: 0000000000000012 R14: ffff88807fe4ab40 R15: ffff888029210580 [ 417.807801] FS: 00007f339fa7a740(0000) GS:ffff8881fa9b9000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 417.808570] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 417.809193] CR2: 0000000000000b00 CR3: 000000002a4f0004 CR4: 0000000000370ef0 [ 417.809925] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 417.810622] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 417.811353] Call Trace: [ 417.811709] <TASK> [ 417.812038] folio_add_file_rmap_ptes+0x143/0x230 [ 417.812566] insert_page_into_pte_locked+0x1ee/0x3c0 [ 417.813132] insert_page+0x78/0xf0 [ 417.813558] vmf_insert_page_mkwrite+0x55/0xa0 [ 417.814088] dax_fault_iter+0x484/0x7b0 [ 417.814542] dax_iomap_pte_fault+0x1ca/0x620 [ 417.815055] dax_iomap_fault+0x39/0x40 [ 417.815499] __xfs_write_fault+0x139/0x380 [ 417.815995] ? __handle_mm_fault+0x5e5/0x1a60 [ 417.816483] xfs_write_fault+0x41/0x50 [ 417.816966] xfs_filemap_fault+0x3b/0xe0 [ 417.817424] __do_fault+0x31/0x180 [ 417.817859] __handle_mm_fault+0xee1/0x1a60 [ 417.818325] ? debug_smp_processor_id+0x17/0x20 [ 417.818844] handle_mm_fault+0xe1/0x2b0 [...] The issue is that when we split a large ZONE_DEVICE folio to order-0 ones, we don't reset the order/_nr_pages. As folio->_nr_pages overlays page[1]->memcg_data, once page[1] is a folio, it suddenly looks like it has folio->memcg_data set. And we never manually initialize folio->memcg_data in fsdax code, because we never expect it to be set at all. When __lruvec_stat_mod_folio() then stumbles over such a folio, it tries to use folio->memcg_data (because it's non-NULL) but it does not actually point at a memcg, resulting in the problem. Alison also observed that these folios sometimes have "locked" set, which is rather concerning (folios locked from the beginning ...). The reason is that the order for large folios is stored in page[1]->flags, which become the folio->flags of a new small folio. Let's fix it by adding a folio helper to clear order/_nr_pages for splitting purposes. Maybe we should reinitialize other large folio flags / folio members as well when splitting, because they might similarly cause harm once page[1] becomes a folio? At least other flags in PAGE_FLAGS_SECOND should not be set for fsdax, so at least page[1]->flags might be as expected with this fix. From a quick glimpse, initializing ->mapping, ->pgmap and ->share should re-initialize most things from a previous page[1] used by large folios that fsdax cares about. For example folio->private might not get reinitialized, but maybe that's not relevant -- no traces of it's use in fsdax code. Needs a closer look. Another thing that should be considered in the future is performing similar checks as we perform in free_tail_page_prepare() -- checking pincount etc. -- when freeing a large fsdax folio. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: 4996fc5 ("mm: let _folio_nr_pages overlay memcg_data in first tail page") Fixes: 38607c6 ("fs/dax: properly refcount fs dax pages") Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Reported-by: Alison Schofield <[email protected]> Closes: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Tested-by: Alison Schofield <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <[email protected]> Tested-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Viro <[email protected]> Cc: Christian Brauner <[email protected]> Cc: Jan Kara <[email protected]> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]> Cc: Alistair Popple <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>

Communicating with the hypervisor using the shared GHCB page requires clearing the C bit in the mapping of that page. When executing in the context of the EFI boot services, the page tables are owned by the firmware, and this manipulation is not possible. So switch to a different API for accepting memory in SEV-SNP guests, one which is actually supported at the point during boot where the EFI stub may need to accept memory, but the SEV-SNP init code has not executed yet. For simplicity, also switch the memory acceptance carried out by the decompressor when not booting via EFI - this only involves the allocation for the decompressed kernel, and is generally only called after kexec, as normal boot will jump straight into the kernel from the EFI stub. Fixes: 6c32117 ("x86/sev: Add SNP-specific unaccepted memory support") Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: Dionna Amalie Glaze <[email protected]> Cc: Kevin Loughlin <[email protected]> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]> Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] # discussion thread #1 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] # discussion thread #2 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] # final submission

There was a bug report about a NULL pointer dereference in __btrfs_add_free_space_zoned() that ultimately happens because a conversion from the default metadata profile DUP to a RAID1 profile on two disks. The stack trace has the following signature: BTRFS error (device sdc): zoned: write pointer offset mismatch of zones in raid1 profile BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000058 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI RIP: 0010:__btrfs_add_free_space_zoned.isra.0+0x61/0x1a0 RSP: 0018:ffffa236b6f3f6d0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff96c8132f3400 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: 0000000010000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff96c8132f3410 RBP: 0000000010000000 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 00000000ffffffff R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff96c758f65a40 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 000011aac0000000 FS: 00007fdab1cb2900(0000) GS:ffff96e60ca00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000058 CR3: 00000001a05ae000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die_body.cold+0x19/0x27 ? page_fault_oops+0x15c/0x2f0 ? exc_page_fault+0x7e/0x180 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 ? __btrfs_add_free_space_zoned.isra.0+0x61/0x1a0 btrfs_add_free_space_async_trimmed+0x34/0x40 btrfs_add_new_free_space+0x107/0x120 btrfs_make_block_group+0x104/0x2b0 btrfs_create_chunk+0x977/0xf20 btrfs_chunk_alloc+0x174/0x510 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f btrfs_inc_block_group_ro+0x1b1/0x230 btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x9e/0x410 btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x3f/0x130 btrfs_balance+0x8ac/0x12b0 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x14c/0x3e0 btrfs_ioctl+0x2686/0x2a80 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? ioctl_has_perm.constprop.0.isra.0+0xd2/0x120 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x97/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x82/0x160 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? __memcg_slab_free_hook+0x11a/0x170 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? kmem_cache_free+0x3f0/0x450 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x10/0x210 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x160 ? sysfs_emit+0xaf/0xc0 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? seq_read_iter+0x207/0x460 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? vfs_read+0x29c/0x370 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x10/0x210 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x160 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? exc_page_fault+0x7e/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7fdab1e0ca6d RSP: 002b:00007ffeb2b60c80 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007fdab1e0ca6d RDX: 00007ffeb2b60d80 RSI: 00000000c4009420 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007ffeb2b60cd0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000013 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ffeb2b6343b R14: 00007ffeb2b60d80 R15: 0000000000000001 </TASK> CR2: 0000000000000058 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- The 1st line is the most interesting here: BTRFS error (device sdc): zoned: write pointer offset mismatch of zones in raid1 profile When a RAID1 block-group is created and a write pointer mismatch between the disks in the RAID set is detected, btrfs sets the alloc_offset to the length of the block group marking it as full. Afterwards the code expects that a balance operation will evacuate the data in this block-group and repair the problems. But before this is possible, the new space of this block-group will be accounted in the free space cache. But in __btrfs_add_free_space_zoned() it is being checked if it is a initial creation of a block group and if not a reclaim decision will be made. But the decision if a block-group's free space accounting is done for an initial creation depends on if the size of the added free space is the whole length of the block-group and the allocation offset is 0. But as btrfs_load_block_group_zone_info() sets the allocation offset to the zone capacity (i.e. marking the block-group as full) this initial decision is not met, and the space_info pointer in the 'struct btrfs_block_group' has not yet been assigned. Fail creation of the block group and rely on manual user intervention to re-balance the filesystem. Afterwards the filesystem can be unmounted, mounted in degraded mode and the missing device can be removed after a full balance of the filesystem. Reported-by: 西木野羰基 <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/CAB_b4sBhDe3tscz=duVyhc9hNE+gu=B8CrgLO152uMyanR8BEA@mail.gmail.com/ Fixes: b1934cd ("btrfs: zoned: handle broken write pointer on zones") Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>

