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Pull request for series with
subject: bpf: BTF support for ksyms
version: 2
url: https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/netdev/list/?series=199405

tsipa and others added 7 commits September 3, 2020 20:46
ksym so that further dereferences on the ksym can use the BTF info
to validate accesses. Internally, when seeing a pseudo_btf_id ld insn,
the verifier reads the btf_id stored in the insn[0]'s imm field and
marks the dst_reg as PTR_TO_BTF_ID. The btf_id points to a VAR_KIND,
which is encoded in btf_vminux by pahole. If the VAR is not of a struct
type, the dst reg will be marked as PTR_TO_MEM instead of PTR_TO_BTF_ID
and the mem_size is resolved to the size of the VAR's type.

From the VAR btf_id, the verifier can also read the address of the
ksym's corresponding kernel var from kallsyms and use that to fill
dst_reg.

Therefore, the proper functionality of pseudo_btf_id depends on (1)
kallsyms and (2) the encoding of kernel global VARs in pahole, which
should be available since pahole v1.18.

Signed-off-by: Hao Luo <[email protected]>
---
 include/linux/bpf_verifier.h   |   4 ++
 include/linux/btf.h            |  15 +++++
 include/uapi/linux/bpf.h       |  38 ++++++++---
 kernel/bpf/btf.c               |  15 -----
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c          | 112 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h |  38 ++++++++---
 6 files changed, 182 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
information from kernel btf. If a valid btf entry for the ksym is found,
libbpf can pass in the found btf id to the verifier, which validates the
ksym's type and value.

Typeless ksyms (i.e. those defined as 'void') will not have such btf_id,
but it has the symbol's address (read from kallsyms) and its value is
treated as a raw pointer.

Signed-off-by: Hao Luo <[email protected]>
---
 tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c | 116 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 102 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
the other is a plain int. This tests two paths in the kernel. Struct
ksyms will be converted into PTR_TO_BTF_ID by the verifier while int
typed ksyms will be converted into PTR_TO_MEM.

Signed-off-by: Hao Luo <[email protected]>
---
 .../testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/ksyms.c  | 31 +++------
 .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/ksyms_btf.c      | 63 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../selftests/bpf/progs/test_ksyms_btf.c      | 23 +++++++
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/trace_helpers.c   | 26 ++++++++
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/trace_helpers.h   |  4 ++
 5 files changed, 123 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/ksyms_btf.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_ksyms_btf.c
bpf_per_cpu_ptr() has the same semantic as per_cpu_ptr() in the kernel
except that it may return NULL. This happens when the cpu parameter is
out of range. So the caller must check the returned value.

Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hao Luo <[email protected]>
---
 include/linux/bpf.h            |  3 ++
 include/linux/btf.h            | 11 ++++++
 include/uapi/linux/bpf.h       | 17 +++++++++
 kernel/bpf/btf.c               | 10 ------
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c          | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c       | 18 ++++++++++
 tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 17 +++++++++
 7 files changed, 128 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
helper always returns a valid pointer, therefore no need to check
returned value for NULL. Also note that all programs run with
preemption disabled, which means that the returned pointer is stable
during all the execution of the program.

Signed-off-by: Hao Luo <[email protected]>
---
 include/linux/bpf.h            |  1 +
 include/uapi/linux/bpf.h       | 14 ++++++++++++++
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c          | 10 +++++++---
 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c       | 14 ++++++++++++++
 tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 14 ++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
kernel. If the base pointer points to a struct, the returned reg is
of type PTR_TO_BTF_ID. Direct pointer dereference can be applied on
the returned variable. If the base pointer isn't a struct, the
returned reg is of type PTR_TO_MEM, which also supports direct pointer
dereference.

Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hao Luo <[email protected]>
---
 .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/ksyms_btf.c      | 10 +++++++
 .../selftests/bpf/progs/test_ksyms_btf.c      | 26 +++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+)
@kernel-patches-bot
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At least one diff in series https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/netdev/list/?series=199405 expired. Closing PR.

kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 14, 2020
[ 6525.735488] Unexpected kernel BRK exception at EL1
[ 6525.735502] Internal error: ptrace BRK handler: f2000100 [#1] SMP
[ 6525.741609] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 cifs libdes libarc4 dns_resolver fscache binfmt_misc nls_ascii nls_cp437 vfat fat aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce gf128mul efi_pstore sha2_ce sha256_arm64 sha1_ce evdev efivars efivarfs ip_tables x_tables autofs4 btrfs blake2b_generic xor xor_neon zstd_compress raid6_pq libcrc32c crc32c_generic ahci xhci_pci libahci xhci_hcd igb libata i2c_algo_bit nvme realtek usbcore nvme_core scsi_mod t10_pi netsec mdio_devres of_mdio gpio_keys fixed_phy libphy gpio_mb86s7x
[ 6525.787760] CPU: 3 PID: 7881 Comm: test_verifier Tainted: G        W         5.9.0-rc1+ #47
[ 6525.796111] Hardware name: Socionext SynQuacer E-series DeveloperBox, BIOS build #1 Jun  6 2020
[ 6525.804812] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO BTYPE=--)
[ 6525.810390] pc : bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4
[ 6525.815613] lr : bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c
[ 6525.820832] sp : ffff8000130cbb80
[ 6525.824141] x29: ffff8000130cbbb0 x28: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.829451] x27: 000005ef6fcbf39b x26: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.834759] x25: ffff8000130cbb80 x24: ffff800011dc7038
[ 6525.840067] x23: ffff8000130cbd00 x22: ffff0008f624d080
[ 6525.845375] x21: 0000000000000001 x20: ffff800011dc7000
[ 6525.850682] x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.855990] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.861298] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.866606] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.871913] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff8000000a660c
[ 6525.877220] x9 : ffff800010951810 x8 : ffff8000130cbc38
[ 6525.882528] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000009864cfa881
[ 6525.887836] x5 : 00ffffffffffffff x4 : 002880ba1a0b3e9f
[ 6525.893144] x3 : 0000000000000018 x2 : ffff8000000a4374
[ 6525.898452] x1 : 000000000000000a x0 : 0000000000000009
[ 6525.903760] Call trace:
[ 6525.906202]  bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4
[ 6525.911076]  bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c
[ 6525.915957]  bpf_dispatcher_xdp_func+0x14/0x20
[ 6525.920398]  bpf_test_run+0x70/0x1b0
[ 6525.923969]  bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0xec/0x190
[ 6525.928326]  __do_sys_bpf+0xc88/0x1b28
[ 6525.932072]  __arm64_sys_bpf+0x24/0x30
[ 6525.935820]  el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x70/0x168
[ 6525.940607]  do_el0_svc+0x28/0x88
[ 6525.943920]  el0_sync_handler+0x88/0x190
[ 6525.947838]  el0_sync+0x140/0x180
[ 6525.951154] Code: d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 (d4202000)
[ 6525.957249] ---[ end trace cecc3f93b14927e2 ]---

The reason is the offset[] creation and later usage while building
the eBPF body. The code currently omits the first instruction, since
build_insn() will increase our ctx->idx before saving it.
That was fine up until bounded eBPF loops were introduced. After that
introduction, offset[0] must be the offset of the end of prologue which
is the start of the 1st insn while, offset[n] holds the
offset of the end of n-th insn.

When "taken loop with back jump to 1st insn" test runs, it will
eventually call bpf2a64_offset(-1, 2, ctx). Since negative indexing is
permitted, the current outcome depends on the value stored in
ctx->offset[-1], which has nothing to do with our array.
If the value happens to be 0 the tests will work. If not this error
triggers.

7c2e988 ("bpf: fix x64 JIT code generation for jmp to 1st insn")
fixed an indentical bug on x86 when eBPF bounded loops were introduced.

So let's fix it by creating the ctx->offset[] correctly in the first
place and account for the first instruction while calculating the arm
instruction offsets.

Fixes: 2589726 ("bpf: introduce bounded loops")
Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilias Apalodimas <[email protected]>
---
Changes since v1:
 - Added Co-developed-by, Reported-by and Fixes tags correctly
 - Describe the expected context of ctx->offset[] in comments

 arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 14, 2020
[ 6525.735488] Unexpected kernel BRK exception at EL1
[ 6525.735502] Internal error: ptrace BRK handler: f2000100 [#1] SMP
[ 6525.741609] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 cifs libdes libarc4 dns_resolver fscache binfmt_misc nls_ascii nls_cp437 vfat fat aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce gf128mul efi_pstore sha2_ce sha256_arm64 sha1_ce evdev efivars efivarfs ip_tables x_tables autofs4 btrfs blake2b_generic xor xor_neon zstd_compress raid6_pq libcrc32c crc32c_generic ahci xhci_pci libahci xhci_hcd igb libata i2c_algo_bit nvme realtek usbcore nvme_core scsi_mod t10_pi netsec mdio_devres of_mdio gpio_keys fixed_phy libphy gpio_mb86s7x
[ 6525.787760] CPU: 3 PID: 7881 Comm: test_verifier Tainted: G        W         5.9.0-rc1+ #47
[ 6525.796111] Hardware name: Socionext SynQuacer E-series DeveloperBox, BIOS build #1 Jun  6 2020
[ 6525.804812] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO BTYPE=--)
[ 6525.810390] pc : bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4
[ 6525.815613] lr : bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c
[ 6525.820832] sp : ffff8000130cbb80
[ 6525.824141] x29: ffff8000130cbbb0 x28: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.829451] x27: 000005ef6fcbf39b x26: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.834759] x25: ffff8000130cbb80 x24: ffff800011dc7038
[ 6525.840067] x23: ffff8000130cbd00 x22: ffff0008f624d080
[ 6525.845375] x21: 0000000000000001 x20: ffff800011dc7000
[ 6525.850682] x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.855990] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.861298] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.866606] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.871913] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff8000000a660c
[ 6525.877220] x9 : ffff800010951810 x8 : ffff8000130cbc38
[ 6525.882528] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000009864cfa881
[ 6525.887836] x5 : 00ffffffffffffff x4 : 002880ba1a0b3e9f
[ 6525.893144] x3 : 0000000000000018 x2 : ffff8000000a4374
[ 6525.898452] x1 : 000000000000000a x0 : 0000000000000009
[ 6525.903760] Call trace:
[ 6525.906202]  bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4
[ 6525.911076]  bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c
[ 6525.915957]  bpf_dispatcher_xdp_func+0x14/0x20
[ 6525.920398]  bpf_test_run+0x70/0x1b0
[ 6525.923969]  bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0xec/0x190
[ 6525.928326]  __do_sys_bpf+0xc88/0x1b28
[ 6525.932072]  __arm64_sys_bpf+0x24/0x30
[ 6525.935820]  el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x70/0x168
[ 6525.940607]  do_el0_svc+0x28/0x88
[ 6525.943920]  el0_sync_handler+0x88/0x190
[ 6525.947838]  el0_sync+0x140/0x180
[ 6525.951154] Code: d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 (d4202000)
[ 6525.957249] ---[ end trace cecc3f93b14927e2 ]---

The reason is the offset[] creation and later usage while building
the eBPF body. The code currently omits the first instruction, since
build_insn() will increase our ctx->idx before saving it.
That was fine up until bounded eBPF loops were introduced. After that
introduction, offset[0] must be the offset of the end of prologue which
is the start of the 1st insn while, offset[n] holds the
offset of the end of n-th insn.

When "taken loop with back jump to 1st insn" test runs, it will
eventually call bpf2a64_offset(-1, 2, ctx). Since negative indexing is
permitted, the current outcome depends on the value stored in
ctx->offset[-1], which has nothing to do with our array.
If the value happens to be 0 the tests will work. If not this error
triggers.

7c2e988 ("bpf: fix x64 JIT code generation for jmp to 1st insn")
fixed an indentical bug on x86 when eBPF bounded loops were introduced.

So let's fix it by creating the ctx->offset[] correctly in the first
place and account for the first instruction while calculating the arm
instruction offsets.

Fixes: 2589726 ("bpf: introduce bounded loops")
Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilias Apalodimas <[email protected]>
---
Changes since v1:
 - Added Co-developed-by, Reported-by and Fixes tags correctly
 - Describe the expected context of ctx->offset[] in comments

 arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 14, 2020
[ 6525.735488] Unexpected kernel BRK exception at EL1
[ 6525.735502] Internal error: ptrace BRK handler: f2000100 [#1] SMP
[ 6525.741609] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 cifs libdes libarc4 dns_resolver fscache binfmt_misc nls_ascii nls_cp437 vfat fat aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce gf128mul efi_pstore sha2_ce sha256_arm64 sha1_ce evdev efivars efivarfs ip_tables x_tables autofs4 btrfs blake2b_generic xor xor_neon zstd_compress raid6_pq libcrc32c crc32c_generic ahci xhci_pci libahci xhci_hcd igb libata i2c_algo_bit nvme realtek usbcore nvme_core scsi_mod t10_pi netsec mdio_devres of_mdio gpio_keys fixed_phy libphy gpio_mb86s7x
[ 6525.787760] CPU: 3 PID: 7881 Comm: test_verifier Tainted: G        W         5.9.0-rc1+ #47
[ 6525.796111] Hardware name: Socionext SynQuacer E-series DeveloperBox, BIOS build #1 Jun  6 2020
[ 6525.804812] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO BTYPE=--)
[ 6525.810390] pc : bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4
[ 6525.815613] lr : bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c
[ 6525.820832] sp : ffff8000130cbb80
[ 6525.824141] x29: ffff8000130cbbb0 x28: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.829451] x27: 000005ef6fcbf39b x26: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.834759] x25: ffff8000130cbb80 x24: ffff800011dc7038
[ 6525.840067] x23: ffff8000130cbd00 x22: ffff0008f624d080
[ 6525.845375] x21: 0000000000000001 x20: ffff800011dc7000
[ 6525.850682] x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.855990] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.861298] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.866606] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.871913] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff8000000a660c
[ 6525.877220] x9 : ffff800010951810 x8 : ffff8000130cbc38
[ 6525.882528] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000009864cfa881
[ 6525.887836] x5 : 00ffffffffffffff x4 : 002880ba1a0b3e9f
[ 6525.893144] x3 : 0000000000000018 x2 : ffff8000000a4374
[ 6525.898452] x1 : 000000000000000a x0 : 0000000000000009
[ 6525.903760] Call trace:
[ 6525.906202]  bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4
[ 6525.911076]  bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c
[ 6525.915957]  bpf_dispatcher_xdp_func+0x14/0x20
[ 6525.920398]  bpf_test_run+0x70/0x1b0
[ 6525.923969]  bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0xec/0x190
[ 6525.928326]  __do_sys_bpf+0xc88/0x1b28
[ 6525.932072]  __arm64_sys_bpf+0x24/0x30
[ 6525.935820]  el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x70/0x168
[ 6525.940607]  do_el0_svc+0x28/0x88
[ 6525.943920]  el0_sync_handler+0x88/0x190
[ 6525.947838]  el0_sync+0x140/0x180
[ 6525.951154] Code: d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 (d4202000)
[ 6525.957249] ---[ end trace cecc3f93b14927e2 ]---

The reason is the offset[] creation and later usage while building
the eBPF body. The code currently omits the first instruction, since
build_insn() will increase our ctx->idx before saving it.
That was fine up until bounded eBPF loops were introduced. After that
introduction, offset[0] must be the offset of the end of prologue which
is the start of the 1st insn while, offset[n] holds the
offset of the end of n-th insn.

When "taken loop with back jump to 1st insn" test runs, it will
eventually call bpf2a64_offset(-1, 2, ctx). Since negative indexing is
permitted, the current outcome depends on the value stored in
ctx->offset[-1], which has nothing to do with our array.
If the value happens to be 0 the tests will work. If not this error
triggers.

7c2e988 ("bpf: fix x64 JIT code generation for jmp to 1st insn")
fixed an indentical bug on x86 when eBPF bounded loops were introduced.

So let's fix it by creating the ctx->offset[] correctly in the first
place and account for the first instruction while calculating the arm
instruction offsets.

Fixes: 2589726 ("bpf: introduce bounded loops")
Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilias Apalodimas <[email protected]>
---
Changes since v1:
 - Added Co-developed-by, Reported-by and Fixes tags correctly
 - Describe the expected context of ctx->offset[] in comments

 arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 14, 2020
[ 6525.735488] Unexpected kernel BRK exception at EL1
[ 6525.735502] Internal error: ptrace BRK handler: f2000100 [#1] SMP
[ 6525.741609] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 cifs libdes libarc4 dns_resolver fscache binfmt_misc nls_ascii nls_cp437 vfat fat aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce gf128mul efi_pstore sha2_ce sha256_arm64 sha1_ce evdev efivars efivarfs ip_tables x_tables autofs4 btrfs blake2b_generic xor xor_neon zstd_compress raid6_pq libcrc32c crc32c_generic ahci xhci_pci libahci xhci_hcd igb libata i2c_algo_bit nvme realtek usbcore nvme_core scsi_mod t10_pi netsec mdio_devres of_mdio gpio_keys fixed_phy libphy gpio_mb86s7x
[ 6525.787760] CPU: 3 PID: 7881 Comm: test_verifier Tainted: G        W         5.9.0-rc1+ #47
[ 6525.796111] Hardware name: Socionext SynQuacer E-series DeveloperBox, BIOS build #1 Jun  6 2020
[ 6525.804812] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO BTYPE=--)
[ 6525.810390] pc : bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4
[ 6525.815613] lr : bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c
[ 6525.820832] sp : ffff8000130cbb80
[ 6525.824141] x29: ffff8000130cbbb0 x28: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.829451] x27: 000005ef6fcbf39b x26: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.834759] x25: ffff8000130cbb80 x24: ffff800011dc7038
[ 6525.840067] x23: ffff8000130cbd00 x22: ffff0008f624d080
[ 6525.845375] x21: 0000000000000001 x20: ffff800011dc7000
[ 6525.850682] x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.855990] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.861298] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.866606] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.871913] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff8000000a660c
[ 6525.877220] x9 : ffff800010951810 x8 : ffff8000130cbc38
[ 6525.882528] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000009864cfa881
[ 6525.887836] x5 : 00ffffffffffffff x4 : 002880ba1a0b3e9f
[ 6525.893144] x3 : 0000000000000018 x2 : ffff8000000a4374
[ 6525.898452] x1 : 000000000000000a x0 : 0000000000000009
[ 6525.903760] Call trace:
[ 6525.906202]  bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4
[ 6525.911076]  bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c
[ 6525.915957]  bpf_dispatcher_xdp_func+0x14/0x20
[ 6525.920398]  bpf_test_run+0x70/0x1b0
[ 6525.923969]  bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0xec/0x190
[ 6525.928326]  __do_sys_bpf+0xc88/0x1b28
[ 6525.932072]  __arm64_sys_bpf+0x24/0x30
[ 6525.935820]  el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x70/0x168
[ 6525.940607]  do_el0_svc+0x28/0x88
[ 6525.943920]  el0_sync_handler+0x88/0x190
[ 6525.947838]  el0_sync+0x140/0x180
[ 6525.951154] Code: d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 (d4202000)
[ 6525.957249] ---[ end trace cecc3f93b14927e2 ]---

The reason is the offset[] creation and later usage while building
the eBPF body. The code currently omits the first instruction, since
build_insn() will increase our ctx->idx before saving it.
That was fine up until bounded eBPF loops were introduced. After that
introduction, offset[0] must be the offset of the end of prologue which
is the start of the 1st insn while, offset[n] holds the
offset of the end of n-th insn.

When "taken loop with back jump to 1st insn" test runs, it will
eventually call bpf2a64_offset(-1, 2, ctx). Since negative indexing is
permitted, the current outcome depends on the value stored in
ctx->offset[-1], which has nothing to do with our array.
If the value happens to be 0 the tests will work. If not this error
triggers.

7c2e988 ("bpf: fix x64 JIT code generation for jmp to 1st insn")
fixed an indentical bug on x86 when eBPF bounded loops were introduced.

So let's fix it by creating the ctx->offset[] correctly in the first
place and account for the first instruction while calculating the arm
instruction offsets.

Fixes: 2589726 ("bpf: introduce bounded loops")
Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilias Apalodimas <[email protected]>
---
Changes since v1:
 - Added Co-developed-by, Reported-by and Fixes tags correctly
 - Describe the expected context of ctx->offset[] in comments

 arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 14, 2020
[ 6525.735488] Unexpected kernel BRK exception at EL1
[ 6525.735502] Internal error: ptrace BRK handler: f2000100 [#1] SMP
[ 6525.741609] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 cifs libdes libarc4 dns_resolver fscache binfmt_misc nls_ascii nls_cp437 vfat fat aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce gf128mul efi_pstore sha2_ce sha256_arm64 sha1_ce evdev efivars efivarfs ip_tables x_tables autofs4 btrfs blake2b_generic xor xor_neon zstd_compress raid6_pq libcrc32c crc32c_generic ahci xhci_pci libahci xhci_hcd igb libata i2c_algo_bit nvme realtek usbcore nvme_core scsi_mod t10_pi netsec mdio_devres of_mdio gpio_keys fixed_phy libphy gpio_mb86s7x
[ 6525.787760] CPU: 3 PID: 7881 Comm: test_verifier Tainted: G        W         5.9.0-rc1+ #47
[ 6525.796111] Hardware name: Socionext SynQuacer E-series DeveloperBox, BIOS build #1 Jun  6 2020
[ 6525.804812] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO BTYPE=--)
[ 6525.810390] pc : bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4
[ 6525.815613] lr : bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c
[ 6525.820832] sp : ffff8000130cbb80
[ 6525.824141] x29: ffff8000130cbbb0 x28: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.829451] x27: 000005ef6fcbf39b x26: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.834759] x25: ffff8000130cbb80 x24: ffff800011dc7038
[ 6525.840067] x23: ffff8000130cbd00 x22: ffff0008f624d080
[ 6525.845375] x21: 0000000000000001 x20: ffff800011dc7000
[ 6525.850682] x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.855990] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.861298] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.866606] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.871913] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff8000000a660c
[ 6525.877220] x9 : ffff800010951810 x8 : ffff8000130cbc38
[ 6525.882528] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000009864cfa881
[ 6525.887836] x5 : 00ffffffffffffff x4 : 002880ba1a0b3e9f
[ 6525.893144] x3 : 0000000000000018 x2 : ffff8000000a4374
[ 6525.898452] x1 : 000000000000000a x0 : 0000000000000009
[ 6525.903760] Call trace:
[ 6525.906202]  bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4
[ 6525.911076]  bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c
[ 6525.915957]  bpf_dispatcher_xdp_func+0x14/0x20
[ 6525.920398]  bpf_test_run+0x70/0x1b0
[ 6525.923969]  bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0xec/0x190
[ 6525.928326]  __do_sys_bpf+0xc88/0x1b28
[ 6525.932072]  __arm64_sys_bpf+0x24/0x30
[ 6525.935820]  el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x70/0x168
[ 6525.940607]  do_el0_svc+0x28/0x88
[ 6525.943920]  el0_sync_handler+0x88/0x190
[ 6525.947838]  el0_sync+0x140/0x180
[ 6525.951154] Code: d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 (d4202000)
[ 6525.957249] ---[ end trace cecc3f93b14927e2 ]---

The reason is the offset[] creation and later usage while building
the eBPF body. The code currently omits the first instruction, since
build_insn() will increase our ctx->idx before saving it.
That was fine up until bounded eBPF loops were introduced. After that
introduction, offset[0] must be the offset of the end of prologue which
is the start of the 1st insn while, offset[n] holds the
offset of the end of n-th insn.

