Update build.config.rpi5 #1

WojciechMichna · 2024-04-09T12:01:33Z

There is bcm2712-rpi-5-b.dts no bcm2711-rpi-5-b.dts in arch/arm/boot/dts
same in arch/arm64/boot/dts/broadcom/
bcm2712-rpi-5-b.dts which includes
"../../../../arm/boot/dts/bcm2712-rpi-5-b.dts"

There is bcm2712-rpi-5-b.dts no bcm2711-rpi-5-b.dts in arch/arm/boot/dts same in arch/arm64/boot/dts/broadcom/ bcm2712-rpi-5-b.dts which includes "../../../../arm/boot/dts/bcm2712-rpi-5-b.dts"

KonstaT · 2024-04-09T13:59:46Z

Indeed, this is a copy&paste failure on my end. In practice this doesn't make a difference as all the dtb are still built and available at out/common/arch/arm64/boot as documented (https://github.com/raspberry-vanilla/android_kernel_manifest/tree/android-14.0). This would affect the dist output that I'm not using since we also need the overlays and I'm too lazy to list and maintain them in this makefile. :)

My local kernel tree is a bit ahead of what is currently pushed. I've included the patch and will close this PR once I've pushed the updated source code.

Thanks.

…erride commit 6c2f421 upstream. Several core drivers and buses expect that driver_override is a dynamically allocated memory thus later they can kfree() it. However such assumption is not documented, there were in the past and there are already users setting it to a string literal. This leads to kfree() of static memory during device release (e.g. in error paths or during unbind): kernel BUG at ../mm/slub.c:3960! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM ... (kfree) from [<c058da50>] (platform_device_release+0x88/0xb4) (platform_device_release) from [<c0585be0>] (device_release+0x2c/0x90) (device_release) from [<c0a69050>] (kobject_put+0xec/0x20c) (kobject_put) from [<c0f2f120>] (exynos5_clk_probe+0x154/0x18c) (exynos5_clk_probe) from [<c058de70>] (platform_drv_probe+0x6c/0xa4) (platform_drv_probe) from [<c058b7ac>] (really_probe+0x280/0x414) (really_probe) from [<c058baf4>] (driver_probe_device+0x78/0x1c4) (driver_probe_device) from [<c0589854>] (bus_for_each_drv+0x74/0xb8) (bus_for_each_drv) from [<c058b48c>] (__device_attach+0xd4/0x16c) (__device_attach) from [<c058a638>] (bus_probe_device+0x88/0x90) (bus_probe_device) from [<c05871fc>] (device_add+0x3dc/0x62c) (device_add) from [<c075ff10>] (of_platform_device_create_pdata+0x94/0xbc) (of_platform_device_create_pdata) from [<c07600ec>] (of_platform_bus_create+0x1a8/0x4fc) (of_platform_bus_create) from [<c0760150>] (of_platform_bus_create+0x20c/0x4fc) (of_platform_bus_create) from [<c07605f0>] (of_platform_populate+0x84/0x118) (of_platform_populate) from [<c0f3c964>] (of_platform_default_populate_init+0xa0/0xb8) (of_platform_default_populate_init) from [<c01031f8>] (do_one_initcall+0x8c/0x404) Provide a helper which clearly documents the usage of driver_override. This will allow later to reuse the helper and reduce the amount of duplicated code. Convert the platform driver to use a new helper and make the driver_override field const char (it is not modified by the core). Bug: 95334746 Reviewed-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]> Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 389190b) Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <[email protected]> Change-Id: I1ef85ee1f3828e947adec4a45363d8434876aade

There is a chance if a frequent switch of the governor done in a loop result in timer list corruption where timer cancel being done from two place one from cancel_delayed_work_sync() and followed by expire_timers() can be seen from the traces[1]. while true do echo "simple_ondemand" > /sys/class/devfreq/1d84000.ufshc/governor echo "performance" > /sys/class/devfreq/1d84000.ufshc/governor done It looks to be issue with devfreq driver where device_monitor_[start/stop] need to synchronized so that delayed work should get corrupted while it is either being queued or running or being cancelled. Let's use polling flag and devfreq lock to synchronize the queueing the timer instance twice and work data being corrupted. [1] ... .. <idle>-0 [003] 9436.209662: timer_cancel timer=0xffffff80444f0428 <idle>-0 [003] 9436.209664: timer_expire_entry timer=0xffffff80444f0428 now=0x10022da1c function=__typeid__ZTSFvP10timer_listE_global_addr baseclk=0x10022da1c <idle>-0 [003] 9436.209718: timer_expire_exit timer=0xffffff80444f0428 kworker/u16:6-14217 [003] 9436.209863: timer_start timer=0xffffff80444f0428 function=__typeid__ZTSFvP10timer_listE_global_addr expires=0x10022da2b now=0x10022da1c flags=182452227 vendor.xxxyyy.ha-1593 [004] 9436.209888: timer_cancel timer=0xffffff80444f0428 vendor.xxxyyy.ha-1593 [004] 9436.216390: timer_init timer=0xffffff80444f0428 vendor.xxxyyy.ha-1593 [004] 9436.216392: timer_start timer=0xffffff80444f0428 function=__typeid__ZTSFvP10timer_listE_global_addr expires=0x10022da2c now=0x10022da1d flags=186646532 vendor.xxxyyy.ha-1593 [005] 9436.220992: timer_cancel timer=0xffffff80444f0428 xxxyyyTraceManag-7795 [004] 9436.261641: timer_cancel timer=0xffffff80444f0428 [2] 9436.261653][ C4] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address dead00000000012a [ 9436.261664][ C4] Mem abort info: [ 9436.261666][ C4] ESR = 0x96000044 [ 9436.261669][ C4] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 9436.261671][ C4] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 9436.261673][ C4] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 9436.261675][ C4] Data abort info: [ 9436.261677][ C4] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000044 [ 9436.261680][ C4] CM = 0, WnR = 1 [ 9436.261682][ C4] [dead00000000012a] address between user and kernel address ranges [ 9436.261685][ C4] Internal error: Oops: 96000044 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 9436.261701][ C4] Skip md ftrace buffer dump for: 0x3a982d0 ... [ 9436.262138][ C4] CPU: 4 PID: 7795 Comm: TraceManag Tainted: G S W O 5.10.149-android12-9-o-g17f915d29d0c #1 [ 9436.262141][ C4] Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. (DT) [ 9436.262144][ C4] pstate: 22400085 (nzCv daIf +PAN -UAO +TCO BTYPE=--) [ 9436.262161][ C4] pc : expire_timers+0x9c/0x438 [ 9436.262164][ C4] lr : expire_timers+0x2a4/0x438 [ 9436.262168][ C4] sp : ffffffc010023dd0 [ 9436.262171][ C4] x29: ffffffc010023df0 x28: ffffffd0636fdc18 [ 9436.262178][ C4] x27: ffffffd063569dd0 x26: ffffffd063536008 [ 9436.262182][ C4] x25: 0000000000000001 x24: ffffff88f7c69280 [ 9436.262185][ C4] x23: 00000000000000e0 x22: dead000000000122 [ 9436.262188][ C4] x21: 000000010022da29 x20: ffffff8af72b4e80 [ 9436.262191][ C4] x19: ffffffc010023e50 x18: ffffffc010025038 [ 9436.262195][ C4] x17: 0000000000000240 x16: 0000000000000201 [ 9436.262199][ C4] x15: ffffffffffffffff x14: ffffff889f3c3100 [ 9436.262203][ C4] x13: ffffff889f3c3100 x12: 00000000049f56b8 [ 9436.262207][ C4] x11: 00000000049f56b8 x10: 00000000ffffffff [ 9436.262212][ C4] x9 : ffffffc010023e50 x8 : dead000000000122 [ 9436.262216][ C4] x7 : ffffffffffffffff x6 : ffffffc0100239d8 [ 9436.262220][ C4] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000101 [ 9436.262223][ C4] x3 : 0000000000000080 x2 : ffffff889edc155c [ 9436.262227][ C4] x1 : ffffff8001005200 x0 : ffffff80444f0428 [ 9436.262232][ C4] Call trace: [ 9436.262236][ C4] expire_timers+0x9c/0x438 [ 9436.262240][ C4] __run_timers+0x1f0/0x330 [ 9436.262245][ C4] run_timer_softirq+0x28/0x58 [ 9436.262255][ C4] efi_header_end+0x168/0x5ec [ 9436.262265][ C4] __irq_exit_rcu+0x108/0x124 [ 9436.262274][ C4] __handle_domain_irq+0x118/0x1e4 [ 9436.262282][ C4] gic_handle_irq.30369+0x6c/0x2bc [ 9436.262286][ C4] el0_irq_naked+0x60/0x6c Bug: 317188938 Change-Id: I9a22325f6abbf28217c8f37b093cf77509b0139a Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ Reported-by: Joyyoung Huang <[email protected]> Acked-by: MyungJoo Ham <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mukesh Ojha <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Chanwoo Choi <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit aed5ed5 https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/chanwoo/linux.git devfreq-next) Signed-off-by: Srinivasarao Pathipati <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1469417 ] Trying to suspend to RAM on SAMA5D27 EVK leads to the following lockdep warning: ============================================ WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 6.7.0-rc5-wt+ #532 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- sh/92 is trying to acquire lock: c3cf306c (&irq_desc_lock_class){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: __irq_get_desc_lock+0xe8/0x100 but task is already holding lock: c3d7c46c (&irq_desc_lock_class){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: __irq_get_desc_lock+0xe8/0x100 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&irq_desc_lock_class); lock(&irq_desc_lock_class); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 6 locks held by sh/92: #0: c3aa0258 (sb_writers#6){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0xd8/0x178 #1: c4c2df44 (&of->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x138/0x284 #2: c32684a0 (kn->active){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x148/0x284 #3: c232b6d4 (system_transition_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: pm_suspend+0x13c/0x4e8 #4: c387b088 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: __device_suspend+0x1e8/0x91c #5: c3d7c46c (&irq_desc_lock_class){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: __irq_get_desc_lock+0xe8/0x100 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 92 Comm: sh Not tainted 6.7.0-rc5-wt+ #532 Hardware name: Atmel SAMA5 unwind_backtrace from show_stack+0x18/0x1c show_stack from dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x48 dump_stack_lvl from __lock_acquire+0x19ec/0x3a0c __lock_acquire from lock_acquire.part.0+0x124/0x2d0 lock_acquire.part.0 from _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x5c/0x78 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave from __irq_get_desc_lock+0xe8/0x100 __irq_get_desc_lock from irq_set_irq_wake+0xa8/0x204 irq_set_irq_wake from atmel_gpio_irq_set_wake+0x58/0xb4 atmel_gpio_irq_set_wake from irq_set_irq_wake+0x100/0x204 irq_set_irq_wake from gpio_keys_suspend+0xec/0x2b8 gpio_keys_suspend from dpm_run_callback+0xe4/0x248 dpm_run_callback from __device_suspend+0x234/0x91c __device_suspend from dpm_suspend+0x224/0x43c dpm_suspend from dpm_suspend_start+0x9c/0xa8 dpm_suspend_start from suspend_devices_and_enter+0x1e0/0xa84 suspend_devices_and_enter from pm_suspend+0x460/0x4e8 pm_suspend from state_store+0x78/0xe4 state_store from kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x1a0/0x284 kernfs_fop_write_iter from vfs_write+0x38c/0x6f4 vfs_write from ksys_write+0xd8/0x178 ksys_write from ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x1c Exception stack(0xc52b3fa8 to 0xc52b3ff0) 3fa0: 00000004 005a0ae8 00000001 005a0ae8 00000004 00000001 3fc0: 00000004 005a0ae8 00000001 00000004 00000004 b6c616c0 00000020 0059d190 3fe0: 00000004 b6c61678 aec5a041 aebf1a26 This warning is raised because pinctrl-at91-pio4 uses chained IRQ. Whenever a wake up source configures an IRQ through irq_set_irq_wake, it will lock the corresponding IRQ desc, and then call irq_set_irq_wake on "parent" IRQ which will do the same on its own IRQ desc, but since those two locks share the same class, lockdep reports this as an issue. Fix lockdep false positive by setting a different class for parent and children IRQ Fixes: 7761808 ("pinctrl: introduce driver for Atmel PIO4 controller") Signed-off-by: Alexis Lothoré <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

@len

[ Upstream commit 90d025c ] If server replied SMB2_NEGOTIATE with a zero SecurityBufferOffset, smb2_get_data_area() sets @len to non-zero but return NULL, so decode_negTokeninit() ends up being called with a NULL @security_blob: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 2 PID: 871 Comm: mount.cifs Not tainted 6.7.0-rc4 #2 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.2-3-gd478f380-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:asn1_ber_decoder+0x173/0xc80 Code: 01 4c 39 2c 24 75 09 45 84 c9 0f 85 2f 03 00 00 48 8b 14 24 4c 29 ea 48 83 fa 01 0f 86 1e 07 00 00 48 8b 74 24 28 4d 8d 5d 01 <42> 0f b6 3c 2e 89 fa 40 88 7c 24 5c f7 d2 83 e2 1f 0f 84 3d 07 00 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000063f950 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000000000000004a RDX: 000000000000004a RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000000000000004d R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007fce52b0fbc0(0000) GS:ffff88806ba00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000001ae64000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die+0x23/0x70 ? page_fault_oops+0x181/0x480 ? __stack_depot_save+0x1e6/0x480 ? exc_page_fault+0x6f/0x1c0 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 ? asn1_ber_decoder+0x173/0xc80 ? check_object+0x40/0x340 decode_negTokenInit+0x1e/0x30 [cifs] SMB2_negotiate+0xc99/0x17c0 [cifs] ? smb2_negotiate+0x46/0x60 [cifs] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 smb2_negotiate+0x46/0x60 [cifs] cifs_negotiate_protocol+0xae/0x130 [cifs] cifs_get_smb_ses+0x517/0x1040 [cifs] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? queue_delayed_work_on+0x5d/0x90 cifs_mount_get_session+0x78/0x200 [cifs] dfs_mount_share+0x13a/0x9f0 [cifs] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? lock_acquire+0xbf/0x2b0 ? find_nls+0x16/0x80 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 cifs_mount+0x7e/0x350 [cifs] cifs_smb3_do_mount+0x128/0x780 [cifs] smb3_get_tree+0xd9/0x290 [cifs] vfs_get_tree+0x2c/0x100 ? capable+0x37/0x70 path_mount+0x2d7/0xb80 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x44/0x60 __x64_sys_mount+0x11a/0x150 do_syscall_64+0x47/0xf0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77 RIP: 0033:0x7fce52c2ab1e Fix this by setting @len to zero when @off == 0 so callers won't attempt to dereference non-existing data areas. Reported-by: Robert Morris <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3a42709 ] Validate @ioctl_rsp->OutputOffset and @ioctl_rsp->OutputCount so that their sum does not wrap to a number that is smaller than @reparse_buf and we end up with a wild pointer as follows: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff88809c5cd45f #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 4a01067 P4D 4a01067 PUD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 2 PID: 1260 Comm: mount.cifs Not tainted 6.7.0-rc4 #2 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.2-3-gd478f380-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:smb2_query_reparse_point+0x3e0/0x4c0 [cifs] Code: ff ff e8 f3 51 fe ff 41 89 c6 58 5a 45 85 f6 0f 85 14 fe ff ff 49 8b 57 48 8b 42 60 44 8b 42 64 42 8d 0c 00 49 39 4f 50 72 40 <8b> 04 02 48 8b 9d f0 fe ff ff 49 8b 57 50 89 03 48 8b 9d e8 fe ff RSP: 0018:ffffc90000347a90 EFLAGS: 00010212 RAX: 000000008000001f RBX: ffff88800ae11000 RCX: 00000000000000ec RDX: ffff88801c5cd440 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffffff82004aa4 RBP: ffffc90000347bb0 R08: 00000000800000cd R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000024 R12: ffff8880114d4100 R13: ffff8880114d4198 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8880114d4000 FS: 00007f02c07babc0(0000) GS:ffff88806ba00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffff88809c5cd45f CR3: 0000000011750000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die+0x23/0x70 ? page_fault_oops+0x181/0x480 ? search_module_extables+0x19/0x60 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? exc_page_fault+0x1b6/0x1c0 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x44/0x60 ? smb2_query_reparse_point+0x3e0/0x4c0 [cifs] cifs_get_fattr+0x16e/0xa50 [cifs] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? lock_acquire+0xbf/0x2b0 cifs_root_iget+0x163/0x5f0 [cifs] cifs_smb3_do_mount+0x5bd/0x780 [cifs] smb3_get_tree+0xd9/0x290 [cifs] vfs_get_tree+0x2c/0x100 ? capable+0x37/0x70 path_mount+0x2d7/0xb80 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x44/0x60 __x64_sys_mount+0x11a/0x150 do_syscall_64+0x47/0xf0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77 RIP: 0033:0x7f02c08d5b1e Fixes: 2e4564b ("smb3: add support for stat of WSL reparse points for special file types") Cc: [email protected] Reported-by: Robert Morris <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