If we have a failure at create_reloc_inode(), under the 'out' label we assign an error pointer to the 'inode' variable and then return a weird pointer because we return the expression "&inode->vfs_inode": static noinline_for_stack struct inode *create_reloc_inode( const struct btrfs_block_group *group) { (...) out: (...) if (ret) { if (inode) iput(&inode->vfs_inode); inode = ERR_PTR(ret); } return &inode->vfs_inode; } This can make us return a pointer that is not an error pointer and make the caller proceed as if an error didn't happen and later result in an invalid memory access when dereferencing the inode pointer. Syzbot reported reported such a case with the following stack trace: R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 431bde82d7b634db R15: 00007ffc55de5790 </TASK> BTRFS info (device loop0): relocating block group 6881280 flags data|metadata Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000045: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000228-0x000000000000022f] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5332 Comm: syz-executor215 Not tainted 6.14.0-syzkaller-13423-ga8662bcd2ff1 #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:relocate_file_extent_cluster+0xe7/0x1750 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:2971 Code: 00 74 08 (...) RSP: 0018:ffffc9000d3375e0 EFLAGS: 00010203 RAX: 0000000000000045 RBX: 000000000000022c RCX: ffff888000562440 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8880452db000 RBP: ffffc9000d337870 R08: ffffffff84089251 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: dffffc0000000000 R13: ffffffff9368a020 R14: 0000000000000394 R15: ffff8880452db000 FS: 000055558bc7b380(0000) GS:ffff88808c596000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000055a7a192e740 CR3: 0000000036e2e000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> relocate_block_group+0xa1e/0xd50 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:3657 btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x777/0xd80 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:4011 btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x12c/0x3b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:3511 __btrfs_balance+0x1a93/0x25e0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4292 btrfs_balance+0xbde/0x10c0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4669 btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x3f5/0x660 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3586 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:906 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xf1/0x160 fs/ioctl.c:892 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7fb4ef537dd9 Code: 28 00 00 (...) RSP: 002b:00007ffc55de5728 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffc55de5750 RCX: 00007fb4ef537dd9 RDX: 0000200000000440 RSI: 00000000c4009420 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 00007ffc55de54c6 R09: 00007ffc55de5770 R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 431bde82d7b634db R15: 00007ffc55de5790 </TASK> Modules linked in: ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:relocate_file_extent_cluster+0xe7/0x1750 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:2971 Code: 00 74 08 (...) RSP: 0018:ffffc9000d3375e0 EFLAGS: 00010203 RAX: 0000000000000045 RBX: 000000000000022c RCX: ffff888000562440 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8880452db000 RBP: ffffc9000d337870 R08: ffffffff84089251 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: dffffc0000000000 R13: ffffffff9368a020 R14: 0000000000000394 R15: ffff8880452db000 FS: 000055558bc7b380(0000) GS:ffff88808c596000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000055a7a192e740 CR3: 0000000036e2e000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 ---------------- Code disassembly (best guess): 0: 00 74 08 48 add %dh,0x48(%rax,%rcx,1) 4: 89 df mov %ebx,%edi 6: e8 f8 36 24 fe call 0xfe243703 b: 48 89 9c 24 30 01 00 mov %rbx,0x130(%rsp) 12: 00 13: 4c 89 74 24 28 mov %r14,0x28(%rsp) 18: 4d 8b 76 10 mov 0x10(%r14),%r14 1c: 49 8d 9e 98 fe ff ff lea -0x168(%r14),%rbx 23: 48 89 d8 mov %rbx,%rax 26: 48 c1 e8 03 shr $0x3,%rax * 2a: 42 80 3c 20 00 cmpb $0x0,(%rax,%r12,1) <-- trapping instruction 2f: 74 08 je 0x39 31: 48 89 df mov %rbx,%rdi 34: e8 ca 36 24 fe call 0xfe243703 39: 4c 8b 3b mov (%rbx),%r15 3c: 48 rex.W 3d: 8b .byte 0x8b 3e: 44 rex.R 3f: 24 .byte 0x24 So fix this by returning the error immediately. Reported-by: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/[email protected]/ Fixes: b204e5c ("btrfs: make btrfs_iget() return a btrfs inode instead") Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>