When "taken loop with back jump to 1st insn" test runs, it will
eventually call bpf2a64_offset(-1, 2, ctx). Since negative indexing is
permitted, the current outcome depends on the value stored in
ctx->offset[-1], which has nothing to do with our array.
If the value happens to be 0 the tests will work. If not this error
triggers.

7c2e988 ("bpf: fix x64 JIT code generation for jmp to 1st insn")
fixed an indentical bug on x86 when eBPF bounded loops were introduced.

So let's fix it by creating the ctx->offset[] correctly in the first
place and account for the first instruction while calculating the arm
instruction offsets.

Fixes: 2589726 ("bpf: introduce bounded loops")
Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilias Apalodimas <[email protected]>
---
Changes since v1:
 - Added Co-developed-by, Reported-by and Fixes tags correctly
 - Describe the expected context of ctx->offset[] in comments

 arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 14, 2020
[ 6525.735488] Unexpected kernel BRK exception at EL1
[ 6525.735502] Internal error: ptrace BRK handler: f2000100 [#1] SMP
[ 6525.741609] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 cifs libdes libarc4 dns_resolver fscache binfmt_misc nls_ascii nls_cp437 vfat fat aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce gf128mul efi_pstore sha2_ce sha256_arm64 sha1_ce evdev efivars efivarfs ip_tables x_tables autofs4 btrfs blake2b_generic xor xor_neon zstd_compress raid6_pq libcrc32c crc32c_generic ahci xhci_pci libahci xhci_hcd igb libata i2c_algo_bit nvme realtek usbcore nvme_core scsi_mod t10_pi netsec mdio_devres of_mdio gpio_keys fixed_phy libphy gpio_mb86s7x
[ 6525.787760] CPU: 3 PID: 7881 Comm: test_verifier Tainted: G        W         5.9.0-rc1+ #47
[ 6525.796111] Hardware name: Socionext SynQuacer E-series DeveloperBox, BIOS build #1 Jun  6 2020
[ 6525.804812] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO BTYPE=--)
[ 6525.810390] pc : bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4
[ 6525.815613] lr : bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c
[ 6525.820832] sp : ffff8000130cbb80
[ 6525.824141] x29: ffff8000130cbbb0 x28: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.829451] x27: 000005ef6fcbf39b x26: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.834759] x25: ffff8000130cbb80 x24: ffff800011dc7038
[ 6525.840067] x23: ffff8000130cbd00 x22: ffff0008f624d080
[ 6525.845375] x21: 0000000000000001 x20: ffff800011dc7000
[ 6525.850682] x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.855990] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.861298] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.866606] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.871913] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff8000000a660c
[ 6525.877220] x9 : ffff800010951810 x8 : ffff8000130cbc38
[ 6525.882528] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000009864cfa881
[ 6525.887836] x5 : 00ffffffffffffff x4 : 002880ba1a0b3e9f
[ 6525.893144] x3 : 0000000000000018 x2 : ffff8000000a4374
[ 6525.898452] x1 : 000000000000000a x0 : 0000000000000009
[ 6525.903760] Call trace:
[ 6525.906202]  bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4
[ 6525.911076]  bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c
[ 6525.915957]  bpf_dispatcher_xdp_func+0x14/0x20
[ 6525.920398]  bpf_test_run+0x70/0x1b0
[ 6525.923969]  bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0xec/0x190
[ 6525.928326]  __do_sys_bpf+0xc88/0x1b28
[ 6525.932072]  __arm64_sys_bpf+0x24/0x30
[ 6525.935820]  el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x70/0x168
[ 6525.940607]  do_el0_svc+0x28/0x88
[ 6525.943920]  el0_sync_handler+0x88/0x190
[ 6525.947838]  el0_sync+0x140/0x180
[ 6525.951154] Code: d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 (d4202000)
[ 6525.957249] ---[ end trace cecc3f93b14927e2 ]---

The reason is the offset[] creation and later usage while building
the eBPF body. The code currently omits the first instruction, since
build_insn() will increase our ctx->idx before saving it.
That was fine up until bounded eBPF loops were introduced. After that
introduction, offset[0] must be the offset of the end of prologue which
is the start of the 1st insn while, offset[n] holds the
offset of the end of n-th insn.

When "taken loop with back jump to 1st insn" test runs, it will
eventually call bpf2a64_offset(-1, 2, ctx). Since negative indexing is
permitted, the current outcome depends on the value stored in
ctx->offset[-1], which has nothing to do with our array.
If the value happens to be 0 the tests will work. If not this error
triggers.

7c2e988 ("bpf: fix x64 JIT code generation for jmp to 1st insn")
fixed an indentical bug on x86 when eBPF bounded loops were introduced.

So let's fix it by creating the ctx->offset[] correctly in the first
place and account for the first instruction while calculating the arm
instruction offsets.

Fixes: 2589726 ("bpf: introduce bounded loops")
Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilias Apalodimas <[email protected]>
---
Changes since v1:
 - Added Co-developed-by, Reported-by and Fixes tags correctly
 - Describe the expected context of ctx->offset[] in comments

 arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 14, 2020
[ 6525.735488] Unexpected kernel BRK exception at EL1
[ 6525.735502] Internal error: ptrace BRK handler: f2000100 [#1] SMP
[ 6525.741609] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 cifs libdes libarc4 dns_resolver fscache binfmt_misc nls_ascii nls_cp437 vfat fat aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce gf128mul efi_pstore sha2_ce sha256_arm64 sha1_ce evdev efivars efivarfs ip_tables x_tables autofs4 btrfs blake2b_generic xor xor_neon zstd_compress raid6_pq libcrc32c crc32c_generic ahci xhci_pci libahci xhci_hcd igb libata i2c_algo_bit nvme realtek usbcore nvme_core scsi_mod t10_pi netsec mdio_devres of_mdio gpio_keys fixed_phy libphy gpio_mb86s7x
[ 6525.787760] CPU: 3 PID: 7881 Comm: test_verifier Tainted: G        W         5.9.0-rc1+ #47
[ 6525.796111] Hardware name: Socionext SynQuacer E-series DeveloperBox, BIOS build #1 Jun  6 2020
[ 6525.804812] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO BTYPE=--)
[ 6525.810390] pc : bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4
[ 6525.815613] lr : bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c
[ 6525.820832] sp : ffff8000130cbb80
[ 6525.824141] x29: ffff8000130cbbb0 x28: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.829451] x27: 000005ef6fcbf39b x26: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.834759] x25: ffff8000130cbb80 x24: ffff800011dc7038
[ 6525.840067] x23: ffff8000130cbd00 x22: ffff0008f624d080
[ 6525.845375] x21: 0000000000000001 x20: ffff800011dc7000
[ 6525.850682] x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.855990] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.861298] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.866606] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.871913] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff8000000a660c
[ 6525.877220] x9 : ffff800010951810 x8 : ffff8000130cbc38
[ 6525.882528] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000009864cfa881
[ 6525.887836] x5 : 00ffffffffffffff x4 : 002880ba1a0b3e9f
[ 6525.893144] x3 : 0000000000000018 x2 : ffff8000000a4374
[ 6525.898452] x1 : 000000000000000a x0 : 0000000000000009
[ 6525.903760] Call trace:
[ 6525.906202]  bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4
[ 6525.911076]  bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c
[ 6525.915957]  bpf_dispatcher_xdp_func+0x14/0x20
[ 6525.920398]  bpf_test_run+0x70/0x1b0
[ 6525.923969]  bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0xec/0x190
[ 6525.928326]  __do_sys_bpf+0xc88/0x1b28
[ 6525.932072]  __arm64_sys_bpf+0x24/0x30
[ 6525.935820]  el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x70/0x168
[ 6525.940607]  do_el0_svc+0x28/0x88
[ 6525.943920]  el0_sync_handler+0x88/0x190
[ 6525.947838]  el0_sync+0x140/0x180
[ 6525.951154] Code: d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 (d4202000)
[ 6525.957249] ---[ end trace cecc3f93b14927e2 ]---

The reason is the offset[] creation and later usage while building
the eBPF body. The code currently omits the first instruction, since
build_insn() will increase our ctx->idx before saving it.
That was fine up until bounded eBPF loops were introduced. After that
introduction, offset[0] must be the offset of the end of prologue which
is the start of the 1st insn while, offset[n] holds the
offset of the end of n-th insn.

When "taken loop with back jump to 1st insn" test runs, it will
eventually call bpf2a64_offset(-1, 2, ctx). Since negative indexing is
permitted, the current outcome depends on the value stored in
ctx->offset[-1], which has nothing to do with our array.
If the value happens to be 0 the tests will work. If not this error
triggers.

7c2e988 ("bpf: fix x64 JIT code generation for jmp to 1st insn")
fixed an indentical bug on x86 when eBPF bounded loops were introduced.

So let's fix it by creating the ctx->offset[] correctly in the first
place and account for the first instruction while calculating the arm
instruction offsets.

Fixes: 2589726 ("bpf: introduce bounded loops")
Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilias Apalodimas <[email protected]>
---
Changes since v1:
 - Added Co-developed-by, Reported-by and Fixes tags correctly
 - Describe the expected context of ctx->offset[] in comments

 arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 14, 2020
[ 6525.735488] Unexpected kernel BRK exception at EL1
[ 6525.735502] Internal error: ptrace BRK handler: f2000100 [#1] SMP
[ 6525.741609] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 cifs libdes libarc4 dns_resolver fscache binfmt_misc nls_ascii nls_cp437 vfat fat aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce gf128mul efi_pstore sha2_ce sha256_arm64 sha1_ce evdev efivars efivarfs ip_tables x_tables autofs4 btrfs blake2b_generic xor xor_neon zstd_compress raid6_pq libcrc32c crc32c_generic ahci xhci_pci libahci xhci_hcd igb libata i2c_algo_bit nvme realtek usbcore nvme_core scsi_mod t10_pi netsec mdio_devres of_mdio gpio_keys fixed_phy libphy gpio_mb86s7x
[ 6525.787760] CPU: 3 PID: 7881 Comm: test_verifier Tainted: G        W         5.9.0-rc1+ #47
[ 6525.796111] Hardware name: Socionext SynQuacer E-series DeveloperBox, BIOS build #1 Jun  6 2020
[ 6525.804812] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO BTYPE=--)
[ 6525.810390] pc : bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4
[ 6525.815613] lr : bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c
[ 6525.820832] sp : ffff8000130cbb80
[ 6525.824141] x29: ffff8000130cbbb0 x28: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.829451] x27: 000005ef6fcbf39b x26: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.834759] x25: ffff8000130cbb80 x24: ffff800011dc7038
[ 6525.840067] x23: ffff8000130cbd00 x22: ffff0008f624d080
[ 6525.845375] x21: 0000000000000001 x20: ffff800011dc7000
[ 6525.850682] x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.855990] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.861298] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.866606] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.871913] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff8000000a660c
[ 6525.877220] x9 : ffff800010951810 x8 : ffff8000130cbc38
[ 6525.882528] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000009864cfa881
[ 6525.887836] x5 : 00ffffffffffffff x4 : 002880ba1a0b3e9f
[ 6525.893144] x3 : 0000000000000018 x2 : ffff8000000a4374
[ 6525.898452] x1 : 000000000000000a x0 : 0000000000000009
[ 6525.903760] Call trace:
[ 6525.906202]  bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4
[ 6525.911076]  bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c
[ 6525.915957]  bpf_dispatcher_xdp_func+0x14/0x20
[ 6525.920398]  bpf_test_run+0x70/0x1b0
[ 6525.923969]  bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0xec/0x190
[ 6525.928326]  __do_sys_bpf+0xc88/0x1b28
[ 6525.932072]  __arm64_sys_bpf+0x24/0x30
[ 6525.935820]  el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x70/0x168
[ 6525.940607]  do_el0_svc+0x28/0x88
[ 6525.943920]  el0_sync_handler+0x88/0x190
[ 6525.947838]  el0_sync+0x140/0x180
[ 6525.951154] Code: d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 (d4202000)
[ 6525.957249] ---[ end trace cecc3f93b14927e2 ]---

The reason is the offset[] creation and later usage while building
the eBPF body. The code currently omits the first instruction, since
build_insn() will increase our ctx->idx before saving it.
That was fine up until bounded eBPF loops were introduced. After that
introduction, offset[0] must be the offset of the end of prologue which
is the start of the 1st insn while, offset[n] holds the
offset of the end of n-th insn.

When "taken loop with back jump to 1st insn" test runs, it will
eventually call bpf2a64_offset(-1, 2, ctx). Since negative indexing is
permitted, the current outcome depends on the value stored in
ctx->offset[-1], which has nothing to do with our array.
If the value happens to be 0 the tests will work. If not this error
triggers.

7c2e988 ("bpf: fix x64 JIT code generation for jmp to 1st insn")
fixed an indentical bug on x86 when eBPF bounded loops were introduced.

So let's fix it by creating the ctx->offset[] correctly in the first
place and account for the first instruction while calculating the arm
instruction offsets.

Fixes: 2589726 ("bpf: introduce bounded loops")
Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilias Apalodimas <[email protected]>
---
Changes since v1:
 - Added Co-developed-by, Reported-by and Fixes tags correctly
 - Describe the expected context of ctx->offset[] in comments

 arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 14, 2020
[ 6525.735488] Unexpected kernel BRK exception at EL1
[ 6525.735502] Internal error: ptrace BRK handler: f2000100 [#1] SMP
[ 6525.741609] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 cifs libdes libarc4 dns_resolver fscache binfmt_misc nls_ascii nls_cp437 vfat fat aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce gf128mul efi_pstore sha2_ce sha256_arm64 sha1_ce evdev efivars efivarfs ip_tables x_tables autofs4 btrfs blake2b_generic xor xor_neon zstd_compress raid6_pq libcrc32c crc32c_generic ahci xhci_pci libahci xhci_hcd igb libata i2c_algo_bit nvme realtek usbcore nvme_core scsi_mod t10_pi netsec mdio_devres of_mdio gpio_keys fixed_phy libphy gpio_mb86s7x
[ 6525.787760] CPU: 3 PID: 7881 Comm: test_verifier Tainted: G        W         5.9.0-rc1+ #47
[ 6525.796111] Hardware name: Socionext SynQuacer E-series DeveloperBox, BIOS build #1 Jun  6 2020
[ 6525.804812] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO BTYPE=--)
[ 6525.810390] pc : bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4
[ 6525.815613] lr : bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c
[ 6525.820832] sp : ffff8000130cbb80
[ 6525.824141] x29: ffff8000130cbbb0 x28: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.829451] x27: 000005ef6fcbf39b x26: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.834759] x25: ffff8000130cbb80 x24: ffff800011dc7038
[ 6525.840067] x23: ffff8000130cbd00 x22: ffff0008f624d080
[ 6525.845375] x21: 0000000000000001 x20: ffff800011dc7000
[ 6525.850682] x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.855990] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.861298] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.866606] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.871913] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff8000000a660c
[ 6525.877220] x9 : ffff800010951810 x8 : ffff8000130cbc38
[ 6525.882528] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000009864cfa881
[ 6525.887836] x5 : 00ffffffffffffff x4 : 002880ba1a0b3e9f
[ 6525.893144] x3 : 0000000000000018 x2 : ffff8000000a4374
[ 6525.898452] x1 : 000000000000000a x0 : 0000000000000009
[ 6525.903760] Call trace:
[ 6525.906202]  bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4
[ 6525.911076]  bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c
[ 6525.915957]  bpf_dispatcher_xdp_func+0x14/0x20
[ 6525.920398]  bpf_test_run+0x70/0x1b0
[ 6525.923969]  bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0xec/0x190
[ 6525.928326]  __do_sys_bpf+0xc88/0x1b28
[ 6525.932072]  __arm64_sys_bpf+0x24/0x30
[ 6525.935820]  el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x70/0x168
[ 6525.940607]  do_el0_svc+0x28/0x88
[ 6525.943920]  el0_sync_handler+0x88/0x190
[ 6525.947838]  el0_sync+0x140/0x180
[ 6525.951154] Code: d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 (d4202000)
[ 6525.957249] ---[ end trace cecc3f93b14927e2 ]---

The reason is the offset[] creation and later usage while building
the eBPF body. The code currently omits the first instruction, since
build_insn() will increase our ctx->idx before saving it.
That was fine up until bounded eBPF loops were introduced. After that
introduction, offset[0] must be the offset of the end of prologue which
is the start of the 1st insn while, offset[n] holds the
offset of the end of n-th insn.

When "taken loop with back jump to 1st insn" test runs, it will
eventually call bpf2a64_offset(-1, 2, ctx). Since negative indexing is
permitted, the current outcome depends on the value stored in
ctx->offset[-1], which has nothing to do with our array.
If the value happens to be 0 the tests will work. If not this error
triggers.

7c2e988 ("bpf: fix x64 JIT code generation for jmp to 1st insn")
fixed an indentical bug on x86 when eBPF bounded loops were introduced.

So let's fix it by creating the ctx->offset[] correctly in the first
place and account for the first instruction while calculating the arm
instruction offsets.

Fixes: 2589726 ("bpf: introduce bounded loops")
Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilias Apalodimas <[email protected]>
---
Changes since v1:
 - Added Co-developed-by, Reported-by and Fixes tags correctly
 - Describe the expected context of ctx->offset[] in comments

 arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 14, 2020
[ 6525.735488] Unexpected kernel BRK exception at EL1
[ 6525.735502] Internal error: ptrace BRK handler: f2000100 [#1] SMP
[ 6525.741609] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 cifs libdes libarc4 dns_resolver fscache binfmt_misc nls_ascii nls_cp437 vfat fat aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce gf128mul efi_pstore sha2_ce sha256_arm64 sha1_ce evdev efivars efivarfs ip_tables x_tables autofs4 btrfs blake2b_generic xor xor_neon zstd_compress raid6_pq libcrc32c crc32c_generic ahci xhci_pci libahci xhci_hcd igb libata i2c_algo_bit nvme realtek usbcore nvme_core scsi_mod t10_pi netsec mdio_devres of_mdio gpio_keys fixed_phy libphy gpio_mb86s7x
[ 6525.787760] CPU: 3 PID: 7881 Comm: test_verifier Tainted: G        W         5.9.0-rc1+ #47
[ 6525.796111] Hardware name: Socionext SynQuacer E-series DeveloperBox, BIOS build #1 Jun  6 2020
[ 6525.804812] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO BTYPE=--)
[ 6525.810390] pc : bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4
[ 6525.815613] lr : bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c
[ 6525.820832] sp : ffff8000130cbb80
[ 6525.824141] x29: ffff8000130cbbb0 x28: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.829451] x27: 000005ef6fcbf39b x26: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.834759] x25: ffff8000130cbb80 x24: ffff800011dc7038
[ 6525.840067] x23: ffff8000130cbd00 x22: ffff0008f624d080
[ 6525.845375] x21: 0000000000000001 x20: ffff800011dc7000
[ 6525.850682] x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.855990] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.861298] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.866606] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.871913] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff8000000a660c
[ 6525.877220] x9 : ffff800010951810 x8 : ffff8000130cbc38
[ 6525.882528] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000009864cfa881
[ 6525.887836] x5 : 00ffffffffffffff x4 : 002880ba1a0b3e9f
[ 6525.893144] x3 : 0000000000000018 x2 : ffff8000000a4374
[ 6525.898452] x1 : 000000000000000a x0 : 0000000000000009
[ 6525.903760] Call trace:
[ 6525.906202]  bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4
[ 6525.911076]  bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c
[ 6525.915957]  bpf_dispatcher_xdp_func+0x14/0x20
[ 6525.920398]  bpf_test_run+0x70/0x1b0
[ 6525.923969]  bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0xec/0x190
[ 6525.928326]  __do_sys_bpf+0xc88/0x1b28
[ 6525.932072]  __arm64_sys_bpf+0x24/0x30
[ 6525.935820]  el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x70/0x168
[ 6525.940607]  do_el0_svc+0x28/0x88
[ 6525.943920]  el0_sync_handler+0x88/0x190
[ 6525.947838]  el0_sync+0x140/0x180
[ 6525.951154] Code: d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 (d4202000)
[ 6525.957249] ---[ end trace cecc3f93b14927e2 ]---

The reason is the offset[] creation and later usage while building
the eBPF body. The code currently omits the first instruction, since
build_insn() will increase our ctx->idx before saving it.
That was fine up until bounded eBPF loops were introduced. After that
introduction, offset[0] must be the offset of the end of prologue which
is the start of the 1st insn while, offset[n] holds the
offset of the end of n-th insn.