…te_call_indirect commit f5d03da upstream. kprobe_emulate_call_indirect currently uses int3_emulate_call to emulate indirect calls. However, int3_emulate_call always assumes the size of the call to be 5 bytes when calculating the return address. This is incorrect for register-based indirect calls in x86, which can be either 2 or 3 bytes depending on whether REX prefix is used. At kprobe runtime, the incorrect return address causes control flow to land onto the wrong place after return -- possibly not a valid instruction boundary. This can lead to a panic like the following: [ 7.308204][ C1] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 000000000002b4d8 [ 7.308883][ C1] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 7.309168][ C1] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 7.309461][ C1] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 7.309652][ C1] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 7.309929][ C1] CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 6.7.0-rc5-trace-for-next #6 [ 7.310397][ C1] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.0-20220807_005459-localhost 04/01/2014 [ 7.311068][ C1] RIP: 0010:__common_interrupt+0x52/0xc0 [ 7.311349][ C1] Code: 01 00 4d 85 f6 74 39 49 81 fe 00 f0 ff ff 77 30 4c 89 f7 4d 8b 5e 68 41 ba 91 76 d8 42 45 03 53 fc 74 02 0f 0b cc ff d3 65 48 <8b> 05 30 c7 ff 7e 65 4c 89 3d 28 c7 ff 7e 5b 41 5c 41 5e 41 5f c3 [ 7.312512][ C1] RSP: 0018:ffffc900000e0fd0 EFLAGS: 00010046 [ 7.312899][ C1] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000023 RCX: 0000000000000001 [ 7.313334][ C1] RDX: 00000000000003cd RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff888100d302a4 [ 7.313702][ C1] RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0ef439818636191f R09: b1621ff338a3b482 [ 7.314146][ C1] R10: ffffffff81e5127b R11: ffffffff81059810 R12: 0000000000000023 [ 7.314509][ C1] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff888100d30200 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 7.314951][ C1] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88813bc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 7.315396][ C1] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 7.315691][ C1] CR2: 000000000002b4d8 CR3: 0000000003028003 CR4: 0000000000370ef0 [ 7.316153][ C1] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 7.316508][ C1] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 7.316948][ C1] Call Trace: [ 7.317123][ C1] <IRQ> [ 7.317279][ C1] ? __die_body+0x64/0xb0 [ 7.317482][ C1] ? page_fault_oops+0x248/0x370 [ 7.317712][ C1] ? __wake_up+0x96/0xb0 [ 7.317964][ C1] ? exc_page_fault+0x62/0x130 [ 7.318211][ C1] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 [ 7.318444][ C1] ? __cfi_native_send_call_func_single_ipi+0x10/0x10 [ 7.318860][ C1] ? default_idle+0xb/0x10 [ 7.319063][ C1] ? __common_interrupt+0x52/0xc0 [ 7.319330][ C1] common_interrupt+0x78/0x90 [ 7.319546][ C1] </IRQ> [ 7.319679][ C1] <TASK> [ 7.319854][ C1] asm_common_interrupt+0x22/0x40 [ 7.320082][ C1] RIP: 0010:default_idle+0xb/0x10 [ 7.320309][ C1] Code: 4c 01 c7 4c 29 c2 e9 72 ff ff ff cc cc cc cc 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 b8 0c 67 40 a5 66 90 0f 00 2d 09 b9 3b 00 fb f4 <fa> c3 0f 1f 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 b8 0c 67 40 a5 e9 [ 7.321449][ C1] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000009bee8 EFLAGS: 00000256 [ 7.321808][ C1] RAX: ffff88813bca8b68 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 000000000001ef0c [ 7.322227][ C1] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 000000000001ef0c [ 7.322656][ C1] RBP: ffffc9000009bef8 R08: 8000000000000000 R09: 00000000000008c2 [ 7.323083][ C1] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff81058e70 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 7.323530][ C1] R13: ffff8881002b30c0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 7.323948][ C1] ? __cfi_lapic_next_deadline+0x10/0x10 [ 7.324239][ C1] default_idle_call+0x31/0x50 [ 7.324464][ C1] do_idle+0xd3/0x240 [ 7.324690][ C1] cpu_startup_entry+0x25/0x30 [ 7.324983][ C1] start_secondary+0xb4/0xc0 [ 7.325217][ C1] secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0x179/0x17b [ 7.325498][ C1] </TASK> [ 7.325641][ C1] Modules linked in: [ 7.325906][ C1] CR2: 000000000002b4d8 [ 7.326104][ C1] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 7.326354][ C1] RIP: 0010:__common_interrupt+0x52/0xc0 [ 7.326614][ C1] Code: 01 00 4d 85 f6 74 39 49 81 fe 00 f0 ff ff 77 30 4c 89 f7 4d 8b 5e 68 41 ba 91 76 d8 42 45 03 53 fc 74 02 0f 0b cc ff d3 65 48 <8b> 05 30 c7 ff 7e 65 4c 89 3d 28 c7 ff 7e 5b 41 5c 41 5e 41 5f c3 [ 7.327570][ C1] RSP: 0018:ffffc900000e0fd0 EFLAGS: 00010046 [ 7.327910][ C1] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000023 RCX: 0000000000000001 [ 7.328273][ C1] RDX: 00000000000003cd RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff888100d302a4 [ 7.328632][ C1] RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0ef439818636191f R09: b1621ff338a3b482 [ 7.329223][ C1] R10: ffffffff81e5127b R11: ffffffff81059810 R12: 0000000000000023 [ 7.329780][ C1] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff888100d30200 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 7.330193][ C1] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88813bc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 7.330632][ C1] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 7.331050][ C1] CR2: 000000000002b4d8 CR3: 0000000003028003 CR4: 0000000000370ef0 [ 7.331454][ C1] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 7.331854][ C1] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 7.332236][ C1] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt [ 7.332730][ C1] Kernel Offset: disabled [ 7.333044][ C1] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt ]--- The relevant assembly code is (from objdump, faulting address highlighted): ffffffff8102ed9d: 41 ff d3 call *%r11 ffffffff8102eda0: 65 48 <8b> 05 30 c7 ff mov %gs:0x7effc730(%rip),%rax The emulation incorrectly sets the return address to be ffffffff8102ed9d + 0x5 = ffffffff8102eda2, which is the 8b byte in the middle of the next mov. This in turn causes incorrect subsequent instruction decoding and eventually triggers the page fault above. Instead of invoking int3_emulate_call, perform push and jmp emulation directly in kprobe_emulate_call_indirect. At this point we can obtain the instruction size from p->ainsn.size so that we can calculate the correct return address. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ Fixes: 6256e66 ("x86/kprobes: Use int3 instead of debug trap for single-step") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Jinghao Jia <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0e8d244 ] If SetVariable at runtime is not supported by the firmware we never assign a callback for that function. At the same time mount the efivarfs as RO so no one can call that. However, we never check the permission flags when someone remounts the filesystem as RW. As a result this leads to a crash looking like this: $ mount -o remount,rw /sys/firmware/efi/efivars $ efi-updatevar -f PK.auth PK [ 303.279166] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000 [ 303.280482] Mem abort info: [ 303.280854] ESR = 0x0000000086000004 [ 303.281338] EC = 0x21: IABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 303.282016] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 303.282414] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 303.282821] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault [ 303.283771] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=000000004258c000 [ 303.284913] [0000000000000000] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000 [ 303.286076] Internal error: Oops: 0000000086000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 303.286936] Modules linked in: qrtr tpm_tis tpm_tis_core crct10dif_ce arm_smccc_trng rng_core drm fuse ip_tables x_tables ipv6 [ 303.288586] CPU: 1 PID: 755 Comm: efi-updatevar Not tainted 6.3.0-rc1-00108-gc7d0c4695c68 #1 [ 303.289748] Hardware name: Unknown Unknown Product/Unknown Product, BIOS 2023.04-00627-g88336918701d 04/01/2023 [ 303.291150] pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 303.292123] pc : 0x0 [ 303.292443] lr : efivar_set_variable_locked+0x74/0xec [ 303.293156] sp : ffff800008673c10 [ 303.293619] x29: ffff800008673c10 x28: ffff0000037e8000 x27: 0000000000000000 [ 303.294592] x26: 0000000000000800 x25: ffff000002467400 x24: 0000000000000027 [ 303.295572] x23: ffffd49ea9832000 x22: ffff0000020c9800 x21: ffff000002467000 [ 303.296566] x20: 0000000000000001 x19: 00000000000007fc x18: 0000000000000000 [ 303.297531] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000aaaac807ab54 [ 303.298495] x14: ed37489f673633c0 x13: 71c45c606de13f80 x12: 47464259e219acf4 [ 303.299453] x11: ffff000002af7b01 x10: 0000000000000003 x9 : 0000000000000002 [ 303.300431] x8 : 0000000000000010 x7 : ffffd49ea8973230 x6 : 0000000000a85201 [ 303.301412] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : ffff0000020c9800 x3 : 00000000000007fc [ 303.302370] x2 : 0000000000000027 x1 : ffff000002467400 x0 : ffff000002467000 [ 303.303341] Call trace: [ 303.303679] 0x0 [ 303.303938] efivar_entry_set_get_size+0x98/0x16c [ 303.304585] efivarfs_file_write+0xd0/0x1a4 [ 303.305148] vfs_write+0xc4/0x2e4 [ 303.305601] ksys_write+0x70/0x104 [ 303.306073] __arm64_sys_write+0x1c/0x28 [ 303.306622] invoke_syscall+0x48/0x114 [ 303.307156] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x44/0xec [ 303.307803] do_el0_svc+0x38/0x98 [ 303.308268] el0_svc+0x2c/0x84 [ 303.308702] el0t_64_sync_handler+0xf4/0x120 [ 303.309293] el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 [ 303.309794] Code: ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? (????????) [ 303.310612] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Fix this by adding a .reconfigure() function to the fs operations which we can use to check the requested flags and deny anything that's not RO if the firmware doesn't implement SetVariable at runtime. Fixes: f88814c ("efi/efivars: Expose RT service availability via efivars abstraction") Signed-off-by: Ilias Apalodimas <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3f14b37 ] act_ct adds skb->users before defragmentation. If frags arrive in order, the last frag's reference is reset in: inet_frag_reasm_prepare skb_morph which is not straightforward. However when frags arrive out of order, nobody unref the last frag, and all frags are leaked. The situation is even worse, as initiating packet capture can lead to a crash[0] when skb has been cloned and shared at the same time. Fix the issue by removing skb_get() before defragmentation. act_ct returns TC_ACT_CONSUMED when defrag failed or in progress. [0]: [ 843.804823] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 843.809659] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:2091! [ 843.814516] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 843.819296] CPU: 7 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/7 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S 6.7.0-rc3 #2 [ 843.824107] Hardware name: XFUSION 1288H V6/BC13MBSBD, BIOS 1.29 11/25/2022 [ 843.828953] RIP: 0010:pskb_expand_head+0x2ac/0x300 [ 843.833805] Code: 8b 70 28 48 85 f6 74 82 48 83 c6 08 bf 01 00 00 00 e8 38 bd ff ff 8b 83 c0 00 00 00 48 03 83 c8 00 00 00 e9 62 ff ff ff 0f 0b <0f> 0b e8 8d d0 ff ff e9 b3 fd ff ff 81 7c 24 14 40 01 00 00 4c 89 [ 843.843698] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000cce07c0 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 843.848524] RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff88811a211d00 RCX: 0000000000000820 [ 843.853299] RDX: 0000000000000640 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88811a211d00 [ 843.857974] RBP: ffff888127d39518 R08: 00000000bee97314 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 843.862584] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8881109f0000 R12: 0000000000000880 [ 843.867147] R13: ffff888127d39580 R14: 0000000000000640 R15: ffff888170f7b900 [ 843.871680] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff889ffffc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 843.876242] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 843.880778] CR2: 00007fa42affcfb8 CR3: 000000011433a002 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 [ 843.885336] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 843.889809] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 843.894229] PKRU: 55555554 [ 843.898539] Call Trace: [ 843.902772] <IRQ> [ 843.906922] ? __die_body+0x1e/0x60 [ 843.911032] ? die+0x3c/0x60 [ 843.915037] ? do_trap+0xe2/0x110 [ 843.918911] ? pskb_expand_head+0x2ac/0x300 [ 843.922687] ? do_error_trap+0x65/0x80 [ 843.926342] ? pskb_expand_head+0x2ac/0x300 [ 843.929905] ? exc_invalid_op+0x50/0x60 [ 843.933398] ? pskb_expand_head+0x2ac/0x300 [ 843.936835] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 [ 843.940226] ? pskb_expand_head+0x2ac/0x300 [ 843.943580] inet_frag_reasm_prepare+0xd1/0x240 [ 843.946904] ip_defrag+0x5d4/0x870 [ 843.950132] nf_ct_handle_fragments+0xec/0x130 [nf_conntrack] [ 843.953334] tcf_ct_act+0x252/0xd90 [act_ct] [ 843.956473] ? tcf_mirred_act+0x516/0x5a0 [act_mirred] [ 843.959657] tcf_action_exec+0xa1/0x160 [ 843.962823] fl_classify+0x1db/0x1f0 [cls_flower] [ 843.966010] ? skb_clone+0x53/0xc0 [ 843.969173] tcf_classify+0x24d/0x420 [ 843.972333] tc_run+0x8f/0xf0 [ 843.975465] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x67a/0x1080 [ 843.978634] ? dev_gro_receive+0x249/0x730 [ 843.981759] __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x12d/0x260 [ 843.984869] netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x1cb/0x2f0 [ 843.987957] ? mlx5e_handle_rx_cqe_mpwrq_rep+0xfa/0x1a0 [mlx5_core] [ 843.991170] napi_complete_done+0x72/0x1a0 [ 843.994305] mlx5e_napi_poll+0x28c/0x6d0 [mlx5_core] [ 843.997501] __napi_poll+0x25/0x1b0 [ 844.000627] net_rx_action+0x256/0x330 [ 844.003705] __do_softirq+0xb3/0x29b [ 844.006718] irq_exit_rcu+0x9e/0xc0 [ 844.009672] common_interrupt+0x86/0xa0 [ 844.012537] </IRQ> [ 844.015285] <TASK> [ 844.017937] asm_common_interrupt+0x26/0x40 [ 844.020591] RIP: 0010:acpi_safe_halt+0x1b/0x20 [ 844.023247] Code: ff 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 65 48 8b 04 25 00 18 03 00 48 8b 00 a8 08 75 0c 66 90 0f 00 2d 81 d0 44 00 fb f4 <fa> c3 0f 1f 00 89 fa ec 48 8b 05 ee 88 ed 00 a9 00 00 00 80 75 11 [ 844.028900] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000533e70 EFLAGS: 00000246 [ 844.031725] RAX: 0000000000004000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 844.034553] RDX: ffff889ffffc0000 RSI: ffffffff828b7f20 RDI: ffff88a090f45c64 [ 844.037368] RBP: ffff88a0901a2800 R08: ffff88a090f45c00 R09: 00000000000317c0 [ 844.040155] R10: 00ec812281150475 R11: ffff889fffff0e04 R12: ffffffff828b7fa0 [ 844.042962] R13: ffffffff828b7f20 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 844.045819] acpi_idle_enter+0x7b/0xc0 [ 844.048621] cpuidle_enter_state+0x7f/0x430 [ 844.051451] cpuidle_enter+0x2d/0x40 [ 844.054279] do_idle+0x1d4/0x240 [ 844.057096] cpu_startup_entry+0x2a/0x30 [ 844.059934] start_secondary+0x104/0x130 [ 844.062787] secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0x16b/0x16b [ 844.065674] </TASK> Fixes: b57dc7c ("net/sched: Introduce action ct") Signed-off-by: Tao Liu <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ca34d81 ] This reverts commit 4d56a4f. The DMA-fence annotations cause a lockdep warning (see below). As per https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/462170/ it sounds like the annotations don't work correctly. ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.6.0-rc2+ #1 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ kmstest/733 is trying to acquire lock: ffff8000819377f0 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x58/0x2d4 but task is already holding lock: ffff800081a06aa0 (dma_fence_map){++++}-{0:0}, at: tidss_atomic_commit_tail+0x20/0xc0 [tidss] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (dma_fence_map){++++}-{0:0}: __dma_fence_might_wait+0x5c/0xd0 dma_resv_lockdep+0x1a4/0x32c do_one_initcall+0x84/0x2fc kernel_init_freeable+0x28c/0x4c4 kernel_init+0x24/0x1dc ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 -> #1 (mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start){+.+.}-{0:0}: fs_reclaim_acquire+0x70/0xe4 __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x58/0x2d4 kmalloc_trace+0x38/0x78 __kthread_create_worker+0x3c/0x150 kthread_create_worker+0x64/0x8c workqueue_init+0x1e8/0x2f0 kernel_init_freeable+0x11c/0x4c4 kernel_init+0x24/0x1dc ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 -> #0 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x1370/0x20d8 lock_acquire+0x1e8/0x308 fs_reclaim_acquire+0xd0/0xe4 __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x58/0x2d4 __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x58/0xf0 kmemdup+0x34/0x60 regmap_bulk_write+0x64/0x2c0 tc358768_bridge_pre_enable+0x8c/0x12d0 [tc358768] drm_atomic_bridge_call_pre_enable+0x68/0x80 [drm] drm_atomic_bridge_chain_pre_enable+0x50/0x158 [drm] drm_atomic_helper_commit_modeset_enables+0x164/0x264 [drm_kms_helper] tidss_atomic_commit_tail+0x58/0xc0 [tidss] commit_tail+0xa0/0x188 [drm_kms_helper] drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x1a8/0x1c0 [drm_kms_helper] drm_atomic_commit+0xa8/0xe0 [drm] drm_mode_atomic_ioctl+0x9ec/0xc80 [drm] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xc4/0x170 [drm] drm_ioctl+0x234/0x4b0 [drm] drm_compat_ioctl+0x110/0x12c [drm] __arm64_compat_sys_ioctl+0x128/0x150 invoke_syscall+0x48/0x110 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0 do_el0_svc_compat+0x1c/0x38 el0_svc_compat+0x48/0xb4 el0t_32_sync_handler+0xb0/0x138 el0t_32_sync+0x194/0x198 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: fs_reclaim --> mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start --> dma_fence_map Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- rlock(dma_fence_map); lock(mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start); lock(dma_fence_map); lock(fs_reclaim); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by kmstest/733: #0: ffff800082e5bba0 (crtc_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: drm_mode_atomic_ioctl+0x118/0xc80 [drm] #1: ffff000004224c88 (crtc_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: modeset_lock+0xdc/0x1a0 [drm] #2: ffff800081a06aa0 (dma_fence_map){++++}-{0:0}, at: tidss_atomic_commit_tail+0x20/0xc0 [tidss] stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 733 Comm: kmstest Not tainted 6.6.0-rc2+ #1 Hardware name: Toradex Verdin AM62 on Verdin Development Board (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x98/0x118 show_stack+0x18/0x24 dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0xac dump_stack+0x18/0x24 print_circular_bug+0x288/0x368 check_noncircular+0x168/0x17c __lock_acquire+0x1370/0x20d8 lock_acquire+0x1e8/0x308 fs_reclaim_acquire+0xd0/0xe4 __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x58/0x2d4 __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x58/0xf0 kmemdup+0x34/0x60 regmap_bulk_write+0x64/0x2c0 tc358768_bridge_pre_enable+0x8c/0x12d0 [tc358768] drm_atomic_bridge_call_pre_enable+0x68/0x80 [drm] drm_atomic_bridge_chain_pre_enable+0x50/0x158 [drm] drm_atomic_helper_commit_modeset_enables+0x164/0x264 [drm_kms_helper] tidss_atomic_commit_tail+0x58/0xc0 [tidss] commit_tail+0xa0/0x188 [drm_kms_helper] drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x1a8/0x1c0 [drm_kms_helper] drm_atomic_commit+0xa8/0xe0 [drm] drm_mode_atomic_ioctl+0x9ec/0xc80 [drm] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xc4/0x170 [drm] drm_ioctl+0x234/0x4b0 [drm] drm_compat_ioctl+0x110/0x12c [drm] __arm64_compat_sys_ioctl+0x128/0x150 invoke_syscall+0x48/0x110 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0 do_el0_svc_compat+0x1c/0x38 el0_svc_compat+0x48/0xb4 el0t_32_sync_handler+0xb0/0x138 el0t_32_sync+0x194/0x198 Fixes: 4d56a4f ("drm/tidss: Annotate dma-fence critical section in commit path") Reviewed-by: Aradhya Bhatia <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tomi Valkeinen <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230920-dma-fence-annotation-revert-v1-1-7ebf6f7f5bf6@ideasonboard.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9d7c8c0 ] This reverts commit 250aa22. The DMA-fence annotations cause a lockdep warning (see below). As per https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/462170/ it sounds like the annotations don't work correctly. ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.5.0-rc2+ #2 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ kmstest/219 is trying to acquire lock: c4705838 (&hdmi->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: hdmi5_bridge_mode_set+0x1c/0x50 but task is already holding lock: c11e1128 (dma_fence_map){++++}-{0:0}, at: omap_atomic_commit_tail+0x14/0xbc which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (dma_fence_map){++++}-{0:0}: __dma_fence_might_wait+0x48/0xb4 dma_resv_lockdep+0x1b8/0x2bc do_one_initcall+0x68/0x3b0 kernel_init_freeable+0x260/0x34c kernel_init+0x14/0x140 ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28 -> #1 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}: fs_reclaim_acquire+0x70/0xa8 __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x3c/0x368 kmalloc_trace+0x28/0x58 _drm_do_get_edid+0x7c/0x35c hdmi5_bridge_get_edid+0xc8/0x1ac drm_bridge_connector_get_modes+0x64/0xc0 drm_helper_probe_single_connector_modes+0x170/0x528 drm_client_modeset_probe+0x208/0x1334 __drm_fb_helper_initial_config_and_unlock+0x30/0x548 omap_fbdev_client_hotplug+0x3c/0x6c drm_client_register+0x58/0x94 pdev_probe+0x544/0x6b0 platform_probe+0x58/0xbc really_probe+0xd8/0x3fc __driver_probe_device+0x94/0x1f4 driver_probe_device+0x2c/0xc4 __device_attach_driver+0xa4/0x11c bus_for_each_drv+0x84/0xdc __device_attach+0xac/0x20c bus_probe_device+0x8c/0x90 device_add+0x588/0x7e0 platform_device_add+0x110/0x24c platform_device_register_full+0x108/0x15c dss_bind+0x90/0xc0 try_to_bring_up_aggregate_device+0x1e0/0x2c8 __component_add+0xa4/0x174 hdmi5_probe+0x1c8/0x270 platform_probe+0x58/0xbc really_probe+0xd8/0x3fc __driver_probe_device+0x94/0x1f4 driver_probe_device+0x2c/0xc4 __device_attach_driver+0xa4/0x11c bus_for_each_drv+0x84/0xdc __device_attach+0xac/0x20c bus_probe_device+0x8c/0x90 deferred_probe_work_func+0x8c/0xd8 process_one_work+0x2ac/0x6e4 worker_thread+0x30/0x4ec kthread+0x100/0x124 ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28 -> #0 (&hdmi->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x145c/0x29cc lock_acquire.part.0+0xb4/0x258 __mutex_lock+0x90/0x950 mutex_lock_nested+0x1c/0x24 hdmi5_bridge_mode_set+0x1c/0x50 drm_bridge_chain_mode_set+0x48/0x5c crtc_set_mode+0x188/0x1d0 omap_atomic_commit_tail+0x2c/0xbc commit_tail+0x9c/0x188 drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x158/0x18c drm_atomic_commit+0xa4/0xe8 drm_mode_atomic_ioctl+0x9a4/0xc38 drm_ioctl+0x210/0x4a8 sys_ioctl+0x138/0xf00 ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x1c other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &hdmi->lock --> fs_reclaim --> dma_fence_map Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- rlock(dma_fence_map); lock(fs_reclaim); lock(dma_fence_map); lock(&hdmi->lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by kmstest/219: #0: f1011de4 (crtc_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: drm_mode_atomic_ioctl+0xf0/0xc38 #1: c47059c8 (crtc_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: modeset_lock+0xf8/0x230 #2: c11e1128 (dma_fence_map){++++}-{0:0}, at: omap_atomic_commit_tail+0x14/0xbc stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 219 Comm: kmstest Not tainted 6.5.0-rc2+ #2 Hardware name: Generic DRA74X (Flattened Device Tree) unwind_backtrace from show_stack+0x10/0x14 show_stack from dump_stack_lvl+0x58/0x70 dump_stack_lvl from check_noncircular+0x164/0x198 check_noncircular from __lock_acquire+0x145c/0x29cc __lock_acquire from lock_acquire.part.0+0xb4/0x258 lock_acquire.part.0 from __mutex_lock+0x90/0x950 __mutex_lock from mutex_lock_nested+0x1c/0x24 mutex_lock_nested from hdmi5_bridge_mode_set+0x1c/0x50 hdmi5_bridge_mode_set from drm_bridge_chain_mode_set+0x48/0x5c drm_bridge_chain_mode_set from crtc_set_mode+0x188/0x1d0 crtc_set_mode from omap_atomic_commit_tail+0x2c/0xbc omap_atomic_commit_tail from commit_tail+0x9c/0x188 commit_tail from drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x158/0x18c drm_atomic_helper_commit from drm_atomic_commit+0xa4/0xe8 drm_atomic_commit from drm_mode_atomic_ioctl+0x9a4/0xc38 drm_mode_atomic_ioctl from drm_ioctl+0x210/0x4a8 drm_ioctl from sys_ioctl+0x138/0xf00 sys_ioctl from ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x1c Exception stack(0xf1011fa8 to 0xf1011ff0) 1fa0: 00466d58 be9ab510 00000003 c03864bc be9ab510 be9ab4e0 1fc0: 00466d58 be9ab510 c03864bc 00000036 00466ef0 00466fc0 00467020 00466f20 1fe0: b6bc7ef4 be9ab4d0 b6bbbb00 b6cb2cc0 Fixes: 250aa22 ("drm/omapdrm: Annotate dma-fence critical section in commit path") Reviewed-by: Aradhya Bhatia <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tomi Valkeinen <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230920-dma-fence-annotation-revert-v1-2-7ebf6f7f5bf6@ideasonboard.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 55a8210 ] When processing a packed profile in unpack_profile() described like "profile :ns::samba-dcerpcd /usr/lib*/samba/{,samba/}samba-dcerpcd {...}" a string ":samba-dcerpcd" is unpacked as a fully-qualified name and then passed to aa_splitn_fqname(). aa_splitn_fqname() treats ":samba-dcerpcd" as only containing a namespace. Thus it returns NULL for tmpname, meanwhile tmpns is non-NULL. Later aa_alloc_profile() crashes as the new profile name is NULL now. general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] CPU: 6 PID: 1657 Comm: apparmor_parser Not tainted 6.7.0-rc2-dirty #16 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.2-3-gd478f380-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:strlen+0x1e/0xa0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? strlen+0x1e/0xa0 aa_policy_init+0x1bb/0x230 aa_alloc_profile+0xb1/0x480 unpack_profile+0x3bc/0x4960 aa_unpack+0x309/0x15e0 aa_replace_profiles+0x213/0x33c0 policy_update+0x261/0x370 profile_replace+0x20e/0x2a0 vfs_write+0x2af/0xe00 ksys_write+0x126/0x250 do_syscall_64+0x46/0xf0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:strlen+0x1e/0xa0 It seems such behaviour of aa_splitn_fqname() is expected and checked in other places where it is called (e.g. aa_remove_profiles). Well, there is an explicit comment "a ns name without a following profile is allowed" inside. AFAICS, nothing can prevent unpacked "name" to be in form like ":samba-dcerpcd" - it is passed from userspace. Deny the whole profile set replacement in such case and inform user with EPROTO and an explaining message. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org). Fixes: 04dc715 ("apparmor: audit policy ns specified in policy load") Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