There is a potential deadlock if we do report zones in an IO context, detailed in below lockdep report. When one process do a report zones and another process freezes the block device, the report zones side cannot allocate a tag because the freeze is already started. This can thus result in new block group creation to hang forever, blocking the write path. Thankfully, a new block group should be created on empty zones. So, reporting the zones is not necessary and we can set the write pointer = 0 and load the zone capacity from the block layer using bdev_zone_capacity() helper. ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.14.0-rc1 #252 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ modprobe/1110 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888100ac83e0 ((work_completion)(&(&wb->dwork)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x38f/0xb60 but task is already holding lock: ffff8881205b6f20 (&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#16){++++}-{0:0}, at: sd_remove+0x85/0x130 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #3 (&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#16){++++}-{0:0}: blk_queue_enter+0x3d9/0x500 blk_mq_alloc_request+0x47d/0x8e0 scsi_execute_cmd+0x14f/0xb80 sd_zbc_do_report_zones+0x1c1/0x470 sd_zbc_report_zones+0x362/0xd60 blkdev_report_zones+0x1b1/0x2e0 btrfs_get_dev_zones+0x215/0x7e0 [btrfs] btrfs_load_block_group_zone_info+0x6d2/0x2c10 [btrfs] btrfs_make_block_group+0x36b/0x870 [btrfs] btrfs_create_chunk+0x147d/0x2320 [btrfs] btrfs_chunk_alloc+0x2ce/0xcf0 [btrfs] start_transaction+0xce6/0x1620 [btrfs] btrfs_uuid_scan_kthread+0x4ee/0x5b0 [btrfs] kthread+0x39d/0x750 ret_from_fork+0x30/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #2 (&fs_info->dev_replace.rwsem){++++}-{4:4}: down_read+0x9b/0x470 btrfs_map_block+0x2ce/0x2ce0 [btrfs] btrfs_submit_chunk+0x2d4/0x16c0 [btrfs] btrfs_submit_bbio+0x16/0x30 [btrfs] btree_write_cache_pages+0xb5a/0xf90 [btrfs] do_writepages+0x17f/0x7b0 __writeback_single_inode+0x114/0xb00 writeback_sb_inodes+0x52b/0xe00 wb_writeback+0x1a7/0x800 wb_workfn+0x12a/0xbd0 process_one_work+0x85a/0x1460 worker_thread+0x5e2/0xfc0 kthread+0x39d/0x750 ret_from_fork+0x30/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #1 (&fs_info->zoned_meta_io_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock+0x1aa/0x1360 btree_write_cache_pages+0x252/0xf90 [btrfs] do_writepages+0x17f/0x7b0 __writeback_single_inode+0x114/0xb00 writeback_sb_inodes+0x52b/0xe00 wb_writeback+0x1a7/0x800 wb_workfn+0x12a/0xbd0 process_one_work+0x85a/0x1460 worker_thread+0x5e2/0xfc0 kthread+0x39d/0x750 ret_from_fork+0x30/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&wb->dwork)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x2f52/0x5ea0 lock_acquire+0x1b1/0x540 __flush_work+0x3ac/0xb60 wb_shutdown+0x15b/0x1f0 bdi_unregister+0x172/0x5b0 del_gendisk+0x841/0xa20 sd_remove+0x85/0x130 device_release_driver_internal+0x368/0x520 bus_remove_device+0x1f1/0x3f0 device_del+0x3bd/0x9c0 __scsi_remove_device+0x272/0x340 scsi_forget_host+0xf7/0x170 scsi_remove_host+0xd2/0x2a0 sdebug_driver_remove+0x52/0x2f0 [scsi_debug] device_release_driver_internal+0x368/0x520 bus_remove_device+0x1f1/0x3f0 device_del+0x3bd/0x9c0 device_unregister+0x13/0xa0 sdebug_do_remove_host+0x1fb/0x290 [scsi_debug] scsi_debug_exit+0x17/0x70 [scsi_debug] __do_sys_delete_module.isra.0+0x321/0x520 do_syscall_64+0x93/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: (work_completion)(&(&wb->dwork)->work) --> &fs_info->dev_replace.rwsem --> &q->q_usage_counter(queue)#16 Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#16); lock(&fs_info->dev_replace.rwsem); lock(&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#16); lock((work_completion)(&(&wb->dwork)->work)); *** DEADLOCK *** 5 locks held by modprobe/1110: #0: ffff88811f7bc108 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x8f/0x520 #1: ffff8881022ee0e0 (&shost->scan_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: scsi_remove_host+0x20/0x2a0 #2: ffff88811b4c4378 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x8f/0x520 #3: ffff8881205b6f20 (&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#16){++++}-{0:0}, at: sd_remove+0x85/0x130 #4: ffffffffa3284360 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: __flush_work+0xda/0xb60 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1110 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 6.14.0-rc1 #252 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-3.fc41 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x6a/0x90 print_circular_bug.cold+0x1e0/0x274 check_noncircular+0x306/0x3f0 ? __pfx_check_noncircular+0x10/0x10 ? mark_lock+0xf5/0x1650 ? __pfx_check_irq_usage+0x10/0x10 ? lockdep_lock+0xca/0x1c0 ? __pfx_lockdep_lock+0x10/0x10 __lock_acquire+0x2f52/0x5ea0 ? __pfx___lock_acquire+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_mark_lock+0x10/0x10 lock_acquire+0x1b1/0x540 ? __flush_work+0x38f/0xb60 ? __pfx_lock_acquire+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10 ? mark_held_locks+0x94/0xe0 ? __flush_work+0x38f/0xb60 __flush_work+0x3ac/0xb60 ? __flush_work+0x38f/0xb60 ? __pfx_mark_lock+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx___flush_work+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_wq_barrier_func+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx___might_resched+0x10/0x10 ? mark_held_locks+0x94/0xe0 wb_shutdown+0x15b/0x1f0 bdi_unregister+0x172/0x5b0 ? __pfx_bdi_unregister+0x10/0x10 ? up_write+0x1ba/0x510 del_gendisk+0x841/0xa20 ? __pfx_del_gendisk+0x10/0x10 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x35/0x60 ? __pm_runtime_resume+0x79/0x110 sd_remove+0x85/0x130 device_release_driver_internal+0x368/0x520 ? kobject_put+0x5d/0x4a0 bus_remove_device+0x1f1/0x3f0 device_del+0x3bd/0x9c0 ? __pfx_device_del+0x10/0x10 __scsi_remove_device+0x272/0x340 scsi_forget_host+0xf7/0x170 scsi_remove_host+0xd2/0x2a0 sdebug_driver_remove+0x52/0x2f0 [scsi_debug] ? kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0xc0/0xf0 device_release_driver_internal+0x368/0x520 ? kobject_put+0x5d/0x4a0 bus_remove_device+0x1f1/0x3f0 device_del+0x3bd/0x9c0 ? __pfx_device_del+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx___mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x10/0x10 device_unregister+0x13/0xa0 sdebug_do_remove_host+0x1fb/0x290 [scsi_debug] scsi_debug_exit+0x17/0x70 [scsi_debug] __do_sys_delete_module.isra.0+0x321/0x520 ? __pfx___do_sys_delete_module.isra.0+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_slab_free_after_rcu_debug+0x10/0x10 ? kasan_save_stack+0x2c/0x50 ? kasan_record_aux_stack+0xa3/0xb0 ? __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0xc4/0xfb0 ? kmem_cache_free+0x3a0/0x590 ? __x64_sys_close+0x78/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x93/0x180 ? lock_is_held_type+0xd5/0x130 ? __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x3c0/0xfb0 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x78/0x100 ? __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x3c0/0xfb0 ? __pfx___call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x10/0x10 ? kmem_cache_free+0x3a0/0x590 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x16d/0x400 ? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x78/0x100 ? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180 ? __pfx___x64_sys_openat+0x10/0x10 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x16d/0x400 ? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x78/0x100 ? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7f436712b68b RSP: 002b:00007ffe9f1a8658 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005559b367fd80 RCX: 00007f436712b68b RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000800 RDI: 00005559b367fde8 RBP: 00007ffe9f1a8680 R08: 1999999999999999 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00007f43671a5fe0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ffe9f1a86b0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> Reported-by: Shin'ichiro Kawasaki <[email protected]> CC: <[email protected]> # 6.13+ Tested-by: Shin'ichiro Kawasaki <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Naohiro Aota <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>