When "taken loop with back jump to 1st insn" test runs, it will
eventually call bpf2a64_offset(-1, 2, ctx). Since negative indexing is
permitted, the current outcome depends on the value stored in
ctx->offset[-1], which has nothing to do with our array.
If the value happens to be 0 the tests will work. If not this error
triggers.

7c2e988 ("bpf: fix x64 JIT code generation for jmp to 1st insn")
fixed an indentical bug on x86 when eBPF bounded loops were introduced.

So let's fix it by creating the ctx->offset[] correctly in the first
place and account for the first instruction while calculating the arm
instruction offsets.

Fixes: 2589726 ("bpf: introduce bounded loops")
Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilias Apalodimas <[email protected]>
---
Changes since v1:
 - Added Co-developed-by, Reported-by and Fixes tags correctly
 - Describe the expected context of ctx->offset[] in comments

 arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 15, 2020
[ 6525.735488] Unexpected kernel BRK exception at EL1
[ 6525.735502] Internal error: ptrace BRK handler: f2000100 [#1] SMP
[ 6525.741609] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 cifs libdes libarc4 dns_resolver fscache binfmt_misc nls_ascii nls_cp437 vfat fat aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce gf128mul efi_pstore sha2_ce sha256_arm64 sha1_ce evdev efivars efivarfs ip_tables x_tables autofs4 btrfs blake2b_generic xor xor_neon zstd_compress raid6_pq libcrc32c crc32c_generic ahci xhci_pci libahci xhci_hcd igb libata i2c_algo_bit nvme realtek usbcore nvme_core scsi_mod t10_pi netsec mdio_devres of_mdio gpio_keys fixed_phy libphy gpio_mb86s7x
[ 6525.787760] CPU: 3 PID: 7881 Comm: test_verifier Tainted: G        W         5.9.0-rc1+ #47
[ 6525.796111] Hardware name: Socionext SynQuacer E-series DeveloperBox, BIOS build #1 Jun  6 2020
[ 6525.804812] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO BTYPE=--)
[ 6525.810390] pc : bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4
[ 6525.815613] lr : bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c
[ 6525.820832] sp : ffff8000130cbb80
[ 6525.824141] x29: ffff8000130cbbb0 x28: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.829451] x27: 000005ef6fcbf39b x26: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.834759] x25: ffff8000130cbb80 x24: ffff800011dc7038
[ 6525.840067] x23: ffff8000130cbd00 x22: ffff0008f624d080
[ 6525.845375] x21: 0000000000000001 x20: ffff800011dc7000
[ 6525.850682] x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.855990] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.861298] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.866606] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.871913] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff8000000a660c
[ 6525.877220] x9 : ffff800010951810 x8 : ffff8000130cbc38
[ 6525.882528] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000009864cfa881
[ 6525.887836] x5 : 00ffffffffffffff x4 : 002880ba1a0b3e9f
[ 6525.893144] x3 : 0000000000000018 x2 : ffff8000000a4374
[ 6525.898452] x1 : 000000000000000a x0 : 0000000000000009
[ 6525.903760] Call trace:
[ 6525.906202]  bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4
[ 6525.911076]  bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c
[ 6525.915957]  bpf_dispatcher_xdp_func+0x14/0x20
[ 6525.920398]  bpf_test_run+0x70/0x1b0
[ 6525.923969]  bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0xec/0x190
[ 6525.928326]  __do_sys_bpf+0xc88/0x1b28
[ 6525.932072]  __arm64_sys_bpf+0x24/0x30
[ 6525.935820]  el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x70/0x168
[ 6525.940607]  do_el0_svc+0x28/0x88
[ 6525.943920]  el0_sync_handler+0x88/0x190
[ 6525.947838]  el0_sync+0x140/0x180
[ 6525.951154] Code: d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 (d4202000)
[ 6525.957249] ---[ end trace cecc3f93b14927e2 ]---

The reason is the offset[] creation and later usage while building
the eBPF body. The code currently omits the first instruction, since
build_insn() will increase our ctx->idx before saving it.
That was fine up until bounded eBPF loops were introduced. After that
introduction, offset[0] must be the offset of the end of prologue which
is the start of the 1st insn while, offset[n] holds the
offset of the end of n-th insn.

When "taken loop with back jump to 1st insn" test runs, it will
eventually call bpf2a64_offset(-1, 2, ctx). Since negative indexing is
permitted, the current outcome depends on the value stored in
ctx->offset[-1], which has nothing to do with our array.
If the value happens to be 0 the tests will work. If not this error
triggers.

7c2e988 ("bpf: fix x64 JIT code generation for jmp to 1st insn")
fixed an indentical bug on x86 when eBPF bounded loops were introduced.

So let's fix it by creating the ctx->offset[] correctly in the first
place and account for the first instruction while calculating the arm
instruction offsets.

Fixes: 2589726 ("bpf: introduce bounded loops")
Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilias Apalodimas <[email protected]>
---
Changes since v1:
 - Added Co-developed-by, Reported-by and Fixes tags correctly
 - Describe the expected context of ctx->offset[] in comments

 arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 15, 2020
[ 6525.735488] Unexpected kernel BRK exception at EL1
[ 6525.735502] Internal error: ptrace BRK handler: f2000100 [#1] SMP
[ 6525.741609] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 cifs libdes libarc4 dns_resolver fscache binfmt_misc nls_ascii nls_cp437 vfat fat aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce gf128mul efi_pstore sha2_ce sha256_arm64 sha1_ce evdev efivars efivarfs ip_tables x_tables autofs4 btrfs blake2b_generic xor xor_neon zstd_compress raid6_pq libcrc32c crc32c_generic ahci xhci_pci libahci xhci_hcd igb libata i2c_algo_bit nvme realtek usbcore nvme_core scsi_mod t10_pi netsec mdio_devres of_mdio gpio_keys fixed_phy libphy gpio_mb86s7x
[ 6525.787760] CPU: 3 PID: 7881 Comm: test_verifier Tainted: G        W         5.9.0-rc1+ #47
[ 6525.796111] Hardware name: Socionext SynQuacer E-series DeveloperBox, BIOS build #1 Jun  6 2020
[ 6525.804812] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO BTYPE=--)
[ 6525.810390] pc : bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4
[ 6525.815613] lr : bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c
[ 6525.820832] sp : ffff8000130cbb80
[ 6525.824141] x29: ffff8000130cbbb0 x28: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.829451] x27: 000005ef6fcbf39b x26: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.834759] x25: ffff8000130cbb80 x24: ffff800011dc7038
[ 6525.840067] x23: ffff8000130cbd00 x22: ffff0008f624d080
[ 6525.845375] x21: 0000000000000001 x20: ffff800011dc7000
[ 6525.850682] x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.855990] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.861298] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.866606] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.871913] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff8000000a660c
[ 6525.877220] x9 : ffff800010951810 x8 : ffff8000130cbc38
[ 6525.882528] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000009864cfa881
[ 6525.887836] x5 : 00ffffffffffffff x4 : 002880ba1a0b3e9f
[ 6525.893144] x3 : 0000000000000018 x2 : ffff8000000a4374
[ 6525.898452] x1 : 000000000000000a x0 : 0000000000000009
[ 6525.903760] Call trace:
[ 6525.906202]  bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4
[ 6525.911076]  bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c
[ 6525.915957]  bpf_dispatcher_xdp_func+0x14/0x20
[ 6525.920398]  bpf_test_run+0x70/0x1b0
[ 6525.923969]  bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0xec/0x190
[ 6525.928326]  __do_sys_bpf+0xc88/0x1b28
[ 6525.932072]  __arm64_sys_bpf+0x24/0x30
[ 6525.935820]  el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x70/0x168
[ 6525.940607]  do_el0_svc+0x28/0x88
[ 6525.943920]  el0_sync_handler+0x88/0x190
[ 6525.947838]  el0_sync+0x140/0x180
[ 6525.951154] Code: d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 (d4202000)
[ 6525.957249] ---[ end trace cecc3f93b14927e2 ]---

The reason is the offset[] creation and later usage while building
the eBPF body. The code currently omits the first instruction, since
build_insn() will increase our ctx->idx before saving it.
That was fine up until bounded eBPF loops were introduced. After that
introduction, offset[0] must be the offset of the end of prologue which
is the start of the 1st insn while, offset[n] holds the
offset of the end of n-th insn.

When "taken loop with back jump to 1st insn" test runs, it will
eventually call bpf2a64_offset(-1, 2, ctx). Since negative indexing is
permitted, the current outcome depends on the value stored in
ctx->offset[-1], which has nothing to do with our array.
If the value happens to be 0 the tests will work. If not this error
triggers.

7c2e988 ("bpf: fix x64 JIT code generation for jmp to 1st insn")
fixed an indentical bug on x86 when eBPF bounded loops were introduced.

So let's fix it by creating the ctx->offset[] correctly in the first
place and account for the first instruction while calculating the arm
instruction offsets.

Fixes: 2589726 ("bpf: introduce bounded loops")
Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilias Apalodimas <[email protected]>
---
Changes since v1:
 - Added Co-developed-by, Reported-by and Fixes tags correctly
 - Describe the expected context of ctx->offset[] in comments

 arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 15, 2020
[ 6525.735488] Unexpected kernel BRK exception at EL1
[ 6525.735502] Internal error: ptrace BRK handler: f2000100 [#1] SMP
[ 6525.741609] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 cifs libdes libarc4 dns_resolver fscache binfmt_misc nls_ascii nls_cp437 vfat fat aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce gf128mul efi_pstore sha2_ce sha256_arm64 sha1_ce evdev efivars efivarfs ip_tables x_tables autofs4 btrfs blake2b_generic xor xor_neon zstd_compress raid6_pq libcrc32c crc32c_generic ahci xhci_pci libahci xhci_hcd igb libata i2c_algo_bit nvme realtek usbcore nvme_core scsi_mod t10_pi netsec mdio_devres of_mdio gpio_keys fixed_phy libphy gpio_mb86s7x
[ 6525.787760] CPU: 3 PID: 7881 Comm: test_verifier Tainted: G        W         5.9.0-rc1+ #47
[ 6525.796111] Hardware name: Socionext SynQuacer E-series DeveloperBox, BIOS build #1 Jun  6 2020
[ 6525.804812] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO BTYPE=--)
[ 6525.810390] pc : bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4
[ 6525.815613] lr : bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c
[ 6525.820832] sp : ffff8000130cbb80
[ 6525.824141] x29: ffff8000130cbbb0 x28: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.829451] x27: 000005ef6fcbf39b x26: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.834759] x25: ffff8000130cbb80 x24: ffff800011dc7038
[ 6525.840067] x23: ffff8000130cbd00 x22: ffff0008f624d080
[ 6525.845375] x21: 0000000000000001 x20: ffff800011dc7000
[ 6525.850682] x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.855990] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.861298] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.866606] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.871913] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff8000000a660c
[ 6525.877220] x9 : ffff800010951810 x8 : ffff8000130cbc38
[ 6525.882528] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000009864cfa881
[ 6525.887836] x5 : 00ffffffffffffff x4 : 002880ba1a0b3e9f
[ 6525.893144] x3 : 0000000000000018 x2 : ffff8000000a4374
[ 6525.898452] x1 : 000000000000000a x0 : 0000000000000009
[ 6525.903760] Call trace:
[ 6525.906202]  bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4
[ 6525.911076]  bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c
[ 6525.915957]  bpf_dispatcher_xdp_func+0x14/0x20
[ 6525.920398]  bpf_test_run+0x70/0x1b0
[ 6525.923969]  bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0xec/0x190
[ 6525.928326]  __do_sys_bpf+0xc88/0x1b28
[ 6525.932072]  __arm64_sys_bpf+0x24/0x30
[ 6525.935820]  el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x70/0x168
[ 6525.940607]  do_el0_svc+0x28/0x88
[ 6525.943920]  el0_sync_handler+0x88/0x190
[ 6525.947838]  el0_sync+0x140/0x180
[ 6525.951154] Code: d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 (d4202000)
[ 6525.957249] ---[ end trace cecc3f93b14927e2 ]---

The reason is the offset[] creation and later usage while building
the eBPF body. The code currently omits the first instruction, since
build_insn() will increase our ctx->idx before saving it.
That was fine up until bounded eBPF loops were introduced. After that
introduction, offset[0] must be the offset of the end of prologue which
is the start of the 1st insn while, offset[n] holds the
offset of the end of n-th insn.

When "taken loop with back jump to 1st insn" test runs, it will
eventually call bpf2a64_offset(-1, 2, ctx). Since negative indexing is
permitted, the current outcome depends on the value stored in
ctx->offset[-1], which has nothing to do with our array.
If the value happens to be 0 the tests will work. If not this error
triggers.

7c2e988 ("bpf: fix x64 JIT code generation for jmp to 1st insn")
fixed an indentical bug on x86 when eBPF bounded loops were introduced.

So let's fix it by creating the ctx->offset[] correctly in the first
place and account for the first instruction while calculating the arm
instruction offsets.

Fixes: 2589726 ("bpf: introduce bounded loops")
Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilias Apalodimas <[email protected]>
---
Changes since v1:
 - Added Co-developed-by, Reported-by and Fixes tags correctly
 - Describe the expected context of ctx->offset[] in comments

 arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 15, 2020
[ 6525.735488] Unexpected kernel BRK exception at EL1
[ 6525.735502] Internal error: ptrace BRK handler: f2000100 [#1] SMP
[ 6525.741609] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 cifs libdes libarc4 dns_resolver fscache binfmt_misc nls_ascii nls_cp437 vfat fat aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce gf128mul efi_pstore sha2_ce sha256_arm64 sha1_ce evdev efivars efivarfs ip_tables x_tables autofs4 btrfs blake2b_generic xor xor_neon zstd_compress raid6_pq libcrc32c crc32c_generic ahci xhci_pci libahci xhci_hcd igb libata i2c_algo_bit nvme realtek usbcore nvme_core scsi_mod t10_pi netsec mdio_devres of_mdio gpio_keys fixed_phy libphy gpio_mb86s7x
[ 6525.787760] CPU: 3 PID: 7881 Comm: test_verifier Tainted: G        W         5.9.0-rc1+ #47
[ 6525.796111] Hardware name: Socionext SynQuacer E-series DeveloperBox, BIOS build #1 Jun  6 2020
[ 6525.804812] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO BTYPE=--)
[ 6525.810390] pc : bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4
[ 6525.815613] lr : bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c
[ 6525.820832] sp : ffff8000130cbb80
[ 6525.824141] x29: ffff8000130cbbb0 x28: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.829451] x27: 000005ef6fcbf39b x26: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.834759] x25: ffff8000130cbb80 x24: ffff800011dc7038
[ 6525.840067] x23: ffff8000130cbd00 x22: ffff0008f624d080
[ 6525.845375] x21: 0000000000000001 x20: ffff800011dc7000
[ 6525.850682] x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.855990] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.861298] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.866606] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.871913] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff8000000a660c
[ 6525.877220] x9 : ffff800010951810 x8 : ffff8000130cbc38
[ 6525.882528] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000009864cfa881
[ 6525.887836] x5 : 00ffffffffffffff x4 : 002880ba1a0b3e9f
[ 6525.893144] x3 : 0000000000000018 x2 : ffff8000000a4374
[ 6525.898452] x1 : 000000000000000a x0 : 0000000000000009
[ 6525.903760] Call trace:
[ 6525.906202]  bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4
[ 6525.911076]  bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c
[ 6525.915957]  bpf_dispatcher_xdp_func+0x14/0x20
[ 6525.920398]  bpf_test_run+0x70/0x1b0
[ 6525.923969]  bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0xec/0x190
[ 6525.928326]  __do_sys_bpf+0xc88/0x1b28
[ 6525.932072]  __arm64_sys_bpf+0x24/0x30
[ 6525.935820]  el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x70/0x168
[ 6525.940607]  do_el0_svc+0x28/0x88
[ 6525.943920]  el0_sync_handler+0x88/0x190
[ 6525.947838]  el0_sync+0x140/0x180
[ 6525.951154] Code: d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 (d4202000)
[ 6525.957249] ---[ end trace cecc3f93b14927e2 ]---

The reason is the offset[] creation and later usage while building
the eBPF body. The code currently omits the first instruction, since
build_insn() will increase our ctx->idx before saving it.
That was fine up until bounded eBPF loops were introduced. After that
introduction, offset[0] must be the offset of the end of prologue which
is the start of the 1st insn while, offset[n] holds the
offset of the end of n-th insn.

When "taken loop with back jump to 1st insn" test runs, it will
eventually call bpf2a64_offset(-1, 2, ctx). Since negative indexing is
permitted, the current outcome depends on the value stored in
ctx->offset[-1], which has nothing to do with our array.
If the value happens to be 0 the tests will work. If not this error
triggers.

7c2e988 ("bpf: fix x64 JIT code generation for jmp to 1st insn")
fixed an indentical bug on x86 when eBPF bounded loops were introduced.

So let's fix it by creating the ctx->offset[] correctly in the first
place and account for the first instruction while calculating the arm
instruction offsets.

Fixes: 2589726 ("bpf: introduce bounded loops")
Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilias Apalodimas <[email protected]>
---
Changes since v1:
 - Added Co-developed-by, Reported-by and Fixes tags correctly
 - Describe the expected context of ctx->offset[] in comments

 arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 15, 2020
[ 6525.735488] Unexpected kernel BRK exception at EL1
[ 6525.735502] Internal error: ptrace BRK handler: f2000100 [#1] SMP
[ 6525.741609] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 cifs libdes libarc4 dns_resolver fscache binfmt_misc nls_ascii nls_cp437 vfat fat aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce gf128mul efi_pstore sha2_ce sha256_arm64 sha1_ce evdev efivars efivarfs ip_tables x_tables autofs4 btrfs blake2b_generic xor xor_neon zstd_compress raid6_pq libcrc32c crc32c_generic ahci xhci_pci libahci xhci_hcd igb libata i2c_algo_bit nvme realtek usbcore nvme_core scsi_mod t10_pi netsec mdio_devres of_mdio gpio_keys fixed_phy libphy gpio_mb86s7x
[ 6525.787760] CPU: 3 PID: 7881 Comm: test_verifier Tainted: G        W         5.9.0-rc1+ #47
[ 6525.796111] Hardware name: Socionext SynQuacer E-series DeveloperBox, BIOS build #1 Jun  6 2020
[ 6525.804812] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO BTYPE=--)
[ 6525.810390] pc : bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4
[ 6525.815613] lr : bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c
[ 6525.820832] sp : ffff8000130cbb80
[ 6525.824141] x29: ffff8000130cbbb0 x28: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.829451] x27: 000005ef6fcbf39b x26: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.834759] x25: ffff8000130cbb80 x24: ffff800011dc7038
[ 6525.840067] x23: ffff8000130cbd00 x22: ffff0008f624d080
[ 6525.845375] x21: 0000000000000001 x20: ffff800011dc7000
[ 6525.850682] x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.855990] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.861298] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.866606] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 6525.871913] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff8000000a660c
[ 6525.877220] x9 : ffff800010951810 x8 : ffff8000130cbc38
[ 6525.882528] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000009864cfa881
[ 6525.887836] x5 : 00ffffffffffffff x4 : 002880ba1a0b3e9f
[ 6525.893144] x3 : 0000000000000018 x2 : ffff8000000a4374
[ 6525.898452] x1 : 000000000000000a x0 : 0000000000000009
[ 6525.903760] Call trace:
[ 6525.906202]  bpf_prog_c3d01833289b6311_F+0xc8/0x9f4
[ 6525.911076]  bpf_prog_d53bb52e3f4483f9_F+0x38/0xc8c
[ 6525.915957]  bpf_dispatcher_xdp_func+0x14/0x20
[ 6525.920398]  bpf_test_run+0x70/0x1b0
[ 6525.923969]  bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0xec/0x190
[ 6525.928326]  __do_sys_bpf+0xc88/0x1b28
[ 6525.932072]  __arm64_sys_bpf+0x24/0x30
[ 6525.935820]  el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x70/0x168
[ 6525.940607]  do_el0_svc+0x28/0x88
[ 6525.943920]  el0_sync_handler+0x88/0x190
[ 6525.947838]  el0_sync+0x140/0x180
[ 6525.951154] Code: d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 d4202000 (d4202000)
[ 6525.957249] ---[ end trace cecc3f93b14927e2 ]---

The reason is the offset[] creation and later usage while building
the eBPF body. The code currently omits the first instruction, since
build_insn() will increase our ctx->idx before saving it.
That was fine up until bounded eBPF loops were introduced. After that
introduction, offset[0] must be the offset of the end of prologue which
is the start of the 1st insn while, offset[n] holds the
offset of the end of n-th insn.

When "taken loop with back jump to 1st insn" test runs, it will
eventually call bpf2a64_offset(-1, 2, ctx). Since negative indexing is
permitted, the current outcome depends on the value stored in
ctx->offset[-1], which has nothing to do with our array.
If the value happens to be 0 the tests will work. If not this error
triggers.

7c2e988 ("bpf: fix x64 JIT code generation for jmp to 1st insn")
fixed an indentical bug on x86 when eBPF bounded loops were introduced.

So let's fix it by creating the ctx->offset[] correctly in the first
place and account for the first instruction while calculating the arm
instruction offsets.