…q_wake calls [ Upstream commit a23aa04 ] We found the following dmesg calltrace when testing the GMAC NIC notebook: [9.448656] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [9.448658] Unbalanced IRQ 43 wake disable [9.448673] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1083 at kernel/irq/manage.c:688 irq_set_irq_wake+0xe0/0x128 [9.448717] CPU: 3 PID: 1083 Comm: ethtool Tainted: G O 4.19 #1 [9.448773] ... [9.448774] Call Trace: [9.448781] [<9000000000209b5c>] show_stack+0x34/0x140 [9.448788] [<9000000000d52700>] dump_stack+0x98/0xd0 [9.448794] [<9000000000228610>] __warn+0xa8/0x120 [9.448797] [<9000000000d2fb60>] report_bug+0x98/0x130 [9.448800] [<900000000020a418>] do_bp+0x248/0x2f0 [9.448805] [<90000000002035f4>] handle_bp_int+0x4c/0x78 [9.448808] [<900000000029ea40>] irq_set_irq_wake+0xe0/0x128 [9.448813] [<9000000000a96a7c>] stmmac_set_wol+0x134/0x150 [9.448819] [<9000000000be6ed0>] dev_ethtool+0x1368/0x2440 [9.448824] [<9000000000c08350>] dev_ioctl+0x1f8/0x3e0 [9.448827] [<9000000000bb2a34>] sock_ioctl+0x2a4/0x450 [9.448832] [<900000000046f044>] do_vfs_ioctl+0xa4/0x738 [9.448834] [<900000000046f778>] ksys_ioctl+0xa0/0xe8 [9.448837] [<900000000046f7d8>] sys_ioctl+0x18/0x28 [9.448840] [<9000000000211ab4>] syscall_common+0x20/0x34 [9.448842] ---[ end trace 40c18d9aec863c3e ]--- Multiple disable_irq_wake() calls will keep decreasing the IRQ wake_depth, When wake_depth is 0, calling disable_irq_wake() again, will report the above calltrace. Due to the need to appear in pairs, we cannot call disable_irq_wake() without calling enable_irq_wake(). Fix this by making sure there are no unbalanced disable_irq_wake() calls. Fixes: 3172d3a ("stmmac: support wake up irq from external sources (v3)") Signed-off-by: Qiang Ma <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6d6eeab ] Lately, a bug was found when many TC filters are added - at some point, several bugs are printed to dmesg [1] and the switch is crashed with segmentation fault. The issue starts when gen_pool_free() fails because of unexpected behavior - a try to free memory which is already freed, this leads to BUG() call which crashes the switch and makes many other bugs. Trying to track down the unexpected behavior led to a bug in eRP code. The function mlxsw_sp_acl_erp_table_alloc() gets a pointer to the allocated index, sets the value and returns an error code. When gen_pool_alloc() fails it returns address 0, we track it and return -ENOBUFS outside, BUT the call for gen_pool_alloc() already override the index in erp_table structure. This is a problem when such allocation is done as part of table expansion. This is not a new table, which will not be used in case of allocation failure. We try to expand eRP table and override the current index (non-zero) with zero. Then, it leads to an unexpected behavior when address 0 is freed twice. Note that address 0 is valid in erp_table->base_index and indeed other tables use it. gen_pool_alloc() fails in case that there is no space left in the pre-allocated pool, in our case, the pool is limited to ACL_MAX_ERPT_BANK_SIZE, which is read from hardware. When more than max erp entries are required, we exceed the limit and return an error, this error leads to "Failed to migrate vregion" print. Fix this by changing erp_table->base_index only in case of a successful allocation. Add a test case for such a scenario. Without this fix it causes segmentation fault: $ TESTS="max_erp_entries_test" ./tc_flower.sh ./tc_flower.sh: line 988: 1560 Segmentation fault tc filter del dev $h2 ingress chain $i protocol ip pref $i handle $j flower &>/dev/null [1]: kernel BUG at lib/genalloc.c:508! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP CPU: 6 PID: 3531 Comm: tc Not tainted 6.7.0-rc5-custom-ga6893f479f5e #1 Hardware name: Mellanox Technologies Ltd. MSN4700/VMOD0010, BIOS 5.11 07/12/2021 RIP: 0010:gen_pool_free_owner+0xc9/0xe0 ... Call Trace: <TASK> __mlxsw_sp_acl_erp_table_other_dec+0x70/0xa0 [mlxsw_spectrum] mlxsw_sp_acl_erp_mask_destroy+0xf5/0x110 [mlxsw_spectrum] objagg_obj_root_destroy+0x18/0x80 [objagg] objagg_obj_destroy+0x12c/0x130 [objagg] mlxsw_sp_acl_erp_mask_put+0x37/0x50 [mlxsw_spectrum] mlxsw_sp_acl_ctcam_region_entry_remove+0x74/0xa0 [mlxsw_spectrum] mlxsw_sp_acl_ctcam_entry_del+0x1e/0x40 [mlxsw_spectrum] mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_ventry_del+0x78/0xd0 [mlxsw_spectrum] mlxsw_sp_flower_destroy+0x4d/0x70 [mlxsw_spectrum] mlxsw_sp_flow_block_cb+0x73/0xb0 [mlxsw_spectrum] tc_setup_cb_destroy+0xc1/0x180 fl_hw_destroy_filter+0x94/0xc0 [cls_flower] __fl_delete+0x1ac/0x1c0 [cls_flower] fl_destroy+0xc2/0x150 [cls_flower] tcf_proto_destroy+0x1a/0xa0 ... mlxsw_spectrum3 0000:07:00.0: Failed to migrate vregion mlxsw_spectrum3 0000:07:00.0: Failed to migrate vregion Fixes: f465261 ("mlxsw: spectrum_acl: Implement common eRP core") Signed-off-by: Amit Cohen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Petr Machata <[email protected]> Acked-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/4cfca254dfc0e5d283974801a24371c7b6db5989.1705502064.git.petrm@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

Marek reported the warning below. ========================= WARNING: held lock freed! 5.16.0-rc2+ #10984 Not tainted ------------------------- kworker/1:0/18 is freeing memory ffff00004034e200-ffff00004034e3ff, with a lock still held there! ffff00004034e348 (&root->kernfs_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: __kernfs_remove+0x310/0x37c 3 locks held by kworker/1:0/18: #0: ffff000040107938 ((wq_completion)cgroup_destroy){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1f0/0x6f0 #1: ffff80000b55bdc0 ((work_completion)(&(&css->destroy_rwork)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1f0/0x6f0 #2: ffff00004034e348 (&root->kernfs_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: __kernfs_remove+0x310/0x37c stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 18 Comm: kworker/1:0 Not tainted 5.16.0-rc2+ #10984 Hardware name: Raspberry Pi 4 Model B (DT) Workqueue: cgroup_destroy css_free_rwork_fn Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1ac show_stack+0x18/0x24 dump_stack_lvl+0x8c/0xb8 dump_stack+0x18/0x34 debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x124/0x140 kfree+0xf0/0x3a4 kernfs_put+0x1f8/0x224 __kernfs_remove+0x1b8/0x37c kernfs_destroy_root+0x38/0x50 css_free_rwork_fn+0x288/0x3d4 process_one_work+0x288/0x6f0 worker_thread+0x74/0x470 kthread+0x188/0x194 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Since kernfs moves the kernfs_rwsem lock into root, it couldn't hold the lock when the root node is tearing down. Thus, get the refcount of root node. Fixes: 393c371 ("kernfs: switch global kernfs_rwsem lock to per-fs lock") Reported-by: Marek Szyprowski <[email protected]> Tested-by: Marek Szyprowski <[email protected]> Acked-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Minchan Kim <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 555a0ce) Bug: 320903885 Change-Id: If96f85b88b662e88430c9c8d1efb436e9a80ddcf Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <[email protected]>

kernfs_remove supported NULL kernfs_node param to bail out but revent per-fs lock change introduced regression that dereferencing the param without NULL check so kernel goes crash. This patch checks the NULL kernfs_node in kernfs_remove and if so, just return. Quote from bug report by Jirka ``` The bug is triggered by running NAS Parallel benchmark suite on SuperMicro servers with 2x Xeon(R) Gold 6126 CPU. Here is the error log: [ 247.035564] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008 [ 247.036009] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 247.036009] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 247.036009] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 247.036009] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI [ 247.058060] CPU: 1 PID: 6546 Comm: umount Not tainted 5.16.0393c3714081a53795bbff0e985d24146def6f57f+ #16 [ 247.058060] Hardware name: Supermicro Super Server/X11DDW-L, BIOS 2.0b 03/07/2018 [ 247.058060] RIP: 0010:kernfs_remove+0x8/0x50 [ 247.058060] Code: 4c 89 e0 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e c3 49 c7 c4 f4 ff ff ff eb b2 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 55 <48> 8b 47 08 48 89 fd 48 85 c0 48 0f 44 c7 4c 8b 60 50 49 83 c4 60 [ 247.058060] RSP: 0018:ffffbbfa48a27e48 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 247.058060] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffffffff89e31f98 RCX: 0000000080200018 [ 247.058060] RDX: 0000000080200019 RSI: fffff6760786c900 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 247.058060] RBP: ffffffff89e31f98 R08: ffff926b61b24d00 R09: 0000000080200018 [ 247.122048] R10: ffff926b61b24d00 R11: ffff926a8040c000 R12: ffff927bd09a2000 [ 247.122048] R13: ffffffff89e31fa0 R14: dead000000000122 R15: dead000000000100 [ 247.122048] FS: 00007f01be0a8c40(0000) GS:ffff926fa8e40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 247.122048] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 247.122048] CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 00000001145c6003 CR4: 00000000007706e0 [ 247.122048] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 247.122048] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 247.122048] PKRU: 55555554 [ 247.122048] Call Trace: [ 247.122048] <TASK> [ 247.122048] rdt_kill_sb+0x29d/0x350 [ 247.122048] deactivate_locked_super+0x36/0xa0 [ 247.122048] cleanup_mnt+0x131/0x190 [ 247.122048] task_work_run+0x5c/0x90 [ 247.122048] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x229/0x230 [ 247.122048] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x18/0x40 [ 247.122048] do_syscall_64+0x48/0x90 [ 247.122048] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 247.122048] RIP: 0033:0x7f01be2d735b ``` Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=215696 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAE4VaGDZr_4wzRn2___eDYRtmdPaGGJdzu_LCSkJYuY9BEO3cw@mail.gmail.com/ Fixes: 393c371 (kernfs: switch global kernfs_rwsem lock to per-fs lock) Cc: [email protected] Reported-by: Jirka Hladky <[email protected]> Tested-by: Jirka Hladky <[email protected]> Acked-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Minchan Kim <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit ad8d869) Bug: 320903885 Bug: 219424218 Bug: 206126556 Change-Id: I5b0a491231ee8913b7f522f22349c22ba0e07d88 Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3f14b37 ] act_ct adds skb->users before defragmentation. If frags arrive in order, the last frag's reference is reset in: inet_frag_reasm_prepare skb_morph which is not straightforward. However when frags arrive out of order, nobody unref the last frag, and all frags are leaked. The situation is even worse, as initiating packet capture can lead to a crash[0] when skb has been cloned and shared at the same time. Fix the issue by removing skb_get() before defragmentation. act_ct returns TC_ACT_CONSUMED when defrag failed or in progress. [0]: [ 843.804823] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 843.809659] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:2091! [ 843.814516] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 843.819296] CPU: 7 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/7 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S 6.7.0-rc3 #2 [ 843.824107] Hardware name: XFUSION 1288H V6/BC13MBSBD, BIOS 1.29 11/25/2022 [ 843.828953] RIP: 0010:pskb_expand_head+0x2ac/0x300 [ 843.833805] Code: 8b 70 28 48 85 f6 74 82 48 83 c6 08 bf 01 00 00 00 e8 38 bd ff ff 8b 83 c0 00 00 00 48 03 83 c8 00 00 00 e9 62 ff ff ff 0f 0b <0f> 0b e8 8d d0 ff ff e9 b3 fd ff ff 81 7c 24 14 40 01 00 00 4c 89 [ 843.843698] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000cce07c0 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 843.848524] RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff88811a211d00 RCX: 0000000000000820 [ 843.853299] RDX: 0000000000000640 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88811a211d00 [ 843.857974] RBP: ffff888127d39518 R08: 00000000bee97314 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 843.862584] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8881109f0000 R12: 0000000000000880 [ 843.867147] R13: ffff888127d39580 R14: 0000000000000640 R15: ffff888170f7b900 [ 843.871680] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff889ffffc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 843.876242] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 843.880778] CR2: 00007fa42affcfb8 CR3: 000000011433a002 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 [ 843.885336] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 843.889809] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 843.894229] PKRU: 55555554 [ 843.898539] Call Trace: [ 843.902772] <IRQ> [ 843.906922] ? __die_body+0x1e/0x60 [ 843.911032] ? die+0x3c/0x60 [ 843.915037] ? do_trap+0xe2/0x110 [ 843.918911] ? pskb_expand_head+0x2ac/0x300 [ 843.922687] ? do_error_trap+0x65/0x80 [ 843.926342] ? pskb_expand_head+0x2ac/0x300 [ 843.929905] ? exc_invalid_op+0x50/0x60 [ 843.933398] ? pskb_expand_head+0x2ac/0x300 [ 843.936835] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 [ 843.940226] ? pskb_expand_head+0x2ac/0x300 [ 843.943580] inet_frag_reasm_prepare+0xd1/0x240 [ 843.946904] ip_defrag+0x5d4/0x870 [ 843.950132] nf_ct_handle_fragments+0xec/0x130 [nf_conntrack] [ 843.953334] tcf_ct_act+0x252/0xd90 [act_ct] [ 843.956473] ? tcf_mirred_act+0x516/0x5a0 [act_mirred] [ 843.959657] tcf_action_exec+0xa1/0x160 [ 843.962823] fl_classify+0x1db/0x1f0 [cls_flower] [ 843.966010] ? skb_clone+0x53/0xc0 [ 843.969173] tcf_classify+0x24d/0x420 [ 843.972333] tc_run+0x8f/0xf0 [ 843.975465] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x67a/0x1080 [ 843.978634] ? dev_gro_receive+0x249/0x730 [ 843.981759] __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x12d/0x260 [ 843.984869] netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x1cb/0x2f0 [ 843.987957] ? mlx5e_handle_rx_cqe_mpwrq_rep+0xfa/0x1a0 [mlx5_core] [ 843.991170] napi_complete_done+0x72/0x1a0 [ 843.994305] mlx5e_napi_poll+0x28c/0x6d0 [mlx5_core] [ 843.997501] __napi_poll+0x25/0x1b0 [ 844.000627] net_rx_action+0x256/0x330 [ 844.003705] __do_softirq+0xb3/0x29b [ 844.006718] irq_exit_rcu+0x9e/0xc0 [ 844.009672] common_interrupt+0x86/0xa0 [ 844.012537] </IRQ> [ 844.015285] <TASK> [ 844.017937] asm_common_interrupt+0x26/0x40 [ 844.020591] RIP: 0010:acpi_safe_halt+0x1b/0x20 [ 844.023247] Code: ff 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 65 48 8b 04 25 00 18 03 00 48 8b 00 a8 08 75 0c 66 90 0f 00 2d 81 d0 44 00 fb f4 <fa> c3 0f 1f 00 89 fa ec 48 8b 05 ee 88 ed 00 a9 00 00 00 80 75 11 [ 844.028900] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000533e70 EFLAGS: 00000246 [ 844.031725] RAX: 0000000000004000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 844.034553] RDX: ffff889ffffc0000 RSI: ffffffff828b7f20 RDI: ffff88a090f45c64 [ 844.037368] RBP: ffff88a0901a2800 R08: ffff88a090f45c00 R09: 00000000000317c0 [ 844.040155] R10: 00ec812281150475 R11: ffff889fffff0e04 R12: ffffffff828b7fa0 [ 844.042962] R13: ffffffff828b7f20 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 844.045819] acpi_idle_enter+0x7b/0xc0 [ 844.048621] cpuidle_enter_state+0x7f/0x430 [ 844.051451] cpuidle_enter+0x2d/0x40 [ 844.054279] do_idle+0x1d4/0x240 [ 844.057096] cpu_startup_entry+0x2a/0x30 [ 844.059934] start_secondary+0x104/0x130 [ 844.062787] secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0x16b/0x16b [ 844.065674] </TASK> Fixes: b57dc7c ("net/sched: Introduce action ct") Signed-off-by: Tao Liu <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ca34d81 ] This reverts commit 4d56a4f. The DMA-fence annotations cause a lockdep warning (see below). As per https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/462170/ it sounds like the annotations don't work correctly. ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.6.0-rc2+ #1 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ kmstest/733 is trying to acquire lock: ffff8000819377f0 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x58/0x2d4 but task is already holding lock: ffff800081a06aa0 (dma_fence_map){++++}-{0:0}, at: tidss_atomic_commit_tail+0x20/0xc0 [tidss] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (dma_fence_map){++++}-{0:0}: __dma_fence_might_wait+0x5c/0xd0 dma_resv_lockdep+0x1a4/0x32c do_one_initcall+0x84/0x2fc kernel_init_freeable+0x28c/0x4c4 kernel_init+0x24/0x1dc ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 -> #1 (mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start){+.+.}-{0:0}: fs_reclaim_acquire+0x70/0xe4 __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x58/0x2d4 kmalloc_trace+0x38/0x78 __kthread_create_worker+0x3c/0x150 kthread_create_worker+0x64/0x8c workqueue_init+0x1e8/0x2f0 kernel_init_freeable+0x11c/0x4c4 kernel_init+0x24/0x1dc ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 -> #0 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x1370/0x20d8 lock_acquire+0x1e8/0x308 fs_reclaim_acquire+0xd0/0xe4 __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x58/0x2d4 __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x58/0xf0 kmemdup+0x34/0x60 regmap_bulk_write+0x64/0x2c0 tc358768_bridge_pre_enable+0x8c/0x12d0 [tc358768] drm_atomic_bridge_call_pre_enable+0x68/0x80 [drm] drm_atomic_bridge_chain_pre_enable+0x50/0x158 [drm] drm_atomic_helper_commit_modeset_enables+0x164/0x264 [drm_kms_helper] tidss_atomic_commit_tail+0x58/0xc0 [tidss] commit_tail+0xa0/0x188 [drm_kms_helper] drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x1a8/0x1c0 [drm_kms_helper] drm_atomic_commit+0xa8/0xe0 [drm] drm_mode_atomic_ioctl+0x9ec/0xc80 [drm] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xc4/0x170 [drm] drm_ioctl+0x234/0x4b0 [drm] drm_compat_ioctl+0x110/0x12c [drm] __arm64_compat_sys_ioctl+0x128/0x150 invoke_syscall+0x48/0x110 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0 do_el0_svc_compat+0x1c/0x38 el0_svc_compat+0x48/0xb4 el0t_32_sync_handler+0xb0/0x138 el0t_32_sync+0x194/0x198 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: fs_reclaim --> mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start --> dma_fence_map Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- rlock(dma_fence_map); lock(mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start); lock(dma_fence_map); lock(fs_reclaim); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by kmstest/733: #0: ffff800082e5bba0 (crtc_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: drm_mode_atomic_ioctl+0x118/0xc80 [drm] #1: ffff000004224c88 (crtc_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: modeset_lock+0xdc/0x1a0 [drm] #2: ffff800081a06aa0 (dma_fence_map){++++}-{0:0}, at: tidss_atomic_commit_tail+0x20/0xc0 [tidss] stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 733 Comm: kmstest Not tainted 6.6.0-rc2+ #1 Hardware name: Toradex Verdin AM62 on Verdin Development Board (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x98/0x118 show_stack+0x18/0x24 dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0xac dump_stack+0x18/0x24 print_circular_bug+0x288/0x368 check_noncircular+0x168/0x17c __lock_acquire+0x1370/0x20d8 lock_acquire+0x1e8/0x308 fs_reclaim_acquire+0xd0/0xe4 __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x58/0x2d4 __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x58/0xf0 kmemdup+0x34/0x60 regmap_bulk_write+0x64/0x2c0 tc358768_bridge_pre_enable+0x8c/0x12d0 [tc358768] drm_atomic_bridge_call_pre_enable+0x68/0x80 [drm] drm_atomic_bridge_chain_pre_enable+0x50/0x158 [drm] drm_atomic_helper_commit_modeset_enables+0x164/0x264 [drm_kms_helper] tidss_atomic_commit_tail+0x58/0xc0 [tidss] commit_tail+0xa0/0x188 [drm_kms_helper] drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x1a8/0x1c0 [drm_kms_helper] drm_atomic_commit+0xa8/0xe0 [drm] drm_mode_atomic_ioctl+0x9ec/0xc80 [drm] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xc4/0x170 [drm] drm_ioctl+0x234/0x4b0 [drm] drm_compat_ioctl+0x110/0x12c [drm] __arm64_compat_sys_ioctl+0x128/0x150 invoke_syscall+0x48/0x110 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0 do_el0_svc_compat+0x1c/0x38 el0_svc_compat+0x48/0xb4 el0t_32_sync_handler+0xb0/0x138 el0t_32_sync+0x194/0x198 Fixes: 4d56a4f ("drm/tidss: Annotate dma-fence critical section in commit path") Reviewed-by: Aradhya Bhatia <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tomi Valkeinen <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230920-dma-fence-annotation-revert-v1-1-7ebf6f7f5bf6@ideasonboard.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9d7c8c0 ] This reverts commit 250aa22. The DMA-fence annotations cause a lockdep warning (see below). As per https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/462170/ it sounds like the annotations don't work correctly. ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.5.0-rc2+ #2 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ kmstest/219 is trying to acquire lock: c4705838 (&hdmi->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: hdmi5_bridge_mode_set+0x1c/0x50 but task is already holding lock: c11e1128 (dma_fence_map){++++}-{0:0}, at: omap_atomic_commit_tail+0x14/0xbc which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (dma_fence_map){++++}-{0:0}: __dma_fence_might_wait+0x48/0xb4 dma_resv_lockdep+0x1b8/0x2bc do_one_initcall+0x68/0x3b0 kernel_init_freeable+0x260/0x34c kernel_init+0x14/0x140 ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28 -> #1 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}: fs_reclaim_acquire+0x70/0xa8 __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x3c/0x368 kmalloc_trace+0x28/0x58 _drm_do_get_edid+0x7c/0x35c hdmi5_bridge_get_edid+0xc8/0x1ac drm_bridge_connector_get_modes+0x64/0xc0 drm_helper_probe_single_connector_modes+0x170/0x528 drm_client_modeset_probe+0x208/0x1334 __drm_fb_helper_initial_config_and_unlock+0x30/0x548 omap_fbdev_client_hotplug+0x3c/0x6c drm_client_register+0x58/0x94 pdev_probe+0x544/0x6b0 platform_probe+0x58/0xbc really_probe+0xd8/0x3fc __driver_probe_device+0x94/0x1f4 driver_probe_device+0x2c/0xc4 __device_attach_driver+0xa4/0x11c bus_for_each_drv+0x84/0xdc __device_attach+0xac/0x20c bus_probe_device+0x8c/0x90 device_add+0x588/0x7e0 platform_device_add+0x110/0x24c platform_device_register_full+0x108/0x15c dss_bind+0x90/0xc0 try_to_bring_up_aggregate_device+0x1e0/0x2c8 __component_add+0xa4/0x174 hdmi5_probe+0x1c8/0x270 platform_probe+0x58/0xbc really_probe+0xd8/0x3fc __driver_probe_device+0x94/0x1f4 driver_probe_device+0x2c/0xc4 __device_attach_driver+0xa4/0x11c bus_for_each_drv+0x84/0xdc __device_attach+0xac/0x20c bus_probe_device+0x8c/0x90 deferred_probe_work_func+0x8c/0xd8 process_one_work+0x2ac/0x6e4 worker_thread+0x30/0x4ec kthread+0x100/0x124 ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28 -> #0 (&hdmi->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x145c/0x29cc lock_acquire.part.0+0xb4/0x258 __mutex_lock+0x90/0x950 mutex_lock_nested+0x1c/0x24 hdmi5_bridge_mode_set+0x1c/0x50 drm_bridge_chain_mode_set+0x48/0x5c crtc_set_mode+0x188/0x1d0 omap_atomic_commit_tail+0x2c/0xbc commit_tail+0x9c/0x188 drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x158/0x18c drm_atomic_commit+0xa4/0xe8 drm_mode_atomic_ioctl+0x9a4/0xc38 drm_ioctl+0x210/0x4a8 sys_ioctl+0x138/0xf00 ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x1c other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &hdmi->lock --> fs_reclaim --> dma_fence_map Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- rlock(dma_fence_map); lock(fs_reclaim); lock(dma_fence_map); lock(&hdmi->lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by kmstest/219: #0: f1011de4 (crtc_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: drm_mode_atomic_ioctl+0xf0/0xc38 #1: c47059c8 (crtc_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: modeset_lock+0xf8/0x230 #2: c11e1128 (dma_fence_map){++++}-{0:0}, at: omap_atomic_commit_tail+0x14/0xbc stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 219 Comm: kmstest Not tainted 6.5.0-rc2+ #2 Hardware name: Generic DRA74X (Flattened Device Tree) unwind_backtrace from show_stack+0x10/0x14 show_stack from dump_stack_lvl+0x58/0x70 dump_stack_lvl from check_noncircular+0x164/0x198 check_noncircular from __lock_acquire+0x145c/0x29cc __lock_acquire from lock_acquire.part.0+0xb4/0x258 lock_acquire.part.0 from __mutex_lock+0x90/0x950 __mutex_lock from mutex_lock_nested+0x1c/0x24 mutex_lock_nested from hdmi5_bridge_mode_set+0x1c/0x50 hdmi5_bridge_mode_set from drm_bridge_chain_mode_set+0x48/0x5c drm_bridge_chain_mode_set from crtc_set_mode+0x188/0x1d0 crtc_set_mode from omap_atomic_commit_tail+0x2c/0xbc omap_atomic_commit_tail from commit_tail+0x9c/0x188 commit_tail from drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x158/0x18c drm_atomic_helper_commit from drm_atomic_commit+0xa4/0xe8 drm_atomic_commit from drm_mode_atomic_ioctl+0x9a4/0xc38 drm_mode_atomic_ioctl from drm_ioctl+0x210/0x4a8 drm_ioctl from sys_ioctl+0x138/0xf00 sys_ioctl from ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x1c Exception stack(0xf1011fa8 to 0xf1011ff0) 1fa0: 00466d58 be9ab510 00000003 c03864bc be9ab510 be9ab4e0 1fc0: 00466d58 be9ab510 c03864bc 00000036 00466ef0 00466fc0 00467020 00466f20 1fe0: b6bc7ef4 be9ab4d0 b6bbbb00 b6cb2cc0 Fixes: 250aa22 ("drm/omapdrm: Annotate dma-fence critical section in commit path") Reviewed-by: Aradhya Bhatia <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tomi Valkeinen <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230920-dma-fence-annotation-revert-v1-2-7ebf6f7f5bf6@ideasonboard.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

