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Merged
merged 3 commits into from
Oct 15, 2020
Merged

Add outpoint index in watch_outputs to fix tracking #653

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30aad79
Add transaction index in watched_outputs
Jul 1, 2020
613ac6e
Add test_htlc_no_detection
Oct 6, 2020
27ee115
Assert on correct registeration of outputs index
Oct 9, 2020
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8 changes: 4 additions & 4 deletions lightning/src/chain/chainmonitor.rs
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -95,8 +95,8 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, C: Deref, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChainMonit

if let Some(ref chain_source) = self.chain_source {
for (txid, outputs) in txn_outputs.drain(..) {
for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
chain_source.register_output(&OutPoint { txid, index: idx as u16 }, &output.script_pubkey);
for (idx, output) in outputs.iter() {
chain_source.register_output(&OutPoint { txid, index: *idx as u16 }, &output.script_pubkey);
}
}
}
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -152,8 +152,8 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, C: Deref, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChainMonit
if let Some(ref chain_source) = self.chain_source {
chain_source.register_tx(&funding_txo.0.txid, &funding_txo.1);
for (txid, outputs) in monitor.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
for (idx, script_pubkey) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
chain_source.register_output(&OutPoint { txid: *txid, index: idx as u16 }, &script_pubkey);
for (idx, script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
chain_source.register_output(&OutPoint { txid: *txid, index: *idx as u16 }, script_pubkey);
}
}
}
Expand Down
75 changes: 53 additions & 22 deletions lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -666,7 +666,7 @@ pub struct ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
// interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
// be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
// Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Txid, Vec<Script>>,
outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>>,

#[cfg(test)]
pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<ChanSigner>,
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -914,10 +914,11 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
}

(self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
for (txid, output_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
for (txid, idx_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
txid.write(writer)?;
(output_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
for script in output_scripts.iter() {
(idx_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
for (idx, script) in idx_scripts.iter() {
idx.write(writer)?;
script.write(writer)?;
}
}
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -963,7 +964,7 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(initial_holder_commitment_tx);

let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::new();
outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![funding_info.1.clone()]);
outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![(funding_info.0.index as u32, funding_info.1.clone())]);

ChannelMonitor {
latest_update_id: 0,
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -1209,7 +1210,7 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
/// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
///
/// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<Script>> {
pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>> {
// If we've detected a counterparty commitment tx on chain, we must include it in the set
// of outputs to watch for spends of, otherwise we're likely to lose user funds. Because
// its trivial to do, double-check that here.
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -1264,7 +1265,7 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
/// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
/// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
/// revoked counterparty commitment tx
fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, (Txid, Vec<TxOut>)) where L::Target: Logger {
fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, (Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>)) where L::Target: Logger {
// Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
// a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -1319,7 +1320,9 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
// We're definitely a counterparty commitment transaction!
log_trace!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
}
self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);

macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -1366,7 +1369,9 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
// already processed the block, resulting in the counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
// not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
// insert it here.
watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
}
self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);

log_trace!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -1456,7 +1461,7 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
}

/// Attempts to claim a counterparty HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
fn check_spend_counterparty_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Option<(Txid, Vec<TxOut>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
fn check_spend_counterparty_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Option<(Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 || tx.input[0].witness.len() != 5 {
return (Vec::new(), None)
Expand All @@ -1478,10 +1483,11 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty HTLC broadcast {}:{}", htlc_txid, 0);
let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, amount: tx.output[0].value, htlc: None, on_counterparty_tx_csv: self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv };
let claimable_outpoints = vec!(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_txid, vout: 0}, witness_data });
(claimable_outpoints, Some((htlc_txid, tx.output.clone())))
let outputs = vec![(0, tx.output[0].clone())];
(claimable_outpoints, Some((htlc_txid, outputs)))
}

fn broadcast_by_holder_state(&self, commitment_tx: &Transaction, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Vec<TxOut>, Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) {
fn broadcast_by_holder_state(&self, commitment_tx: &Transaction, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>, Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) {
let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());

Expand All @@ -1502,7 +1508,7 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
} else { None },
amount: htlc.amount_msat,
}});
watch_outputs.push(commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
watch_outputs.push((transaction_output_index, commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone()));
}
}

