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feat: use public AES protected key from lib/ocrypto #2600
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feat: use public AES protected key from lib/ocrypto #2600
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Summary of Changes
Hello @strantalis, I'm Gemini Code Assist1! I'm currently reviewing this pull request and will post my feedback shortly. In the meantime, here's a summary to help you and other reviewers quickly get up to speed!
This pull request introduces a new public interface for handling protected cryptographic keys within the lib/ocrypto package. My aim is to expose previously internal AES-based key management functionality, allowing for external consumption and more robust cryptographic operations like key encapsulation, decryption, and policy binding verification.
Highlights
- New Cryptographic Interfaces: I've added ProtectedKey and Encapsulator interfaces in lib/ocrypto/interfaces.go. ProtectedKey defines operations on a decrypted key, while Encapsulator specifies methods for wrapping secret keys.
- AES Protected Key Implementation: I've provided AESProtectedKey in lib/ocrypto/protected_key.go, which implements the ProtectedKey interface. This includes methods for AES-GCM decryption, secure key export (with optional encapsulation), and HMAC-based policy binding verification.
- Robust Error Handling: I've introduced specific error types (ErrEmptyKeyData, ErrPolicyHMACMismatch, ErrHMACGeneration) to provide clearer feedback on cryptographic operation failures.
- Comprehensive Test Coverage: I've included a thorough test suite in lib/ocrypto/protected_key_test.go to ensure the correctness and reliability of the AESProtectedKey implementation, covering various scenarios including valid operations, error conditions, and interface compliance.
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Code Review
This pull request introduces a new ProtectedKey
interface and its AESProtectedKey
implementation. The changes are well-structured and include comprehensive tests. My review focuses on improving security by preventing key mutation, enhancing code clarity by removing unused parameters and redundant checks, and ensuring consistency in naming.
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This pr is dependent on #2599 |
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Needs this pr #2709 |
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I think we should be okay for the change to the interface, as the only call I can find outside of this repo is to the concrete type
Add ProtectedKey and Encapsulator interfaces to lib/ocrypto package, along with AESProtectedKey implementation. This exposes previously internal cryptographic functionality for external consumption. - Add interfaces.go with ProtectedKey and Encapsulator interfaces - Add protected_key.go with AESProtectedKey implementation - Add comprehensive test suite in protected_key_test.go - Use standard error types without logging dependencies
- Add defensive copying in constructor to prevent external mutation - Add defensive copying in Export method for security - Simplify generateHMACDigest by removing unused context and error handling - Update tests to match simplified signature Addresses feedback from code review on PR opentdf#2599
Update service components to use the newly exposed AESProtectedKey implementation from lib/ocrypto instead of internal implementation. - Update trust/key_manager.go with type aliases for backward compatibility - Replace InProcessAESKey usage with ocrypto.NewAESProtectedKey() - Remove duplicate implementation from security package - Maintain all existing functionality and interfaces
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🤖 I have created a release *beep* *boop* --- ## [0.10.0](service/v0.9.0...service/v0.10.0) (2025-09-17) ### ⚠ BREAKING CHANGES * **policy:** Add manager column to provider configuration for multi-instance support ([#2601](#2601)) ### Features * **authz:** add obligation policy decision point ([#2706](#2706)) ([bb2a4f8](bb2a4f8)) * **core:** add service negation for op mode ([#2680](#2680)) ([029db8c](029db8c)) * **core:** Bump default write timeout. ([#2671](#2671)) ([6a233c1](6a233c1)) * **core:** Encapsulate>Encrypt ([#2676](#2676)) ([3c5a614](3c5a614)) * **core:** Lets key manager factory take context ([#2715](#2715)) ([8d70993](8d70993)) * **policy:** add FQN of obligation definitions/values to protos ([#2703](#2703)) ([45ded0e](45ded0e)) * **policy:** Add manager column to provider configuration for multi-instance support ([#2601](#2601)) ([a5fc994](a5fc994)) * **policy:** Add obligation triggers ([#2675](#2675)) ([22d0837](22d0837)) * **policy:** add protovalidate for obligation defs + vals ([#2699](#2699)) ([af5c049](af5c049)) * **policy:** Allow creation and update of triggers on Obligation Values ([#2691](#2691)) ([b1e7ba1](b1e7ba1)) * **policy:** Allow for additional context to be added to obligation triggers ([#2705](#2705)) ([7025599](7025599)) * **policy:** Include Triggers in GET/LISTable reqs ([#2704](#2704)) ([b4381d1](b4381d1)) * **policy:** obligations + values CRUD ([#2545](#2545)) ([c194e35](c194e35)) * use public AES protected key from lib/ocrypto ([#2600](#2600)) ([75d7590](75d7590)) ### Bug Fixes * **core:** remove extraneous comment ([#2741](#2741)) ([ada8da6](ada8da6)) * **core:** return services in the order they were registered ([#2733](#2733)) ([1d661db](1d661db)) * **deps:** bump github.com/opentdf/platform/lib/ocrypto from 0.3.0 to 0.6.0 in /service ([#2714](#2714)) ([00354b3](00354b3)) * **deps:** bump github.com/opentdf/platform/protocol/go from 0.7.0 to 0.9.0 in /service ([#2726](#2726)) ([9004368](9004368)) * **deps:** bump protocol/go to 0.10.0 in service ([#2734](#2734)) ([11e6201](11e6201)) * **deps:** update protovalidate to v0.14.2 to use new buf validate MessageOneofRule ([#2698](#2698)) ([1cae18e](1cae18e)) * **policy:** Registered Resources should consider actions correctly within Decision Requests ([#2681](#2681)) ([cf264a2](cf264a2)) * sanitize db schema identifiers ([#2682](#2682)) ([0d3dd94](0d3dd94)) --- This PR was generated with [Release Please](https://github.com/googleapis/release-please). See [documentation](https://github.com/googleapis/release-please#release-please). Co-authored-by: opentdf-automation[bot] <149537512+opentdf-automation[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Update service components to use the newly exposed AESProtectedKey implementation from lib/ocrypto instead of internal implementation.
Proposed Changes
Checklist
Testing Instructions