It looks like GPUs are used after shutdown is invoked. Thus, breaking virtio gpu in the shutdown callback is not a good idea - guest hangs attempting to finish console drawing, with these warnings: [ 20.504464] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 568 at drivers/gpu/drm/virtio/virtgpu_vq.c:358 virtio_gpu_queue_ctrl_sgs+0x236/0x290 [virtio_gpu] [ 20.505685] Modules linked in: nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6 nft_reject nft_ct nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 rfkill ip_set nf_tables nfnetlink vfat fat intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common intel_uncore_frequency_common nfit libnvdimm kvm_intel kvm rapl iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support virtio_gpu virtio_dma_buf pcspkr drm_shmem_helper i2c_i801 drm_kms_helper lpc_ich i2c_smbus virtio_balloon joydev drm fuse xfs libcrc32c ahci libahci crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel libata virtio_net ghash_clmulni_intel net_failover virtio_blk failover serio_raw dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod [ 20.511847] CPU: 0 PID: 568 Comm: kworker/0:3 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W ------- --- 5.14.0-578.6675_1757216455.el9.x86_64 #1 [ 20.513157] Hardware name: Red Hat KVM/RHEL, BIOS edk2-20241117-3.el9 11/17/2024 [ 20.513918] Workqueue: events drm_fb_helper_damage_work [drm_kms_helper] [ 20.514626] RIP: 0010:virtio_gpu_queue_ctrl_sgs+0x236/0x290 [virtio_gpu] [ 20.515332] Code: 00 00 48 85 c0 74 0c 48 8b 78 08 48 89 ee e8 51 50 00 00 65 ff 0d 42 e3 74 3f 0f 85 69 ff ff ff 0f 1f 44 00 00 e9 5f ff ff ff <0f> 0b e9 3f ff ff ff 48 83 3c 24 00 74 0e 49 8b 7f 40 48 85 ff 74 [ 20.517272] RSP: 0018:ff34f0a8c0787ad8 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 20.517820] RAX: 00000000fffffffb RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000820 [ 20.518565] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ff34f0a8c0787be0 RDI: ff218bef03a26300 [ 20.519308] RBP: ff218bef03a26300 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ff218bef07224360 [ 20.520059] R10: 0000000000008dc0 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: ff218bef02630028 [ 20.520806] R13: ff218bef0263fb48 R14: ff218bef00cb8000 R15: ff218bef07224360 [ 20.521555] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ff218bef7ba00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 20.522397] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 20.522996] CR2: 000055ac4f7871c0 CR3: 000000010b9f2002 CR4: 0000000000771ef0 [ 20.523740] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 20.524477] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 20.525223] PKRU: 55555554 [ 20.525515] Call Trace: [ 20.525777] <TASK> [ 20.526003] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df [ 20.526464] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df [ 20.526925] ? virtio_gpu_queue_fenced_ctrl_buffer+0x82/0x2c0 [virtio_gpu] [ 20.527643] ? virtio_gpu_queue_ctrl_sgs+0x236/0x290 [virtio_gpu] [ 20.528282] ? __warn+0x7e/0xd0 [ 20.528621] ? virtio_gpu_queue_ctrl_sgs+0x236/0x290 [virtio_gpu] [ 20.529256] ? report_bug+0x100/0x140 [ 20.529643] ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x70 [ 20.530010] ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70 [ 20.530421] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20 [ 20.530862] ? virtio_gpu_queue_ctrl_sgs+0x236/0x290 [virtio_gpu] [ 20.531506] ? virtio_gpu_queue_ctrl_sgs+0x174/0x290 [virtio_gpu] [ 20.532148] virtio_gpu_queue_fenced_ctrl_buffer+0x82/0x2c0 [virtio_gpu] [ 20.532843] virtio_gpu_primary_plane_update+0x3e2/0x460 [virtio_gpu] [ 20.533520] drm_atomic_helper_commit_planes+0x108/0x320 [drm_kms_helper] [ 20.534233] drm_atomic_helper_commit_tail+0x45/0x80 [drm_kms_helper] [ 20.534914] commit_tail+0xd2/0x130 [drm_kms_helper] [ 20.535446] drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x11b/0x140 [drm_kms_helper] [ 20.536097] drm_atomic_commit+0xa4/0xe0 [drm] [ 20.536588] ? __pfx___drm_printfn_info+0x10/0x10 [drm] [ 20.537162] drm_atomic_helper_dirtyfb+0x192/0x270 [drm_kms_helper] [ 20.537823] drm_fbdev_shmem_helper_fb_dirty+0x43/0xa0 [drm_shmem_helper] [ 20.538536] drm_fb_helper_damage_work+0x87/0x160 [drm_kms_helper] [ 20.539188] process_one_work+0x194/0x380 [ 20.539612] worker_thread+0x2fe/0x410 [ 20.540007] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 20.540456] kthread+0xdd/0x100 [ 20.540791] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 20.541190] ret_from_fork+0x29/0x50 [ 20.541566] </TASK> [ 20.541802] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- It looks like the shutdown is called in the middle of console drawing, so we should either wait for it to finish, or let drm handle the shutdown. This patch implements this second option: Add an option for drivers to bypass the common break+reset handling. As DRM is careful to flush/synchronize outstanding buffers, it looks like GPU can just have a NOP there. Reviewed-by: Eric Auger <[email protected]> Tested-by: Eric Auger <[email protected]> Fixes: 8bd2fa0 ("virtio: break and reset virtio devices on device_shutdown()") Cc: Eric Auger <[email protected]> Cc: Jocelyn Falempe <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]> Message-Id: <8490dbeb6f79ed039e6c11d121002618972538a3.1744293540.git.mst@redhat.com>