commit 91398b4 upstream. Surfaces can be backed (i.e. stored in) memory objects (mob's) which are created and managed by the userspace as GEM buffers. Surfaces grab only a ttm reference which means that the gem object can be deleted underneath us, especially in cases where prime buffer export is used. Make sure that all userspace surfaces which are backed by gem objects hold a gem reference to make sure they're not deleted before vmw surfaces are done with them, which fixes: ------------[ cut here ]------------ refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free. WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 2632 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0xfb/0x150 Modules linked in: overlay vsock_loopback vmw_vsock_virtio_transport_common vmw_vsock_vmci_transport vsock snd_ens1371 snd_ac97_codec ac97_bus snd_pcm gameport> CPU: 2 PID: 2632 Comm: vmw_ref_count Not tainted 6.5.0-rc2-vmwgfx #1 Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 11/12/2020 RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xfb/0x150 Code: eb 9e 0f b6 1d 8b 5b a6 01 80 fb 01 0f 87 ba e4 80 00 83 e3 01 75 89 48 c7 c7 c0 3c f9 a3 c6 05 6f 5b a6 01 01 e8 15 81 98 ff <0f> 0b e9 6f ff ff ff 0f b> RSP: 0018:ffffbdc34344bba0 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000027 RDX: ffff960475ea1548 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff960475ea1540 RBP: ffffbdc34344bba8 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 65646e75203a745f R10: ffffffffa5b32b20 R11: 72657466612d6573 R12: ffff96037d6a6400 R13: ffff9603484805b0 R14: 000000000000000b R15: ffff9603bed06060 FS: 00007f5fd8520c40(0000) GS:ffff960475e80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f5fda755000 CR3: 000000010d012005 CR4: 00000000003706e0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? show_regs+0x6e/0x80 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xfb/0x150 ? __warn+0x91/0x150 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xfb/0x150 ? report_bug+0x19d/0x1b0 ? handle_bug+0x46/0x80 ? exc_invalid_op+0x1d/0x80 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1f/0x30 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xfb/0x150 drm_gem_object_handle_put_unlocked+0xba/0x110 [drm] drm_gem_object_release_handle+0x6e/0x80 [drm] drm_gem_handle_delete+0x6a/0xc0 [drm] ? __pfx_vmw_bo_unref_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [vmwgfx] vmw_bo_unref_ioctl+0x33/0x40 [vmwgfx] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xbc/0x160 [drm] drm_ioctl+0x2d2/0x580 [drm] ? __pfx_vmw_bo_unref_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [vmwgfx] ? do_vmi_munmap+0xee/0x180 vmw_generic_ioctl+0xbd/0x180 [vmwgfx] vmw_unlocked_ioctl+0x19/0x20 [vmwgfx] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x99/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x90 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x2a/0x50 ? do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x90 ? handle_mm_fault+0x16e/0x2f0 ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x34/0x170 ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0xd/0x20 ? irqentry_exit+0x3f/0x50 ? exc_page_fault+0x8e/0x190 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 RIP: 0033:0x7f5fda51aaff Code: 00 48 89 44 24 18 31 c0 48 8d 44 24 60 c7 04 24 10 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8d 44 24 20 48 89 44 24 10 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <41> 89 c0 3d 00 f0 ff ff 7> RSP: 002b:00007ffd536a4d30 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffd536a4de0 RCX: 00007f5fda51aaff RDX: 00007ffd536a4de0 RSI: 0000000040086442 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000000040086442 R08: 000055fa603ada50 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffd536a51b8 R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 000055fa5ebb4c80 R15: 00007f5fda90f040 </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- A lot of the analyis on the bug was done by Murray McAllister and Ian Forbes. Reported-by: Murray McAllister <[email protected]> Cc: Ian Forbes <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Zack Rusin <[email protected]> Fixes: a950b98 ("drm/vmwgfx: Do not drop the reference to the handle too soon") Cc: <[email protected]> # v6.2+ Reviewed-by: Martin Krastev <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jocelyn Falempe <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 55a8210 ] When processing a packed profile in unpack_profile() described like "profile :ns::samba-dcerpcd /usr/lib*/samba/{,samba/}samba-dcerpcd {...}" a string ":samba-dcerpcd" is unpacked as a fully-qualified name and then passed to aa_splitn_fqname(). aa_splitn_fqname() treats ":samba-dcerpcd" as only containing a namespace. Thus it returns NULL for tmpname, meanwhile tmpns is non-NULL. Later aa_alloc_profile() crashes as the new profile name is NULL now. general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] CPU: 6 PID: 1657 Comm: apparmor_parser Not tainted 6.7.0-rc2-dirty #16 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.2-3-gd478f380-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:strlen+0x1e/0xa0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? strlen+0x1e/0xa0 aa_policy_init+0x1bb/0x230 aa_alloc_profile+0xb1/0x480 unpack_profile+0x3bc/0x4960 aa_unpack+0x309/0x15e0 aa_replace_profiles+0x213/0x33c0 policy_update+0x261/0x370 profile_replace+0x20e/0x2a0 vfs_write+0x2af/0xe00 ksys_write+0x126/0x250 do_syscall_64+0x46/0xf0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:strlen+0x1e/0xa0 It seems such behaviour of aa_splitn_fqname() is expected and checked in other places where it is called (e.g. aa_remove_profiles). Well, there is an explicit comment "a ns name without a following profile is allowed" inside. AFAICS, nothing can prevent unpacked "name" to be in form like ":samba-dcerpcd" - it is passed from userspace. Deny the whole profile set replacement in such case and inform user with EPROTO and an explaining message. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org). Fixes: 04dc715 ("apparmor: audit policy ns specified in policy load") Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

…q_wake calls [ Upstream commit a23aa04 ] We found the following dmesg calltrace when testing the GMAC NIC notebook: [9.448656] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [9.448658] Unbalanced IRQ 43 wake disable [9.448673] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1083 at kernel/irq/manage.c:688 irq_set_irq_wake+0xe0/0x128 [9.448717] CPU: 3 PID: 1083 Comm: ethtool Tainted: G O 4.19 #1 [9.448773] ... [9.448774] Call Trace: [9.448781] [<9000000000209b5c>] show_stack+0x34/0x140 [9.448788] [<9000000000d52700>] dump_stack+0x98/0xd0 [9.448794] [<9000000000228610>] __warn+0xa8/0x120 [9.448797] [<9000000000d2fb60>] report_bug+0x98/0x130 [9.448800] [<900000000020a418>] do_bp+0x248/0x2f0 [9.448805] [<90000000002035f4>] handle_bp_int+0x4c/0x78 [9.448808] [<900000000029ea40>] irq_set_irq_wake+0xe0/0x128 [9.448813] [<9000000000a96a7c>] stmmac_set_wol+0x134/0x150 [9.448819] [<9000000000be6ed0>] dev_ethtool+0x1368/0x2440 [9.448824] [<9000000000c08350>] dev_ioctl+0x1f8/0x3e0 [9.448827] [<9000000000bb2a34>] sock_ioctl+0x2a4/0x450 [9.448832] [<900000000046f044>] do_vfs_ioctl+0xa4/0x738 [9.448834] [<900000000046f778>] ksys_ioctl+0xa0/0xe8 [9.448837] [<900000000046f7d8>] sys_ioctl+0x18/0x28 [9.448840] [<9000000000211ab4>] syscall_common+0x20/0x34 [9.448842] ---[ end trace 40c18d9aec863c3e ]--- Multiple disable_irq_wake() calls will keep decreasing the IRQ wake_depth, When wake_depth is 0, calling disable_irq_wake() again, will report the above calltrace. Due to the need to appear in pairs, we cannot call disable_irq_wake() without calling enable_irq_wake(). Fix this by making sure there are no unbalanced disable_irq_wake() calls. Fixes: 3172d3a ("stmmac: support wake up irq from external sources (v3)") Signed-off-by: Qiang Ma <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6d6eeab ] Lately, a bug was found when many TC filters are added - at some point, several bugs are printed to dmesg [1] and the switch is crashed with segmentation fault. The issue starts when gen_pool_free() fails because of unexpected behavior - a try to free memory which is already freed, this leads to BUG() call which crashes the switch and makes many other bugs. Trying to track down the unexpected behavior led to a bug in eRP code. The function mlxsw_sp_acl_erp_table_alloc() gets a pointer to the allocated index, sets the value and returns an error code. When gen_pool_alloc() fails it returns address 0, we track it and return -ENOBUFS outside, BUT the call for gen_pool_alloc() already override the index in erp_table structure. This is a problem when such allocation is done as part of table expansion. This is not a new table, which will not be used in case of allocation failure. We try to expand eRP table and override the current index (non-zero) with zero. Then, it leads to an unexpected behavior when address 0 is freed twice. Note that address 0 is valid in erp_table->base_index and indeed other tables use it. gen_pool_alloc() fails in case that there is no space left in the pre-allocated pool, in our case, the pool is limited to ACL_MAX_ERPT_BANK_SIZE, which is read from hardware. When more than max erp entries are required, we exceed the limit and return an error, this error leads to "Failed to migrate vregion" print. Fix this by changing erp_table->base_index only in case of a successful allocation. Add a test case for such a scenario. Without this fix it causes segmentation fault: $ TESTS="max_erp_entries_test" ./tc_flower.sh ./tc_flower.sh: line 988: 1560 Segmentation fault tc filter del dev $h2 ingress chain $i protocol ip pref $i handle $j flower &>/dev/null [1]: kernel BUG at lib/genalloc.c:508! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP CPU: 6 PID: 3531 Comm: tc Not tainted 6.7.0-rc5-custom-ga6893f479f5e #1 Hardware name: Mellanox Technologies Ltd. MSN4700/VMOD0010, BIOS 5.11 07/12/2021 RIP: 0010:gen_pool_free_owner+0xc9/0xe0 ... Call Trace: <TASK> __mlxsw_sp_acl_erp_table_other_dec+0x70/0xa0 [mlxsw_spectrum] mlxsw_sp_acl_erp_mask_destroy+0xf5/0x110 [mlxsw_spectrum] objagg_obj_root_destroy+0x18/0x80 [objagg] objagg_obj_destroy+0x12c/0x130 [objagg] mlxsw_sp_acl_erp_mask_put+0x37/0x50 [mlxsw_spectrum] mlxsw_sp_acl_ctcam_region_entry_remove+0x74/0xa0 [mlxsw_spectrum] mlxsw_sp_acl_ctcam_entry_del+0x1e/0x40 [mlxsw_spectrum] mlxsw_sp_acl_tcam_ventry_del+0x78/0xd0 [mlxsw_spectrum] mlxsw_sp_flower_destroy+0x4d/0x70 [mlxsw_spectrum] mlxsw_sp_flow_block_cb+0x73/0xb0 [mlxsw_spectrum] tc_setup_cb_destroy+0xc1/0x180 fl_hw_destroy_filter+0x94/0xc0 [cls_flower] __fl_delete+0x1ac/0x1c0 [cls_flower] fl_destroy+0xc2/0x150 [cls_flower] tcf_proto_destroy+0x1a/0xa0 ... mlxsw_spectrum3 0000:07:00.0: Failed to migrate vregion mlxsw_spectrum3 0000:07:00.0: Failed to migrate vregion Fixes: f465261 ("mlxsw: spectrum_acl: Implement common eRP core") Signed-off-by: Amit Cohen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Petr Machata <[email protected]> Acked-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/4cfca254dfc0e5d283974801a24371c7b6db5989.1705502064.git.petrm@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

commit e1a9ae4 upstream. max_mapnr variable is utilized in the pfn_valid() method in order to determine the upper PFN space boundary. Having it uninitialized effectively makes any PFN passed to that method invalid. That in its turn causes the kernel mm-subsystem occasion malfunctions even after the max_mapnr variable is actually properly updated. For instance, pfn_valid() is called in the init_unavailable_range() method in the framework of the calls-chain on MIPS: setup_arch() +-> paging_init() +-> free_area_init() +-> memmap_init() +-> memmap_init_zone_range() +-> init_unavailable_range() Since pfn_valid() always returns "false" value before max_mapnr is initialized in the mem_init() method, any flatmem page-holes will be left in the poisoned/uninitialized state including the IO-memory pages. Thus any further attempts to map/remap the IO-memory by using MMU may fail. In particular it happened in my case on attempt to map the SRAM region. The kernel bootup procedure just crashed on the unhandled unaligned access bug raised in the __update_cache() method: > Unhandled kernel unaligned access[#1]: > CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.7.0-rc1-XXX-dirty #2056 > ... > Call Trace: > [<8011ef9c>] __update_cache+0x88/0x1bc > [<80385944>] ioremap_page_range+0x110/0x2a4 > [<80126948>] ioremap_prot+0x17c/0x1f4 > [<80711b80>] __devm_ioremap+0x8c/0x120 > [<80711e0c>] __devm_ioremap_resource+0xf4/0x218 > [<808bf244>] sram_probe+0x4f4/0x930 > [<80889d20>] platform_probe+0x68/0xec > ... Let's fix the problem by initializing the max_mapnr variable as soon as the required data is available. In particular it can be done right in the paging_init() method before free_area_init() is called since all the PFN zone boundaries have already been calculated by that time. Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Serge Semin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit dad555c ] syzbot was able to trick llc_ui_sendmsg(), allocating an skb with no headroom, but subsequently trying to push 14 bytes of Ethernet header [1] Like some others, llc_ui_sendmsg() releases the socket lock before calling sock_alloc_send_skb(). Then it acquires it again, but does not redo all the sanity checks that were performed. This fix: - Uses LL_RESERVED_SPACE() to reserve space. - Check all conditions again after socket lock is held again. - Do not account Ethernet header for mtu limitation. [1] skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffff800088baa334 len:1514 put:14 head:ffff0000c9c37000 data:ffff0000c9c36ff2 tail:0x5dc end:0x6c0 dev:bond0 kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:193 ! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 6875 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.7.0-rc8-syzkaller-00101-g0802e17d9aca-dirty #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/17/2023 pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:189 [inline] pc : skb_under_panic+0x13c/0x140 net/core/skbuff.c:203 lr : skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:189 [inline] lr : skb_under_panic+0x13c/0x140 net/core/skbuff.c:203 sp : ffff800096f97000 x29: ffff800096f97010 x28: ffff80008cc8d668 x27: dfff800000000000 x26: ffff0000cb970c90 x25: 00000000000005dc x24: ffff0000c9c36ff2 x23: ffff0000c9c37000 x22: 00000000000005ea x21: 00000000000006c0 x20: 000000000000000e x19: ffff800088baa334 x18: 1fffe000368261ce x17: ffff80008e4ed000 x16: ffff80008a8310f8 x15: 0000000000000001 x14: 1ffff00012df2d58 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 x11: 0000000000000001 x10: 0000000000ff0100 x9 : e28a51f1087e8400 x8 : e28a51f1087e8400 x7 : ffff80008028f8d0 x6 : 0000000000000000 x5 : 0000000000000001 x4 : 0000000000000001 x3 : ffff800082b78714 x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : 0000000100000000 x0 : 0000000000000089 Call trace: skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:189 [inline] skb_under_panic+0x13c/0x140 net/core/skbuff.c:203 skb_push+0xf0/0x108 net/core/skbuff.c:2451 eth_header+0x44/0x1f8 net/ethernet/eth.c:83 dev_hard_header include/linux/netdevice.h:3188 [inline] llc_mac_hdr_init+0x110/0x17c net/llc/llc_output.c:33 llc_sap_action_send_xid_c+0x170/0x344 net/llc/llc_s_ac.c:85 llc_exec_sap_trans_actions net/llc/llc_sap.c:153 [inline] llc_sap_next_state net/llc/llc_sap.c:182 [inline] llc_sap_state_process+0x1ec/0x774 net/llc/llc_sap.c:209 llc_build_and_send_xid_pkt+0x12c/0x1c0 net/llc/llc_sap.c:270 llc_ui_sendmsg+0x7bc/0xb1c net/llc/af_llc.c:997 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0x194/0x274 net/socket.c:767 splice_to_socket+0x7cc/0xd58 fs/splice.c:881 do_splice_from fs/splice.c:933 [inline] direct_splice_actor+0xe4/0x1c0 fs/splice.c:1142 splice_direct_to_actor+0x2a0/0x7e4 fs/splice.c:1088 do_splice_direct+0x20c/0x348 fs/splice.c:1194 do_sendfile+0x4bc/0xc70 fs/read_write.c:1254 __do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1322 [inline] __se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1308 [inline] __arm64_sys_sendfile64+0x160/0x3b4 fs/read_write.c:1308 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:37 [inline] invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2b8 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:51 el0_svc_common+0x130/0x23c arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:136 do_el0_svc+0x48/0x58 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:155 el0_svc+0x54/0x158 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:678 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:696 el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:595 Code: aa1803e6 aa1903e7 a90023f5 94792f6a (d4210000) Fixes: 1da177e ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-and-tested-by: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 13e788d ] Syzcaller UBSAN crash occurs in rds_cmsg_recv(), which reads inc->i_rx_lat_trace[j + 1] with index 4 (3 + 1), but with array size of 4 (RDS_RX_MAX_TRACES). Here 'j' is assigned from rs->rs_rx_trace[i] and in-turn from trace.rx_trace_pos[i] in rds_recv_track_latency(), with both arrays sized 3 (RDS_MSG_RX_DGRAM_TRACE_MAX). So fix the off-by-one bounds check in rds_recv_track_latency() to prevent a potential crash in rds_cmsg_recv(). Found by syzcaller: ================================================================= UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in net/rds/recv.c:585:39 index 4 is out of range for type 'u64 [4]' CPU: 1 PID: 8058 Comm: syz-executor228 Not tainted 6.6.0-gd2f51b3516da #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x136/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:106 ubsan_epilogue lib/ubsan.c:217 [inline] __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0xd5/0x130 lib/ubsan.c:348 rds_cmsg_recv+0x60d/0x700 net/rds/recv.c:585 rds_recvmsg+0x3fb/0x1610 net/rds/recv.c:716 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1044 [inline] sock_recvmsg+0xe2/0x160 net/socket.c:1066 __sys_recvfrom+0x1b6/0x2f0 net/socket.c:2246 __do_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2264 [inline] __se_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2260 [inline] __x64_sys_recvfrom+0xe0/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2260 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x40/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:82 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b ================================================================== Fixes: 3289025 ("RDS: add receive message trace used by application") Reported-by: Chenyuan Yang <[email protected]> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-rdma/CALGdzuoVdq-wtQ4Az9iottBqC5cv9ZhcE5q8N7LfYFvkRsOVcw@mail.gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Sharath Srinivasan <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