Fixes: 2589726 ("bpf: introduce bounded loops")
Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilias Apalodimas <[email protected]>
---
Changes since v1:
 - Added Co-developed-by, Reported-by and Fixes tags correctly
 - Describe the expected context of ctx->offset[] in comments

 arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request May 20, 2025
When xdp is attached or detached, dev->ndo_bpf() is called by
do_setlink(), and it acquires netdev_lock() if needed.
Unlike other drivers, the bnxt driver is protected by netdev_lock while
xdp is attached/detached because it sets dev->request_ops_lock to true.

So, the bnxt_xdp(), that is callback of ->ndo_bpf should not acquire
netdev_lock().
But the xdp_features_{set | clear}_redirect_target() was changed to
acquire netdev_lock() internally.
It causes a deadlock.
To fix this problem, bnxt driver should use
xdp_features_{set | clear}_redirect_target_locked() instead.

Splat looks like:
============================================
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
6.15.0-rc6+ kernel-patches#1 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------
bpftool/1745 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff888131b85038 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: xdp_features_set_redirect_target+0x1f/0x80

but task is already holding lock:
ffff888131b85038 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: do_setlink.constprop.0+0x24e/0x35d0

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0
       ----
  lock(&dev->lock);
  lock(&dev->lock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

 May be due to missing lock nesting notation

3 locks held by bpftool/1745:
 #0: ffffffffa56131c8 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnl_setlink+0x1fe/0x570
 kernel-patches#1: ffffffffaafa75a0 (&net->rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnl_setlink+0x236/0x570
 kernel-patches#2: ffff888131b85038 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: do_setlink.constprop.0+0x24e/0x35d0

stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1745 Comm: bpftool Not tainted 6.15.0-rc6+ kernel-patches#1 PREEMPT(undef)
Hardware name: ASUS System Product Name/PRIME Z690-P D4, BIOS 0603 11/01/2021
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x7a/0xd0
 print_deadlock_bug+0x294/0x3d0
 __lock_acquire+0x153b/0x28f0
 lock_acquire+0x184/0x340
 ? xdp_features_set_redirect_target+0x1f/0x80
 __mutex_lock+0x1ac/0x18a0
 ? xdp_features_set_redirect_target+0x1f/0x80
 ? xdp_features_set_redirect_target+0x1f/0x80
 ? __pfx_bnxt_rx_page_skb+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_en
 ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
 ? __pfx_netdev_update_features+0x10/0x10
 ? bnxt_set_rx_skb_mode+0x284/0x540 [bnxt_en
 ? __pfx_bnxt_set_rx_skb_mode+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_en
 ? xdp_features_set_redirect_target+0x1f/0x80
 xdp_features_set_redirect_target+0x1f/0x80
 bnxt_xdp+0x34e/0x730 [bnxt_en 11cbcce8fa11cff1dddd7ef358d6219e4ca9add3]
 dev_xdp_install+0x3f4/0x830
 ? __pfx_bnxt_xdp+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_en 11cbcce8fa11cff1dddd7ef358d6219e4ca9add3]
 ? __pfx_dev_xdp_install+0x10/0x10
 dev_xdp_attach+0x560/0xf70
 dev_change_xdp_fd+0x22d/0x280
 do_setlink.constprop.0+0x2989/0x35d0
 ? __pfx_do_setlink.constprop.0+0x10/0x10
 ? lock_acquire+0x184/0x340
 ? find_held_lock+0x32/0x90
 ? rtnl_setlink+0x236/0x570
 ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
 ? trace_contention_end+0xdc/0x120
 ? __mutex_lock+0x946/0x18a0
 ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
 ? __lock_acquire+0xa95/0x28f0
 ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
 ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
 ? cap_capable+0x172/0x350
 rtnl_setlink+0x2cd/0x570

Fixes: 03df156 ("xdp: double protect netdev->xdp_flags with netdev->lock")
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michael Chan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request May 20, 2025
While tracking an IDPF bug, I found that idpf_vport_splitq_napi_poll()
was not following NAPI rules.

It can indeed return @Budget after napi_complete() has been called.

Add two debug conditions in networking core to hopefully catch
this kind of bugs sooner.

IDPF bug will be fixed in a separate patch.

[   72.441242] repoll requested for device eth1 idpf_vport_splitq_napi_poll [idpf] but napi is not scheduled.
[   72.446291] list_del corruption. next->prev should be ff31783d93b14040, but was ff31783d93b10080. (next=ff31783d93b10080)
[   72.446659] kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:67!
[   72.446816] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [kernel-patches#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC NOPTI
[   72.447031] CPU: 156 UID: 0 PID: 16258 Comm: ip Tainted: G        W           6.15.0-dbg-DEV kernel-patches#1944 NONE
[   72.447340] Tainted: [W]=WARN
[   72.447702] RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid_or_report (lib/list_debug.c:65)
[   72.450630] Call Trace:
[   72.450720]  <IRQ>
[   72.450797] net_rx_action (include/linux/list.h:215 include/linux/list.h:287 net/core/dev.c:7385 net/core/dev.c:7516)
[   72.450928] ? lock_release (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:?)
[   72.451059] ? clockevents_program_event (kernel/time/clockevents.c:?)
[   72.451222] handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:579)
[   72.451356] ? do_softirq (kernel/softirq.c:480)
[   72.451480] ? idpf_vc_xn_exec (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c:462) idpf
[   72.451635] do_softirq (kernel/softirq.c:480)
[   72.451750]  </IRQ>
[   72.451828]  <TASK>
[   72.451905] __local_bh_enable_ip (kernel/softirq.c:?)
[   72.452051] idpf_vc_xn_exec (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c:462) idpf
[   72.452210] idpf_send_delete_queues_msg (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c:2083) idpf
[   72.452390] idpf_vport_stop (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_lib.c:837 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_lib.c:868) idpf
[   72.452541] ? idpf_vport_stop (include/linux/bottom_half.h:? include/linux/netdevice.h:4762 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_lib.c:855) idpf
[   72.452695] idpf_initiate_soft_reset (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_lib.c:?) idpf
[   72.452867] idpf_change_mtu (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_lib.c:2189) idpf
[   72.453015] netif_set_mtu_ext (net/core/dev.c:9437)
[   72.453157] ? packet_notifier (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 net/packet/af_packet.c:4240)
[   72.453292] netif_set_mtu (net/core/dev.c:9515)
[   72.453416] dev_set_mtu (net/core/dev_api.c:?)
[   72.453534] bond_change_mtu (drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:4833)
[   72.453666] netif_set_mtu_ext (net/core/dev.c:9437)
[   72.453803] do_setlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3116)
[   72.453925] ? rtnl_newlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3901)
[   72.454055] ? rtnl_newlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3901)
[   72.454185] ? rtnl_newlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3901)
[   72.454314] ? trace_contention_end (include/trace/events/lock.h:122)
[   72.454467] ? __mutex_lock (arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:85 kernel/locking/mutex.c:611 kernel/locking/mutex.c:746)
[   72.454597] ? cap_capable (include/trace/events/capability.h:26)
[   72.454721] ? security_capable (security/security.c:?)
[   72.454857] rtnl_newlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:?)
[   72.454982] ? lock_is_held_type (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5599 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5938)
[   72.455121] ? __lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:?)
[   72.455256] ? __change_page_attr_set_clr (arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c:685)
[   72.455438] ? __lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:?)
[   72.455582] ? rtnetlink_rcv_msg (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6885)
[   72.455721] ? lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5866)
[   72.455848] ? rtnetlink_rcv_msg (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6885)
[   72.455987] ? lock_release (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:?)
[   72.456117] ? rcu_read_unlock (include/linux/rcupdate.h:341 include/linux/rcupdate.h:871)
[   72.456249] ? __pfx_rtnl_newlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3956)
[   72.456388] rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6955)
[   72.456526] ? rtnetlink_rcv_msg (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6885)
[   72.456671] ? lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5866)
[   72.456802] ? net_generic (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 include/net/netns/generic.h:45)
[   72.456929] ? __pfx_rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6858)
[   72.457082] netlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2534)
[   72.457212] netlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1313)
[   72.457344] netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1883)
[   72.457476] __sock_sendmsg (net/socket.c:712)
[   72.457602] ____sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:?)
[   72.457735] ? _copy_from_user (arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:126 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:134 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:141 include/linux/uaccess.h:178 lib/usercopy.c:18)
[   72.457875] ___sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2620)
[   72.458042] ? __call_rcu_common (arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:42 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:119 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:159 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3107)
[   72.458185] ? mntput_no_expire (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 fs/namespace.c:1457)
[   72.458324] ? lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5866)
[   72.458451] ? mntput_no_expire (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 fs/namespace.c:1457)
[   72.458588] ? lock_release (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:?)
[   72.458718] ? mntput_no_expire (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 fs/namespace.c:1457)
[   72.458856] __x64_sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2652)
[   72.458997] ? do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:42 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:119 include/linux/entry-common.h:198 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:90)
[   72.459136] do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:?)
[   72.459259] ? exc_page_fault (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1542)
[   72.459387] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
[   72.459555] RIP: 0033:0x7fd15f17cbd0

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request May 20, 2025
There is no disagreement that we should check both ptp->is_virtual_clock
and ptp->n_vclocks to check if the ptp virtual clock is in use.

However, when we acquire ptp->n_vclocks_mux to read ptp->n_vclocks in
ptp_vclock_in_use(), we observe a recursive lock in the call trace
starting from n_vclocks_store().

============================================
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
6.15.0-rc6 kernel-patches#1 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------
syz.0.1540/13807 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff888035a24868 (&ptp->n_vclocks_mux){+.+.}-{4:4}, at:
 ptp_vclock_in_use drivers/ptp/ptp_private.h:103 [inline]
ffff888035a24868 (&ptp->n_vclocks_mux){+.+.}-{4:4}, at:
 ptp_clock_unregister+0x21/0x250 drivers/ptp/ptp_clock.c:415

but task is already holding lock:
ffff888030704868 (&ptp->n_vclocks_mux){+.+.}-{4:4}, at:
 n_vclocks_store+0xf1/0x6d0 drivers/ptp/ptp_sysfs.c:215

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0
       ----
  lock(&ptp->n_vclocks_mux);
  lock(&ptp->n_vclocks_mux);

 *** DEADLOCK ***
....
============================================

The best way to solve this is to remove the logic that checks
ptp->n_vclocks in ptp_vclock_in_use().

The reason why this is appropriate is that any path that uses
ptp->n_vclocks must unconditionally check if ptp->n_vclocks is greater
than 0 before unregistering vclocks, and all functions are already
written this way. And in the function that uses ptp->n_vclocks, we
already get ptp->n_vclocks_mux before unregistering vclocks.

Therefore, we need to remove the redundant check for ptp->n_vclocks in
ptp_vclock_in_use() to prevent recursive locking.

Fixes: 73f3706 ("ptp: support ptp physical/virtual clocks conversion")
Signed-off-by: Jeongjun Park <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request May 21, 2025
When xdp is attached or detached, dev->ndo_bpf() is called by
do_setlink(), and it acquires netdev_lock() if needed.
Unlike other drivers, the bnxt driver is protected by netdev_lock while
xdp is attached/detached because it sets dev->request_ops_lock to true.

So, the bnxt_xdp(), that is callback of ->ndo_bpf should not acquire
netdev_lock().
But the xdp_features_{set | clear}_redirect_target() was changed to
acquire netdev_lock() internally.
It causes a deadlock.
To fix this problem, bnxt driver should use
xdp_features_{set | clear}_redirect_target_locked() instead.

Splat looks like:
============================================
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
6.15.0-rc6+ kernel-patches#1 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------
bpftool/1745 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff888131b85038 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: xdp_features_set_redirect_target+0x1f/0x80

but task is already holding lock:
ffff888131b85038 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: do_setlink.constprop.0+0x24e/0x35d0

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0
       ----
  lock(&dev->lock);
  lock(&dev->lock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

 May be due to missing lock nesting notation

3 locks held by bpftool/1745:
 #0: ffffffffa56131c8 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnl_setlink+0x1fe/0x570
 kernel-patches#1: ffffffffaafa75a0 (&net->rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnl_setlink+0x236/0x570
 kernel-patches#2: ffff888131b85038 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: do_setlink.constprop.0+0x24e/0x35d0

stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1745 Comm: bpftool Not tainted 6.15.0-rc6+ kernel-patches#1 PREEMPT(undef)
Hardware name: ASUS System Product Name/PRIME Z690-P D4, BIOS 0603 11/01/2021
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x7a/0xd0
 print_deadlock_bug+0x294/0x3d0
 __lock_acquire+0x153b/0x28f0
 lock_acquire+0x184/0x340
 ? xdp_features_set_redirect_target+0x1f/0x80
 __mutex_lock+0x1ac/0x18a0
 ? xdp_features_set_redirect_target+0x1f/0x80
 ? xdp_features_set_redirect_target+0x1f/0x80
 ? __pfx_bnxt_rx_page_skb+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_en
 ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
 ? __pfx_netdev_update_features+0x10/0x10
 ? bnxt_set_rx_skb_mode+0x284/0x540 [bnxt_en
 ? __pfx_bnxt_set_rx_skb_mode+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_en
 ? xdp_features_set_redirect_target+0x1f/0x80
 xdp_features_set_redirect_target+0x1f/0x80
 bnxt_xdp+0x34e/0x730 [bnxt_en 11cbcce8fa11cff1dddd7ef358d6219e4ca9add3]
 dev_xdp_install+0x3f4/0x830
 ? __pfx_bnxt_xdp+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_en 11cbcce8fa11cff1dddd7ef358d6219e4ca9add3]
 ? __pfx_dev_xdp_install+0x10/0x10
 dev_xdp_attach+0x560/0xf70
 dev_change_xdp_fd+0x22d/0x280
 do_setlink.constprop.0+0x2989/0x35d0
 ? __pfx_do_setlink.constprop.0+0x10/0x10
 ? lock_acquire+0x184/0x340
 ? find_held_lock+0x32/0x90
 ? rtnl_setlink+0x236/0x570
 ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
 ? trace_contention_end+0xdc/0x120
 ? __mutex_lock+0x946/0x18a0
 ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
 ? __lock_acquire+0xa95/0x28f0
 ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
 ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
 ? cap_capable+0x172/0x350
 rtnl_setlink+0x2cd/0x570

Fixes: 03df156 ("xdp: double protect netdev->xdp_flags with netdev->lock")
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michael Chan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request May 21, 2025
While tracking an IDPF bug, I found that idpf_vport_splitq_napi_poll()
was not following NAPI rules.

It can indeed return @Budget after napi_complete() has been called.

Add two debug conditions in networking core to hopefully catch
this kind of bugs sooner.

IDPF bug will be fixed in a separate patch.

[   72.441242] repoll requested for device eth1 idpf_vport_splitq_napi_poll [idpf] but napi is not scheduled.
[   72.446291] list_del corruption. next->prev should be ff31783d93b14040, but was ff31783d93b10080. (next=ff31783d93b10080)
[   72.446659] kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:67!
[   72.446816] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [kernel-patches#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC NOPTI
[   72.447031] CPU: 156 UID: 0 PID: 16258 Comm: ip Tainted: G        W           6.15.0-dbg-DEV kernel-patches#1944 NONE
[   72.447340] Tainted: [W]=WARN
[   72.447702] RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid_or_report (lib/list_debug.c:65)
[   72.450630] Call Trace:
[   72.450720]  <IRQ>
[   72.450797] net_rx_action (include/linux/list.h:215 include/linux/list.h:287 net/core/dev.c:7385 net/core/dev.c:7516)
[   72.450928] ? lock_release (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:?)
[   72.451059] ? clockevents_program_event (kernel/time/clockevents.c:?)
[   72.451222] handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:579)
[   72.451356] ? do_softirq (kernel/softirq.c:480)
[   72.451480] ? idpf_vc_xn_exec (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c:462) idpf
[   72.451635] do_softirq (kernel/softirq.c:480)
[   72.451750]  </IRQ>
[   72.451828]  <TASK>
[   72.451905] __local_bh_enable_ip (kernel/softirq.c:?)
[   72.452051] idpf_vc_xn_exec (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c:462) idpf
[   72.452210] idpf_send_delete_queues_msg (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c:2083) idpf
[   72.452390] idpf_vport_stop (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_lib.c:837 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_lib.c:868) idpf
[   72.452541] ? idpf_vport_stop (include/linux/bottom_half.h:? include/linux/netdevice.h:4762 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_lib.c:855) idpf
[   72.452695] idpf_initiate_soft_reset (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_lib.c:?) idpf
[   72.452867] idpf_change_mtu (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_lib.c:2189) idpf
[   72.453015] netif_set_mtu_ext (net/core/dev.c:9437)
[   72.453157] ? packet_notifier (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 net/packet/af_packet.c:4240)
[   72.453292] netif_set_mtu (net/core/dev.c:9515)
[   72.453416] dev_set_mtu (net/core/dev_api.c:?)
[   72.453534] bond_change_mtu (drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:4833)
[   72.453666] netif_set_mtu_ext (net/core/dev.c:9437)
[   72.453803] do_setlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3116)
[   72.453925] ? rtnl_newlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3901)
[   72.454055] ? rtnl_newlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3901)
[   72.454185] ? rtnl_newlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3901)
[   72.454314] ? trace_contention_end (include/trace/events/lock.h:122)
[   72.454467] ? __mutex_lock (arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:85 kernel/locking/mutex.c:611 kernel/locking/mutex.c:746)
[   72.454597] ? cap_capable (include/trace/events/capability.h:26)
[   72.454721] ? security_capable (security/security.c:?)
[   72.454857] rtnl_newlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:?)
[   72.454982] ? lock_is_held_type (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5599 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5938)
[   72.455121] ? __lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:?)
[   72.455256] ? __change_page_attr_set_clr (arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c:685)
[   72.455438] ? __lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:?)
[   72.455582] ? rtnetlink_rcv_msg (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6885)
[   72.455721] ? lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5866)
[   72.455848] ? rtnetlink_rcv_msg (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6885)
[   72.455987] ? lock_release (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:?)
[   72.456117] ? rcu_read_unlock (include/linux/rcupdate.h:341 include/linux/rcupdate.h:871)
[   72.456249] ? __pfx_rtnl_newlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3956)
[   72.456388] rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6955)
[   72.456526] ? rtnetlink_rcv_msg (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6885)
[   72.456671] ? lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5866)
[   72.456802] ? net_generic (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 include/net/netns/generic.h:45)
[   72.456929] ? __pfx_rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6858)
[   72.457082] netlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2534)
[   72.457212] netlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1313)
[   72.457344] netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1883)
[   72.457476] __sock_sendmsg (net/socket.c:712)
[   72.457602] ____sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:?)
[   72.457735] ? _copy_from_user (arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:126 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:134 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:141 include/linux/uaccess.h:178 lib/usercopy.c:18)
[   72.457875] ___sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2620)
[   72.458042] ? __call_rcu_common (arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:42 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:119 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:159 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3107)
[   72.458185] ? mntput_no_expire (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 fs/namespace.c:1457)
[   72.458324] ? lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5866)
[   72.458451] ? mntput_no_expire (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 fs/namespace.c:1457)
[   72.458588] ? lock_release (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:?)
[   72.458718] ? mntput_no_expire (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 fs/namespace.c:1457)
[   72.458856] __x64_sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2652)
[   72.458997] ? do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:42 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:119 include/linux/entry-common.h:198 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:90)
[   72.459136] do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:?)
[   72.459259] ? exc_page_fault (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1542)
[   72.459387] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
[   72.459555] RIP: 0033:0x7fd15f17cbd0

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request May 21, 2025
There is no disagreement that we should check both ptp->is_virtual_clock
and ptp->n_vclocks to check if the ptp virtual clock is in use.

However, when we acquire ptp->n_vclocks_mux to read ptp->n_vclocks in
ptp_vclock_in_use(), we observe a recursive lock in the call trace
starting from n_vclocks_store().

============================================
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
6.15.0-rc6 kernel-patches#1 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------
syz.0.1540/13807 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff888035a24868 (&ptp->n_vclocks_mux){+.+.}-{4:4}, at:
 ptp_vclock_in_use drivers/ptp/ptp_private.h:103 [inline]
ffff888035a24868 (&ptp->n_vclocks_mux){+.+.}-{4:4}, at:
 ptp_clock_unregister+0x21/0x250 drivers/ptp/ptp_clock.c:415

but task is already holding lock:
ffff888030704868 (&ptp->n_vclocks_mux){+.+.}-{4:4}, at:
 n_vclocks_store+0xf1/0x6d0 drivers/ptp/ptp_sysfs.c:215

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0
       ----
  lock(&ptp->n_vclocks_mux);
  lock(&ptp->n_vclocks_mux);

 *** DEADLOCK ***
....
============================================

The best way to solve this is to remove the logic that checks
ptp->n_vclocks in ptp_vclock_in_use().

The reason why this is appropriate is that any path that uses
ptp->n_vclocks must unconditionally check if ptp->n_vclocks is greater
than 0 before unregistering vclocks, and all functions are already
written this way. And in the function that uses ptp->n_vclocks, we
already get ptp->n_vclocks_mux before unregistering vclocks.

Therefore, we need to remove the redundant check for ptp->n_vclocks in
ptp_vclock_in_use() to prevent recursive locking.

Fixes: 73f3706 ("ptp: support ptp physical/virtual clocks conversion")
Signed-off-by: Jeongjun Park <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request May 21, 2025
When xdp is attached or detached, dev->ndo_bpf() is called by
do_setlink(), and it acquires netdev_lock() if needed.
Unlike other drivers, the bnxt driver is protected by netdev_lock while
xdp is attached/detached because it sets dev->request_ops_lock to true.