Expand All @@ -1512,7 +1518,7 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
/// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
/// revoked using data in holder_claimable_outpoints.
/// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
fn check_spend_holder_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, (Txid, Vec<TxOut>)) where L::Target: Logger {
fn check_spend_holder_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, (Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>)) where L::Target: Logger {
let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -1662,7 +1668,7 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
/// [`get_outputs_to_watch`].
///
/// [`get_outputs_to_watch`]: #method.get_outputs_to_watch
pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)-> Vec<(Txid, Vec<TxOut>)>
pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)-> Vec<(Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>)>
where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -1763,9 +1769,23 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
// Determine new outputs to watch by comparing against previously known outputs to watch,
// updating the latter in the process.
watch_outputs.retain(|&(ref txid, ref txouts)| {
let output_scripts = txouts.iter().map(|o| o.script_pubkey.clone()).collect();
self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), output_scripts).is_none()
let idx_and_scripts = txouts.iter().map(|o| (o.0, o.1.script_pubkey.clone())).collect();
self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), idx_and_scripts).is_none()
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Can we iterate the new watch txn to assert they're known types so that the panic!() two hunks down is definitely correct?

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Actually, its all test-only, it doesnt matter.

});
#[cfg(test)]
{
// If we see a transaction for which we registered outputs previously,
// make sure the registered scriptpubkey at the expected index match
// the actual transaction output one. We failed this case before #653.
for tx in &txn_matched {
if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&tx.txid()) {
for idx_and_script in outputs.iter() {
assert!((idx_and_script.0 as usize) < tx.output.len());
assert_eq!(tx.output[idx_and_script.0 as usize].script_pubkey, idx_and_script.1);
}
}
}
}
watch_outputs
}

Expand Down Expand Up @@ -1813,8 +1833,19 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
fn spends_watched_output(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> bool {
for input in tx.input.iter() {
if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
for (idx, _script_pubkey) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
if idx == input.previous_output.vout as usize {
for (idx, _script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
if *idx == input.previous_output.vout {
#[cfg(test)]
{
// If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
// appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
// actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().clone()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
} else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
} else { panic!(); }
}
return true;
}
}
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -2316,13 +2347,13 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable> Readable for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor
}

let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Txid>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<Script>>())));
let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Txid>() + mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<Script>>())));
for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Script>()));
let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Script>())));
for _ in 0..outputs_len {
outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
outputs.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
}
if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
Expand Down
101 changes: 47 additions & 54 deletions lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs
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Expand Up @@ -7157,60 +7157,6 @@ fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
}

#[test]
fn test_no_failure_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
// Transaction filters for failing back dust htlc based on local commitment txn infos has been
// prone to error, we test here that a dummy transaction don't fail them.

let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());

// Rebalance a bit
send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000, 8_000_000);

let as_dust_limit = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;

// We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
let (preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
let (preimage_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], as_dust_limit*1000);

// Build a dummy invalid transaction trying to spend a commitment tx
let input = TxIn {
previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), vout: 0 },
script_sig: Script::new(),
sequence: 0,
witness: Vec::new(),
};

let outp = TxOut {
script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
value: 10000,
};

let dummy_tx = Transaction {
version: 2,
lock_time: 0,
input: vec![input],
output: vec![outp]
};

let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.block_connected(&header, &[(0, &dummy_tx)], 1);
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 0);
// We broadcast a few more block to check everything is all right
connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20, 1, true, header.block_hash());
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 0);

claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], preimage_1, bs_dust_limit*1000);
claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], preimage_2, as_dust_limit*1000);
}

fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
// Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
// Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -8497,3 +8443,50 @@ fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], bob_state_y);
}
}

#[test]
fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
// This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
// before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
// inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
// it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
// on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
// outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.

let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

// Create some initial channels
let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());

send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
let (_, our_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);

// Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
// We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
// this test before #653 fix.
connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

let htlc_timeout = {
let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
node_txn[0].clone()
};

let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] }, 201);
connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 201, true, header_201.block_hash());
expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
}