commit 8e7f82d upstream. When opening a directory (opendir(3)) or rewinding it (rewinddir(3)), we are not holding the directory's inode locked, and this can result in later attempting to add two entries to the directory with the same index number, resulting in a transaction abort, with -EEXIST (-17), when inserting the second delayed dir index. This results in a trace like the following: Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: BTRFS error (device dm-3): err add delayed dir index item(name: cockroach-stderr.log) into the insertion tree of the delayed node(root id: 5, inode id: 4539217, errno: -17) Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: ------------[ cut here ]------------ Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1504! Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: CPU: 0 PID: 7159 Comm: cockroach Not tainted 6.4.15-200.fc38.x86_64 #1 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: Hardware name: ASUS ESC500 G3/P9D WS, BIOS 2402 06/27/2018 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: RIP: 0010:btrfs_insert_delayed_dir_index+0x1da/0x260 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: Code: eb dd 48 (...) Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: RSP: 0000:ffffa9980e0fbb28 EFLAGS: 00010282 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8b10b8f4a3c0 RCX: 0000000000000000 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff8b177ec21540 RDI: ffff8b177ec21540 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: RBP: ffff8b110cf80888 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffa9980e0fb938 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: R10: 0000000000000003 R11: ffffffff86146508 R12: 0000000000000014 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: R13: ffff8b1131ae5b40 R14: ffff8b10b8f4a418 R15: 00000000ffffffef Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: FS: 00007fb14a7fe6c0(0000) GS:ffff8b177ec00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: CR2: 000000c00143d000 CR3: 00000001b3b4e002 CR4: 00000000001706f0 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: Call Trace: Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: <TASK> Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: ? die+0x36/0x90 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: ? do_trap+0xda/0x100 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: ? btrfs_insert_delayed_dir_index+0x1da/0x260 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: ? do_error_trap+0x6a/0x90 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: ? btrfs_insert_delayed_dir_index+0x1da/0x260 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: ? exc_invalid_op+0x50/0x70 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: ? btrfs_insert_delayed_dir_index+0x1da/0x260 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: ? btrfs_insert_delayed_dir_index+0x1da/0x260 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: ? btrfs_insert_delayed_dir_index+0x1da/0x260 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: btrfs_insert_dir_item+0x200/0x280 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: btrfs_add_link+0xab/0x4f0 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: ? ktime_get_real_ts64+0x47/0xe0 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: btrfs_create_new_inode+0x7cd/0xa80 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: btrfs_symlink+0x190/0x4d0 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: ? schedule+0x5e/0xd0 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: ? __d_lookup+0x7e/0xc0 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: vfs_symlink+0x148/0x1e0 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: do_symlinkat+0x130/0x140 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: __x64_sys_symlinkat+0x3d/0x50 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x90 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x2b/0x40 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: ? do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x90 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc The race leading to the problem happens like this: 1) Directory inode X is loaded into memory, its ->index_cnt field is initialized to (u64)-1 (at btrfs_alloc_inode()); 2) Task A is adding a new file to directory X, holding its vfs inode lock, and calls btrfs_set_inode_index() to get an index number for the entry. Because the inode's index_cnt field is set to (u64)-1 it calls btrfs_inode_delayed_dir_index_count() which fails because no dir index entries were added yet to the delayed inode and then it calls btrfs_set_inode_index_count(). This functions finds the last dir index key and then sets index_cnt to that index value + 1. It found that the last index key has an offset of 100. However before it assigns a value of 101 to index_cnt... 3) Task B calls opendir(3), ending up at btrfs_opendir(), where the VFS lock for inode X is not taken, so it calls btrfs_get_dir_last_index() and sees index_cnt still with a value of (u64)-1. Because of that it calls btrfs_inode_delayed_dir_index_count() which fails since no dir index entries were added to the delayed inode yet, and then it also calls btrfs_set_inode_index_count(). This also finds that the last index key has an offset of 100, and before it assigns the value 101 to the index_cnt field of inode X... 4) Task A assigns a value of 101 to index_cnt. And then the code flow goes to btrfs_set_inode_index() where it increments index_cnt from 101 to 102. Task A then creates a delayed dir index entry with a sequence number of 101 and adds it to the delayed inode; 5) Task B assigns 101 to the index_cnt field of inode X; 6) At some later point when someone tries to add a new entry to the directory, btrfs_set_inode_index() will return 101 again and shortly after an attempt to add another delayed dir index key with index number 101 will fail with -EEXIST resulting in a transaction abort. Fix this by locking the inode at btrfs_get_dir_last_index(), which is only only used when opening a directory or attempting to lseek on it. Reported-by: ken <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/CAE6xmH+Lp=Q=E61bU+v9eWX8gYfLvu6jLYxjxjFpo3zHVPR0EQ@mail.gmail.com/ Reported-by: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/[email protected]/ Fixes: 9b378f6 ("btrfs: fix infinite directory reads") CC: [email protected] # 6.5+ Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit aed5ed5 ] There is a chance if a frequent switch of the governor done in a loop result in timer list corruption where timer cancel being done from two place one from cancel_delayed_work_sync() and followed by expire_timers() can be seen from the traces[1]. while true do echo "simple_ondemand" > /sys/class/devfreq/1d84000.ufshc/governor echo "performance" > /sys/class/devfreq/1d84000.ufshc/governor done It looks to be issue with devfreq driver where device_monitor_[start/stop] need to synchronized so that delayed work should get corrupted while it is either being queued or running or being cancelled. Let's use polling flag and devfreq lock to synchronize the queueing the timer instance twice and work data being corrupted. [1] ... .. <idle>-0 [003] 9436.209662: timer_cancel timer=0xffffff80444f0428 <idle>-0 [003] 9436.209664: timer_expire_entry timer=0xffffff80444f0428 now=0x10022da1c function=__typeid__ZTSFvP10timer_listE_global_addr baseclk=0x10022da1c <idle>-0 [003] 9436.209718: timer_expire_exit timer=0xffffff80444f0428 kworker/u16:6-14217 [003] 9436.209863: timer_start timer=0xffffff80444f0428 function=__typeid__ZTSFvP10timer_listE_global_addr expires=0x10022da2b now=0x10022da1c flags=182452227 vendor.xxxyyy.ha-1593 [004] 9436.209888: timer_cancel timer=0xffffff80444f0428 vendor.xxxyyy.ha-1593 [004] 9436.216390: timer_init timer=0xffffff80444f0428 vendor.xxxyyy.ha-1593 [004] 9436.216392: timer_start timer=0xffffff80444f0428 function=__typeid__ZTSFvP10timer_listE_global_addr expires=0x10022da2c now=0x10022da1d flags=186646532 vendor.xxxyyy.ha-1593 [005] 9436.220992: timer_cancel timer=0xffffff80444f0428 xxxyyyTraceManag-7795 [004] 9436.261641: timer_cancel timer=0xffffff80444f0428 [2] 9436.261653][ C4] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address dead00000000012a [ 9436.261664][ C4] Mem abort info: [ 9436.261666][ C4] ESR = 0x96000044 [ 9436.261669][ C4] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 9436.261671][ C4] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 9436.261673][ C4] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 9436.261675][ C4] Data abort info: [ 9436.261677][ C4] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000044 [ 9436.261680][ C4] CM = 0, WnR = 1 [ 9436.261682][ C4] [dead00000000012a] address between user and kernel address ranges [ 9436.261685][ C4] Internal error: Oops: 96000044 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 9436.261701][ C4] Skip md ftrace buffer dump for: 0x3a982d0 ... [ 9436.262138][ C4] CPU: 4 PID: 7795 Comm: TraceManag Tainted: G S W O 5.10.149-android12-9-o-g17f915d29d0c #1 [ 9436.262141][ C4] Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. (DT) [ 9436.262144][ C4] pstate: 22400085 (nzCv daIf +PAN -UAO +TCO BTYPE=--) [ 9436.262161][ C4] pc : expire_timers+0x9c/0x438 [ 9436.262164][ C4] lr : expire_timers+0x2a4/0x438 [ 9436.262168][ C4] sp : ffffffc010023dd0 [ 9436.262171][ C4] x29: ffffffc010023df0 x28: ffffffd0636fdc18 [ 9436.262178][ C4] x27: ffffffd063569dd0 x26: ffffffd063536008 [ 9436.262182][ C4] x25: 0000000000000001 x24: ffffff88f7c69280 [ 9436.262185][ C4] x23: 00000000000000e0 x22: dead000000000122 [ 9436.262188][ C4] x21: 000000010022da29 x20: ffffff8af72b4e80 [ 9436.262191][ C4] x19: ffffffc010023e50 x18: ffffffc010025038 [ 9436.262195][ C4] x17: 0000000000000240 x16: 0000000000000201 [ 9436.262199][ C4] x15: ffffffffffffffff x14: ffffff889f3c3100 [ 9436.262203][ C4] x13: ffffff889f3c3100 x12: 00000000049f56b8 [ 9436.262207][ C4] x11: 00000000049f56b8 x10: 00000000ffffffff [ 9436.262212][ C4] x9 : ffffffc010023e50 x8 : dead000000000122 [ 9436.262216][ C4] x7 : ffffffffffffffff x6 : ffffffc0100239d8 [ 9436.262220][ C4] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000101 [ 9436.262223][ C4] x3 : 0000000000000080 x2 : ffffff889edc155c [ 9436.262227][ C4] x1 : ffffff8001005200 x0 : ffffff80444f0428 [ 9436.262232][ C4] Call trace: [ 9436.262236][ C4] expire_timers+0x9c/0x438 [ 9436.262240][ C4] __run_timers+0x1f0/0x330 [ 9436.262245][ C4] run_timer_softirq+0x28/0x58 [ 9436.262255][ C4] efi_header_end+0x168/0x5ec [ 9436.262265][ C4] __irq_exit_rcu+0x108/0x124 [ 9436.262274][ C4] __handle_domain_irq+0x118/0x1e4 [ 9436.262282][ C4] gic_handle_irq.30369+0x6c/0x2bc [ 9436.262286][ C4] el0_irq_naked+0x60/0x6c Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ Reported-by: Joyyoung Huang <[email protected]> Acked-by: MyungJoo Ham <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mukesh Ojha <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Chanwoo Choi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit fc3a553 ] An issue occurred while reading an ELF file in libbpf.c during fuzzing: Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x0000000000958e97 in bpf_object.collect_prog_relos () at libbpf.c:4206 4206 in libbpf.c (gdb) bt #0 0x0000000000958e97 in bpf_object.collect_prog_relos () at libbpf.c:4206 #1 0x000000000094f9d6 in bpf_object.collect_relos () at libbpf.c:6706 #2 0x000000000092bef3 in bpf_object_open () at libbpf.c:7437 #3 0x000000000092c046 in bpf_object.open_mem () at libbpf.c:7497 #4 0x0000000000924afa in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput () at fuzz/bpf-object-fuzzer.c:16 #5 0x000000000060be11 in testblitz_engine::fuzzer::Fuzzer::run_one () #6 0x000000000087ad92 in tracing::span::Span::in_scope () #7 0x00000000006078aa in testblitz_engine::fuzzer::util::walkdir () #8 0x00000000005f3217 in testblitz_engine::entrypoint::main::{{closure}} () #9 0x00000000005f2601 in main () (gdb) scn_data was null at this code(tools/lib/bpf/src/libbpf.c): if (rel->r_offset % BPF_INSN_SZ || rel->r_offset >= scn_data->d_size) { The scn_data is derived from the code above: scn = elf_sec_by_idx(obj, sec_idx); scn_data = elf_sec_data(obj, scn); relo_sec_name = elf_sec_str(obj, shdr->sh_name); sec_name = elf_sec_name(obj, scn); if (!relo_sec_name || !sec_name)// don't check whether scn_data is NULL return -EINVAL; In certain special scenarios, such as reading a malformed ELF file, it is possible that scn_data may be a null pointer Signed-off-by: Mingyi Zhang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Xin Liu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Changye Wu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

commit 3051a77a09dfe3022aa012071346937fdf059033 upstream. The MTU setting at the time an XDP multi-buffer is attached determines whether the aggregation ring will be used and the rx_skb_func handler. This is done in bnxt_set_rx_skb_mode(). If the MTU is later changed, the aggregation ring setting may need to be changed and it may become out-of-sync with the settings initially done in bnxt_set_rx_skb_mode(). This may result in random memory corruption and crashes as the HW may DMA data larger than the allocated buffer size, such as: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000003c0 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 17 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/17 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S OE 6.1.0-226bf9805506 #1 Hardware name: Wiwynn Delta Lake PVT BZA.02601.0150/Delta Lake-Class1, BIOS F0E_3A12 08/26/2021 RIP: 0010:bnxt_rx_pkt+0xe97/0x1ae0 [bnxt_en] Code: 8b 95 70 ff ff ff 4c 8b 9d 48 ff ff ff 66 41 89 87 b4 00 00 00 e9 0b f7 ff ff 0f b7 43 0a 49 8b 95 a8 04 00 00 25 ff 0f 00 00 <0f> b7 14 42 48 c1 e2 06 49 03 95 a0 04 00 00 0f b6 42 33f RSP: 0018:ffffa19f40cc0d18 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 00000000000001e0 RBX: ffff8e2c805c6100 RCX: 00000000000007ff RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff8e2c271ab990 RDI: ffff8e2c84f12380 RBP: ffffa19f40cc0e48 R08: 000000000001000d R09: 974ea2fcddfa4cbf R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffa19f40cc0ff8 R12: ffff8e2c94b58980 R13: ffff8e2c952d6600 R14: 0000000000000016 R15: ffff8e2c271ab990 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8e3b3f840000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000000003c0 CR3: 0000000e8580a004 CR4: 00000000007706e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <IRQ> __bnxt_poll_work+0x1c2/0x3e0 [bnxt_en] To address the issue, we now call bnxt_set_rx_skb_mode() within bnxt_change_mtu() to properly set the AGG rings configuration and update rx_skb_func based on the new MTU value. Additionally, BNXT_FLAG_NO_AGG_RINGS is cleared at the beginning of bnxt_set_rx_skb_mode() to make sure it gets set or cleared based on the current MTU. Fixes: 08450ea ("bnxt_en: Fix max_mtu setting for multi-buf XDP") Co-developed-by: Somnath Kotur <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Somnath Kotur <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Shravya KN <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Michael Chan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jianqi Ren <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: He Zhe <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit 4676741a3464b300b486e70585c3c9b692be1632 upstream. This fixes the following crash: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in rtsx_usb_ms_poll_card+0x159/0x200 [rtsx_usb_ms] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888136335380 by task kworker/6:0/140241 CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 140241 Comm: kworker/6:0 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 6.14.0-rc6+ #1 Tainted: [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE Hardware name: LENOVO 30FNA1V7CW/1057, BIOS S0EKT54A 07/01/2024 Workqueue: events rtsx_usb_ms_poll_card [rtsx_usb_ms] Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x70 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x27/0x320 ? rtsx_usb_ms_poll_card+0x159/0x200 [rtsx_usb_ms] print_report+0x3e/0x70 kasan_report+0xab/0xe0 ? rtsx_usb_ms_poll_card+0x159/0x200 [rtsx_usb_ms] rtsx_usb_ms_poll_card+0x159/0x200 [rtsx_usb_ms] ? __pfx_rtsx_usb_ms_poll_card+0x10/0x10 [rtsx_usb_ms] ? __pfx___schedule+0x10/0x10 ? kick_pool+0x3b/0x270 process_one_work+0x357/0x660 worker_thread+0x390/0x4c0 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0x190/0x1d0 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Allocated by task 161446: kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0x7b/0x90 __kmalloc_noprof+0x1a7/0x470 memstick_alloc_host+0x1f/0xe0 [memstick] rtsx_usb_ms_drv_probe+0x47/0x320 [rtsx_usb_ms] platform_probe+0x60/0xe0 call_driver_probe+0x35/0x120 really_probe+0x123/0x410 __driver_probe_device+0xc7/0x1e0 driver_probe_device+0x49/0xf0 __device_attach_driver+0xc6/0x160 bus_for_each_drv+0xe4/0x160 __device_attach+0x13a/0x2b0 bus_probe_device+0xbd/0xd0 device_add+0x4a5/0x760 platform_device_add+0x189/0x370 mfd_add_device+0x587/0x5e0 mfd_add_devices+0xb1/0x130 rtsx_usb_probe+0x28e/0x2e0 [rtsx_usb] usb_probe_interface+0x15c/0x460 call_driver_probe+0x35/0x120 really_probe+0x123/0x410 __driver_probe_device+0xc7/0x1e0 driver_probe_device+0x49/0xf0 __device_attach_driver+0xc6/0x160 bus_for_each_drv+0xe4/0x160 __device_attach+0x13a/0x2b0 rebind_marked_interfaces.isra.0+0xcc/0x110 usb_reset_device+0x352/0x410 usbdev_do_ioctl+0xe5c/0x1860 usbdev_ioctl+0xa/0x20 __x64_sys_ioctl+0xc5/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x59/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Freed by task 161506: kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x36/0x60 __kasan_slab_free+0x34/0x50 kfree+0x1fd/0x3b0 device_release+0x56/0xf0 kobject_cleanup+0x73/0x1c0 rtsx_usb_ms_drv_remove+0x13d/0x220 [rtsx_usb_ms] platform_remove+0x2f/0x50 device_release_driver_internal+0x24b/0x2e0 bus_remove_device+0x124/0x1d0 device_del+0x239/0x530 platform_device_del.part.0+0x19/0xe0 platform_device_unregister+0x1c/0x40 mfd_remove_devices_fn+0x167/0x170 device_for_each_child_reverse+0xc9/0x130 mfd_remove_devices+0x6e/0xa0 rtsx_usb_disconnect+0x2e/0xd0 [rtsx_usb] usb_unbind_interface+0xf3/0x3f0 device_release_driver_internal+0x24b/0x2e0 proc_disconnect_claim+0x13d/0x220 usbdev_do_ioctl+0xb5e/0x1860 usbdev_ioctl+0xa/0x20 __x64_sys_ioctl+0xc5/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x59/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Last potentially related work creation: kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 kasan_record_aux_stack+0x85/0x90 insert_work+0x29/0x100 __queue_work+0x34a/0x540 call_timer_fn+0x2a/0x160 expire_timers+0x5f/0x1f0 __run_timer_base.part.0+0x1b6/0x1e0 run_timer_softirq+0x8b/0xe0 handle_softirqs+0xf9/0x360 __irq_exit_rcu+0x114/0x130 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x72/0x90 asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16/0x20 Second to last potentially related work creation: kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 kasan_record_aux_stack+0x85/0x90 insert_work+0x29/0x100 __queue_work+0x34a/0x540 call_timer_fn+0x2a/0x160 expire_timers+0x5f/0x1f0 __run_timer_base.part.0+0x1b6/0x1e0 run_timer_softirq+0x8b/0xe0 handle_softirqs+0xf9/0x360 __irq_exit_rcu+0x114/0x130 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x72/0x90 asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16/0x20 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888136335000 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048 The buggy address is located 896 bytes inside of freed 2048-byte region [ffff888136335000, ffff888136335800) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x136330 head: order:3 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0 flags: 0x17ffffc0000040(head|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) page_type: f5(slab) raw: 0017ffffc0000040 ffff888100042f00 ffffea000417a000 dead000000000002 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000080008 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000 head: 0017ffffc0000040 ffff888100042f00 ffffea000417a000 dead000000000002 head: 0000000000000000 0000000000080008 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000 head: 0017ffffc0000003 ffffea0004d8cc01 ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 head: 0000000000000008 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888136335280: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff888136335300: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb >ffff888136335380: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff888136335400: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff888136335480: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== Fixes: 6827ca5 ("memstick: rtsx_usb_ms: Support runtime power management") Signed-off-by: Luo Qiu <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