So, the bnxt_xdp(), that is callback of ->ndo_bpf should not acquire
netdev_lock().
But the xdp_features_{set | clear}_redirect_target() was changed to
acquire netdev_lock() internally.
It causes a deadlock.
To fix this problem, bnxt driver should use
xdp_features_{set | clear}_redirect_target_locked() instead.

Splat looks like:
============================================
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
6.15.0-rc6+ kernel-patches#1 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------
bpftool/1745 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff888131b85038 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: xdp_features_set_redirect_target+0x1f/0x80

but task is already holding lock:
ffff888131b85038 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: do_setlink.constprop.0+0x24e/0x35d0

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0
       ----
  lock(&dev->lock);
  lock(&dev->lock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

 May be due to missing lock nesting notation

3 locks held by bpftool/1745:
 #0: ffffffffa56131c8 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnl_setlink+0x1fe/0x570
 kernel-patches#1: ffffffffaafa75a0 (&net->rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnl_setlink+0x236/0x570
 kernel-patches#2: ffff888131b85038 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: do_setlink.constprop.0+0x24e/0x35d0

stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1745 Comm: bpftool Not tainted 6.15.0-rc6+ kernel-patches#1 PREEMPT(undef)
Hardware name: ASUS System Product Name/PRIME Z690-P D4, BIOS 0603 11/01/2021
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x7a/0xd0
 print_deadlock_bug+0x294/0x3d0
 __lock_acquire+0x153b/0x28f0
 lock_acquire+0x184/0x340
 ? xdp_features_set_redirect_target+0x1f/0x80
 __mutex_lock+0x1ac/0x18a0
 ? xdp_features_set_redirect_target+0x1f/0x80
 ? xdp_features_set_redirect_target+0x1f/0x80
 ? __pfx_bnxt_rx_page_skb+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_en
 ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
 ? __pfx_netdev_update_features+0x10/0x10
 ? bnxt_set_rx_skb_mode+0x284/0x540 [bnxt_en
 ? __pfx_bnxt_set_rx_skb_mode+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_en
 ? xdp_features_set_redirect_target+0x1f/0x80
 xdp_features_set_redirect_target+0x1f/0x80
 bnxt_xdp+0x34e/0x730 [bnxt_en 11cbcce8fa11cff1dddd7ef358d6219e4ca9add3]
 dev_xdp_install+0x3f4/0x830
 ? __pfx_bnxt_xdp+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_en 11cbcce8fa11cff1dddd7ef358d6219e4ca9add3]
 ? __pfx_dev_xdp_install+0x10/0x10
 dev_xdp_attach+0x560/0xf70
 dev_change_xdp_fd+0x22d/0x280
 do_setlink.constprop.0+0x2989/0x35d0
 ? __pfx_do_setlink.constprop.0+0x10/0x10
 ? lock_acquire+0x184/0x340
 ? find_held_lock+0x32/0x90
 ? rtnl_setlink+0x236/0x570
 ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
 ? trace_contention_end+0xdc/0x120
 ? __mutex_lock+0x946/0x18a0
 ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
 ? __lock_acquire+0xa95/0x28f0
 ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
 ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
 ? cap_capable+0x172/0x350
 rtnl_setlink+0x2cd/0x570

Fixes: 03df156 ("xdp: double protect netdev->xdp_flags with netdev->lock")
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michael Chan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request May 21, 2025
While tracking an IDPF bug, I found that idpf_vport_splitq_napi_poll()
was not following NAPI rules.

It can indeed return @Budget after napi_complete() has been called.

Add two debug conditions in networking core to hopefully catch
this kind of bugs sooner.

IDPF bug will be fixed in a separate patch.

[   72.441242] repoll requested for device eth1 idpf_vport_splitq_napi_poll [idpf] but napi is not scheduled.
[   72.446291] list_del corruption. next->prev should be ff31783d93b14040, but was ff31783d93b10080. (next=ff31783d93b10080)
[   72.446659] kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:67!
[   72.446816] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [kernel-patches#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC NOPTI
[   72.447031] CPU: 156 UID: 0 PID: 16258 Comm: ip Tainted: G        W           6.15.0-dbg-DEV kernel-patches#1944 NONE
[   72.447340] Tainted: [W]=WARN
[   72.447702] RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid_or_report (lib/list_debug.c:65)
[   72.450630] Call Trace:
[   72.450720]  <IRQ>
[   72.450797] net_rx_action (include/linux/list.h:215 include/linux/list.h:287 net/core/dev.c:7385 net/core/dev.c:7516)
[   72.450928] ? lock_release (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:?)
[   72.451059] ? clockevents_program_event (kernel/time/clockevents.c:?)
[   72.451222] handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:579)
[   72.451356] ? do_softirq (kernel/softirq.c:480)
[   72.451480] ? idpf_vc_xn_exec (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c:462) idpf
[   72.451635] do_softirq (kernel/softirq.c:480)
[   72.451750]  </IRQ>
[   72.451828]  <TASK>
[   72.451905] __local_bh_enable_ip (kernel/softirq.c:?)
[   72.452051] idpf_vc_xn_exec (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c:462) idpf
[   72.452210] idpf_send_delete_queues_msg (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c:2083) idpf
[   72.452390] idpf_vport_stop (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_lib.c:837 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_lib.c:868) idpf
[   72.452541] ? idpf_vport_stop (include/linux/bottom_half.h:? include/linux/netdevice.h:4762 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_lib.c:855) idpf
[   72.452695] idpf_initiate_soft_reset (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_lib.c:?) idpf
[   72.452867] idpf_change_mtu (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_lib.c:2189) idpf
[   72.453015] netif_set_mtu_ext (net/core/dev.c:9437)
[   72.453157] ? packet_notifier (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 net/packet/af_packet.c:4240)
[   72.453292] netif_set_mtu (net/core/dev.c:9515)
[   72.453416] dev_set_mtu (net/core/dev_api.c:?)
[   72.453534] bond_change_mtu (drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:4833)
[   72.453666] netif_set_mtu_ext (net/core/dev.c:9437)
[   72.453803] do_setlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3116)
[   72.453925] ? rtnl_newlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3901)
[   72.454055] ? rtnl_newlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3901)
[   72.454185] ? rtnl_newlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3901)
[   72.454314] ? trace_contention_end (include/trace/events/lock.h:122)
[   72.454467] ? __mutex_lock (arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:85 kernel/locking/mutex.c:611 kernel/locking/mutex.c:746)
[   72.454597] ? cap_capable (include/trace/events/capability.h:26)
[   72.454721] ? security_capable (security/security.c:?)
[   72.454857] rtnl_newlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:?)
[   72.454982] ? lock_is_held_type (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5599 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5938)
[   72.455121] ? __lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:?)
[   72.455256] ? __change_page_attr_set_clr (arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c:685)
[   72.455438] ? __lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:?)
[   72.455582] ? rtnetlink_rcv_msg (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6885)
[   72.455721] ? lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5866)
[   72.455848] ? rtnetlink_rcv_msg (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6885)
[   72.455987] ? lock_release (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:?)
[   72.456117] ? rcu_read_unlock (include/linux/rcupdate.h:341 include/linux/rcupdate.h:871)
[   72.456249] ? __pfx_rtnl_newlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3956)
[   72.456388] rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6955)
[   72.456526] ? rtnetlink_rcv_msg (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6885)
[   72.456671] ? lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5866)
[   72.456802] ? net_generic (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 include/net/netns/generic.h:45)
[   72.456929] ? __pfx_rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6858)
[   72.457082] netlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2534)
[   72.457212] netlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1313)
[   72.457344] netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1883)
[   72.457476] __sock_sendmsg (net/socket.c:712)
[   72.457602] ____sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:?)
[   72.457735] ? _copy_from_user (arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:126 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:134 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:141 include/linux/uaccess.h:178 lib/usercopy.c:18)
[   72.457875] ___sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2620)
[   72.458042] ? __call_rcu_common (arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:42 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:119 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:159 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3107)
[   72.458185] ? mntput_no_expire (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 fs/namespace.c:1457)
[   72.458324] ? lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5866)
[   72.458451] ? mntput_no_expire (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 fs/namespace.c:1457)
[   72.458588] ? lock_release (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:?)
[   72.458718] ? mntput_no_expire (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 fs/namespace.c:1457)
[   72.458856] __x64_sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2652)
[   72.458997] ? do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:42 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:119 include/linux/entry-common.h:198 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:90)
[   72.459136] do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:?)
[   72.459259] ? exc_page_fault (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1542)
[   72.459387] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
[   72.459555] RIP: 0033:0x7fd15f17cbd0

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request May 21, 2025
There is no disagreement that we should check both ptp->is_virtual_clock
and ptp->n_vclocks to check if the ptp virtual clock is in use.

However, when we acquire ptp->n_vclocks_mux to read ptp->n_vclocks in
ptp_vclock_in_use(), we observe a recursive lock in the call trace
starting from n_vclocks_store().

============================================
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
6.15.0-rc6 kernel-patches#1 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------
syz.0.1540/13807 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff888035a24868 (&ptp->n_vclocks_mux){+.+.}-{4:4}, at:
 ptp_vclock_in_use drivers/ptp/ptp_private.h:103 [inline]
ffff888035a24868 (&ptp->n_vclocks_mux){+.+.}-{4:4}, at:
 ptp_clock_unregister+0x21/0x250 drivers/ptp/ptp_clock.c:415

but task is already holding lock:
ffff888030704868 (&ptp->n_vclocks_mux){+.+.}-{4:4}, at:
 n_vclocks_store+0xf1/0x6d0 drivers/ptp/ptp_sysfs.c:215

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0
       ----
  lock(&ptp->n_vclocks_mux);
  lock(&ptp->n_vclocks_mux);

 *** DEADLOCK ***
....
============================================

The best way to solve this is to remove the logic that checks
ptp->n_vclocks in ptp_vclock_in_use().

The reason why this is appropriate is that any path that uses
ptp->n_vclocks must unconditionally check if ptp->n_vclocks is greater
than 0 before unregistering vclocks, and all functions are already
written this way. And in the function that uses ptp->n_vclocks, we
already get ptp->n_vclocks_mux before unregistering vclocks.

Therefore, we need to remove the redundant check for ptp->n_vclocks in
ptp_vclock_in_use() to prevent recursive locking.

Fixes: 73f3706 ("ptp: support ptp physical/virtual clocks conversion")
Signed-off-by: Jeongjun Park <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request May 21, 2025
Removing a peer while userspace attempts to close its transport
socket triggers a race condition resulting in the following
crash:

Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000077: 0000 [kernel-patches#1] SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000003b8-0x00000000000003bf]
CPU: 12 UID: 0 PID: 162 Comm: kworker/12:1 Tainted: G           O        6.15.0-rc2-00635-g521139ac3840 kernel-patches#272 PREEMPT(full)
Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-20240910_120124-localhost 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events ovpn_peer_keepalive_work [ovpn]
RIP: 0010:ovpn_socket_release+0x23c/0x500 [ovpn]
Code: ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 71 02 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4d 8b 64 24 18 49 8d bc 24 be 03 00 00 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 14 02 48 89 f8 83 e0 07 83 c0 01 38 d0 7c 08 84 d2 0f 85 30
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000c9fb18 EFLAGS: 00010217
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff8881148d7940 RCX: ffffffff817787bb
RDX: 0000000000000077 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 00000000000003be
RBP: ffffc90000c9fb30 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: fffffbfff0d3e840
R10: ffffffff869f4207 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff888115eb9300 R14: ffffc90000c9fbc8 R15: 000000000000000c
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8882b0151000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f37266b6114 CR3: 00000000054a8000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 unlock_ovpn+0x8b/0xe0 [ovpn]
 ovpn_peer_keepalive_work+0xe3/0x540 [ovpn]
 ? ovpn_peers_free+0x780/0x780 [ovpn]
 ? lock_acquire+0x56/0x70
 ? process_one_work+0x888/0x1740
 process_one_work+0x933/0x1740
 ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x10b0/0x10b0
 ? move_linked_works+0x12d/0x2c0
 ? assign_work+0x163/0x270
 worker_thread+0x4d6/0xd90
 ? preempt_count_sub+0x4c/0x70
 ? process_one_work+0x1740/0x1740
 kthread+0x36c/0x710
 ? trace_preempt_on+0x8c/0x1e0
 ? kthread_is_per_cpu+0xc0/0xc0
 ? preempt_count_sub+0x4c/0x70
 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x36/0x60
 ? calculate_sigpending+0x7b/0xa0
 ? kthread_is_per_cpu+0xc0/0xc0
 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x80
 ? kthread_is_per_cpu+0xc0/0xc0
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
 </TASK>
Modules linked in: ovpn(O)

This happens because the peer deletion operation reaches
ovpn_socket_release() while ovpn_sock->sock (struct socket *)
and its sk member (struct sock *) are still both valid.
Here synchronize_rcu() is invoked, after which ovpn_sock->sock->sk
becomes NULL, due to the concurrent socket closing triggered
from userspace.

After having invoked synchronize_rcu(), ovpn_socket_release() will
attempt dereferencing ovpn_sock->sock->sk, triggering the crash
reported above.

The reason for accessing sk is that we need to retrieve its
protocol and continue the cleanup routine accordingly.

This crash can be easily produced by running openvpn userspace in
client mode with `--keepalive 10 20`, while entirely omitting this
option on the server side.
After 20 seconds ovpn will assume the peer (server) to be dead,
will start removing it and will notify userspace. The latter will
receive the notification and close the transport socket, thus
triggering the crash.

To fix the race condition for good, we need to refactor ovpn_socket.
Since we are always only interested in the sock->sk member (struct sock *)
we can directly hold a reference to it, raher than relying on
sock->sk.

This means changing ovpn_socket->sock to ovpn_socket->sk.

While holding a reference to sk, we can increase its refcounter
without affecting the socket close()/destroy() notification
(which we rely on when userspace closes a socket we are using).

By increasing sk's refcounter we know we can dereference it
in ovpn_socket_release() without incurring in any race condition
anymore.

ovpn_socket_release() will ultimately decrease the reference
counter.

Cc: Oleksandr Natalenko <[email protected]>
Fixes: 11851cb ("ovpn: implement TCP transport")
Reported-by: Qingfang Deng <[email protected]>
Closes: OpenVPN/ovpn-net-next#1
Tested-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]>
Link: https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg31575.html
Signed-off-by: Antonio Quartulli <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request May 21, 2025
When xdp is attached or detached, dev->ndo_bpf() is called by
do_setlink(), and it acquires netdev_lock() if needed.
Unlike other drivers, the bnxt driver is protected by netdev_lock while
xdp is attached/detached because it sets dev->request_ops_lock to true.

So, the bnxt_xdp(), that is callback of ->ndo_bpf should not acquire
netdev_lock().
But the xdp_features_{set | clear}_redirect_target() was changed to
acquire netdev_lock() internally.
It causes a deadlock.
To fix this problem, bnxt driver should use
xdp_features_{set | clear}_redirect_target_locked() instead.

Splat looks like:
============================================
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
6.15.0-rc6+ kernel-patches#1 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------
bpftool/1745 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff888131b85038 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: xdp_features_set_redirect_target+0x1f/0x80

but task is already holding lock:
ffff888131b85038 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: do_setlink.constprop.0+0x24e/0x35d0

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0
       ----
  lock(&dev->lock);
  lock(&dev->lock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

 May be due to missing lock nesting notation

3 locks held by bpftool/1745:
 #0: ffffffffa56131c8 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnl_setlink+0x1fe/0x570
 kernel-patches#1: ffffffffaafa75a0 (&net->rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnl_setlink+0x236/0x570
 kernel-patches#2: ffff888131b85038 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: do_setlink.constprop.0+0x24e/0x35d0

stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1745 Comm: bpftool Not tainted 6.15.0-rc6+ kernel-patches#1 PREEMPT(undef)
Hardware name: ASUS System Product Name/PRIME Z690-P D4, BIOS 0603 11/01/2021
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x7a/0xd0
 print_deadlock_bug+0x294/0x3d0
 __lock_acquire+0x153b/0x28f0
 lock_acquire+0x184/0x340
 ? xdp_features_set_redirect_target+0x1f/0x80
 __mutex_lock+0x1ac/0x18a0
 ? xdp_features_set_redirect_target+0x1f/0x80
 ? xdp_features_set_redirect_target+0x1f/0x80
 ? __pfx_bnxt_rx_page_skb+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_en
 ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
 ? __pfx_netdev_update_features+0x10/0x10
 ? bnxt_set_rx_skb_mode+0x284/0x540 [bnxt_en
 ? __pfx_bnxt_set_rx_skb_mode+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_en
 ? xdp_features_set_redirect_target+0x1f/0x80
 xdp_features_set_redirect_target+0x1f/0x80
 bnxt_xdp+0x34e/0x730 [bnxt_en 11cbcce8fa11cff1dddd7ef358d6219e4ca9add3]
 dev_xdp_install+0x3f4/0x830
 ? __pfx_bnxt_xdp+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_en 11cbcce8fa11cff1dddd7ef358d6219e4ca9add3]
 ? __pfx_dev_xdp_install+0x10/0x10
 dev_xdp_attach+0x560/0xf70
 dev_change_xdp_fd+0x22d/0x280
 do_setlink.constprop.0+0x2989/0x35d0
 ? __pfx_do_setlink.constprop.0+0x10/0x10
 ? lock_acquire+0x184/0x340
 ? find_held_lock+0x32/0x90
 ? rtnl_setlink+0x236/0x570
 ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
 ? trace_contention_end+0xdc/0x120
 ? __mutex_lock+0x946/0x18a0
 ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
 ? __lock_acquire+0xa95/0x28f0
 ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
 ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
 ? cap_capable+0x172/0x350
 rtnl_setlink+0x2cd/0x570

Fixes: 03df156 ("xdp: double protect netdev->xdp_flags with netdev->lock")
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michael Chan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request May 21, 2025
While tracking an IDPF bug, I found that idpf_vport_splitq_napi_poll()
was not following NAPI rules.

It can indeed return @Budget after napi_complete() has been called.

Add two debug conditions in networking core to hopefully catch
this kind of bugs sooner.

IDPF bug will be fixed in a separate patch.

[   72.441242] repoll requested for device eth1 idpf_vport_splitq_napi_poll [idpf] but napi is not scheduled.
[   72.446291] list_del corruption. next->prev should be ff31783d93b14040, but was ff31783d93b10080. (next=ff31783d93b10080)
[   72.446659] kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:67!
[   72.446816] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [kernel-patches#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC NOPTI
[   72.447031] CPU: 156 UID: 0 PID: 16258 Comm: ip Tainted: G        W           6.15.0-dbg-DEV kernel-patches#1944 NONE
[   72.447340] Tainted: [W]=WARN
[   72.447702] RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid_or_report (lib/list_debug.c:65)
[   72.450630] Call Trace:
[   72.450720]  <IRQ>
[   72.450797] net_rx_action (include/linux/list.h:215 include/linux/list.h:287 net/core/dev.c:7385 net/core/dev.c:7516)
[   72.450928] ? lock_release (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:?)
[   72.451059] ? clockevents_program_event (kernel/time/clockevents.c:?)
[   72.451222] handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:579)
[   72.451356] ? do_softirq (kernel/softirq.c:480)
[   72.451480] ? idpf_vc_xn_exec (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c:462) idpf
[   72.451635] do_softirq (kernel/softirq.c:480)
[   72.451750]  </IRQ>
[   72.451828]  <TASK>
[   72.451905] __local_bh_enable_ip (kernel/softirq.c:?)
[   72.452051] idpf_vc_xn_exec (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c:462) idpf
[   72.452210] idpf_send_delete_queues_msg (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c:2083) idpf
[   72.452390] idpf_vport_stop (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_lib.c:837 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_lib.c:868) idpf
[   72.452541] ? idpf_vport_stop (include/linux/bottom_half.h:? include/linux/netdevice.h:4762 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_lib.c:855) idpf
[   72.452695] idpf_initiate_soft_reset (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_lib.c:?) idpf
[   72.452867] idpf_change_mtu (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_lib.c:2189) idpf
[   72.453015] netif_set_mtu_ext (net/core/dev.c:9437)
[   72.453157] ? packet_notifier (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 net/packet/af_packet.c:4240)
[   72.453292] netif_set_mtu (net/core/dev.c:9515)
[   72.453416] dev_set_mtu (net/core/dev_api.c:?)
[   72.453534] bond_change_mtu (drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:4833)
[   72.453666] netif_set_mtu_ext (net/core/dev.c:9437)
[   72.453803] do_setlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3116)
[   72.453925] ? rtnl_newlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3901)
[   72.454055] ? rtnl_newlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3901)
[   72.454185] ? rtnl_newlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3901)
[   72.454314] ? trace_contention_end (include/trace/events/lock.h:122)
[   72.454467] ? __mutex_lock (arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:85 kernel/locking/mutex.c:611 kernel/locking/mutex.c:746)
[   72.454597] ? cap_capable (include/trace/events/capability.h:26)
[   72.454721] ? security_capable (security/security.c:?)
[   72.454857] rtnl_newlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:?)
[   72.454982] ? lock_is_held_type (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5599 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5938)
[   72.455121] ? __lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:?)
[   72.455256] ? __change_page_attr_set_clr (arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c:685)
[   72.455438] ? __lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:?)
[   72.455582] ? rtnetlink_rcv_msg (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6885)
[   72.455721] ? lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5866)
[   72.455848] ? rtnetlink_rcv_msg (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6885)
[   72.455987] ? lock_release (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:?)
[   72.456117] ? rcu_read_unlock (include/linux/rcupdate.h:341 include/linux/rcupdate.h:871)
[   72.456249] ? __pfx_rtnl_newlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3956)
[   72.456388] rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6955)
[   72.456526] ? rtnetlink_rcv_msg (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6885)
[   72.456671] ? lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5866)
[   72.456802] ? net_generic (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 include/net/netns/generic.h:45)
[   72.456929] ? __pfx_rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6858)
[   72.457082] netlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2534)
[   72.457212] netlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1313)
[   72.457344] netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1883)
[   72.457476] __sock_sendmsg (net/socket.c:712)
[   72.457602] ____sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:?)
[   72.457735] ? _copy_from_user (arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:126 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:134 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:141 include/linux/uaccess.h:178 lib/usercopy.c:18)
[   72.457875] ___sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2620)
[   72.458042] ? __call_rcu_common (arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:42 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:119 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:159 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3107)
[   72.458185] ? mntput_no_expire (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 fs/namespace.c:1457)
[   72.458324] ? lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5866)
[   72.458451] ? mntput_no_expire (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 fs/namespace.c:1457)
[   72.458588] ? lock_release (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:?)
[   72.458718] ? mntput_no_expire (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 fs/namespace.c:1457)
[   72.458856] __x64_sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2652)
[   72.458997] ? do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:42 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:119 include/linux/entry-common.h:198 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:90)
[   72.459136] do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:?)
[   72.459259] ? exc_page_fault (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1542)
[   72.459387] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
[   72.459555] RIP: 0033:0x7fd15f17cbd0

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request May 21, 2025
There is no disagreement that we should check both ptp->is_virtual_clock
and ptp->n_vclocks to check if the ptp virtual clock is in use.