…ssed-by-bridge' Amit Cohen says: ==================== bridge: Prevent unicast ARP/NS packets from being suppressed by bridge Currently, unicast ARP requests/NS packets are replied by bridge when suppression is enabled, then they are also forwarded, which results two replicas of ARP reply/NA - one from the bridge and second from the target. The purpose of ARP/ND suppression is to reduce flooding in the broadcast domain, which is not relevant for unicast packets. In addition, the use case of unicast ARP/NS is to poll a specific host, so it does not make sense to have the switch answer on behalf of the host. Forward ARP requests/NS packets and prevent the bridge from replying to them. Patch set overview: Patch #1 prevents unicast ARP/NS packets from being suppressed by bridge Patch #2 adds test cases for unicast ARP/NS with suppression enabled ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

Ido Schimmel says: ==================== vxlan: Convert FDB table to rhashtable The VXLAN driver currently stores FDB entries in a hash table with a fixed number of buckets (256), resulting in reduced performance as the number of entries grows. This patchset solves the issue by converting the driver to use rhashtable which maintains a more or less constant performance regardless of the number of entries. Measured transmitted packets per second using a single pktgen thread with varying number of entries when the transmitted packet always hits the default entry (worst case): Number of entries | Improvement ------------------|------------ 1k | +1.12% 4k | +9.22% 16k | +55% 64k | +585% 256k | +2460% The first patches are preparations for the conversion in the last patch. Specifically, the series is structured as follows: Patch #1 adds RCU read-side critical sections in the Tx path when accessing FDB entries. Targeting at net-next as I am not aware of any issues due to this omission despite the code being structured that way for a long time. Without it, traces will be generated when converting FDB lookup to rhashtable_lookup(). Patch #2-#5 simplify the creation of the default FDB entry (all-zeroes). Current code assumes that insertion into the hash table cannot fail, which will no longer be true with rhashtable. Patches #6-#10 add FDB entries to a linked list for entry traversal instead of traversing over them using the fixed size hash table which is removed in the last patch. Patches #11-#12 add wrappers for FDB lookup that make it clear when each should be used along with lockdep annotations. Needed as a preparation for rhashtable_lookup() that must be called from an RCU read-side critical section. Patch #13 treats dst cache initialization errors as non-fatal. See more info in the commit message. The current code happens to work because insertion into the fixed size hash table is slow enough for the per-CPU allocator to be able to create new chunks of per-CPU memory. Patch #14 adds an FDB key structure that includes the MAC address and source VNI. To be used as rhashtable key. Patch #15 does the conversion to rhashtable. ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>

Commit 03df156 ("xdp: double protect netdev->xdp_flags with netdev->lock") introduces the netdev lock to xdp_set_features_flag(). The change includes a _locked version of the method, as it is possible for a driver to have already acquired the netdev lock before calling this helper. However, the same applies to xdp_features_(set|clear)_redirect_flags(), which ends up calling the unlocked version of xdp_set_features_flags() leading to deadlocks in GVE, which grabs the netdev lock as part of its suspend, reset, and shutdown processes: [ 833.265543] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected [ 833.270949] 6.15.0-rc1 #6 Tainted: G E [ 833.276271] -------------------------------------------- [ 833.281681] systemd-shutdow/1 is trying to acquire lock: [ 833.287090] ffff949d2b148c68 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: xdp_set_features_flag+0x29/0x90 [ 833.295470] [ 833.295470] but task is already holding lock: [ 833.301400] ffff949d2b148c68 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: gve_shutdown+0x44/0x90 [gve] [ 833.309508] [ 833.309508] other info that might help us debug this: [ 833.316130] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 833.316130] [ 833.322142] CPU0 [ 833.324681] ---- [ 833.327220] lock(&dev->lock); [ 833.330455] lock(&dev->lock); [ 833.333689] [ 833.333689] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 833.333689] [ 833.339701] May be due to missing lock nesting notation [ 833.339701] [ 833.346582] 5 locks held by systemd-shutdow/1: [ 833.351205] #0: ffffffffa9c89130 (system_transition_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __se_sys_reboot+0xe6/0x210 [ 833.360695] #1: ffff93b399e5c1b8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: device_shutdown+0xb4/0x1f0 [ 833.369144] #2: ffff949d19a471b8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: device_shutdown+0xc2/0x1f0 [ 833.377603] #3: ffffffffa9eca050 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: gve_shutdown+0x33/0x90 [gve] [ 833.386138] #4: ffff949d2b148c68 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: gve_shutdown+0x44/0x90 [gve] Introduce xdp_features_(set|clear)_redirect_target_locked() versions which assume that the netdev lock has already been acquired before setting the XDP feature flag and update GVE to use the locked version. Fixes: 03df156 ("xdp: double protect netdev->xdp_flags with netdev->lock") Tested-by: Mina Almasry <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Harshitha Ramamurthy <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Joshua Washington <[email protected]> Acked-by: Stanislav Fomichev <[email protected]> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

for_each_present_section_nr() was introduced to add_boot_memory_block() by commit 61659ef ("drivers/base/memory: improve add_boot_memory_block()"). It causes unnecessary overhead when the present sections are really sparse. next_present_section_nr() called by the macro to find the next present section, which is far away from the spanning sections in the specified block. Too much time consumed by next_present_section_nr() in this case, which can lead to softlockup as observed by Aditya Gupta on IBM Power10 machine. watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#248 stuck for 22s! [swapper/248:1] Modules linked in: CPU: 248 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/248 Not tainted 6.15.0-rc1-next-20250408 #1 VOLUNTARY Hardware name: 9105-22A POWER10 (raw) 0x800200 opal:v7.1-107-gfda75d121942 PowerNV NIP: c00000000209218c LR: c000000002092204 CTR: 0000000000000000 REGS: c00040000418fa30 TRAP: 0900 Not tainted (6.15.0-rc1-next-20250408) MSR: 9000000002009033 <SF,HV,VEC,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 28000428 XER: 00000000 CFAR: 0000000000000000 IRQMASK: 0 GPR00: c000000002092204 c00040000418fcd0 c000000001b08100 0000000000000040 GPR04: 0000000000013e00 c000c03ffebabb00 0000000000c03fff c000400fff587f80 GPR08: 0000000000000000 00000000001196f7 0000000000000000 0000000028000428 GPR12: 0000000000000000 c000000002e80000 c00000000001007c 0000000000000000 GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR20: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR24: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR28: c000000002df7f70 0000000000013dc0 c0000000011dd898 0000000008000000 NIP [c00000000209218c] memory_dev_init+0x114/0x1e0 LR [c000000002092204] memory_dev_init+0x18c/0x1e0 Call Trace: [c00040000418fcd0] [c000000002092204] memory_dev_init+0x18c/0x1e0 (unreliable) [c00040000418fd50] [c000000002091348] driver_init+0x78/0xa4 [c00040000418fd70] [c0000000020063ac] kernel_init_freeable+0x22c/0x370 [c00040000418fde0] [c0000000000100a8] kernel_init+0x34/0x25c [c00040000418fe50] [c00000000000cd94] ret_from_kernel_user_thread+0x14/0x1c Avoid the overhead by folding for_each_present_section_nr() to the outer loop. add_boot_memory_block() is dropped after that. Fixes: 61659ef ("drivers/base/memory: improve add_boot_memory_block()") Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/[email protected] Reported-by: Aditya Gupta <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Gavin Shan <[email protected]> Acked-by: Oscar Salvador <[email protected]> Tested-by: Aditya Gupta <[email protected]> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