…ate_pagetables' [ Upstream commit fddc45026311c05a5355fd34b9dc0a1d7eaef4a2 ] This commit addresses a circular locking dependency in the svm_range_cpu_invalidate_pagetables function. The function previously held a lock while determining whether to perform an unmap or eviction operation, which could lead to deadlocks. Fixes the below: [ 223.418794] ====================================================== [ 223.418820] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 223.418845] 6.12.0-amdstaging-drm-next-lol-050225 #14 Tainted: G U OE [ 223.418869] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 223.418889] kfdtest/3939 is trying to acquire lock: [ 223.418906] ffff8957552eae38 (&dqm->lock_hidden){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: evict_process_queues_cpsch+0x43/0x210 [amdgpu] [ 223.419302] but task is already holding lock: [ 223.419303] ffff8957556b83b0 (&prange->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: svm_range_cpu_invalidate_pagetables+0x9d/0x850 [amdgpu] [ 223.419447] Console: switching to colour dummy device 80x25 [ 223.419477] [IGT] amd_basic: executing [ 223.419599] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 223.419611] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 223.419621] -> #2 (&prange->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 223.419636] __mutex_lock+0x85/0xe20 [ 223.419647] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [ 223.419656] svm_range_validate_and_map+0x2f1/0x15b0 [amdgpu] [ 223.419954] svm_range_set_attr+0xe8c/0x1710 [amdgpu] [ 223.420236] svm_ioctl+0x46/0x50 [amdgpu] [ 223.420503] kfd_ioctl_svm+0x50/0x90 [amdgpu] [ 223.420763] kfd_ioctl+0x409/0x6d0 [amdgpu] [ 223.421024] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x95/0xd0 [ 223.421036] x64_sys_call+0x1205/0x20d0 [ 223.421047] do_syscall_64+0x87/0x140 [ 223.421056] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 223.421068] -> #1 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 223.421084] __ww_mutex_lock.constprop.0+0xab/0x1560 [ 223.421095] ww_mutex_lock+0x2b/0x90 [ 223.421103] amdgpu_amdkfd_alloc_gtt_mem+0xcc/0x2b0 [amdgpu] [ 223.421361] add_queue_mes+0x3bc/0x440 [amdgpu] [ 223.421623] unhalt_cpsch+0x1ae/0x240 [amdgpu] [ 223.421888] kgd2kfd_start_sched+0x5e/0xd0 [amdgpu] [ 223.422148] amdgpu_amdkfd_start_sched+0x3d/0x50 [amdgpu] [ 223.422414] amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_handler+0x132/0x270 [amdgpu] [ 223.422662] process_one_work+0x21e/0x680 [ 223.422673] worker_thread+0x190/0x330 [ 223.422682] kthread+0xe7/0x120 [ 223.422690] ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60 [ 223.422699] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 223.422708] -> #0 (&dqm->lock_hidden){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 223.422723] __lock_acquire+0x16f4/0x2810 [ 223.422734] lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300 [ 223.422742] __mutex_lock+0x85/0xe20 [ 223.422751] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [ 223.422760] evict_process_queues_cpsch+0x43/0x210 [amdgpu] [ 223.423025] kfd_process_evict_queues+0x8a/0x1d0 [amdgpu] [ 223.423285] kgd2kfd_quiesce_mm+0x43/0x90 [amdgpu] [ 223.423540] svm_range_cpu_invalidate_pagetables+0x4a7/0x850 [amdgpu] [ 223.423807] __mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start+0x1f5/0x250 [ 223.423819] copy_page_range+0x1e94/0x1ea0 [ 223.423829] copy_process+0x172f/0x2ad0 [ 223.423839] kernel_clone+0x9c/0x3f0 [ 223.423847] __do_sys_clone+0x66/0x90 [ 223.423856] __x64_sys_clone+0x25/0x30 [ 223.423864] x64_sys_call+0x1d7c/0x20d0 [ 223.423872] do_syscall_64+0x87/0x140 [ 223.423880] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 223.423891] other info that might help us debug this: [ 223.423903] Chain exists of: &dqm->lock_hidden --> reservation_ww_class_mutex --> &prange->lock [ 223.423926] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 223.423935] CPU0 CPU1 [ 223.423942] ---- ---- [ 223.423949] lock(&prange->lock); [ 223.423958] lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex); [ 223.423970] lock(&prange->lock); [ 223.423981] lock(&dqm->lock_hidden); [ 223.423990] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 223.423999] 5 locks held by kfdtest/3939: [ 223.424006] #0: ffffffffb82b4fc0 (dup_mmap_sem){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: copy_process+0x1387/0x2ad0 [ 223.424026] #1: ffff89575eda81b0 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: copy_process+0x13a8/0x2ad0 [ 223.424046] #2: ffff89575edaf3b0 (&mm->mmap_lock/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: copy_process+0x13e4/0x2ad0 [ 223.424066] #3: ffffffffb82e76e0 (mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: copy_page_range+0x1cea/0x1ea0 [ 223.424088] #4: ffff8957556b83b0 (&prange->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: svm_range_cpu_invalidate_pagetables+0x9d/0x850 [amdgpu] [ 223.424365] stack backtrace: [ 223.424374] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 3939 Comm: kfdtest Tainted: G U OE 6.12.0-amdstaging-drm-next-lol-050225 #14 [ 223.424392] Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE [ 223.424401] Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. X570 AORUS PRO WIFI/X570 AORUS PRO WIFI, BIOS F36a 02/16/2022 [ 223.424416] Call Trace: [ 223.424423] <TASK> [ 223.424430] dump_stack_lvl+0x9b/0xf0 [ 223.424441] dump_stack+0x10/0x20 [ 223.424449] print_circular_bug+0x275/0x350 [ 223.424460] check_noncircular+0x157/0x170 [ 223.424469] ? __bfs+0xfd/0x2c0 [ 223.424481] __lock_acquire+0x16f4/0x2810 [ 223.424490] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.424505] lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300 [ 223.424514] ? evict_process_queues_cpsch+0x43/0x210 [amdgpu] [ 223.424783] __mutex_lock+0x85/0xe20 [ 223.424792] ? evict_process_queues_cpsch+0x43/0x210 [amdgpu] [ 223.425058] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.425067] ? mark_held_locks+0x54/0x90 [ 223.425076] ? evict_process_queues_cpsch+0x43/0x210 [amdgpu] [ 223.425339] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.425350] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [ 223.425358] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [ 223.425367] evict_process_queues_cpsch+0x43/0x210 [amdgpu] [ 223.425631] kfd_process_evict_queues+0x8a/0x1d0 [amdgpu] [ 223.425893] kgd2kfd_quiesce_mm+0x43/0x90 [amdgpu] [ 223.426156] svm_range_cpu_invalidate_pagetables+0x4a7/0x850 [amdgpu] [ 223.426423] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426436] __mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start+0x1f5/0x250 [ 223.426450] copy_page_range+0x1e94/0x1ea0 [ 223.426461] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426474] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426484] ? lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300 [ 223.426494] ? copy_process+0x1718/0x2ad0 [ 223.426502] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426510] ? sched_clock_noinstr+0x9/0x10 [ 223.426519] ? local_clock_noinstr+0xe/0xc0 [ 223.426528] ? copy_process+0x1718/0x2ad0 [ 223.426537] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426550] copy_process+0x172f/0x2ad0 [ 223.426569] kernel_clone+0x9c/0x3f0 [ 223.426577] ? __schedule+0x4c9/0x1b00 [ 223.426586] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426594] ? sched_clock_noinstr+0x9/0x10 [ 223.426602] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426610] ? local_clock_noinstr+0xe/0xc0 [ 223.426619] ? schedule+0x107/0x1a0 [ 223.426629] __do_sys_clone+0x66/0x90 [ 223.426643] __x64_sys_clone+0x25/0x30 [ 223.426652] x64_sys_call+0x1d7c/0x20d0 [ 223.426661] do_syscall_64+0x87/0x140 [ 223.426671] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426679] ? common_nsleep+0x44/0x50 [ 223.426690] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426698] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0x52/0xd0 [ 223.426709] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426717] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0xcc/0x200 [ 223.426727] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426736] ? do_syscall_64+0x93/0x140 [ 223.426748] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426756] ? up_write+0x1c/0x1e0 [ 223.426765] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426775] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426783] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0x52/0xd0 [ 223.426792] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426800] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0xcc/0x200 [ 223.426810] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426818] ? do_syscall_64+0x93/0x140 [ 223.426826] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0xcc/0x200 [ 223.426836] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426844] ? do_syscall_64+0x93/0x140 [ 223.426853] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426861] ? irqentry_exit+0x6b/0x90 [ 223.426869] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426877] ? exc_page_fault+0xa7/0x2c0 [ 223.426888] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 223.426898] RIP: 0033:0x7f46758eab57 [ 223.426906] Code: ba 04 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 48 8b 04 25 10 00 00 00 45 31 c0 31 d2 31 f6 bf 11 00 20 01 4c 8d 90 d0 02 00 00 b8 38 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 41 41 89 c0 85 c0 75 2c 64 48 8b 04 25 10 00 [ 223.426930] RSP: 002b:00007fff5c3e5188 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000038 [ 223.426943] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f4675f8c040 RCX: 00007f46758eab57 [ 223.426954] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000001200011 [ 223.426965] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 223.426975] R10: 00007f4675e81a50 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001 [ 223.426986] R13: 00007fff5c3e5470 R14: 00007fff5c3e53e0 R15: 00007fff5c3e5410 [ 223.427004] </TASK> v2: To resolve this issue, the allocation of the process context buffer (`proc_ctx_bo`) has been moved from the `add_queue_mes` function to the `pqm_create_queue` function. This change ensures that the buffer is allocated only when the first queue for a process is created and only if the Micro Engine Scheduler (MES) is enabled. (Felix) v3: Fix typo s/Memory Execution Scheduler (MES)/Micro Engine Scheduler in commit message. (Lijo) Fixes: 438b39ac74e2 ("drm/amdkfd: pause autosuspend when creating pdd") Cc: Jesse Zhang <[email protected]> Cc: Yunxiang Li <[email protected]> Cc: Philip Yang <[email protected]> Cc: Alex Sierra <[email protected]> Cc: Felix Kuehling <[email protected]> Cc: Christian König <[email protected]> Cc: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Srinivasan Shanmugam <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Felix Kuehling <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 42d9d7bed270247f134190ba0cb05bbd072f58c2 ] ctx->dmub_srv will de NULL if the ASIC does not support DMUB, which is tested in dm_dmub_sw_init. However, it will be dereferenced in dmub_hw_lock_mgr_cmd if should_use_dmub_lock returns true. This has been the case since dmub support has been added for PSR1. Fix this by checking for dmub_srv in should_use_dmub_lock. [ 37.440832] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000058 [ 37.447808] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 37.452959] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 37.458112] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 37.460662] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ 37.465553] CPU: 2 UID: 1000 PID: 1745 Comm: DrmThread Not tainted 6.14.0-rc1-00003-gd62e938120f0 #23 99720e1cb1e0fc4773b8513150932a07de3c6e88 [ 37.478324] Hardware name: Google Morphius/Morphius, BIOS Google_Morphius.13434.858.0 10/26/2023 [ 37.487103] RIP: 0010:dmub_hw_lock_mgr_cmd+0x77/0xb0 [ 37.492074] Code: 44 24 0e 00 00 00 00 48 c7 04 24 45 00 00 0c 40 88 74 24 0d 0f b6 02 88 44 24 0c 8b 01 89 44 24 08 85 f6 75 05 c6 44 24 0e 01 <48> 8b 7f 58 48 89 e6 ba 01 00 00 00 e8 08 3c 2a 00 65 48 8b 04 5 [ 37.510822] RSP: 0018:ffff969442853300 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 37.516052] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff92db03000000 RCX: ffff969442853358 [ 37.523185] RDX: ffff969442853368 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 37.530322] RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 00000000000004a7 R09: 00000000000004a5 [ 37.537453] R10: 0000000000000476 R11: 0000000000000062 R12: ffff92db0ade8000 [ 37.544589] R13: ffff92da01180ae0 R14: ffff92da011802a8 R15: ffff92db03000000 [ 37.551725] FS: 0000784a9cdfc6c0(0000) GS:ffff92db2af00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 37.559814] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 37.565562] CR2: 0000000000000058 CR3: 0000000112b1c000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 [ 37.572697] Call Trace: [ 37.575152] <TASK> [ 37.577258] ? __die_body+0x66/0xb0 [ 37.580756] ? page_fault_oops+0x3e7/0x4a0 [ 37.584861] ? exc_page_fault+0x3e/0xe0 [ 37.588706] ? exc_page_fault+0x5c/0xe0 [ 37.592550] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 [ 37.596742] ? dmub_hw_lock_mgr_cmd+0x77/0xb0 [ 37.601107] dcn10_cursor_lock+0x1e1/0x240 [ 37.605211] program_cursor_attributes+0x81/0x190 [ 37.609923] commit_planes_for_stream+0x998/0x1ef0 [ 37.614722] update_planes_and_stream_v2+0x41e/0x5c0 [ 37.619703] dc_update_planes_and_stream+0x78/0x140 [ 37.624588] amdgpu_dm_atomic_commit_tail+0x4362/0x49f0 [ 37.629832] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 37.633847] ? mark_held_locks+0x6d/0xd0 [ 37.637774] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x50 [ 37.642135] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 37.646148] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x95/0x150 [ 37.650510] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 37.654522] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x2f/0x50 [ 37.658883] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 37.662897] ? wait_for_common+0x186/0x1c0 [ 37.666998] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 37.671009] ? drm_crtc_next_vblank_start+0xc3/0x170 [ 37.675983] commit_tail+0xf5/0x1c0 [ 37.679478] drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x2a2/0x2b0 [ 37.684186] drm_atomic_commit+0xd6/0x100 [ 37.688199] ? __cfi___drm_printfn_info+0x10/0x10 [ 37.692911] drm_atomic_helper_update_plane+0xe5/0x130 [ 37.698054] drm_mode_cursor_common+0x501/0x670 [ 37.702600] ? __cfi_drm_mode_cursor_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [ 37.707572] drm_mode_cursor_ioctl+0x48/0x70 [ 37.711851] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xf2/0x150 [ 37.715781] drm_ioctl+0x363/0x590 [ 37.719189] ? __cfi_drm_mode_cursor_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [ 37.724165] amdgpu_drm_ioctl+0x41/0x80 [ 37.728013] __se_sys_ioctl+0x7f/0xd0 [ 37.731685] do_syscall_64+0x87/0x100 [ 37.735355] ? vma_end_read+0x12/0xe0 [ 37.739024] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 37.743041] ? find_held_lock+0x47/0xf0 [ 37.746884] ? vma_end_read+0x12/0xe0 [ 37.750552] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 37.754565] ? lock_release+0x1c4/0x2e0 [ 37.758406] ? vma_end_read+0x12/0xe0 [ 37.762079] ? exc_page_fault+0x84/0xe0 [ 37.765921] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 37.769938] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x95/0x150 [ 37.774303] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 37.778317] ? exc_page_fault+0x84/0xe0 [ 37.782163] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x55/0x5d [ 37.787218] RIP: 0033:0x784aa5ec3059 [ 37.790803] Code: 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 45 c8 31 c0 48 8d 45 10 c7 45 b0 10 00 00 00 48 89 45 b8 48 8d 45 d0 48 89 45 c0 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <41> 89 c0 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 1d 48 8b 45 c8 64 48 2b 04 25 28 00 0 [ 37.809553] RSP: 002b:0000784a9cdf90e0 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 [ 37.817121] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000784a9cdf917c RCX: 0000784aa5ec3059 [ 37.824256] RDX: 0000784a9cdf917c RSI: 00000000c01c64a3 RDI: 0000000000000020 [ 37.831391] RBP: 0000784a9cdf9130 R08: 0000000000000100 R09: 0000000000ff0000 [ 37.838525] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000025c01606ed0 [ 37.845657] R13: 0000025c00030200 R14: 00000000c01c64a3 R15: 0000000000000020 [ 37.852799] </TASK> [ 37.854992] Modules linked in: [ 37.864546] gsmi: Log Shutdown Reason 0x03 [ 37.868656] CR2: 0000000000000058 [ 37.871979] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 37.880976] RIP: 0010:dmub_hw_lock_mgr_cmd+0x77/0xb0 [ 37.885954] Code: 44 24 0e 00 00 00 00 48 c7 04 24 45 00 00 0c 40 88 74 24 0d 0f b6 02 88 44 24 0c 8b 01 89 44 24 08 85 f6 75 05 c6 44 24 0e 01 <48> 8b 7f 58 48 89 e6 ba 01 00 00 00 e8 08 3c 2a 00 65 48 8b 04 5 [ 37.904703] RSP: 0018:ffff969442853300 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 37.909933] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff92db03000000 RCX: ffff969442853358 [ 37.917068] RDX: ffff969442853368 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 37.924201] RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 00000000000004a7 R09: 00000000000004a5 [ 37.931336] R10: 0000000000000476 R11: 0000000000000062 R12: ffff92db0ade8000 [ 37.938469] R13: ffff92da01180ae0 R14: ffff92da011802a8 R15: ffff92db03000000 [ 37.945602] FS: 0000784a9cdfc6c0(0000) GS:ffff92db2af00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 37.953689] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 37.959435] CR2: 0000000000000058 CR3: 0000000112b1c000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 [ 37.966570] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception [ 37.971901] Kernel Offset: 0x30200000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff) [ 37.982840] gsmi: Log Shutdown Reason 0x02 Fixes: b5c764d6ed55 ("drm/amd/display: Use HW lock mgr for PSR1") Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <[email protected]> Cc: Sun peng Li <[email protected]> Cc: Tom Chung <[email protected]> Cc: Daniel Wheeler <[email protected]> Cc: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Rodrigo Siqueira <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Leo Li <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit efdde3d73ab25cef4ff2d06783b0aad8b093c0e4 ] There is case as below could trigger kernel dump: Use U-Boot to start remote processor(rproc) with resource table published to a fixed address by rproc. After Kernel boots up, stop the rproc, load a new firmware which doesn't have resource table ,and start rproc. When starting rproc with a firmware not have resource table, `memcpy(loaded_table, rproc->cached_table, rproc->table_sz)` will trigger dump, because rproc->cache_table is set to NULL during the last stop operation, but rproc->table_sz is still valid. This issue is found on i.MX8MP and i.MX9. Dump as below: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000 Mem abort info: ESR = 0x0000000096000004 EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000 CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=000000010af63000 [0000000000000000] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000 Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 1060 Comm: sh Not tainted 6.14.0-rc7-next-20250317-dirty #38 Hardware name: NXP i.MX8MPlus EVK board (DT) pstate: a0000005 (NzCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : __pi_memcpy_generic+0x110/0x22c lr : rproc_start+0x88/0x1e0 Call trace: __pi_memcpy_generic+0x110/0x22c (P) rproc_boot+0x198/0x57c state_store+0x40/0x104 dev_attr_store+0x18/0x2c sysfs_kf_write+0x7c/0x94 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x120/0x1cc vfs_write+0x240/0x378 ksys_write+0x70/0x108 __arm64_sys_write+0x1c/0x28 invoke_syscall+0x48/0x10c el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc0/0xe0 do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 el0_svc+0x30/0xcc el0t_64_sync_handler+0x10c/0x138 el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c Clear rproc->table_sz to address the issue. Fixes: 9dc9507 ("remoteproc: Properly deal with the resource table when detaching") Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d19d7345a7bcdb083b65568a11b11adffe0687af ] With UBSAN_ARRAY_BOUNDS=y, I'm hitting the below panic due to dereferencing `ctx->clk_data.hws` before setting `ctx->clk_data.num = nr_clks`. Move that up to fix the crash. UBSAN: array index out of bounds: 00000000f2005512 [#1] PREEMPT SMP <snip> Call trace: samsung_clk_init+0x110/0x124 (P) samsung_clk_init+0x48/0x124 (L) samsung_cmu_register_one+0x3c/0xa0 exynos_arm64_register_cmu+0x54/0x64 __gs101_cmu_top_of_clk_init_declare+0x28/0x60 ... Fixes: e620a1e ("drivers/clk: convert VL struct to struct_size") Signed-off-by: Will McVicker <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a1ecb30f90856b0be4168ad51b8875148e285c1f ] Commit 467f432 ("RDMA/core: Split port and device counter sysfs attributes") accidentally almost exposed hw counters to non-init net namespaces. It didn't expose them fully, as an attempt to read any of those counters leads to a crash like this one: [42021.807566] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000028 [42021.814463] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [42021.819549] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [42021.824636] PGD 0 P4D 0 [42021.827145] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [42021.830598] CPU: 82 PID: 2843922 Comm: switchto-defaul Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S W I XXX [42021.841697] Hardware name: XXX [42021.849619] RIP: 0010:hw_stat_device_show+0x1e/0x40 [ib_core] [42021.855362] Code: 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 d0 4c 8b 5e 20 48 8b 8f b8 04 00 00 48 81 c7 f0 fa ff ff <48> 8b 41 28 48 29 ce 48 83 c6 d0 48 c1 ee 04 69 d6 ab aa aa aa 48 [42021.873931] RSP: 0018:ffff97fe90f03da0 EFLAGS: 00010287 [42021.879108] RAX: ffff9406988a8c60 RBX: ffff940e1072d438 RCX: 0000000000000000 [42021.886169] RDX: ffff94085f1aa000 RSI: ffff93c6cbbdbcb0 RDI: ffff940c7517aef0 [42021.893230] RBP: ffff97fe90f03e70 R08: ffff94085f1aa000 R09: 0000000000000000 [42021.900294] R10: ffff94085f1aa000 R11: ffffffffc0775680 R12: ffffffff87ca2530 [42021.907355] R13: ffff940651602840 R14: ffff93c6cbbdbcb0 R15: ffff94085f1aa000 [42021.914418] FS: 00007fda1a3b9700(0000) GS:ffff94453fb80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [42021.922423] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [42021.928130] CR2: 0000000000000028 CR3: 00000042dcfb8003 CR4: 00000000003726f0 [42021.935194] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [42021.942257] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [42021.949324] Call Trace: [42021.951756] <TASK> [42021.953842] [<ffffffff86c58674>] ? show_regs+0x64/0x70 [42021.959030] [<ffffffff86c58468>] ? __die+0x78/0xc0 [42021.963874] [<ffffffff86c9ef75>] ? page_fault_oops+0x2b5/0x3b0 [42021.969749] [<ffffffff87674b92>] ? exc_page_fault+0x1a2/0x3c0 [42021.975549] [<ffffffff87801326>] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 [42021.981517] [<ffffffffc0775680>] ? __pfx_show_hw_stats+0x10/0x10 [ib_core] [42021.988482] [<ffffffffc077564e>] ? hw_stat_device_show+0x1e/0x40 [ib_core] [42021.995438] [<ffffffff86ac7f8e>] dev_attr_show+0x1e/0x50 [42022.000803] [<ffffffff86a3eeb1>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x81/0xe0 [42022.006508] [<ffffffff86a11134>] seq_read_iter+0xf4/0x410 [42022.011954] [<ffffffff869f4b2e>] vfs_read+0x16e/0x2f0 [42022.017058] [<ffffffff869f50ee>] ksys_read+0x6e/0xe0 [42022.022073] [<ffffffff8766f1ca>] do_syscall_64+0x6a/0xa0 [42022.027441] [<ffffffff8780013b>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0xe2 The problem can be reproduced using the following steps: ip netns add foo ip netns exec foo bash cat /sys/class/infiniband/mlx4_0/hw_counters/* The panic occurs because of casting the device pointer into an ib_device pointer using container_of() in hw_stat_device_show() is wrong and leads to a memory corruption. However the real problem is that hw counters should never been exposed outside of the non-init net namespace. Fix this by saving the index of the corresponding attribute group (it might be 1 or 2 depending on the presence of driver-specific attributes) and zeroing the pointer to hw_counters group for compat devices during the initialization. With this fix applied hw_counters are not available in a non-init net namespace: find /sys/class/infiniband/mlx4_0/ -name hw_counters /sys/class/infiniband/mlx4_0/ports/1/hw_counters /sys/class/infiniband/mlx4_0/ports/2/hw_counters /sys/class/infiniband/mlx4_0/hw_counters ip netns add foo ip netns exec foo bash find /sys/class/infiniband/mlx4_0/ -name hw_counters Fixes: 467f432 ("RDMA/core: Split port and device counter sysfs attributes") Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]> Cc: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]> Cc: Maher Sanalla <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Reviewed-by: Parav Pandit <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5ed3b0cb3f827072e93b4c5b6e2b8106fd7cccbd ] When cur_qp isn't NULL, in order to avoid fetching the QP from the radix tree again we check if the next cqe QP is identical to the one we already have. The bug however is that we are checking if the QP is identical by checking the QP number inside the CQE against the QP number inside the mlx5_ib_qp, but that's wrong since the QP number from the CQE is from FW so it should be matched against mlx5_core_qp which is our FW QP number. Otherwise we could use the wrong QP when handling a CQE which could cause the kernel trace below. This issue is mainly noticeable over QPs 0 & 1, since for now they are the only QPs in our driver whereas the QP number inside mlx5_ib_qp doesn't match the QP number inside mlx5_core_qp. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000012 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 7927 Comm: kworker/u62:1 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc3+ #189 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: ib-comp-unb-wq ib_cq_poll_work [ib_core] RIP: 0010:mlx5_ib_poll_cq+0x4c7/0xd90 [mlx5_ib] Code: 03 00 00 8d 58 ff 21 cb 66 39 d3 74 39 48 c7 c7 3c 89 6e a0 0f b7 db e8 b7 d2 b3 e0 49 8b 86 60 03 00 00 48 c7 c7 4a 89 6e a0 <0f> b7 5c 98 02 e8 9f d2 b3 e0 41 0f b7 86 78 03 00 00 83 e8 01 21 RSP: 0018:ffff88810511bd60 EFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: 0000000000000010 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88885fa1b3c0 RDI: ffffffffa06e894a RBP: 00000000000000b0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88810511bc10 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88810d593000 R13: ffff88810e579108 R14: ffff888105146000 R15: 00000000000000b0 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88885fa00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000012 CR3: 00000001077e6001 CR4: 0000000000370eb0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die+0x20/0x60 ? page_fault_oops+0x150/0x3e0 ? exc_page_fault+0x74/0x130 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 ? mlx5_ib_poll_cq+0x4c7/0xd90 [mlx5_ib] __ib_process_cq+0x5a/0x150 [ib_core] ib_cq_poll_work+0x31/0x90 [ib_core] process_one_work+0x169/0x320 worker_thread+0x288/0x3a0 ? work_busy+0xb0/0xb0 kthread+0xd7/0x1f0 ? kthreads_online_cpu+0x130/0x130 ? kthreads_online_cpu+0x130/0x130 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50 ? kthreads_online_cpu+0x130/0x130 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 </TASK> Fixes: e126ba9 ("mlx5: Add driver for Mellanox Connect-IB adapters") Signed-off-by: Patrisious Haddad <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Edward Srouji <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/4ada09d41f1e36db62c44a9b25c209ea5f054316.1741875692.git.leon@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 23f00807619d15063d676218f36c5dfeda1eb420 ] Commit 30aad41 ("net/core: Add support for getting VF GUIDs") added support for getting VF port and node GUIDs in netlink ifinfo messages, but their size was not taken into consideration in the function that allocates the netlink message, causing the following warning when a netlink message is filled with many VF port and node GUIDs: # echo 64 > /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000\:08\:00.0/sriov_numvfs # ip link show dev ib0 RTNETLINK answers: Message too long Cannot send link get request: Message too long Kernel warning: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1930 at net/core/rtnetlink.c:4151 rtnl_getlink+0x586/0x5a0 Modules linked in: xt_conntrack xt_MASQUERADE nfnetlink xt_addrtype iptable_nat nf_nat br_netfilter overlay mlx5_ib macsec mlx5_core tls rpcrdma rdma_ucm ib_uverbs ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ib_umad rdma_cm iw_cm ib_ipoib fuse ib_cm ib_core CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 1930 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.14.0-rc2+ #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:rtnl_getlink+0x586/0x5a0 Code: cb 82 e8 3d af 0a 00 4d 85 ff 0f 84 08 ff ff ff 4c 89 ff 41 be ea ff ff ff e8 66 63 5b ff 49 c7 07 80 4f cb 82 e9 36 fc ff ff <0f> 0b e9 16 fe ff ff e8 de a0 56 00 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 0018:ffff888113557348 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 00000000ffffffa6 RBX: ffff88817e87aa34 RCX: dffffc0000000000 RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88817e87afb8 RBP: 0000000000000009 R08: ffffffff821f44aa R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffff8881260f79a8 R11: ffff88817e87af00 R12: ffff88817e87aa00 R13: ffffffff8563d300 R14: 00000000ffffffa6 R15: 00000000ffffffff FS: 00007f63a5dbf280(0000) GS:ffff88881ee00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f63a5ba4493 CR3: 00000001700fe002 CR4: 0000000000772eb0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __warn+0xa5/0x230 ? rtnl_getlink+0x586/0x5a0 ? report_bug+0x22d/0x240 ? handle_bug+0x53/0xa0 ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x50 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20 ? skb_trim+0x6a/0x80 ? rtnl_getlink+0x586/0x5a0 ? __pfx_rtnl_getlink+0x10/0x10 ? rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x1e5/0x860 ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10 ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60 ? __pfx_lock_acquire+0x10/0x10 ? stack_trace_save+0x90/0xd0 ? filter_irq_stacks+0x1d/0x70 ? kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x40 ? kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 ? kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x21c/0x860 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e ? __pfx_rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 ? arch_stack_walk+0x9e/0xf0 ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60 ? lock_acquire+0xd5/0x410 ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60 netlink_rcv_skb+0xe0/0x210 ? __pfx_rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_netlink_rcv_skb+0x10/0x10 ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60 ? __pfx___netlink_lookup+0x10/0x10 ? lock_release+0x62/0x200 ? netlink_deliver_tap+0xfd/0x290 ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60 ? lock_release+0x62/0x200 ? netlink_deliver_tap+0x95/0x290 netlink_unicast+0x31f/0x480 ? __pfx_netlink_unicast+0x10/0x10 ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60 ? lock_acquire+0xd5/0x410 netlink_sendmsg+0x369/0x660 ? lock_release+0x62/0x200 ? __pfx_netlink_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 ? import_ubuf+0xb9/0xf0 ? __import_iovec+0x254/0x2b0 ? lock_release+0x62/0x200 ? __pfx_netlink_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 ____sys_sendmsg+0x559/0x5a0 ? __pfx_____sys_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_copy_msghdr_from_user+0x10/0x10 ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60 ? do_read_fault+0x213/0x4a0 ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60 ___sys_sendmsg+0xe4/0x150 ? __pfx____sys_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 ? do_fault+0x2cc/0x6f0 ? handle_pte_fault+0x2e3/0x3d0 ? __pfx_handle_pte_fault+0x10/0x10 ? preempt_count_sub+0x14/0xc0 ? __down_read_trylock+0x150/0x270 ? __handle_mm_fault+0x404/0x8e0 ? __pfx___handle_mm_fault+0x10/0x10 ? lock_release+0x62/0x200 ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x65/0x90 ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60 __sys_sendmsg+0xd5/0x150 ? __pfx___sys_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 ? __up_read+0x192/0x480 ? lock_release+0x62/0x200 ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x65/0x90 ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7f63a5b13367 Code: 0e 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b9 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 89 54 24 1c 48 89 74 24 10 RSP: 002b:00007fff8c726bc8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000067b687c2 RCX: 00007f63a5b13367 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007fff8c726c30 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007fff8c726cb8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000034 R10: 00007fff8c726c7c R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fff8c726cd0 R15: 00007fff8c726cd0 </TASK> irq event stamp: 0 hardirqs last enabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 hardirqs last disabled at (0): [<ffffffff813f9e58>] copy_process+0xd08/0x2830 softirqs last enabled at (0): [<ffffffff813f9e58>] copy_process+0xd08/0x2830 softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Thus, when calculating ifinfo message size, take VF GUIDs sizes into account when supported. Fixes: 30aad41 ("net/core: Add support for getting VF GUIDs") Signed-off-by: Mark Zhang <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Maher Sanalla <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mark Bloch <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8c1624b63a7d24142a2bbc3a5ee7e95f004ea36e ] nvme_tcp_poll() may race with the send path error handler because it may complete the request while it is actively being polled for completion, resulting in a UAF panic [1]: We should make sure to stop polling when we see an error when trying to read from the socket. Hence make sure to propagate the error so that the block layer breaks the polling cycle. [1]: -- [35665.692310] nvme nvme2: failed to send request -13 [35665.702265] nvme nvme2: unsupported pdu type (3) [35665.702272] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [35665.702542] nvme nvme2: queue 1 receive failed: -22 [35665.703209] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode [35665.703213] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page [35665.703214] PGD 8000003801cce067 P4D 8000003801cce067 PUD 37e6f79067 PMD 0 [35665.703220] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP PTI [35665.703658] nvme nvme2: starting error recovery [35665.705809] Hardware name: Inspur aaabbb/YZMB-00882-104, BIOS 4.1.26 09/22/2022 [35665.705812] Workqueue: kblockd blk_mq_requeue_work [35665.709172] RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_lock+0xc/0x30 [35665.715788] Call Trace: [35665.716201] <TASK> [35665.716613] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c1/0x2d9 [35665.717049] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c1/0x2d9 [35665.717457] ? blk_mq_request_bypass_insert+0x2c/0xb0 [35665.717950] ? __die_body.cold+0x8/0xd [35665.718361] ? page_fault_oops+0xac/0x140 [35665.718749] ? blk_mq_start_request+0x30/0xf0 [35665.719144] ? nvme_tcp_queue_rq+0xc7/0x170 [nvme_tcp] [35665.719547] ? exc_page_fault+0x62/0x130 [35665.719938] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 [35665.720333] ? _raw_spin_lock+0xc/0x30 [35665.720723] blk_mq_request_bypass_insert+0x2c/0xb0 [35665.721101] blk_mq_requeue_work+0xa5/0x180 [35665.721451] process_one_work+0x1e8/0x390 [35665.721809] worker_thread+0x53/0x3d0 [35665.722159] ? process_one_work+0x390/0x390 [35665.722501] kthread+0x124/0x150 [35665.722849] ? set_kthread_struct+0x50/0x50 [35665.723182] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 Reported-by: Zhang Guanghui <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sagi Grimberg <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Chaitanya Kulkarni <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