However, when we acquire ptp->n_vclocks_mux to read ptp->n_vclocks in
ptp_vclock_in_use(), we observe a recursive lock in the call trace
starting from n_vclocks_store().

============================================
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
6.15.0-rc6 kernel-patches#1 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------
syz.0.1540/13807 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff888035a24868 (&ptp->n_vclocks_mux){+.+.}-{4:4}, at:
 ptp_vclock_in_use drivers/ptp/ptp_private.h:103 [inline]
ffff888035a24868 (&ptp->n_vclocks_mux){+.+.}-{4:4}, at:
 ptp_clock_unregister+0x21/0x250 drivers/ptp/ptp_clock.c:415

but task is already holding lock:
ffff888030704868 (&ptp->n_vclocks_mux){+.+.}-{4:4}, at:
 n_vclocks_store+0xf1/0x6d0 drivers/ptp/ptp_sysfs.c:215

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0
       ----
  lock(&ptp->n_vclocks_mux);
  lock(&ptp->n_vclocks_mux);

 *** DEADLOCK ***
....
============================================

The best way to solve this is to remove the logic that checks
ptp->n_vclocks in ptp_vclock_in_use().

The reason why this is appropriate is that any path that uses
ptp->n_vclocks must unconditionally check if ptp->n_vclocks is greater
than 0 before unregistering vclocks, and all functions are already
written this way. And in the function that uses ptp->n_vclocks, we
already get ptp->n_vclocks_mux before unregistering vclocks.

Therefore, we need to remove the redundant check for ptp->n_vclocks in
ptp_vclock_in_use() to prevent recursive locking.

Fixes: 73f3706 ("ptp: support ptp physical/virtual clocks conversion")
Signed-off-by: Jeongjun Park <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request May 21, 2025
Removing a peer while userspace attempts to close its transport
socket triggers a race condition resulting in the following
crash:

Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000077: 0000 [kernel-patches#1] SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000003b8-0x00000000000003bf]
CPU: 12 UID: 0 PID: 162 Comm: kworker/12:1 Tainted: G           O        6.15.0-rc2-00635-g521139ac3840 kernel-patches#272 PREEMPT(full)
Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-20240910_120124-localhost 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events ovpn_peer_keepalive_work [ovpn]
RIP: 0010:ovpn_socket_release+0x23c/0x500 [ovpn]
Code: ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 71 02 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4d 8b 64 24 18 49 8d bc 24 be 03 00 00 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 14 02 48 89 f8 83 e0 07 83 c0 01 38 d0 7c 08 84 d2 0f 85 30
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000c9fb18 EFLAGS: 00010217
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff8881148d7940 RCX: ffffffff817787bb
RDX: 0000000000000077 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 00000000000003be
RBP: ffffc90000c9fb30 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: fffffbfff0d3e840
R10: ffffffff869f4207 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff888115eb9300 R14: ffffc90000c9fbc8 R15: 000000000000000c
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8882b0151000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f37266b6114 CR3: 00000000054a8000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 unlock_ovpn+0x8b/0xe0 [ovpn]
 ovpn_peer_keepalive_work+0xe3/0x540 [ovpn]
 ? ovpn_peers_free+0x780/0x780 [ovpn]
 ? lock_acquire+0x56/0x70
 ? process_one_work+0x888/0x1740
 process_one_work+0x933/0x1740
 ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x10b0/0x10b0
 ? move_linked_works+0x12d/0x2c0
 ? assign_work+0x163/0x270
 worker_thread+0x4d6/0xd90
 ? preempt_count_sub+0x4c/0x70
 ? process_one_work+0x1740/0x1740
 kthread+0x36c/0x710
 ? trace_preempt_on+0x8c/0x1e0
 ? kthread_is_per_cpu+0xc0/0xc0
 ? preempt_count_sub+0x4c/0x70
 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x36/0x60
 ? calculate_sigpending+0x7b/0xa0
 ? kthread_is_per_cpu+0xc0/0xc0
 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x80
 ? kthread_is_per_cpu+0xc0/0xc0
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
 </TASK>
Modules linked in: ovpn(O)

This happens because the peer deletion operation reaches
ovpn_socket_release() while ovpn_sock->sock (struct socket *)
and its sk member (struct sock *) are still both valid.
Here synchronize_rcu() is invoked, after which ovpn_sock->sock->sk
becomes NULL, due to the concurrent socket closing triggered
from userspace.

After having invoked synchronize_rcu(), ovpn_socket_release() will
attempt dereferencing ovpn_sock->sock->sk, triggering the crash
reported above.

The reason for accessing sk is that we need to retrieve its
protocol and continue the cleanup routine accordingly.

This crash can be easily produced by running openvpn userspace in
client mode with `--keepalive 10 20`, while entirely omitting this
option on the server side.
After 20 seconds ovpn will assume the peer (server) to be dead,
will start removing it and will notify userspace. The latter will
receive the notification and close the transport socket, thus
triggering the crash.

To fix the race condition for good, we need to refactor ovpn_socket.
Since we are always only interested in the sock->sk member (struct sock *)
we can directly hold a reference to it, raher than relying on
sock->sk.

This means changing ovpn_socket->sock to ovpn_socket->sk.

While holding a reference to sk, we can increase its refcounter
without affecting the socket close()/destroy() notification
(which we rely on when userspace closes a socket we are using).

By increasing sk's refcounter we know we can dereference it
in ovpn_socket_release() without incurring in any race condition
anymore.

ovpn_socket_release() will ultimately decrease the reference
counter.

Cc: Oleksandr Natalenko <[email protected]>
Fixes: 11851cb ("ovpn: implement TCP transport")
Reported-by: Qingfang Deng <[email protected]>
Closes: OpenVPN/ovpn-net-next#1
Tested-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]>
Link: https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg31575.html
Signed-off-by: Antonio Quartulli <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request May 21, 2025
When xdp is attached or detached, dev->ndo_bpf() is called by
do_setlink(), and it acquires netdev_lock() if needed.
Unlike other drivers, the bnxt driver is protected by netdev_lock while
xdp is attached/detached because it sets dev->request_ops_lock to true.

So, the bnxt_xdp(), that is callback of ->ndo_bpf should not acquire
netdev_lock().
But the xdp_features_{set | clear}_redirect_target() was changed to
acquire netdev_lock() internally.
It causes a deadlock.
To fix this problem, bnxt driver should use
xdp_features_{set | clear}_redirect_target_locked() instead.

Splat looks like:
============================================
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
6.15.0-rc6+ kernel-patches#1 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------
bpftool/1745 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff888131b85038 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: xdp_features_set_redirect_target+0x1f/0x80

but task is already holding lock:
ffff888131b85038 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: do_setlink.constprop.0+0x24e/0x35d0

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0
       ----
  lock(&dev->lock);
  lock(&dev->lock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

 May be due to missing lock nesting notation

3 locks held by bpftool/1745:
 #0: ffffffffa56131c8 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnl_setlink+0x1fe/0x570
 kernel-patches#1: ffffffffaafa75a0 (&net->rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnl_setlink+0x236/0x570
 kernel-patches#2: ffff888131b85038 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: do_setlink.constprop.0+0x24e/0x35d0

stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1745 Comm: bpftool Not tainted 6.15.0-rc6+ kernel-patches#1 PREEMPT(undef)
Hardware name: ASUS System Product Name/PRIME Z690-P D4, BIOS 0603 11/01/2021
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x7a/0xd0
 print_deadlock_bug+0x294/0x3d0
 __lock_acquire+0x153b/0x28f0
 lock_acquire+0x184/0x340
 ? xdp_features_set_redirect_target+0x1f/0x80
 __mutex_lock+0x1ac/0x18a0
 ? xdp_features_set_redirect_target+0x1f/0x80
 ? xdp_features_set_redirect_target+0x1f/0x80
 ? __pfx_bnxt_rx_page_skb+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_en
 ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
 ? __pfx_netdev_update_features+0x10/0x10
 ? bnxt_set_rx_skb_mode+0x284/0x540 [bnxt_en
 ? __pfx_bnxt_set_rx_skb_mode+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_en
 ? xdp_features_set_redirect_target+0x1f/0x80
 xdp_features_set_redirect_target+0x1f/0x80
 bnxt_xdp+0x34e/0x730 [bnxt_en 11cbcce8fa11cff1dddd7ef358d6219e4ca9add3]
 dev_xdp_install+0x3f4/0x830
 ? __pfx_bnxt_xdp+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_en 11cbcce8fa11cff1dddd7ef358d6219e4ca9add3]
 ? __pfx_dev_xdp_install+0x10/0x10
 dev_xdp_attach+0x560/0xf70
 dev_change_xdp_fd+0x22d/0x280
 do_setlink.constprop.0+0x2989/0x35d0
 ? __pfx_do_setlink.constprop.0+0x10/0x10
 ? lock_acquire+0x184/0x340
 ? find_held_lock+0x32/0x90
 ? rtnl_setlink+0x236/0x570
 ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
 ? trace_contention_end+0xdc/0x120
 ? __mutex_lock+0x946/0x18a0
 ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
 ? __lock_acquire+0xa95/0x28f0
 ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
 ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
 ? cap_capable+0x172/0x350
 rtnl_setlink+0x2cd/0x570

Fixes: 03df156 ("xdp: double protect netdev->xdp_flags with netdev->lock")
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michael Chan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request May 21, 2025
While tracking an IDPF bug, I found that idpf_vport_splitq_napi_poll()
was not following NAPI rules.

It can indeed return @Budget after napi_complete() has been called.

Add two debug conditions in networking core to hopefully catch
this kind of bugs sooner.

IDPF bug will be fixed in a separate patch.

[   72.441242] repoll requested for device eth1 idpf_vport_splitq_napi_poll [idpf] but napi is not scheduled.
[   72.446291] list_del corruption. next->prev should be ff31783d93b14040, but was ff31783d93b10080. (next=ff31783d93b10080)
[   72.446659] kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:67!
[   72.446816] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [kernel-patches#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC NOPTI
[   72.447031] CPU: 156 UID: 0 PID: 16258 Comm: ip Tainted: G        W           6.15.0-dbg-DEV kernel-patches#1944 NONE
[   72.447340] Tainted: [W]=WARN
[   72.447702] RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid_or_report (lib/list_debug.c:65)
[   72.450630] Call Trace:
[   72.450720]  <IRQ>
[   72.450797] net_rx_action (include/linux/list.h:215 include/linux/list.h:287 net/core/dev.c:7385 net/core/dev.c:7516)
[   72.450928] ? lock_release (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:?)
[   72.451059] ? clockevents_program_event (kernel/time/clockevents.c:?)
[   72.451222] handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:579)
[   72.451356] ? do_softirq (kernel/softirq.c:480)
[   72.451480] ? idpf_vc_xn_exec (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c:462) idpf
[   72.451635] do_softirq (kernel/softirq.c:480)
[   72.451750]  </IRQ>
[   72.451828]  <TASK>
[   72.451905] __local_bh_enable_ip (kernel/softirq.c:?)
[   72.452051] idpf_vc_xn_exec (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c:462) idpf
[   72.452210] idpf_send_delete_queues_msg (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c:2083) idpf
[   72.452390] idpf_vport_stop (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_lib.c:837 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_lib.c:868) idpf
[   72.452541] ? idpf_vport_stop (include/linux/bottom_half.h:? include/linux/netdevice.h:4762 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_lib.c:855) idpf
[   72.452695] idpf_initiate_soft_reset (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_lib.c:?) idpf
[   72.452867] idpf_change_mtu (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_lib.c:2189) idpf
[   72.453015] netif_set_mtu_ext (net/core/dev.c:9437)
[   72.453157] ? packet_notifier (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 net/packet/af_packet.c:4240)
[   72.453292] netif_set_mtu (net/core/dev.c:9515)
[   72.453416] dev_set_mtu (net/core/dev_api.c:?)
[   72.453534] bond_change_mtu (drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:4833)
[   72.453666] netif_set_mtu_ext (net/core/dev.c:9437)
[   72.453803] do_setlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3116)
[   72.453925] ? rtnl_newlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3901)
[   72.454055] ? rtnl_newlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3901)
[   72.454185] ? rtnl_newlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3901)
[   72.454314] ? trace_contention_end (include/trace/events/lock.h:122)
[   72.454467] ? __mutex_lock (arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:85 kernel/locking/mutex.c:611 kernel/locking/mutex.c:746)
[   72.454597] ? cap_capable (include/trace/events/capability.h:26)
[   72.454721] ? security_capable (security/security.c:?)
[   72.454857] rtnl_newlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:?)
[   72.454982] ? lock_is_held_type (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5599 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5938)
[   72.455121] ? __lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:?)
[   72.455256] ? __change_page_attr_set_clr (arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c:685)
[   72.455438] ? __lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:?)
[   72.455582] ? rtnetlink_rcv_msg (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6885)
[   72.455721] ? lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5866)
[   72.455848] ? rtnetlink_rcv_msg (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6885)
[   72.455987] ? lock_release (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:?)
[   72.456117] ? rcu_read_unlock (include/linux/rcupdate.h:341 include/linux/rcupdate.h:871)
[   72.456249] ? __pfx_rtnl_newlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3956)
[   72.456388] rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6955)
[   72.456526] ? rtnetlink_rcv_msg (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6885)
[   72.456671] ? lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5866)
[   72.456802] ? net_generic (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 include/net/netns/generic.h:45)
[   72.456929] ? __pfx_rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6858)
[   72.457082] netlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2534)
[   72.457212] netlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1313)
[   72.457344] netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1883)
[   72.457476] __sock_sendmsg (net/socket.c:712)
[   72.457602] ____sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:?)
[   72.457735] ? _copy_from_user (arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:126 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:134 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:141 include/linux/uaccess.h:178 lib/usercopy.c:18)
[   72.457875] ___sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2620)
[   72.458042] ? __call_rcu_common (arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:42 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:119 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:159 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3107)
[   72.458185] ? mntput_no_expire (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 fs/namespace.c:1457)
[   72.458324] ? lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5866)
[   72.458451] ? mntput_no_expire (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 fs/namespace.c:1457)
[   72.458588] ? lock_release (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:?)
[   72.458718] ? mntput_no_expire (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 fs/namespace.c:1457)
[   72.458856] __x64_sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2652)
[   72.458997] ? do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:42 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:119 include/linux/entry-common.h:198 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:90)
[   72.459136] do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:?)
[   72.459259] ? exc_page_fault (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1542)
[   72.459387] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
[   72.459555] RIP: 0033:0x7fd15f17cbd0

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request May 21, 2025
There is no disagreement that we should check both ptp->is_virtual_clock
and ptp->n_vclocks to check if the ptp virtual clock is in use.

However, when we acquire ptp->n_vclocks_mux to read ptp->n_vclocks in
ptp_vclock_in_use(), we observe a recursive lock in the call trace
starting from n_vclocks_store().

============================================
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
6.15.0-rc6 kernel-patches#1 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------
syz.0.1540/13807 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff888035a24868 (&ptp->n_vclocks_mux){+.+.}-{4:4}, at:
 ptp_vclock_in_use drivers/ptp/ptp_private.h:103 [inline]
ffff888035a24868 (&ptp->n_vclocks_mux){+.+.}-{4:4}, at:
 ptp_clock_unregister+0x21/0x250 drivers/ptp/ptp_clock.c:415

but task is already holding lock:
ffff888030704868 (&ptp->n_vclocks_mux){+.+.}-{4:4}, at:
 n_vclocks_store+0xf1/0x6d0 drivers/ptp/ptp_sysfs.c:215

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0
       ----
  lock(&ptp->n_vclocks_mux);
  lock(&ptp->n_vclocks_mux);

 *** DEADLOCK ***
....
============================================

The best way to solve this is to remove the logic that checks
ptp->n_vclocks in ptp_vclock_in_use().

The reason why this is appropriate is that any path that uses
ptp->n_vclocks must unconditionally check if ptp->n_vclocks is greater
than 0 before unregistering vclocks, and all functions are already
written this way. And in the function that uses ptp->n_vclocks, we
already get ptp->n_vclocks_mux before unregistering vclocks.

Therefore, we need to remove the redundant check for ptp->n_vclocks in
ptp_vclock_in_use() to prevent recursive locking.

Fixes: 73f3706 ("ptp: support ptp physical/virtual clocks conversion")
Signed-off-by: Jeongjun Park <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request May 21, 2025
Removing a peer while userspace attempts to close its transport
socket triggers a race condition resulting in the following
crash:

Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000077: 0000 [kernel-patches#1] SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000003b8-0x00000000000003bf]
CPU: 12 UID: 0 PID: 162 Comm: kworker/12:1 Tainted: G           O        6.15.0-rc2-00635-g521139ac3840 kernel-patches#272 PREEMPT(full)
Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-20240910_120124-localhost 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events ovpn_peer_keepalive_work [ovpn]
RIP: 0010:ovpn_socket_release+0x23c/0x500 [ovpn]
Code: ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 71 02 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4d 8b 64 24 18 49 8d bc 24 be 03 00 00 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 14 02 48 89 f8 83 e0 07 83 c0 01 38 d0 7c 08 84 d2 0f 85 30
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000c9fb18 EFLAGS: 00010217
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff8881148d7940 RCX: ffffffff817787bb
RDX: 0000000000000077 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 00000000000003be
RBP: ffffc90000c9fb30 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: fffffbfff0d3e840
R10: ffffffff869f4207 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff888115eb9300 R14: ffffc90000c9fbc8 R15: 000000000000000c
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8882b0151000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f37266b6114 CR3: 00000000054a8000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 unlock_ovpn+0x8b/0xe0 [ovpn]
 ovpn_peer_keepalive_work+0xe3/0x540 [ovpn]
 ? ovpn_peers_free+0x780/0x780 [ovpn]
 ? lock_acquire+0x56/0x70
 ? process_one_work+0x888/0x1740
 process_one_work+0x933/0x1740
 ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x10b0/0x10b0
 ? move_linked_works+0x12d/0x2c0
 ? assign_work+0x163/0x270
 worker_thread+0x4d6/0xd90
 ? preempt_count_sub+0x4c/0x70
 ? process_one_work+0x1740/0x1740
 kthread+0x36c/0x710
 ? trace_preempt_on+0x8c/0x1e0
 ? kthread_is_per_cpu+0xc0/0xc0
 ? preempt_count_sub+0x4c/0x70
 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x36/0x60
 ? calculate_sigpending+0x7b/0xa0
 ? kthread_is_per_cpu+0xc0/0xc0
 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x80
 ? kthread_is_per_cpu+0xc0/0xc0
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
 </TASK>
Modules linked in: ovpn(O)

This happens because the peer deletion operation reaches
ovpn_socket_release() while ovpn_sock->sock (struct socket *)
and its sk member (struct sock *) are still both valid.
Here synchronize_rcu() is invoked, after which ovpn_sock->sock->sk
becomes NULL, due to the concurrent socket closing triggered
from userspace.

After having invoked synchronize_rcu(), ovpn_socket_release() will
attempt dereferencing ovpn_sock->sock->sk, triggering the crash
reported above.

The reason for accessing sk is that we need to retrieve its
protocol and continue the cleanup routine accordingly.

This crash can be easily produced by running openvpn userspace in
client mode with `--keepalive 10 20`, while entirely omitting this
option on the server side.
After 20 seconds ovpn will assume the peer (server) to be dead,
will start removing it and will notify userspace. The latter will
receive the notification and close the transport socket, thus
triggering the crash.

To fix the race condition for good, we need to refactor ovpn_socket.
Since we are always only interested in the sock->sk member (struct sock *)
we can directly hold a reference to it, raher than relying on
sock->sk.

This means changing ovpn_socket->sock to ovpn_socket->sk.

While holding a reference to sk, we can increase its refcounter
without affecting the socket close()/destroy() notification
(which we rely on when userspace closes a socket we are using).

By increasing sk's refcounter we know we can dereference it
in ovpn_socket_release() without incurring in any race condition
anymore.

ovpn_socket_release() will ultimately decrease the reference
counter.

Cc: Oleksandr Natalenko <[email protected]>
Fixes: 11851cb ("ovpn: implement TCP transport")
Reported-by: Qingfang Deng <[email protected]>
Closes: OpenVPN/ovpn-net-next#1
Tested-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]>
Link: https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg31575.html
Signed-off-by: Antonio Quartulli <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request May 21, 2025
When xdp is attached or detached, dev->ndo_bpf() is called by
do_setlink(), and it acquires netdev_lock() if needed.
Unlike other drivers, the bnxt driver is protected by netdev_lock while
xdp is attached/detached because it sets dev->request_ops_lock to true.