syzbot reported: tipc: Node number set to 1055423674 Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 6017 Comm: kworker/3:5 Not tainted 6.15.0-rc1-syzkaller-00246-g900241a5cc15 #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events tipc_net_finalize_work RIP: 0010:tipc_mon_reinit_self+0x11c/0x210 net/tipc/monitor.c:719 ... RSP: 0018:ffffc9000356fb68 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000000003ee87cba RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8dbc56a7 RDI: ffff88804c2cc010 RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000007 R13: fffffbfff2111097 R14: ffff88804ead8000 R15: ffff88804ead9010 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888097ab9000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000f720eb00 CR3: 000000000e182000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> tipc_net_finalize+0x10b/0x180 net/tipc/net.c:140 process_one_work+0x9cc/0x1b70 kernel/workqueue.c:3238 process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3319 [inline] worker_thread+0x6c8/0xf10 kernel/workqueue.c:3400 kthread+0x3c2/0x780 kernel/kthread.c:464 ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:153 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 </TASK> ... RIP: 0010:tipc_mon_reinit_self+0x11c/0x210 net/tipc/monitor.c:719 ... RSP: 0018:ffffc9000356fb68 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000000003ee87cba RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8dbc56a7 RDI: ffff88804c2cc010 RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000007 R13: fffffbfff2111097 R14: ffff88804ead8000 R15: ffff88804ead9010 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888097ab9000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000f720eb00 CR3: 000000000e182000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 There is a racing condition between workqueue created when enabling bearer and another thread created when disabling bearer right after that as follow: enabling_bearer | disabling_bearer --------------- | ---------------- tipc_disc_timeout() | { | bearer_disable() ... | { schedule_work(&tn->work); | tipc_mon_delete() ... | { } | ... | write_lock_bh(&mon->lock); | mon->self = NULL; | write_unlock_bh(&mon->lock); | ... | } tipc_net_finalize_work() | } { | ... | tipc_net_finalize() | { | ... | tipc_mon_reinit_self() | { | ... | write_lock_bh(&mon->lock); | mon->self->addr = tipc_own_addr(net); | write_unlock_bh(&mon->lock); | ... | } | ... | } | ... | } | 'mon->self' is set to NULL in disabling_bearer thread and dereferenced later in enabling_bearer thread. This commit fixes this issue by validating 'mon->self' before assigning node address to it. Reported-by: [email protected] Fixes: 46cb01e ("tipc: update mon's self addr when node addr generated") Signed-off-by: Tung Nguyen <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

Dave Hansen reports the following crash on a 32-bit system with CONFIG_HIGHMEM=y and CONFIG_X86_PAE=y: > 0xf75fe000 is the mem_map[] entry for the first page >4GB. It > obviously wasn't allocated, thus the oops. BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: f75fe000 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page *pdpt = 0000000002da2001 *pde = 000000000300c067 *pte = 0000000000000000 Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 6.15.0-rc1-00288-ge618ee89561b-dirty #311 PREEMPT(undef) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 EIP: __free_pages_core+0x3c/0x74 ... Call Trace: memblock_free_pages+0x11/0x2c memblock_free_all+0x2ce/0x3a0 mm_core_init+0xf5/0x320 start_kernel+0x296/0x79c i386_start_kernel+0xad/0xb0 startup_32_smp+0x151/0x154 The mem_map[] is allocated up to the end of ZONE_HIGHMEM which is defined by max_pfn. The bug was introduced by this recent commit: 6faea34 ("arch, mm: streamline HIGHMEM freeing") Previously, freeing of high memory was also clamped to the end of ZONE_HIGHMEM but after this change, memblock_free_all() tries to free memory above the of ZONE_HIGHMEM as well and that causes access to mem_map[] entries beyond the end of the memory map. To fix this, discard the memory after max_pfn from memblock on 32-bit systems so that core MM would be aware only of actually usable memory. Fixes: 6faea34 ("arch, mm: streamline HIGHMEM freeing") Reported-by: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Tested-by: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]> Cc: Davide Ciminaghi <[email protected]> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]> Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> Cc: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] # discussion and submission