…cal section [ Upstream commit 85b2b9c16d053364e2004883140538e73b333cdb ] A circular lock dependency splat has been seen involving down_trylock(): ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.12.0-41.el10.s390x+debug ------------------------------------------------------ dd/32479 is trying to acquire lock: 0015a20accd0d4f8 ((console_sem).lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: down_trylock+0x26/0x90 but task is already holding lock: 000000017e461698 (&zone->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: rmqueue_bulk+0xac/0x8f0 the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #4 (&zone->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: -> #3 (hrtimer_bases.lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: -> #2 (&rq->__lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: -> #1 (&p->pi_lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: -> #0 ((console_sem).lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: The console_sem -> pi_lock dependency is due to calling try_to_wake_up() while holding the console_sem raw_spinlock. This dependency can be broken by using wake_q to do the wakeup instead of calling try_to_wake_up() under the console_sem lock. This will also make the semaphore's raw_spinlock become a terminal lock without taking any further locks underneath it. The hrtimer_bases.lock is a raw_spinlock while zone->lock is a spinlock. The hrtimer_bases.lock -> zone->lock dependency happens via the debug_objects_fill_pool() helper function in the debugobjects code. -> #4 (&zone->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: __lock_acquire+0xe86/0x1cc0 lock_acquire.part.0+0x258/0x630 lock_acquire+0xb8/0xe0 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xb4/0x120 rmqueue_bulk+0xac/0x8f0 __rmqueue_pcplist+0x580/0x830 rmqueue_pcplist+0xfc/0x470 rmqueue.isra.0+0xdec/0x11b0 get_page_from_freelist+0x2ee/0xeb0 __alloc_pages_noprof+0x2c2/0x520 alloc_pages_mpol_noprof+0x1fc/0x4d0 alloc_pages_noprof+0x8c/0xe0 allocate_slab+0x320/0x460 ___slab_alloc+0xa58/0x12b0 __slab_alloc.isra.0+0x42/0x60 kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x304/0x350 fill_pool+0xf6/0x450 debug_object_activate+0xfe/0x360 enqueue_hrtimer+0x34/0x190 __run_hrtimer+0x3c8/0x4c0 __hrtimer_run_queues+0x1b2/0x260 hrtimer_interrupt+0x316/0x760 do_IRQ+0x9a/0xe0 do_irq_async+0xf6/0x160 Normally a raw_spinlock to spinlock dependency is not legitimate and will be warned if CONFIG_PROVE_RAW_LOCK_NESTING is enabled, but debug_objects_fill_pool() is an exception as it explicitly allows this dependency for non-PREEMPT_RT kernel without causing PROVE_RAW_LOCK_NESTING lockdep splat. As a result, this dependency is legitimate and not a bug. Anyway, semaphore is the only locking primitive left that is still using try_to_wake_up() to do wakeup inside critical section, all the other locking primitives had been migrated to use wake_q to do wakeup outside of the critical section. It is also possible that there are other circular locking dependencies involving printk/console_sem or other existing/new semaphores lurking somewhere which may show up in the future. Let just do the migration now to wake_q to avoid headache like this. Reported-by: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Boqun Feng <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1b755d8eb1ace3870789d48fbd94f386ad6e30be ] When handling multiple NFTA_TUNNEL_KEY_OPTS_GENEVE attributes, the parsing logic should place every geneve_opt structure one by one compactly. Hence, when deciding the next geneve_opt position, the pointer addition should be in units of char *. However, the current implementation erroneously does type conversion before the addition, which will lead to heap out-of-bounds write. [ 6.989857] ================================================================== [ 6.990293] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nft_tunnel_obj_init+0x977/0xa70 [ 6.990725] Write of size 124 at addr ffff888005f18974 by task poc/178 [ 6.991162] [ 6.991259] CPU: 0 PID: 178 Comm: poc-oob-write Not tainted 6.1.132 #1 [ 6.991655] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 6.992281] Call Trace: [ 6.992423] <TASK> [ 6.992586] dump_stack_lvl+0x44/0x5c [ 6.992801] print_report+0x184/0x4be [ 6.993790] kasan_report+0xc5/0x100 [ 6.994252] kasan_check_range+0xf3/0x1a0 [ 6.994486] memcpy+0x38/0x60 [ 6.994692] nft_tunnel_obj_init+0x977/0xa70 [ 6.995677] nft_obj_init+0x10c/0x1b0 [ 6.995891] nf_tables_newobj+0x585/0x950 [ 6.996922] nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0xdf9/0x1020 [ 6.998997] nfnetlink_rcv+0x1df/0x220 [ 6.999537] netlink_unicast+0x395/0x530 [ 7.000771] netlink_sendmsg+0x3d0/0x6d0 [ 7.001462] __sock_sendmsg+0x99/0xa0 [ 7.001707] ____sys_sendmsg+0x409/0x450 [ 7.002391] ___sys_sendmsg+0xfd/0x170 [ 7.003145] __sys_sendmsg+0xea/0x170 [ 7.004359] do_syscall_64+0x5e/0x90 [ 7.005817] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 [ 7.006127] RIP: 0033:0x7ec756d4e407 [ 7.006339] Code: 48 89 fa 4c 89 df e8 38 aa 00 00 8b 93 08 03 00 00 59 5e 48 83 f8 fc 74 1a 5b c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b 44 24 10 0f 05 <5b> c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 83 e2 39 83 faf [ 7.007364] RSP: 002b:00007ffed5d46760 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e [ 7.007827] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ec756cc4740 RCX: 00007ec756d4e407 [ 7.008223] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffed5d467f0 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 7.008620] RBP: 00007ffed5d468a0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 7.009039] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 7.009429] R13: 00007ffed5d478b0 R14: 00007ec756ee5000 R15: 00005cbd4e655cb8 Fix this bug with correct pointer addition and conversion in parse and dump code. Fixes: 925d844 ("netfilter: nft_tunnel: add support for geneve opts") Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b27055a08ad4b415dcf15b63034f9cb236f7fb40 ] struct geneve_opt uses 5 bit length for each single option, which means every vary size option should be smaller than 128 bytes. However, all current related Netlink policies cannot promise this length condition and the attacker can exploit a exact 128-byte size option to *fake* a zero length option and confuse the parsing logic, further achieve heap out-of-bounds read. One example crash log is like below: [ 3.905425] ================================================================== [ 3.905925] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nla_put+0xa9/0xe0 [ 3.906255] Read of size 124 at addr ffff888005f291cc by task poc/177 [ 3.906646] [ 3.906775] CPU: 0 PID: 177 Comm: poc-oob-read Not tainted 6.1.132 #1 [ 3.907131] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 3.907784] Call Trace: [ 3.907925] <TASK> [ 3.908048] dump_stack_lvl+0x44/0x5c [ 3.908258] print_report+0x184/0x4be [ 3.909151] kasan_report+0xc5/0x100 [ 3.909539] kasan_check_range+0xf3/0x1a0 [ 3.909794] memcpy+0x1f/0x60 [ 3.909968] nla_put+0xa9/0xe0 [ 3.910147] tunnel_key_dump+0x945/0xba0 [ 3.911536] tcf_action_dump_1+0x1c1/0x340 [ 3.912436] tcf_action_dump+0x101/0x180 [ 3.912689] tcf_exts_dump+0x164/0x1e0 [ 3.912905] fw_dump+0x18b/0x2d0 [ 3.913483] tcf_fill_node+0x2ee/0x460 [ 3.914778] tfilter_notify+0xf4/0x180 [ 3.915208] tc_new_tfilter+0xd51/0x10d0 [ 3.918615] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x4a2/0x560 [ 3.919118] netlink_rcv_skb+0xcd/0x200 [ 3.919787] netlink_unicast+0x395/0x530 [ 3.921032] netlink_sendmsg+0x3d0/0x6d0 [ 3.921987] __sock_sendmsg+0x99/0xa0 [ 3.922220] __sys_sendto+0x1b7/0x240 [ 3.922682] __x64_sys_sendto+0x72/0x90 [ 3.922906] do_syscall_64+0x5e/0x90 [ 3.923814] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 [ 3.924122] RIP: 0033:0x7e83eab84407 [ 3.924331] Code: 48 89 fa 4c 89 df e8 38 aa 00 00 8b 93 08 03 00 00 59 5e 48 83 f8 fc 74 1a 5b c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b 44 24 10 0f 05 <5b> c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 83 e2 39 83 faf [ 3.925330] RSP: 002b:00007ffff505e370 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c [ 3.925752] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007e83eaafa740 RCX: 00007e83eab84407 [ 3.926173] RDX: 00000000000001a8 RSI: 00007ffff505e3c0 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 3.926587] RBP: 00007ffff505f460 R08: 00007e83eace1000 R09: 000000000000000c [ 3.926977] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007ffff505f3c0 [ 3.927367] R13: 00007ffff505f5c8 R14: 00007e83ead1b000 R15: 00005d4fbbe6dcb8 Fix these issues by enforing correct length condition in related policies. Fixes: 925d844 ("netfilter: nft_tunnel: add support for geneve opts") Fixes: 4ece477 ("lwtunnel: add options setting and dumping for geneve") Fixes: 0ed5269 ("net/sched: add tunnel option support to act_tunnel_key") Fixes: 0a6e777 ("net/sched: allow flower to match tunnel options") Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Xin Long <[email protected]> Acked-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 053f3ff67d7feefc75797863f3d84b47ad47086f ] v2: - Created a single error handling unlock and exit in veth_pool_store - Greatly expanded commit message with previous explanatory-only text Summary: Use rtnl_mutex to synchronize veth_pool_store with itself, ibmveth_close and ibmveth_open, preventing multiple calls in a row to napi_disable. Background: Two (or more) threads could call veth_pool_store through writing to /sys/devices/vio/30000002/pool*/*. You can do this easily with a little shell script. This causes a hang. I configured LOCKDEP, compiled ibmveth.c with DEBUG, and built a new kernel. I ran this test again and saw: Setting pool0/active to 0 Setting pool1/active to 1 [ 73.911067][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close starting Setting pool1/active to 1 Setting pool1/active to 0 [ 73.911367][ T4366] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close starting [ 73.916056][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close complete [ 73.916064][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: open starting [ 110.808564][ T712] systemd-journald[712]: Sent WATCHDOG=1 notification. [ 230.808495][ T712] systemd-journald[712]: Sent WATCHDOG=1 notification. [ 243.683786][ T123] INFO: task stress.sh:4365 blocked for more than 122 seconds. [ 243.683827][ T123] Not tainted 6.14.0-01103-g2df0c02dab82-dirty #8 [ 243.683833][ T123] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 243.683838][ T123] task:stress.sh state:D stack:28096 pid:4365 tgid:4365 ppid:4364 task_flags:0x400040 flags:0x00042000 [ 243.683852][ T123] Call Trace: [ 243.683857][ T123] [c00000000c38f690] [0000000000000001] 0x1 (unreliable) [ 243.683868][ T123] [c00000000c38f840] [c00000000001f908] __switch_to+0x318/0x4e0 [ 243.683878][ T123] [c00000000c38f8a0] [c000000001549a70] __schedule+0x500/0x12a0 [ 243.683888][ T123] [c00000000c38f9a0] [c00000000154a878] schedule+0x68/0x210 [ 243.683896][ T123] [c00000000c38f9d0] [c00000000154ac80] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x30/0x50 [ 243.683904][ T123] [c00000000c38fa00] [c00000000154dbb0] __mutex_lock+0x730/0x10f0 [ 243.683913][ T123] [c00000000c38fb10] [c000000001154d40] napi_enable+0x30/0x60 [ 243.683921][ T123] [c00000000c38fb40] [c000000000f4ae94] ibmveth_open+0x68/0x5dc [ 243.683928][ T123] [c00000000c38fbe0] [c000000000f4aa20] veth_pool_store+0x220/0x270 [ 243.683936][ T123] [c00000000c38fc70] [c000000000826278] sysfs_kf_write+0x68/0xb0 [ 243.683944][ T123] [c00000000c38fcb0] [c0000000008240b8] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x198/0x2d0 [ 243.683951][ T123] [c00000000c38fd00] [c00000000071b9ac] vfs_write+0x34c/0x650 [ 243.683958][ T123] [c00000000c38fdc0] [c00000000071bea8] ksys_write+0x88/0x150 [ 243.683966][ T123] [c00000000c38fe10] [c0000000000317f4] system_call_exception+0x124/0x340 [ 243.683973][ T123] [c00000000c38fe50] [c00000000000d05c] system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec ... [ 243.684087][ T123] Showing all locks held in the system: [ 243.684095][ T123] 1 lock held by khungtaskd/123: [ 243.684099][ T123] #0: c00000000278e370 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: debug_show_all_locks+0x50/0x248 [ 243.684114][ T123] 4 locks held by stress.sh/4365: [ 243.684119][ T123] #0: c00000003a4cd3f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x88/0x150 [ 243.684132][ T123] #1: c000000041aea888 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x154/0x2d0 [ 243.684143][ T123] #2: c0000000366fb9a8 (kn->active#64){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x160/0x2d0 [ 243.684155][ T123] #3: c000000035ff4cb8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: napi_enable+0x30/0x60 [ 243.684166][ T123] 5 locks held by stress.sh/4366: [ 243.684170][ T123] #0: c00000003a4cd3f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x88/0x150 [ 243.684183][ T123] #1: c00000000aee2288 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x154/0x2d0 [ 243.684194][ T123] #2: c0000000366f4ba8 (kn->active#64){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x160/0x2d0 [ 243.684205][ T123] #3: c000000035ff4cb8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: napi_disable+0x30/0x60 [ 243.684216][ T123] #4: c0000003ff9bbf18 (&rq->__lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: __schedule+0x138/0x12a0 From the ibmveth debug, two threads are calling veth_pool_store, which calls ibmveth_close and ibmveth_open. Here's the sequence: T4365 T4366 ----------------- ----------------- --------- veth_pool_store veth_pool_store ibmveth_close ibmveth_close napi_disable napi_disable ibmveth_open napi_enable <- HANG ibmveth_close calls napi_disable at the top and ibmveth_open calls napi_enable at the top. https://docs.kernel.org/networking/napi.html]] says The control APIs are not idempotent. Control API calls are safe against concurrent use of datapath APIs but an incorrect sequence of control API calls may result in crashes, deadlocks, or race conditions. For example, calling napi_disable() multiple times in a row will deadlock. In the normal open and close paths, rtnl_mutex is acquired to prevent other callers. This is missing from veth_pool_store. Use rtnl_mutex in veth_pool_store fixes these hangs. Signed-off-by: Dave Marquardt <[email protected]> Fixes: 860f242 ("[PATCH] ibmveth change buffer pools dynamically") Reviewed-by: Nick Child <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

commit c28f31deeacda307acfee2f18c0ad904e5123aac upstream. do_alignment_t32_to_handler() only fixes up alignment faults for specific instructions; it returns NULL otherwise (e.g. LDREX). When that's the case, signal to the caller that it needs to proceed with the regular alignment fault handling (i.e. SIGBUS). Without this patch, the kernel panics: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000 Mem abort info: ESR = 0x0000000086000006 EC = 0x21: IABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 FSC = 0x06: level 2 translation fault user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00000800164aa000 [0000000000000000] pgd=0800081fdbd22003, p4d=0800081fdbd22003, pud=08000815d51c6003, pmd=0000000000000000 Internal error: Oops: 0000000086000006 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: cfg80211 rfkill xt_nat xt_tcpudp xt_conntrack nft_chain_nat xt_MASQUERADE nf_nat nf_conntrack_netlink nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 xfrm_user xfrm_algo xt_addrtype nft_compat br_netfilter veth nvme_fa> libcrc32c crc32c_generic raid0 multipath linear dm_mod dax raid1 md_mod xhci_pci nvme xhci_hcd nvme_core t10_pi usbcore igb crc64_rocksoft crc64 crc_t10dif crct10dif_generic crct10dif_ce crct10dif_common usb_common i2c_algo_bit i2c> CPU: 2 PID: 3932954 Comm: WPEWebProcess Not tainted 6.1.0-31-arm64 #1 Debian 6.1.128-1 Hardware name: GIGABYTE MP32-AR1-00/MP32-AR1-00, BIOS F18v (SCP: 1.08.20211002) 12/01/2021 pstate: 80400009 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : 0x0 lr : do_compat_alignment_fixup+0xd8/0x3dc sp : ffff80000f973dd0 x29: ffff80000f973dd0 x28: ffff081b42526180 x27: 0000000000000000 x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000 x23: 0000000000000004 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: 0000000000000001 x20: 00000000e8551f00 x19: ffff80000f973eb0 x18: 0000000000000000 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : ffffaebc949bc488 x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000 x5 : 0000000000400000 x4 : 0000fffffffffffe x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : ffff80000f973eb0 x1 : 00000000e8551f00 x0 : 0000000000000001 Call trace: 0x0 do_alignment_fault+0x40/0x50 do_mem_abort+0x4c/0xa0 el0_da+0x48/0xf0 el0t_32_sync_handler+0x110/0x140 el0t_32_sync+0x190/0x194 Code: bad PC value ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Signed-off-by: Angelos Oikonomopoulos <[email protected]> Fixes: 3fc24ef ("arm64: compat: Implement misalignment fixups for multiword loads") Cc: <[email protected]> # 6.1.x Reviewed-by: Anshuman Khandual <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit d5e206778e96e8667d3bde695ad372c296dc9353 upstream. Mounting a corrupted filesystem with directory which contains '.' dir entry with rec_len == block size results in out-of-bounds read (later on, when the corrupted directory is removed). ext4_empty_dir() assumes every ext4 directory contains at least '.' and '..' as directory entries in the first data block. It first loads the '.' dir entry, performs sanity checks by calling ext4_check_dir_entry() and then uses its rec_len member to compute the location of '..' dir entry (in ext4_next_entry). It assumes the '..' dir entry fits into the same data block. If the rec_len of '.' is precisely one block (4KB), it slips through the sanity checks (it is considered the last directory entry in the data block) and leaves "struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de" point exactly past the memory slot allocated to the data block. The following call to ext4_check_dir_entry() on new value of de then dereferences this pointer which results in out-of-bounds mem access. Fix this by extending __ext4_check_dir_entry() to check for '.' dir entries that reach the end of data block. Make sure to ignore the phony dir entries for checksum (by checking name_len for non-zero). Note: This is reported by KASAN as use-after-free in case another structure was recently freed from the slot past the bound, but it is really an OOB read. This issue was found by syzkaller tool. Call Trace: [ 38.594108] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x67e/0x710 [ 38.594649] Read of size 2 at addr ffff88802b41a004 by task syz-executor/5375 [ 38.595158] [ 38.595288] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5375 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 6.14.0-rc7 #1 [ 38.595298] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 38.595304] Call Trace: [ 38.595308] <TASK> [ 38.595311] dump_stack_lvl+0xa7/0xd0 [ 38.595325] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x3f0 [ 38.595339] ? __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x67e/0x710 [ 38.595349] print_report+0xaa/0x250 [ 38.595359] ? __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x67e/0x710 [ 38.595368] ? kasan_addr_to_slab+0x9/0x90 [ 38.595378] kasan_report+0xab/0xe0 [ 38.595389] ? __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x67e/0x710 [ 38.595400] __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x67e/0x710 [ 38.595410] ext4_empty_dir+0x465/0x990 [ 38.595421] ? __pfx_ext4_empty_dir+0x10/0x10 [ 38.595432] ext4_rmdir.part.0+0x29a/0xd10 [ 38.595441] ? __dquot_initialize+0x2a7/0xbf0 [ 38.595455] ? __pfx_ext4_rmdir.part.0+0x10/0x10 [ 38.595464] ? __pfx___dquot_initialize+0x10/0x10 [ 38.595478] ? down_write+0xdb/0x140 [ 38.595487] ? __pfx_down_write+0x10/0x10 [ 38.595497] ext4_rmdir+0xee/0x140 [ 38.595506] vfs_rmdir+0x209/0x670 [ 38.595517] ? lookup_one_qstr_excl+0x3b/0x190 [ 38.595529] do_rmdir+0x363/0x3c0 [ 38.595537] ? __pfx_do_rmdir+0x10/0x10 [ 38.595544] ? strncpy_from_user+0x1ff/0x2e0 [ 38.595561] __x64_sys_unlinkat+0xf0/0x130 [ 38.595570] do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x180 [ 38.595583] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Fixes: ac27a0e ("[PATCH] ext4: initial copy of files from ext3") Signed-off-by: Jakub Acs <[email protected]> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]> Cc: Andreas Dilger <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: Mahmoud Adam <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