So, the bnxt_xdp(), that is callback of ->ndo_bpf should not acquire
netdev_lock().
But the xdp_features_{set | clear}_redirect_target() was changed to
acquire netdev_lock() internally.
It causes a deadlock.
To fix this problem, bnxt driver should use
xdp_features_{set | clear}_redirect_target_locked() instead.

Splat looks like:
============================================
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
6.15.0-rc6+ kernel-patches#1 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------
bpftool/1745 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff888131b85038 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: xdp_features_set_redirect_target+0x1f/0x80

but task is already holding lock:
ffff888131b85038 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: do_setlink.constprop.0+0x24e/0x35d0

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0
       ----
  lock(&dev->lock);
  lock(&dev->lock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

 May be due to missing lock nesting notation

3 locks held by bpftool/1745:
 #0: ffffffffa56131c8 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnl_setlink+0x1fe/0x570
 kernel-patches#1: ffffffffaafa75a0 (&net->rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnl_setlink+0x236/0x570
 kernel-patches#2: ffff888131b85038 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: do_setlink.constprop.0+0x24e/0x35d0

stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1745 Comm: bpftool Not tainted 6.15.0-rc6+ kernel-patches#1 PREEMPT(undef)
Hardware name: ASUS System Product Name/PRIME Z690-P D4, BIOS 0603 11/01/2021
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x7a/0xd0
 print_deadlock_bug+0x294/0x3d0
 __lock_acquire+0x153b/0x28f0
 lock_acquire+0x184/0x340
 ? xdp_features_set_redirect_target+0x1f/0x80
 __mutex_lock+0x1ac/0x18a0
 ? xdp_features_set_redirect_target+0x1f/0x80
 ? xdp_features_set_redirect_target+0x1f/0x80
 ? __pfx_bnxt_rx_page_skb+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_en
 ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
 ? __pfx_netdev_update_features+0x10/0x10
 ? bnxt_set_rx_skb_mode+0x284/0x540 [bnxt_en
 ? __pfx_bnxt_set_rx_skb_mode+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_en
 ? xdp_features_set_redirect_target+0x1f/0x80
 xdp_features_set_redirect_target+0x1f/0x80
 bnxt_xdp+0x34e/0x730 [bnxt_en 11cbcce8fa11cff1dddd7ef358d6219e4ca9add3]
 dev_xdp_install+0x3f4/0x830
 ? __pfx_bnxt_xdp+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_en 11cbcce8fa11cff1dddd7ef358d6219e4ca9add3]
 ? __pfx_dev_xdp_install+0x10/0x10
 dev_xdp_attach+0x560/0xf70
 dev_change_xdp_fd+0x22d/0x280
 do_setlink.constprop.0+0x2989/0x35d0
 ? __pfx_do_setlink.constprop.0+0x10/0x10
 ? lock_acquire+0x184/0x340
 ? find_held_lock+0x32/0x90
 ? rtnl_setlink+0x236/0x570
 ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
 ? trace_contention_end+0xdc/0x120
 ? __mutex_lock+0x946/0x18a0
 ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
 ? __lock_acquire+0xa95/0x28f0
 ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
 ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
 ? cap_capable+0x172/0x350
 rtnl_setlink+0x2cd/0x570

Fixes: 03df156 ("xdp: double protect netdev->xdp_flags with netdev->lock")
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michael Chan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request May 21, 2025
While tracking an IDPF bug, I found that idpf_vport_splitq_napi_poll()
was not following NAPI rules.

It can indeed return @Budget after napi_complete() has been called.

Add two debug conditions in networking core to hopefully catch
this kind of bugs sooner.

IDPF bug will be fixed in a separate patch.

[   72.441242] repoll requested for device eth1 idpf_vport_splitq_napi_poll [idpf] but napi is not scheduled.
[   72.446291] list_del corruption. next->prev should be ff31783d93b14040, but was ff31783d93b10080. (next=ff31783d93b10080)
[   72.446659] kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:67!
[   72.446816] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [kernel-patches#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC NOPTI
[   72.447031] CPU: 156 UID: 0 PID: 16258 Comm: ip Tainted: G        W           6.15.0-dbg-DEV kernel-patches#1944 NONE
[   72.447340] Tainted: [W]=WARN
[   72.447702] RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid_or_report (lib/list_debug.c:65)
[   72.450630] Call Trace:
[   72.450720]  <IRQ>
[   72.450797] net_rx_action (include/linux/list.h:215 include/linux/list.h:287 net/core/dev.c:7385 net/core/dev.c:7516)
[   72.450928] ? lock_release (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:?)
[   72.451059] ? clockevents_program_event (kernel/time/clockevents.c:?)
[   72.451222] handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:579)
[   72.451356] ? do_softirq (kernel/softirq.c:480)
[   72.451480] ? idpf_vc_xn_exec (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c:462) idpf
[   72.451635] do_softirq (kernel/softirq.c:480)
[   72.451750]  </IRQ>
[   72.451828]  <TASK>
[   72.451905] __local_bh_enable_ip (kernel/softirq.c:?)
[   72.452051] idpf_vc_xn_exec (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c:462) idpf
[   72.452210] idpf_send_delete_queues_msg (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c:2083) idpf
[   72.452390] idpf_vport_stop (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_lib.c:837 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_lib.c:868) idpf
[   72.452541] ? idpf_vport_stop (include/linux/bottom_half.h:? include/linux/netdevice.h:4762 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_lib.c:855) idpf
[   72.452695] idpf_initiate_soft_reset (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_lib.c:?) idpf
[   72.452867] idpf_change_mtu (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_lib.c:2189) idpf
[   72.453015] netif_set_mtu_ext (net/core/dev.c:9437)
[   72.453157] ? packet_notifier (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 net/packet/af_packet.c:4240)
[   72.453292] netif_set_mtu (net/core/dev.c:9515)
[   72.453416] dev_set_mtu (net/core/dev_api.c:?)
[   72.453534] bond_change_mtu (drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:4833)
[   72.453666] netif_set_mtu_ext (net/core/dev.c:9437)
[   72.453803] do_setlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3116)
[   72.453925] ? rtnl_newlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3901)
[   72.454055] ? rtnl_newlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3901)
[   72.454185] ? rtnl_newlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3901)
[   72.454314] ? trace_contention_end (include/trace/events/lock.h:122)
[   72.454467] ? __mutex_lock (arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:85 kernel/locking/mutex.c:611 kernel/locking/mutex.c:746)
[   72.454597] ? cap_capable (include/trace/events/capability.h:26)
[   72.454721] ? security_capable (security/security.c:?)
[   72.454857] rtnl_newlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:?)
[   72.454982] ? lock_is_held_type (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5599 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5938)
[   72.455121] ? __lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:?)
[   72.455256] ? __change_page_attr_set_clr (arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c:685)
[   72.455438] ? __lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:?)
[   72.455582] ? rtnetlink_rcv_msg (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6885)
[   72.455721] ? lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5866)
[   72.455848] ? rtnetlink_rcv_msg (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6885)
[   72.455987] ? lock_release (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:?)
[   72.456117] ? rcu_read_unlock (include/linux/rcupdate.h:341 include/linux/rcupdate.h:871)
[   72.456249] ? __pfx_rtnl_newlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3956)
[   72.456388] rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6955)
[   72.456526] ? rtnetlink_rcv_msg (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6885)
[   72.456671] ? lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5866)
[   72.456802] ? net_generic (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 include/net/netns/generic.h:45)
[   72.456929] ? __pfx_rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6858)
[   72.457082] netlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2534)
[   72.457212] netlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1313)
[   72.457344] netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1883)
[   72.457476] __sock_sendmsg (net/socket.c:712)
[   72.457602] ____sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:?)
[   72.457735] ? _copy_from_user (arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:126 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:134 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:141 include/linux/uaccess.h:178 lib/usercopy.c:18)
[   72.457875] ___sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2620)
[   72.458042] ? __call_rcu_common (arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:42 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:119 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:159 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3107)
[   72.458185] ? mntput_no_expire (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 fs/namespace.c:1457)
[   72.458324] ? lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5866)
[   72.458451] ? mntput_no_expire (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 fs/namespace.c:1457)
[   72.458588] ? lock_release (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:?)
[   72.458718] ? mntput_no_expire (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 fs/namespace.c:1457)
[   72.458856] __x64_sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2652)
[   72.458997] ? do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:42 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:119 include/linux/entry-common.h:198 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:90)
[   72.459136] do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:?)
[   72.459259] ? exc_page_fault (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1542)
[   72.459387] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
[   72.459555] RIP: 0033:0x7fd15f17cbd0

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request May 21, 2025
There is no disagreement that we should check both ptp->is_virtual_clock
and ptp->n_vclocks to check if the ptp virtual clock is in use.

However, when we acquire ptp->n_vclocks_mux to read ptp->n_vclocks in
ptp_vclock_in_use(), we observe a recursive lock in the call trace
starting from n_vclocks_store().

============================================
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
6.15.0-rc6 kernel-patches#1 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------
syz.0.1540/13807 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff888035a24868 (&ptp->n_vclocks_mux){+.+.}-{4:4}, at:
 ptp_vclock_in_use drivers/ptp/ptp_private.h:103 [inline]
ffff888035a24868 (&ptp->n_vclocks_mux){+.+.}-{4:4}, at:
 ptp_clock_unregister+0x21/0x250 drivers/ptp/ptp_clock.c:415

but task is already holding lock:
ffff888030704868 (&ptp->n_vclocks_mux){+.+.}-{4:4}, at:
 n_vclocks_store+0xf1/0x6d0 drivers/ptp/ptp_sysfs.c:215

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0
       ----
  lock(&ptp->n_vclocks_mux);
  lock(&ptp->n_vclocks_mux);

 *** DEADLOCK ***
....
============================================

The best way to solve this is to remove the logic that checks
ptp->n_vclocks in ptp_vclock_in_use().

The reason why this is appropriate is that any path that uses
ptp->n_vclocks must unconditionally check if ptp->n_vclocks is greater
than 0 before unregistering vclocks, and all functions are already
written this way. And in the function that uses ptp->n_vclocks, we
already get ptp->n_vclocks_mux before unregistering vclocks.

Therefore, we need to remove the redundant check for ptp->n_vclocks in
ptp_vclock_in_use() to prevent recursive locking.

Fixes: 73f3706 ("ptp: support ptp physical/virtual clocks conversion")
Signed-off-by: Jeongjun Park <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request May 21, 2025
Removing a peer while userspace attempts to close its transport
socket triggers a race condition resulting in the following
crash:

Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000077: 0000 [kernel-patches#1] SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000003b8-0x00000000000003bf]
CPU: 12 UID: 0 PID: 162 Comm: kworker/12:1 Tainted: G           O        6.15.0-rc2-00635-g521139ac3840 kernel-patches#272 PREEMPT(full)
Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-20240910_120124-localhost 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events ovpn_peer_keepalive_work [ovpn]
RIP: 0010:ovpn_socket_release+0x23c/0x500 [ovpn]
Code: ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 71 02 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4d 8b 64 24 18 49 8d bc 24 be 03 00 00 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 14 02 48 89 f8 83 e0 07 83 c0 01 38 d0 7c 08 84 d2 0f 85 30
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000c9fb18 EFLAGS: 00010217
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff8881148d7940 RCX: ffffffff817787bb
RDX: 0000000000000077 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 00000000000003be
RBP: ffffc90000c9fb30 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: fffffbfff0d3e840
R10: ffffffff869f4207 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff888115eb9300 R14: ffffc90000c9fbc8 R15: 000000000000000c
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8882b0151000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f37266b6114 CR3: 00000000054a8000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 unlock_ovpn+0x8b/0xe0 [ovpn]
 ovpn_peer_keepalive_work+0xe3/0x540 [ovpn]
 ? ovpn_peers_free+0x780/0x780 [ovpn]
 ? lock_acquire+0x56/0x70
 ? process_one_work+0x888/0x1740
 process_one_work+0x933/0x1740
 ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x10b0/0x10b0
 ? move_linked_works+0x12d/0x2c0
 ? assign_work+0x163/0x270
 worker_thread+0x4d6/0xd90
 ? preempt_count_sub+0x4c/0x70
 ? process_one_work+0x1740/0x1740
 kthread+0x36c/0x710
 ? trace_preempt_on+0x8c/0x1e0
 ? kthread_is_per_cpu+0xc0/0xc0
 ? preempt_count_sub+0x4c/0x70
 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x36/0x60
 ? calculate_sigpending+0x7b/0xa0
 ? kthread_is_per_cpu+0xc0/0xc0
 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x80
 ? kthread_is_per_cpu+0xc0/0xc0
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
 </TASK>
Modules linked in: ovpn(O)

This happens because the peer deletion operation reaches
ovpn_socket_release() while ovpn_sock->sock (struct socket *)
and its sk member (struct sock *) are still both valid.
Here synchronize_rcu() is invoked, after which ovpn_sock->sock->sk
becomes NULL, due to the concurrent socket closing triggered
from userspace.

After having invoked synchronize_rcu(), ovpn_socket_release() will
attempt dereferencing ovpn_sock->sock->sk, triggering the crash
reported above.

The reason for accessing sk is that we need to retrieve its
protocol and continue the cleanup routine accordingly.

This crash can be easily produced by running openvpn userspace in
client mode with `--keepalive 10 20`, while entirely omitting this
option on the server side.
After 20 seconds ovpn will assume the peer (server) to be dead,
will start removing it and will notify userspace. The latter will
receive the notification and close the transport socket, thus
triggering the crash.

To fix the race condition for good, we need to refactor ovpn_socket.
Since we are always only interested in the sock->sk member (struct sock *)
we can directly hold a reference to it, raher than relying on
sock->sk.

This means changing ovpn_socket->sock to ovpn_socket->sk.

While holding a reference to sk, we can increase its refcounter
without affecting the socket close()/destroy() notification
(which we rely on when userspace closes a socket we are using).

By increasing sk's refcounter we know we can dereference it
in ovpn_socket_release() without incurring in any race condition
anymore.

ovpn_socket_release() will ultimately decrease the reference
counter.

Cc: Oleksandr Natalenko <[email protected]>
Fixes: 11851cb ("ovpn: implement TCP transport")
Reported-by: Qingfang Deng <[email protected]>
Closes: OpenVPN/ovpn-net-next#1
Tested-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]>
Link: https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg31575.html
Signed-off-by: Antonio Quartulli <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request May 21, 2025
When xdp is attached or detached, dev->ndo_bpf() is called by
do_setlink(), and it acquires netdev_lock() if needed.
Unlike other drivers, the bnxt driver is protected by netdev_lock while
xdp is attached/detached because it sets dev->request_ops_lock to true.

So, the bnxt_xdp(), that is callback of ->ndo_bpf should not acquire
netdev_lock().
But the xdp_features_{set | clear}_redirect_target() was changed to
acquire netdev_lock() internally.
It causes a deadlock.
To fix this problem, bnxt driver should use
xdp_features_{set | clear}_redirect_target_locked() instead.

Splat looks like:
============================================
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
6.15.0-rc6+ kernel-patches#1 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------
bpftool/1745 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff888131b85038 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: xdp_features_set_redirect_target+0x1f/0x80

but task is already holding lock:
ffff888131b85038 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: do_setlink.constprop.0+0x24e/0x35d0

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0
       ----
  lock(&dev->lock);
  lock(&dev->lock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

 May be due to missing lock nesting notation

3 locks held by bpftool/1745:
 #0: ffffffffa56131c8 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnl_setlink+0x1fe/0x570
 kernel-patches#1: ffffffffaafa75a0 (&net->rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnl_setlink+0x236/0x570
 kernel-patches#2: ffff888131b85038 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: do_setlink.constprop.0+0x24e/0x35d0

stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1745 Comm: bpftool Not tainted 6.15.0-rc6+ kernel-patches#1 PREEMPT(undef)
Hardware name: ASUS System Product Name/PRIME Z690-P D4, BIOS 0603 11/01/2021
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x7a/0xd0
 print_deadlock_bug+0x294/0x3d0
 __lock_acquire+0x153b/0x28f0
 lock_acquire+0x184/0x340
 ? xdp_features_set_redirect_target+0x1f/0x80
 __mutex_lock+0x1ac/0x18a0
 ? xdp_features_set_redirect_target+0x1f/0x80
 ? xdp_features_set_redirect_target+0x1f/0x80
 ? __pfx_bnxt_rx_page_skb+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_en
 ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
 ? __pfx_netdev_update_features+0x10/0x10
 ? bnxt_set_rx_skb_mode+0x284/0x540 [bnxt_en
 ? __pfx_bnxt_set_rx_skb_mode+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_en
 ? xdp_features_set_redirect_target+0x1f/0x80
 xdp_features_set_redirect_target+0x1f/0x80
 bnxt_xdp+0x34e/0x730 [bnxt_en 11cbcce8fa11cff1dddd7ef358d6219e4ca9add3]
 dev_xdp_install+0x3f4/0x830
 ? __pfx_bnxt_xdp+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_en 11cbcce8fa11cff1dddd7ef358d6219e4ca9add3]
 ? __pfx_dev_xdp_install+0x10/0x10
 dev_xdp_attach+0x560/0xf70
 dev_change_xdp_fd+0x22d/0x280
 do_setlink.constprop.0+0x2989/0x35d0
 ? __pfx_do_setlink.constprop.0+0x10/0x10
 ? lock_acquire+0x184/0x340
 ? find_held_lock+0x32/0x90
 ? rtnl_setlink+0x236/0x570
 ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
 ? trace_contention_end+0xdc/0x120
 ? __mutex_lock+0x946/0x18a0
 ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
 ? __lock_acquire+0xa95/0x28f0
 ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
 ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
 ? cap_capable+0x172/0x350
 rtnl_setlink+0x2cd/0x570

Fixes: 03df156 ("xdp: double protect netdev->xdp_flags with netdev->lock")
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michael Chan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request May 21, 2025
While tracking an IDPF bug, I found that idpf_vport_splitq_napi_poll()
was not following NAPI rules.

It can indeed return @Budget after napi_complete() has been called.

Add two debug conditions in networking core to hopefully catch
this kind of bugs sooner.

IDPF bug will be fixed in a separate patch.

[   72.441242] repoll requested for device eth1 idpf_vport_splitq_napi_poll [idpf] but napi is not scheduled.
[   72.446291] list_del corruption. next->prev should be ff31783d93b14040, but was ff31783d93b10080. (next=ff31783d93b10080)
[   72.446659] kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:67!
[   72.446816] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [kernel-patches#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC NOPTI
[   72.447031] CPU: 156 UID: 0 PID: 16258 Comm: ip Tainted: G        W           6.15.0-dbg-DEV kernel-patches#1944 NONE
[   72.447340] Tainted: [W]=WARN
[   72.447702] RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid_or_report (lib/list_debug.c:65)
[   72.450630] Call Trace:
[   72.450720]  <IRQ>
[   72.450797] net_rx_action (include/linux/list.h:215 include/linux/list.h:287 net/core/dev.c:7385 net/core/dev.c:7516)
[   72.450928] ? lock_release (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:?)
[   72.451059] ? clockevents_program_event (kernel/time/clockevents.c:?)
[   72.451222] handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:579)
[   72.451356] ? do_softirq (kernel/softirq.c:480)
[   72.451480] ? idpf_vc_xn_exec (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c:462) idpf
[   72.451635] do_softirq (kernel/softirq.c:480)
[   72.451750]  </IRQ>
[   72.451828]  <TASK>
[   72.451905] __local_bh_enable_ip (kernel/softirq.c:?)
[   72.452051] idpf_vc_xn_exec (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c:462) idpf
[   72.452210] idpf_send_delete_queues_msg (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c:2083) idpf
[   72.452390] idpf_vport_stop (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_lib.c:837 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_lib.c:868) idpf
[   72.452541] ? idpf_vport_stop (include/linux/bottom_half.h:? include/linux/netdevice.h:4762 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_lib.c:855) idpf
[   72.452695] idpf_initiate_soft_reset (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_lib.c:?) idpf
[   72.452867] idpf_change_mtu (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_lib.c:2189) idpf
[   72.453015] netif_set_mtu_ext (net/core/dev.c:9437)
[   72.453157] ? packet_notifier (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 net/packet/af_packet.c:4240)
[   72.453292] netif_set_mtu (net/core/dev.c:9515)
[   72.453416] dev_set_mtu (net/core/dev_api.c:?)
[   72.453534] bond_change_mtu (drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:4833)
[   72.453666] netif_set_mtu_ext (net/core/dev.c:9437)
[   72.453803] do_setlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3116)
[   72.453925] ? rtnl_newlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3901)
[   72.454055] ? rtnl_newlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3901)
[   72.454185] ? rtnl_newlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3901)
[   72.454314] ? trace_contention_end (include/trace/events/lock.h:122)
[   72.454467] ? __mutex_lock (arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:85 kernel/locking/mutex.c:611 kernel/locking/mutex.c:746)
[   72.454597] ? cap_capable (include/trace/events/capability.h:26)
[   72.454721] ? security_capable (security/security.c:?)
[   72.454857] rtnl_newlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:?)
[   72.454982] ? lock_is_held_type (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5599 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5938)
[   72.455121] ? __lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:?)
[   72.455256] ? __change_page_attr_set_clr (arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c:685)
[   72.455438] ? __lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:?)
[   72.455582] ? rtnetlink_rcv_msg (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6885)
[   72.455721] ? lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5866)
[   72.455848] ? rtnetlink_rcv_msg (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6885)
[   72.455987] ? lock_release (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:?)
[   72.456117] ? rcu_read_unlock (include/linux/rcupdate.h:341 include/linux/rcupdate.h:871)
[   72.456249] ? __pfx_rtnl_newlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3956)
[   72.456388] rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6955)
[   72.456526] ? rtnetlink_rcv_msg (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6885)
[   72.456671] ? lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5866)
[   72.456802] ? net_generic (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 include/net/netns/generic.h:45)
[   72.456929] ? __pfx_rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6858)
[   72.457082] netlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2534)
[   72.457212] netlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1313)
[   72.457344] netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1883)
[   72.457476] __sock_sendmsg (net/socket.c:712)
[   72.457602] ____sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:?)
[   72.457735] ? _copy_from_user (arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:126 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:134 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:141 include/linux/uaccess.h:178 lib/usercopy.c:18)
[   72.457875] ___sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2620)
[   72.458042] ? __call_rcu_common (arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:42 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:119 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:159 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3107)
[   72.458185] ? mntput_no_expire (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 fs/namespace.c:1457)
[   72.458324] ? lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5866)
[   72.458451] ? mntput_no_expire (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 fs/namespace.c:1457)
[   72.458588] ? lock_release (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:?)
[   72.458718] ? mntput_no_expire (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 fs/namespace.c:1457)
[   72.458856] __x64_sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2652)
[   72.458997] ? do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:42 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:119 include/linux/entry-common.h:198 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:90)
[   72.459136] do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:?)
[   72.459259] ? exc_page_fault (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1542)
[   72.459387] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
[   72.459555] RIP: 0033:0x7fd15f17cbd0

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request May 21, 2025
There is no disagreement that we should check both ptp->is_virtual_clock
and ptp->n_vclocks to check if the ptp virtual clock is in use.