A vmemmap altmap is a device-provided region used to provide backing storage for struct pages. For each namespace, the altmap should belong to that same namespace. If the namespaces are created unaligned, there is a chance that the section vmemmap start address could also be unaligned. If the section vmemmap start address is unaligned, the altmap page allocated from the current namespace might be used by the previous namespace also. During the free operation, since the altmap is shared between two namespaces, the previous namespace may detect that the page does not belong to its altmap and incorrectly assume that the page is a normal page. It then attempts to free the normal page, which leads to a kernel crash. Kernel attempted to read user page (18) - exploit attempt? (uid: 0) BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000018 Faulting instruction address: 0xc000000000530c7c Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries CPU: 32 PID: 2104 Comm: ndctl Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W NIP: c000000000530c7c LR: c000000000530e00 CTR: 0000000000007ffe REGS: c000000015e57040 TRAP: 0300 Tainted: G W MSR: 800000000280b033 <SF,VEC,VSX,EE,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 84482404 CFAR: c000000000530dfc DAR: 0000000000000018 DSISR: 40000000 IRQMASK: 0 GPR00: c000000000530e00 c000000015e572e0 c000000002c5cb00 c00c000101008040 GPR04: 0000000000000000 0000000000000007 0000000000000001 000000000000001f GPR08: 0000000000000005 0000000000000000 0000000000000018 0000000000002000 GPR12: c0000000001d2fb0 c0000060de6b0080 0000000000000000 c0000060dbf90020 GPR16: c00c000101008000 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 c000000125b20f00 GPR20: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 ffffffffffffffff c00c000101007fff GPR24: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR28: 0000000004040201 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 c00c000101008040 NIP [c000000000530c7c] get_pfnblock_flags_mask+0x7c/0xd0 LR [c000000000530e00] free_unref_page_prepare+0x130/0x4f0 Call Trace: free_unref_page+0x50/0x1e0 free_reserved_page+0x40/0x68 free_vmemmap_pages+0x98/0xe0 remove_pte_table+0x164/0x1e8 remove_pmd_table+0x204/0x2c8 remove_pud_table+0x1c4/0x288 remove_pagetable+0x1c8/0x310 vmemmap_free+0x24/0x50 section_deactivate+0x28c/0x2a0 __remove_pages+0x84/0x110 arch_remove_memory+0x38/0x60 memunmap_pages+0x18c/0x3d0 devm_action_release+0x30/0x50 release_nodes+0x68/0x140 devres_release_group+0x100/0x190 dax_pmem_compat_release+0x44/0x80 [dax_pmem_compat] device_for_each_child+0x8c/0x100 [dax_pmem_compat_remove+0x2c/0x50 [dax_pmem_compat] nvdimm_bus_remove+0x78/0x140 [libnvdimm] device_remove+0x70/0xd0 Another issue is that if there is no altmap, a PMD-sized vmemmap page will be allocated from RAM, regardless of the alignment of the section start address. If the section start address is not aligned to the PMD size, a VM_BUG_ON will be triggered when setting the PMD-sized page to page table. In this patch, we are aligning the section vmemmap start address to PAGE_SIZE. After alignment, the start address will not be part of the current namespace, and a normal page will be allocated for the vmemmap mapping of the current section. For the remaining sections, altmaps will be allocated. During the free operation, the normal page will be correctly freed. In the same way, a PMD_SIZE vmemmap page will be allocated only if the section start address is PMD_SIZE-aligned; otherwise, it will fall back to a PAGE-sized vmemmap allocation. Without this patch ================== NS1 start NS2 start _________________________________________________________ | NS1 | NS2 | --------------------------------------------------------- | Altmap| Altmap | .....|Altmap| Altmap | ........... | NS1 | NS1 | | NS2 | NS2 | In the above scenario, NS1 and NS2 are two namespaces. The vmemmap for NS1 comes from Altmap NS1, which belongs to NS1, and the vmemmap for NS2 comes from Altmap NS2, which belongs to NS2. The vmemmap start for NS2 is not aligned, so Altmap NS2 is shared by both NS1 and NS2. During the free operation in NS1, Altmap NS2 is not part of NS1's altmap, causing it to attempt to free an invalid page. With this patch =============== NS1 start NS2 start _________________________________________________________ | NS1 | NS2 | --------------------------------------------------------- | Altmap| Altmap | .....| Normal | Altmap | Altmap |....... | NS1 | NS1 | | Page | NS2 | NS2 | If the vmemmap start for NS2 is not aligned then we are allocating a normal page. NS1 and NS2 vmemmap will be freed correctly. Fixes: 368a059 ("powerpc/book3s64/vmemmap: switch radix to use a different vmemmap handling function") Co-developed-by: Ritesh Harjani (IBM) <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ritesh Harjani (IBM) <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Donet Tom <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/8f98ec2b442977c618f7256cec88eb17dde3f2b9.1741609795.git.donettom@linux.ibm.com

[BUG] There is a bug report that a syzbot reproducer can lead to the following busy inode at unmount time: BTRFS info (device loop1): last unmount of filesystem 1680000e-3c1e-4c46-84b6-56bd3909af50 VFS: Busy inodes after unmount of loop1 (btrfs) ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/super.c:650! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 48168 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 6.15.0-rc2-00471-g119009db2674 #2 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:generic_shutdown_super+0x2e9/0x390 fs/super.c:650 Call Trace: <TASK> kill_anon_super+0x3a/0x60 fs/super.c:1237 btrfs_kill_super+0x3b/0x50 fs/btrfs/super.c:2099 deactivate_locked_super+0xbe/0x1a0 fs/super.c:473 deactivate_super fs/super.c:506 [inline] deactivate_super+0xe2/0x100 fs/super.c:502 cleanup_mnt+0x21f/0x440 fs/namespace.c:1435 task_work_run+0x14d/0x240 kernel/task_work.c:227 resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:50 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:114 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/entry-common.h:329 [inline] __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:207 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x269/0x290 kernel/entry/common.c:218 do_syscall_64+0xd4/0x250 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:100 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f </TASK> [CAUSE] When btrfs_alloc_path() failed, btrfs_iget() directly returned without releasing the inode already allocated by btrfs_iget_locked(). This results the above busy inode and trigger the kernel BUG. [FIX] Fix it by calling iget_failed() if btrfs_alloc_path() failed. If we hit error inside btrfs_read_locked_inode(), it will properly call iget_failed(), so nothing to worry about. Although the iget_failed() cleanup inside btrfs_read_locked_inode() is a break of the normal error handling scheme, let's fix the obvious bug and backport first, then rework the error handling later. Reported-by: Penglei Jiang <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/[email protected]/ Fixes: 7c855e1 ("btrfs: remove conditional path allocation in btrfs_read_locked_inode()") CC: [email protected] # 6.13+ Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Penglei Jiang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>