However, when we acquire ptp->n_vclocks_mux to read ptp->n_vclocks in
ptp_vclock_in_use(), we observe a recursive lock in the call trace
starting from n_vclocks_store().

============================================
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
6.15.0-rc6 kernel-patches#1 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------
syz.0.1540/13807 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff888035a24868 (&ptp->n_vclocks_mux){+.+.}-{4:4}, at:
 ptp_vclock_in_use drivers/ptp/ptp_private.h:103 [inline]
ffff888035a24868 (&ptp->n_vclocks_mux){+.+.}-{4:4}, at:
 ptp_clock_unregister+0x21/0x250 drivers/ptp/ptp_clock.c:415

but task is already holding lock:
ffff888030704868 (&ptp->n_vclocks_mux){+.+.}-{4:4}, at:
 n_vclocks_store+0xf1/0x6d0 drivers/ptp/ptp_sysfs.c:215

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0
       ----
  lock(&ptp->n_vclocks_mux);
  lock(&ptp->n_vclocks_mux);

 *** DEADLOCK ***
....
============================================

The best way to solve this is to remove the logic that checks
ptp->n_vclocks in ptp_vclock_in_use().

The reason why this is appropriate is that any path that uses
ptp->n_vclocks must unconditionally check if ptp->n_vclocks is greater
than 0 before unregistering vclocks, and all functions are already
written this way. And in the function that uses ptp->n_vclocks, we
already get ptp->n_vclocks_mux before unregistering vclocks.

Therefore, we need to remove the redundant check for ptp->n_vclocks in
ptp_vclock_in_use() to prevent recursive locking.

Fixes: 73f3706 ("ptp: support ptp physical/virtual clocks conversion")
Signed-off-by: Jeongjun Park <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request May 21, 2025
Removing a peer while userspace attempts to close its transport
socket triggers a race condition resulting in the following
crash:

Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000077: 0000 [kernel-patches#1] SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000003b8-0x00000000000003bf]
CPU: 12 UID: 0 PID: 162 Comm: kworker/12:1 Tainted: G           O        6.15.0-rc2-00635-g521139ac3840 kernel-patches#272 PREEMPT(full)
Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-20240910_120124-localhost 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events ovpn_peer_keepalive_work [ovpn]
RIP: 0010:ovpn_socket_release+0x23c/0x500 [ovpn]
Code: ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 71 02 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4d 8b 64 24 18 49 8d bc 24 be 03 00 00 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 14 02 48 89 f8 83 e0 07 83 c0 01 38 d0 7c 08 84 d2 0f 85 30
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000c9fb18 EFLAGS: 00010217
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff8881148d7940 RCX: ffffffff817787bb
RDX: 0000000000000077 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 00000000000003be
RBP: ffffc90000c9fb30 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: fffffbfff0d3e840
R10: ffffffff869f4207 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff888115eb9300 R14: ffffc90000c9fbc8 R15: 000000000000000c
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8882b0151000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f37266b6114 CR3: 00000000054a8000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 unlock_ovpn+0x8b/0xe0 [ovpn]
 ovpn_peer_keepalive_work+0xe3/0x540 [ovpn]
 ? ovpn_peers_free+0x780/0x780 [ovpn]
 ? lock_acquire+0x56/0x70
 ? process_one_work+0x888/0x1740
 process_one_work+0x933/0x1740
 ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x10b0/0x10b0
 ? move_linked_works+0x12d/0x2c0
 ? assign_work+0x163/0x270
 worker_thread+0x4d6/0xd90
 ? preempt_count_sub+0x4c/0x70
 ? process_one_work+0x1740/0x1740
 kthread+0x36c/0x710
 ? trace_preempt_on+0x8c/0x1e0
 ? kthread_is_per_cpu+0xc0/0xc0
 ? preempt_count_sub+0x4c/0x70
 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x36/0x60
 ? calculate_sigpending+0x7b/0xa0
 ? kthread_is_per_cpu+0xc0/0xc0
 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x80
 ? kthread_is_per_cpu+0xc0/0xc0
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
 </TASK>
Modules linked in: ovpn(O)

This happens because the peer deletion operation reaches
ovpn_socket_release() while ovpn_sock->sock (struct socket *)
and its sk member (struct sock *) are still both valid.
Here synchronize_rcu() is invoked, after which ovpn_sock->sock->sk
becomes NULL, due to the concurrent socket closing triggered
from userspace.

After having invoked synchronize_rcu(), ovpn_socket_release() will
attempt dereferencing ovpn_sock->sock->sk, triggering the crash
reported above.

The reason for accessing sk is that we need to retrieve its
protocol and continue the cleanup routine accordingly.

This crash can be easily produced by running openvpn userspace in
client mode with `--keepalive 10 20`, while entirely omitting this
option on the server side.
After 20 seconds ovpn will assume the peer (server) to be dead,
will start removing it and will notify userspace. The latter will
receive the notification and close the transport socket, thus
triggering the crash.

To fix the race condition for good, we need to refactor ovpn_socket.
Since we are always only interested in the sock->sk member (struct sock *)
we can directly hold a reference to it, raher than relying on
sock->sk.

This means changing ovpn_socket->sock to ovpn_socket->sk.

While holding a reference to sk, we can increase its refcounter
without affecting the socket close()/destroy() notification
(which we rely on when userspace closes a socket we are using).

By increasing sk's refcounter we know we can dereference it
in ovpn_socket_release() without incurring in any race condition
anymore.

ovpn_socket_release() will ultimately decrease the reference
counter.

Cc: Oleksandr Natalenko <[email protected]>
Fixes: 11851cb ("ovpn: implement TCP transport")
Reported-by: Qingfang Deng <[email protected]>
Closes: OpenVPN/ovpn-net-next#1
Tested-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]>
Link: https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg31575.html
Signed-off-by: Antonio Quartulli <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request May 21, 2025
When xdp is attached or detached, dev->ndo_bpf() is called by
do_setlink(), and it acquires netdev_lock() if needed.
Unlike other drivers, the bnxt driver is protected by netdev_lock while
xdp is attached/detached because it sets dev->request_ops_lock to true.

So, the bnxt_xdp(), that is callback of ->ndo_bpf should not acquire
netdev_lock().
But the xdp_features_{set | clear}_redirect_target() was changed to
acquire netdev_lock() internally.
It causes a deadlock.
To fix this problem, bnxt driver should use
xdp_features_{set | clear}_redirect_target_locked() instead.

Splat looks like:
============================================
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
6.15.0-rc6+ kernel-patches#1 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------
bpftool/1745 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff888131b85038 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: xdp_features_set_redirect_target+0x1f/0x80

but task is already holding lock:
ffff888131b85038 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: do_setlink.constprop.0+0x24e/0x35d0

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0
       ----
  lock(&dev->lock);
  lock(&dev->lock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

 May be due to missing lock nesting notation

3 locks held by bpftool/1745:
 #0: ffffffffa56131c8 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnl_setlink+0x1fe/0x570
 kernel-patches#1: ffffffffaafa75a0 (&net->rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnl_setlink+0x236/0x570
 kernel-patches#2: ffff888131b85038 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: do_setlink.constprop.0+0x24e/0x35d0

stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1745 Comm: bpftool Not tainted 6.15.0-rc6+ kernel-patches#1 PREEMPT(undef)
Hardware name: ASUS System Product Name/PRIME Z690-P D4, BIOS 0603 11/01/2021
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x7a/0xd0
 print_deadlock_bug+0x294/0x3d0
 __lock_acquire+0x153b/0x28f0
 lock_acquire+0x184/0x340
 ? xdp_features_set_redirect_target+0x1f/0x80
 __mutex_lock+0x1ac/0x18a0
 ? xdp_features_set_redirect_target+0x1f/0x80
 ? xdp_features_set_redirect_target+0x1f/0x80
 ? __pfx_bnxt_rx_page_skb+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_en
 ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
 ? __pfx_netdev_update_features+0x10/0x10
 ? bnxt_set_rx_skb_mode+0x284/0x540 [bnxt_en
 ? __pfx_bnxt_set_rx_skb_mode+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_en
 ? xdp_features_set_redirect_target+0x1f/0x80
 xdp_features_set_redirect_target+0x1f/0x80
 bnxt_xdp+0x34e/0x730 [bnxt_en 11cbcce8fa11cff1dddd7ef358d6219e4ca9add3]
 dev_xdp_install+0x3f4/0x830
 ? __pfx_bnxt_xdp+0x10/0x10 [bnxt_en 11cbcce8fa11cff1dddd7ef358d6219e4ca9add3]
 ? __pfx_dev_xdp_install+0x10/0x10
 dev_xdp_attach+0x560/0xf70
 dev_change_xdp_fd+0x22d/0x280
 do_setlink.constprop.0+0x2989/0x35d0
 ? __pfx_do_setlink.constprop.0+0x10/0x10
 ? lock_acquire+0x184/0x340
 ? find_held_lock+0x32/0x90
 ? rtnl_setlink+0x236/0x570
 ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
 ? trace_contention_end+0xdc/0x120
 ? __mutex_lock+0x946/0x18a0
 ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
 ? __lock_acquire+0xa95/0x28f0
 ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
 ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
 ? cap_capable+0x172/0x350
 rtnl_setlink+0x2cd/0x570

Fixes: 03df156 ("xdp: double protect netdev->xdp_flags with netdev->lock")
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michael Chan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request May 21, 2025
While tracking an IDPF bug, I found that idpf_vport_splitq_napi_poll()
was not following NAPI rules.

It can indeed return @Budget after napi_complete() has been called.

Add two debug conditions in networking core to hopefully catch
this kind of bugs sooner.

IDPF bug will be fixed in a separate patch.

[   72.441242] repoll requested for device eth1 idpf_vport_splitq_napi_poll [idpf] but napi is not scheduled.
[   72.446291] list_del corruption. next->prev should be ff31783d93b14040, but was ff31783d93b10080. (next=ff31783d93b10080)
[   72.446659] kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:67!
[   72.446816] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [kernel-patches#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC NOPTI
[   72.447031] CPU: 156 UID: 0 PID: 16258 Comm: ip Tainted: G        W           6.15.0-dbg-DEV kernel-patches#1944 NONE
[   72.447340] Tainted: [W]=WARN
[   72.447702] RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid_or_report (lib/list_debug.c:65)
[   72.450630] Call Trace:
[   72.450720]  <IRQ>
[   72.450797] net_rx_action (include/linux/list.h:215 include/linux/list.h:287 net/core/dev.c:7385 net/core/dev.c:7516)
[   72.450928] ? lock_release (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:?)
[   72.451059] ? clockevents_program_event (kernel/time/clockevents.c:?)
[   72.451222] handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:579)
[   72.451356] ? do_softirq (kernel/softirq.c:480)
[   72.451480] ? idpf_vc_xn_exec (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c:462) idpf
[   72.451635] do_softirq (kernel/softirq.c:480)
[   72.451750]  </IRQ>
[   72.451828]  <TASK>
[   72.451905] __local_bh_enable_ip (kernel/softirq.c:?)
[   72.452051] idpf_vc_xn_exec (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c:462) idpf
[   72.452210] idpf_send_delete_queues_msg (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c:2083) idpf
[   72.452390] idpf_vport_stop (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_lib.c:837 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_lib.c:868) idpf
[   72.452541] ? idpf_vport_stop (include/linux/bottom_half.h:? include/linux/netdevice.h:4762 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_lib.c:855) idpf
[   72.452695] idpf_initiate_soft_reset (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_lib.c:?) idpf
[   72.452867] idpf_change_mtu (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_lib.c:2189) idpf
[   72.453015] netif_set_mtu_ext (net/core/dev.c:9437)
[   72.453157] ? packet_notifier (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 net/packet/af_packet.c:4240)
[   72.453292] netif_set_mtu (net/core/dev.c:9515)
[   72.453416] dev_set_mtu (net/core/dev_api.c:?)
[   72.453534] bond_change_mtu (drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:4833)
[   72.453666] netif_set_mtu_ext (net/core/dev.c:9437)
[   72.453803] do_setlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3116)
[   72.453925] ? rtnl_newlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3901)
[   72.454055] ? rtnl_newlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3901)
[   72.454185] ? rtnl_newlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3901)
[   72.454314] ? trace_contention_end (include/trace/events/lock.h:122)
[   72.454467] ? __mutex_lock (arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:85 kernel/locking/mutex.c:611 kernel/locking/mutex.c:746)
[   72.454597] ? cap_capable (include/trace/events/capability.h:26)
[   72.454721] ? security_capable (security/security.c:?)
[   72.454857] rtnl_newlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:?)
[   72.454982] ? lock_is_held_type (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5599 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5938)
[   72.455121] ? __lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:?)
[   72.455256] ? __change_page_attr_set_clr (arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c:685)
[   72.455438] ? __lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:?)
[   72.455582] ? rtnetlink_rcv_msg (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6885)
[   72.455721] ? lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5866)
[   72.455848] ? rtnetlink_rcv_msg (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6885)
[   72.455987] ? lock_release (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:?)
[   72.456117] ? rcu_read_unlock (include/linux/rcupdate.h:341 include/linux/rcupdate.h:871)
[   72.456249] ? __pfx_rtnl_newlink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3956)
[   72.456388] rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6955)
[   72.456526] ? rtnetlink_rcv_msg (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6885)
[   72.456671] ? lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5866)
[   72.456802] ? net_generic (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 include/net/netns/generic.h:45)
[   72.456929] ? __pfx_rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6858)
[   72.457082] netlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2534)
[   72.457212] netlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1313)
[   72.457344] netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1883)
[   72.457476] __sock_sendmsg (net/socket.c:712)
[   72.457602] ____sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:?)
[   72.457735] ? _copy_from_user (arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:126 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:134 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:141 include/linux/uaccess.h:178 lib/usercopy.c:18)
[   72.457875] ___sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2620)
[   72.458042] ? __call_rcu_common (arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:42 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:119 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:159 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3107)
[   72.458185] ? mntput_no_expire (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 fs/namespace.c:1457)
[   72.458324] ? lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5866)
[   72.458451] ? mntput_no_expire (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 fs/namespace.c:1457)
[   72.458588] ? lock_release (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:?)
[   72.458718] ? mntput_no_expire (include/linux/rcupdate.h:331 include/linux/rcupdate.h:841 fs/namespace.c:1457)
[   72.458856] __x64_sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2652)
[   72.458997] ? do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:42 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:119 include/linux/entry-common.h:198 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:90)
[   72.459136] do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:?)
[   72.459259] ? exc_page_fault (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1542)
[   72.459387] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
[   72.459555] RIP: 0033:0x7fd15f17cbd0

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request May 21, 2025
There is no disagreement that we should check both ptp->is_virtual_clock
and ptp->n_vclocks to check if the ptp virtual clock is in use.

However, when we acquire ptp->n_vclocks_mux to read ptp->n_vclocks in
ptp_vclock_in_use(), we observe a recursive lock in the call trace
starting from n_vclocks_store().

============================================
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
6.15.0-rc6 kernel-patches#1 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------
syz.0.1540/13807 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff888035a24868 (&ptp->n_vclocks_mux){+.+.}-{4:4}, at:
 ptp_vclock_in_use drivers/ptp/ptp_private.h:103 [inline]
ffff888035a24868 (&ptp->n_vclocks_mux){+.+.}-{4:4}, at:
 ptp_clock_unregister+0x21/0x250 drivers/ptp/ptp_clock.c:415

but task is already holding lock:
ffff888030704868 (&ptp->n_vclocks_mux){+.+.}-{4:4}, at:
 n_vclocks_store+0xf1/0x6d0 drivers/ptp/ptp_sysfs.c:215

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0
       ----
  lock(&ptp->n_vclocks_mux);
  lock(&ptp->n_vclocks_mux);

 *** DEADLOCK ***
....
============================================

The best way to solve this is to remove the logic that checks
ptp->n_vclocks in ptp_vclock_in_use().

The reason why this is appropriate is that any path that uses
ptp->n_vclocks must unconditionally check if ptp->n_vclocks is greater
than 0 before unregistering vclocks, and all functions are already
written this way. And in the function that uses ptp->n_vclocks, we
already get ptp->n_vclocks_mux before unregistering vclocks.

Therefore, we need to remove the redundant check for ptp->n_vclocks in
ptp_vclock_in_use() to prevent recursive locking.

Fixes: 73f3706 ("ptp: support ptp physical/virtual clocks conversion")
Signed-off-by: Jeongjun Park <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request May 21, 2025
Removing a peer while userspace attempts to close its transport
socket triggers a race condition resulting in the following
crash:

Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000077: 0000 [kernel-patches#1] SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000003b8-0x00000000000003bf]
CPU: 12 UID: 0 PID: 162 Comm: kworker/12:1 Tainted: G           O        6.15.0-rc2-00635-g521139ac3840 kernel-patches#272 PREEMPT(full)
Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-20240910_120124-localhost 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events ovpn_peer_keepalive_work [ovpn]
RIP: 0010:ovpn_socket_release+0x23c/0x500 [ovpn]
Code: ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 71 02 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4d 8b 64 24 18 49 8d bc 24 be 03 00 00 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 14 02 48 89 f8 83 e0 07 83 c0 01 38 d0 7c 08 84 d2 0f 85 30
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000c9fb18 EFLAGS: 00010217
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff8881148d7940 RCX: ffffffff817787bb
RDX: 0000000000000077 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 00000000000003be
RBP: ffffc90000c9fb30 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: fffffbfff0d3e840
R10: ffffffff869f4207 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff888115eb9300 R14: ffffc90000c9fbc8 R15: 000000000000000c
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8882b0151000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f37266b6114 CR3: 00000000054a8000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 unlock_ovpn+0x8b/0xe0 [ovpn]
 ovpn_peer_keepalive_work+0xe3/0x540 [ovpn]
 ? ovpn_peers_free+0x780/0x780 [ovpn]
 ? lock_acquire+0x56/0x70
 ? process_one_work+0x888/0x1740
 process_one_work+0x933/0x1740
 ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x10b0/0x10b0
 ? move_linked_works+0x12d/0x2c0
 ? assign_work+0x163/0x270
 worker_thread+0x4d6/0xd90
 ? preempt_count_sub+0x4c/0x70
 ? process_one_work+0x1740/0x1740
 kthread+0x36c/0x710
 ? trace_preempt_on+0x8c/0x1e0
 ? kthread_is_per_cpu+0xc0/0xc0
 ? preempt_count_sub+0x4c/0x70
 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x36/0x60
 ? calculate_sigpending+0x7b/0xa0
 ? kthread_is_per_cpu+0xc0/0xc0
 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x80
 ? kthread_is_per_cpu+0xc0/0xc0
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
 </TASK>
Modules linked in: ovpn(O)

This happens because the peer deletion operation reaches
ovpn_socket_release() while ovpn_sock->sock (struct socket *)
and its sk member (struct sock *) are still both valid.
Here synchronize_rcu() is invoked, after which ovpn_sock->sock->sk
becomes NULL, due to the concurrent socket closing triggered
from userspace.

After having invoked synchronize_rcu(), ovpn_socket_release() will
attempt dereferencing ovpn_sock->sock->sk, triggering the crash
reported above.

The reason for accessing sk is that we need to retrieve its
protocol and continue the cleanup routine accordingly.

This crash can be easily produced by running openvpn userspace in
client mode with `--keepalive 10 20`, while entirely omitting this
option on the server side.
After 20 seconds ovpn will assume the peer (server) to be dead,
will start removing it and will notify userspace. The latter will
receive the notification and close the transport socket, thus
triggering the crash.

To fix the race condition for good, we need to refactor ovpn_socket.
Since we are always only interested in the sock->sk member (struct sock *)
we can directly hold a reference to it, raher than relying on
sock->sk.

This means changing ovpn_socket->sock to ovpn_socket->sk.

While holding a reference to sk, we can increase its refcounter
without affecting the socket close()/destroy() notification
(which we rely on when userspace closes a socket we are using).

By increasing sk's refcounter we know we can dereference it
in ovpn_socket_release() without incurring in any race condition
anymore.

ovpn_socket_release() will ultimately decrease the reference
counter.

Cc: Oleksandr Natalenko <[email protected]>
Fixes: 11851cb ("ovpn: implement TCP transport")
Reported-by: Qingfang Deng <[email protected]>
Closes: OpenVPN/ovpn-net-next#1
Tested-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]>
Link: https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg31575.html
Signed-off-by: Antonio Quartulli <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
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3 participants