A BUG was reported as below when CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP and try_verify_in_tasklet are enabled. [ 129.444685][ T934] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at drivers/md/dm-bufio.c:2421 [ 129.444723][ T934] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 934, name: kworker/1:4 [ 129.444740][ T934] preempt_count: 201, expected: 0 [ 129.444756][ T934] RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0 [ 129.444781][ T934] Preemption disabled at: [ 129.444789][ T934] [<ffffffd816231900>] shrink_work+0x21c/0x248 [ 129.445167][ T934] kernel BUG at kernel/sched/walt/walt_debug.c:16! [ 129.445183][ T934] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 129.445204][ T934] Skip md ftrace buffer dump for: 0x1609e0 [ 129.447348][ T934] CPU: 1 PID: 934 Comm: kworker/1:4 Tainted: G W OE 6.6.56-android15-8-o-g6f82312b30b9-debug #1 1400000003000000474e5500b3187743670464e8 [ 129.447362][ T934] Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. Parrot QRD, Alpha-M (DT) [ 129.447373][ T934] Workqueue: dm_bufio_cache shrink_work [ 129.447394][ T934] pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 129.447406][ T934] pc : android_rvh_schedule_bug+0x0/0x8 [sched_walt_debug] [ 129.447435][ T934] lr : __traceiter_android_rvh_schedule_bug+0x44/0x6c [ 129.447451][ T934] sp : ffffffc0843dbc90 [ 129.447459][ T934] x29: ffffffc0843dbc90 x28: ffffffffffffffff x27: 0000000000000c8b [ 129.447479][ T934] x26: 0000000000000040 x25: ffffff804b3d6260 x24: ffffffd816232b68 [ 129.447497][ T934] x23: ffffff805171c5b4 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffffffd816231900 [ 129.447517][ T934] x20: ffffff80306ba898 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: ffffffc084159030 [ 129.447535][ T934] x17: 00000000d2b5dd1f x16: 00000000d2b5dd1f x15: ffffffd816720358 [ 129.447554][ T934] x14: 0000000000000004 x13: ffffff89ef978000 x12: 0000000000000003 [ 129.447572][ T934] x11: ffffffd817a823c4 x10: 0000000000000202 x9 : 7e779c5735de9400 [ 129.447591][ T934] x8 : ffffffd81560d004 x7 : 205b5d3938373434 x6 : ffffffd8167397c8 [ 129.447610][ T934] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000001 x3 : ffffffc0843db9e0 [ 129.447629][ T934] x2 : 0000000000002f15 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000 [ 129.447647][ T934] Call trace: [ 129.447655][ T934] android_rvh_schedule_bug+0x0/0x8 [sched_walt_debug 1400000003000000474e550080cce8a8a78606b6] [ 129.447681][ T934] __might_resched+0x190/0x1a8 [ 129.447694][ T934] shrink_work+0x180/0x248 [ 129.447706][ T934] process_one_work+0x260/0x624 [ 129.447718][ T934] worker_thread+0x28c/0x454 [ 129.447729][ T934] kthread+0x118/0x158 [ 129.447742][ T934] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 129.447761][ T934] Code: ???????? ???????? ???????? d2b5dd1f (d4210000) [ 129.447772][ T934] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- dm_bufio_lock will call spin_lock_bh when try_verify_in_tasklet is enabled, and __scan will be called in atomic context. Fixes: 7cd3267 ("dm bufio: remove dm_bufio_cond_resched()") Signed-off-by: LongPing Wei <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]>

…NFIG_NET_NS=n. kernel test robot reported the splat below. [0] Before commit fed176b ("net: Add ops_undo_single for module load/unload."), if CONFIG_NET_NS=n, ops was linked to pernet_list only when init_net had not been initialised, and ops was unlinked from pernet_list only under the same condition. Let's say an ops is loaded before the init_net setup but unloaded after that. Then, the ops remains in pernet_list, which seems odd. The cited commit added ops_undo_single(), which calls list_add() for ops to link it to a temporary list, so a minor change was added to __register_pernet_operations() and __unregister_pernet_operations() under CONFIG_NET_NS=n to avoid the pernet_list corruption. However, the corruption must have been left as is. When CONFIG_NET_NS=n, pernet_list was used to keep ops registered before the init_net setup, and after that, pernet_list was not used at all. This was because some ops annotated with __net_initdata are cleared out of memory at some point during boot. Then, such ops is initialised by POISON_FREE_INITMEM (0xcc), resulting in that ops->list.{next,prev} suddenly switches from a valid pointer to a weird value, 0xcccccccccccccccc. To avoid such wild memory access, let's allow the pernet_list corruption for CONFIG_NET_NS=n. [0]: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xf999959999999999: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0xccccccccccccccc8-0xcccccccccccccccf] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 346 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 6.15.0-rc1-00294-ga4cba7e98e35 #85 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid_or_report (lib/list_debug.c:32) Code: 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 5a 01 00 00 49 39 74 24 08 0f 85 83 00 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 f2 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 1f 01 00 00 4c 39 26 0f 85 ab 00 00 00 4c 39 ee RSP: 0018:ff11000135b87830 EFLAGS: 00010a07 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffffffffc02223c0 RCX: ffffffff8406fcc2 RDX: 1999999999999999 RSI: cccccccccccccccc RDI: ffffffffc02223c0 RBP: ffffffff86064e40 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffffbfff0a9f5b5 R10: ffffffff854fadaf R11: 676552203a54454e R12: ffffffff86064e40 R13: ffffffffc02223c0 R14: ffffffff86064e48 R15: 0000000000000021 FS: 00007f6fb0d9e1c0(0000) GS:ff11000858ea0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f6fb0eda580 CR3: 0000000122fec005 CR4: 0000000000771ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> register_pernet_operations (./include/linux/list.h:150 (discriminator 5) ./include/linux/list.h:183 (discriminator 5) net/core/net_namespace.c:1315 (discriminator 5) net/core/net_namespace.c:1359 (discriminator 5)) register_pernet_subsys (net/core/net_namespace.c:1401) inet6_init (net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:535) ipv6 do_one_initcall (init/main.c:1257) do_init_module (kernel/module/main.c:2942) load_module (kernel/module/main.c:3409) init_module_from_file (kernel/module/main.c:3599) idempotent_init_module (kernel/module/main.c:3611) __x64_sys_finit_module (./include/linux/file.h:62 ./include/linux/file.h:83 kernel/module/main.c:3634 kernel/module/main.c:3621 kernel/module/main.c:3621) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130) RIP: 0033:0x7f6fb0df7e5d Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 73 9f 1b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fffdc6a8968 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055b535721b70 RCX: 00007f6fb0df7e5d RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000055b51e44aa2a RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 0000000000040000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000055b535721b30 R10: 0000000000000004 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055b51e44aa2a R13: 000055b535721bf0 R14: 000055b5357220b0 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> Modules linked in: ipv6(+) crc_ccitt Fixes: fed176b ("net: Add ops_undo_single for module load/unload.") Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-lkp/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

Commit ddd0a42 only increments scomp_scratch_users when it was 0, causing a panic when using ipcomp: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 619 Comm: ping Tainted: G N 6.15.0-rc3-net-00032-ga79be02bba5c #41 PREEMPT(full) Tainted: [N]=TEST Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:inflate_fast+0x5a2/0x1b90 [...] Call Trace: <IRQ> zlib_inflate+0x2d60/0x6620 deflate_sdecompress+0x166/0x350 scomp_acomp_comp_decomp+0x45f/0xa10 scomp_acomp_decompress+0x21/0x120 acomp_do_req_chain+0x3e5/0x4e0 ipcomp_input+0x212/0x550 xfrm_input+0x2de2/0x72f0 [...] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt Kernel Offset: disabled ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt ]--- Instead, let's keep the old increment, and decrement back to 0 if the scratch allocation fails. Fixes: ddd0a42 ("crypto: scompress - Fix scratch allocation failure handling") Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>

Dave Chinner and others added 30 commits February 1, 2022 14:14

Merge tag 'kvm-riscv-fixes-5.17-1' of https://github.com/kvm-riscv/linux

cb4f084

into HEAD KVM/riscv fixes for 5.17, take #1 - Rework guest entry logic - Make CY, TM, and IR counters accessible in VU mode - Fix SBI implementation version

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