While browsing through ChromeOS crash reports, I found one with an allocation failure that looked like this: chrome: page allocation failure: order:7, mode:0x40dc0(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_ZERO), nodemask=(null),cpuset=urgent,mems_allowed=0 CPU: 7 PID: 3295 Comm: chrome Not tainted 5.15.133-20574-g8044615ac35c #1 (HASH:1162 1) Hardware name: Google Lazor (rev3 - 8) with KB Backlight (DT) Call trace: ... warn_alloc+0x104/0x174 __alloc_pages+0x5f0/0x6e4 kmalloc_order+0x44/0x98 kmalloc_order_trace+0x34/0x124 __kmalloc+0x228/0x36c __regset_get+0x68/0xcc regset_get_alloc+0x1c/0x28 elf_core_dump+0x3d8/0xd8c do_coredump+0xeb8/0x1378 get_signal+0x14c/0x804 ... An order 7 allocation is (1 << 7) contiguous pages, or 512K. It's not a surprise that this allocation failed on a system that's been running for a while. More digging showed that it was fairly easy to see the order 7 allocation by just sending a SIGQUIT to chrome (or other processes) to generate a core dump. The actual amount being allocated was 279,584 bytes and it was for "core_note_type" NT_ARM_SVE. There was quite a bit of discussion [1] on the mailing lists in response to my v1 patch attempting to switch to vmalloc. The overall conclusion was that we could likely reduce the 279,584 byte allocation by quite a bit and Mark Brown has sent a patch to that effect [2]. However even with the 279,584 byte allocation gone there are still 65,552 byte allocations. These are just barely more than the 65,536 bytes and thus would require an order 5 allocation. An order 5 allocation is still something to avoid unless necessary and nothing needs the memory here to be contiguous. Change the allocation to kvzalloc() which should still be efficient for small allocations but doesn't force the memory subsystem to work hard (and maybe fail) at getting a large contiguous chunk. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240201171159.1.Id9ad163b60d21c9e56c2d686b0cc9083a8ba7924@changeid [2] https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240203-arm64-sve-ptrace-regset-size-v1-1-2c3ba1386b9e@kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240205092626.v2.1.Id9ad163b60d21c9e56c2d686b0cc9083a8ba7924@changeid Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]> Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]> Cc: Christian Brauner <[email protected]> Cc: Dave Martin <[email protected]> Cc: Eric Biederman <[email protected]> Cc: Jan Kara <[email protected]> Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Brown <[email protected]> Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <[email protected]> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]> Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Bug: 409708978 (cherry picked from commit 6b839b3) Change-Id: I42c9bcb78bde782b0b52432086c6b3e9e95ab6d3 Signed-off-by: Seiya Wang <[email protected]>

A BUG was reported as below when CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP and try_verify_in_tasklet are enabled. [ 129.444685][ T934] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at drivers/md/dm-bufio.c:2421 [ 129.444723][ T934] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 934, name: kworker/1:4 [ 129.444740][ T934] preempt_count: 201, expected: 0 [ 129.444756][ T934] RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0 [ 129.444781][ T934] Preemption disabled at: [ 129.444789][ T934] [<ffffffd816231900>] shrink_work+0x21c/0x248 [ 129.445167][ T934] kernel BUG at kernel/sched/walt/walt_debug.c:16! [ 129.445183][ T934] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 129.445204][ T934] Skip md ftrace buffer dump for: 0x1609e0 [ 129.447348][ T934] CPU: 1 PID: 934 Comm: kworker/1:4 Tainted: G W OE 6.6.56-android15-8-o-g6f82312b30b9-debug #1 1400000003000000474e5500b3187743670464e8 [ 129.447362][ T934] Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. Parrot QRD, Alpha-M (DT) [ 129.447373][ T934] Workqueue: dm_bufio_cache shrink_work [ 129.447394][ T934] pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 129.447406][ T934] pc : android_rvh_schedule_bug+0x0/0x8 [sched_walt_debug] [ 129.447435][ T934] lr : __traceiter_android_rvh_schedule_bug+0x44/0x6c [ 129.447451][ T934] sp : ffffffc0843dbc90 [ 129.447459][ T934] x29: ffffffc0843dbc90 x28: ffffffffffffffff x27: 0000000000000c8b [ 129.447479][ T934] x26: 0000000000000040 x25: ffffff804b3d6260 x24: ffffffd816232b68 [ 129.447497][ T934] x23: ffffff805171c5b4 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffffffd816231900 [ 129.447517][ T934] x20: ffffff80306ba898 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: ffffffc084159030 [ 129.447535][ T934] x17: 00000000d2b5dd1f x16: 00000000d2b5dd1f x15: ffffffd816720358 [ 129.447554][ T934] x14: 0000000000000004 x13: ffffff89ef978000 x12: 0000000000000003 [ 129.447572][ T934] x11: ffffffd817a823c4 x10: 0000000000000202 x9 : 7e779c5735de9400 [ 129.447591][ T934] x8 : ffffffd81560d004 x7 : 205b5d3938373434 x6 : ffffffd8167397c8 [ 129.447610][ T934] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000001 x3 : ffffffc0843db9e0 [ 129.447629][ T934] x2 : 0000000000002f15 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000 [ 129.447647][ T934] Call trace: [ 129.447655][ T934] android_rvh_schedule_bug+0x0/0x8 [sched_walt_debug 1400000003000000474e550080cce8a8a78606b6] [ 129.447681][ T934] __might_resched+0x190/0x1a8 [ 129.447694][ T934] shrink_work+0x180/0x248 [ 129.447706][ T934] process_one_work+0x260/0x624 [ 129.447718][ T934] worker_thread+0x28c/0x454 [ 129.447729][ T934] kthread+0x118/0x158 [ 129.447742][ T934] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 129.447761][ T934] Code: ???????? ???????? ???????? d2b5dd1f (d4210000) [ 129.447772][ T934] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- dm_bufio_lock will call spin_lock_bh when try_verify_in_tasklet is enabled, and __scan will be called in atomic context. Fixes: 7cd3267 ("dm bufio: remove dm_bufio_cond_resched()") Signed-off-by: LongPing Wei <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit f98e8bd3b53793631cf9fa88dfb4ba8f3aab2490 git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/device-mapper/linux-dm.git dm-6.15) [jstultz: Minor tweak to fix whitespace indentation of closing bracket] Signed-off-by: John Stultz <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/dm-devel/[email protected]/ Bug: 401036538 Change-Id: Idbe59aef135268dcfb90e0ede6b6d89709ba5b81

[ Upstream commit e3ea2eae70692a455e256787e4f54153fb739b90 ] HuC delayed loading fence, introduced with commit 27536e0 ("drm/i915/huc: track delayed HuC load with a fence"), is registered with object tracker early on driver probe but unregistered only from driver remove, which is not called on early probe errors. Since its memory is allocated under devres, then released anyway, it may happen to be allocated again to the fence and reused on future driver probes, resulting in kernel warnings that taint the kernel: <4> [309.731371] ------------[ cut here ]------------ <3> [309.731373] ODEBUG: init destroyed (active state 0) object: ffff88813d7dd2e0 object type: i915_sw_fence hint: sw_fence_dummy_notify+0x0/0x20 [i915] <4> [309.731575] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 3161 at lib/debugobjects.c:612 debug_print_object+0x93/0xf0 ... <4> [309.731693] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 3161 Comm: i915_module_loa Tainted: G U 6.14.0-CI_DRM_16362-gf0fd77956987+ #1 ... <4> [309.731700] RIP: 0010:debug_print_object+0x93/0xf0 ... <4> [309.731728] Call Trace: <4> [309.731730] <TASK> ... <4> [309.731949] __debug_object_init+0x17b/0x1c0 <4> [309.731957] debug_object_init+0x34/0x50 <4> [309.732126] __i915_sw_fence_init+0x34/0x60 [i915] <4> [309.732256] intel_huc_init_early+0x4b/0x1d0 [i915] <4> [309.732468] intel_uc_init_early+0x61/0x680 [i915] <4> [309.732667] intel_gt_common_init_early+0x105/0x130 [i915] <4> [309.732804] intel_root_gt_init_early+0x63/0x80 [i915] <4> [309.732938] i915_driver_probe+0x1fa/0xeb0 [i915] <4> [309.733075] i915_pci_probe+0xe6/0x220 [i915] <4> [309.733198] local_pci_probe+0x44/0xb0 <4> [309.733203] pci_device_probe+0xf4/0x270 <4> [309.733209] really_probe+0xee/0x3c0 <4> [309.733215] __driver_probe_device+0x8c/0x180 <4> [309.733219] driver_probe_device+0x24/0xd0 <4> [309.733223] __driver_attach+0x10f/0x220 <4> [309.733230] bus_for_each_dev+0x7d/0xe0 <4> [309.733236] driver_attach+0x1e/0x30 <4> [309.733239] bus_add_driver+0x151/0x290 <4> [309.733244] driver_register+0x5e/0x130 <4> [309.733247] __pci_register_driver+0x7d/0x90 <4> [309.733251] i915_pci_register_driver+0x23/0x30 [i915] <4> [309.733413] i915_init+0x34/0x120 [i915] <4> [309.733655] do_one_initcall+0x62/0x3f0 <4> [309.733667] do_init_module+0x97/0x2a0 <4> [309.733671] load_module+0x25ff/0x2890 <4> [309.733688] init_module_from_file+0x97/0xe0 <4> [309.733701] idempotent_init_module+0x118/0x330 <4> [309.733711] __x64_sys_finit_module+0x77/0x100 <4> [309.733715] x64_sys_call+0x1f37/0x2650 <4> [309.733719] do_syscall_64+0x91/0x180 <4> [309.733763] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e <4> [309.733792] </TASK> ... <4> [309.733806] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- That scenario is most easily reproducible with igt@i915_module_load@reload-with-fault-injection. Fix the issue by moving the cleanup step to driver release path. Fixes: 27536e0 ("drm/i915/huc: track delayed HuC load with a fence") Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/i915/kernel/-/issues/13592 Cc: Daniele Ceraolo Spurio <[email protected]> Cc: Alan Previn <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Janusz Krzysztofik <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Daniele Ceraolo Spurio <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Karas <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Daniele Ceraolo Spurio <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] (cherry picked from commit 795dbde92fe5c6996a02a5b579481de73035e7bf) Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b61e69bb1c049cf507e3c654fa3dc1568231bd07 ] syzbot report a deadlock in diFree. [1] When calling "ioctl$LOOP_SET_STATUS64", the offset value passed in is 4, which does not match the mounted loop device, causing the mapping of the mounted loop device to be invalidated. When creating the directory and creating the inode of iag in diReadSpecial(), read the page of fixed disk inode (AIT) in raw mode in read_metapage(), the metapage data it returns is corrupted, which causes the nlink value of 0 to be assigned to the iag inode when executing copy_from_dinode(), which ultimately causes a deadlock when entering diFree(). To avoid this, first check the nlink value of dinode before setting iag inode. [1] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 6.12.0-rc7-syzkaller-00212-g4a5df3796467 #0 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- syz-executor301/5309 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888044548920 (&(imap->im_aglock[index])){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diFree+0x37c/0x2fb0 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:889 but task is already holding lock: ffff888044548920 (&(imap->im_aglock[index])){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diAlloc+0x1b6/0x1630 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&(imap->im_aglock[index])); lock(&(imap->im_aglock[index])); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 5 locks held by syz-executor301/5309: #0: ffff8880422a4420 (sb_writers#9){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: mnt_want_write+0x3f/0x90 fs/namespace.c:515 #1: ffff88804755b390 (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#6/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: inode_lock_nested include/linux/fs.h:850 [inline] #1: ffff88804755b390 (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#6/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: filename_create+0x260/0x540 fs/namei.c:4026 #2: ffff888044548920 (&(imap->im_aglock[index])){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diAlloc+0x1b6/0x1630 #3: ffff888044548890 (&imap->im_freelock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diNewIAG fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:2460 [inline] #3: ffff888044548890 (&imap->im_freelock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diAllocExt fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1905 [inline] #3: ffff888044548890 (&imap->im_freelock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diAllocAG+0x4b7/0x1e50 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1669 #4: ffff88804755a618 (&jfs_ip->rdwrlock/1){++++}-{3:3}, at: diNewIAG fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:2477 [inline] #4: ffff88804755a618 (&jfs_ip->rdwrlock/1){++++}-{3:3}, at: diAllocExt fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1905 [inline] #4: ffff88804755a618 (&jfs_ip->rdwrlock/1){++++}-{3:3}, at: diAllocAG+0x869/0x1e50 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1669 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5309 Comm: syz-executor301 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc7-syzkaller-00212-g4a5df3796467 #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_deadlock_bug+0x483/0x620 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3037 check_deadlock kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3089 [inline] validate_chain+0x15e2/0x5920 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3891 __lock_acquire+0x1384/0x2050 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5202 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5825 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:608 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x136/0xd70 kernel/locking/mutex.c:752 diFree+0x37c/0x2fb0 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:889 jfs_evict_inode+0x32d/0x440 fs/jfs/inode.c:156 evict+0x4e8/0x9b0 fs/inode.c:725 diFreeSpecial fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:552 [inline] duplicateIXtree+0x3c6/0x550 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:3022 diNewIAG fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:2597 [inline] diAllocExt fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1905 [inline] diAllocAG+0x17dc/0x1e50 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1669 diAlloc+0x1d2/0x1630 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1590 ialloc+0x8f/0x900 fs/jfs/jfs_inode.c:56 jfs_mkdir+0x1c5/0xba0 fs/jfs/namei.c:225 vfs_mkdir+0x2f9/0x4f0 fs/namei.c:4257 do_mkdirat+0x264/0x3a0 fs/namei.c:4280 __do_sys_mkdirat fs/namei.c:4295 [inline] __se_sys_mkdirat fs/namei.c:4293 [inline] __x64_sys_mkdirat+0x87/0xa0 fs/namei.c:4293 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Reported-by: [email protected] Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=355da3b3a74881008e8f Signed-off-by: Edward Adam Davis <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 27b918007d96402aba10ed52a6af8015230f1793 ] With the device instance lock, there is now a possibility of a deadlock: [ 1.211455] ============================================ [ 1.211571] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected [ 1.211687] 6.14.0-rc5-01215-g032756b4ca7a-dirty #5 Not tainted [ 1.211823] -------------------------------------------- [ 1.211936] ip/184 is trying to acquire lock: [ 1.212032] ffff8881024a4c30 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: dev_set_allmulti+0x4e/0xb0 [ 1.212207] [ 1.212207] but task is already holding lock: [ 1.212332] ffff8881024a4c30 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: dev_open+0x50/0xb0 [ 1.212487] [ 1.212487] other info that might help us debug this: [ 1.212626] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 1.212626] [ 1.212751] CPU0 [ 1.212815] ---- [ 1.212871] lock(&dev->lock); [ 1.212944] lock(&dev->lock); [ 1.213016] [ 1.213016] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 1.213016] [ 1.213143] May be due to missing lock nesting notation [ 1.213143] [ 1.213294] 3 locks held by ip/184: [ 1.213371] #0: ffffffff838b53e0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnl_nets_lock+0x1b/0xa0 [ 1.213543] #1: ffffffff84e5fc70 (&net->rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnl_nets_lock+0x37/0xa0 [ 1.213727] #2: ffff8881024a4c30 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: dev_open+0x50/0xb0 [ 1.213895] [ 1.213895] stack backtrace: [ 1.213991] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 184 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.14.0-rc5-01215-g032756b4ca7a-dirty #5 [ 1.213993] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014 [ 1.213994] Call Trace: [ 1.213995] <TASK> [ 1.213996] dump_stack_lvl+0x8e/0xd0 [ 1.214000] print_deadlock_bug+0x28b/0x2a0 [ 1.214020] lock_acquire+0xea/0x2a0 [ 1.214027] __mutex_lock+0xbf/0xd40 [ 1.214038] dev_set_allmulti+0x4e/0xb0 # real_dev->flags & IFF_ALLMULTI [ 1.214040] vlan_dev_open+0xa5/0x170 # ndo_open on vlandev [ 1.214042] __dev_open+0x145/0x270 [ 1.214046] __dev_change_flags+0xb0/0x1e0 [ 1.214051] netif_change_flags+0x22/0x60 # IFF_UP vlandev [ 1.214053] dev_change_flags+0x61/0xb0 # for each device in group from dev->vlan_info [ 1.214055] vlan_device_event+0x766/0x7c0 # on netdevsim0 [ 1.214058] notifier_call_chain+0x78/0x120 [ 1.214062] netif_open+0x6d/0x90 [ 1.214064] dev_open+0x5b/0xb0 # locks netdevsim0 [ 1.214066] bond_enslave+0x64c/0x1230 [ 1.214075] do_set_master+0x175/0x1e0 # on netdevsim0 [ 1.214077] do_setlink+0x516/0x13b0 [ 1.214094] rtnl_newlink+0xaba/0xb80 [ 1.214132] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x440/0x490 [ 1.214144] netlink_rcv_skb+0xeb/0x120 [ 1.214150] netlink_unicast+0x1f9/0x320 [ 1.214153] netlink_sendmsg+0x346/0x3f0 [ 1.214157] __sock_sendmsg+0x86/0xb0 [ 1.214160] ____sys_sendmsg+0x1c8/0x220 [ 1.214164] ___sys_sendmsg+0x28f/0x2d0 [ 1.214179] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0xef/0x140 [ 1.214184] do_syscall_64+0xec/0x1d0 [ 1.214190] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f [ 1.214191] RIP: 0033:0x7f2d1b4a7e56 Device setup: netdevsim0 (down) ^ ^ bond netdevsim1.100@netdevsim1 allmulticast=on (down) When we enslave the lower device (netdevsim0) which has a vlan, we propagate vlan's allmuti/promisc flags during ndo_open. This causes (re)locking on of the real_dev. Propagate allmulti/promisc on flags change, not on the open. There is a slight semantics change that vlans that are down now propagate the flags, but this seems unlikely to result in the real issues. Reproducer: echo 0 1 > /sys/bus/netdevsim/new_device dev_path=$(ls -d /sys/bus/netdevsim/devices/netdevsim0/net/*) dev=$(echo $dev_path | rev | cut -d/ -f1 | rev) ip link set dev $dev name netdevsim0 ip link set dev netdevsim0 up ip link add link netdevsim0 name netdevsim0.100 type vlan id 100 ip link set dev netdevsim0.100 allmulticast on down ip link add name bond1 type bond mode 802.3ad ip link set dev netdevsim0 down ip link set dev netdevsim0 master bond1 ip link set dev bond1 up ip link show Reported-by: [email protected] Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/Z9CfXjLMKn6VLG5d@mini-arch/T/#m15ba130f53227c883e79fb969687d69d670337a0 Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

commit 691ee97e1a9de0cdb3efb893c1f180e3f4a35e32 upstream. Patch series "Fix lazy mmu mode", v2. I'm planning to implement lazy mmu mode for arm64 to optimize vmalloc. As part of that, I will extend lazy mmu mode to cover kernel mappings in vmalloc table walkers. While lazy mmu mode is already used for kernel mappings in a few places, this will extend it's use significantly. Having reviewed the existing lazy mmu implementations in powerpc, sparc and x86, it looks like there are a bunch of bugs, some of which may be more likely to trigger once I extend the use of lazy mmu. So this series attempts to clarify the requirements and fix all the bugs in advance of that series. See patch #1 commit log for all the details. This patch (of 5): The docs, implementations and use of arch_[enter|leave]_lazy_mmu_mode() is a bit of a mess (to put it politely). There are a number of issues related to nesting of lazy mmu regions and confusion over whether the task, when in a lazy mmu region, is preemptible or not. Fix all the issues relating to the core-mm. Follow up commits will fix the arch-specific implementations. 3 arches implement lazy mmu; powerpc, sparc and x86. When arch_[enter|leave]_lazy_mmu_mode() was first introduced by commit 6606c3e ("[PATCH] paravirt: lazy mmu mode hooks.patch"), it was expected that lazy mmu regions would never nest and that the appropriate page table lock(s) would be held while in the region, thus ensuring the region is non-preemptible. Additionally lazy mmu regions were only used during manipulation of user mappings. Commit 38e0edb ("mm/apply_to_range: call pte function with lazy updates") started invoking the lazy mmu mode in apply_to_pte_range(), which is used for both user and kernel mappings. For kernel mappings the region is no longer protected by any lock so there is no longer any guarantee about non-preemptibility. Additionally, for RT configs, the holding the PTL only implies no CPU migration, it doesn't prevent preemption. Commit bcc6cc8 ("mm: add default definition of set_ptes()") added arch_[enter|leave]_lazy_mmu_mode() to the default implementation of set_ptes(), used by x86. So after this commit, lazy mmu regions can be nested. Additionally commit 1a10a44 ("sparc64: implement the new page table range API") and commit 9fee28b ("powerpc: implement the new page table range API") did the same for the sparc and powerpc set_ptes() overrides. powerpc couldn't deal with preemption so avoids it in commit b9ef323 ("powerpc/64s: Disable preemption in hash lazy mmu mode"), which explicitly disables preemption for the whole region in its implementation. x86 can support preemption (or at least it could until it tried to add support nesting; more on this below). Sparc looks to be totally broken in the face of preemption, as far as I can tell. powerpc can't deal with nesting, so avoids it in commit 47b8def ("powerpc/mm: Avoid calling arch_enter/leave_lazy_mmu() in set_ptes"), which removes the lazy mmu calls from its implementation of set_ptes(). x86 attempted to support nesting in commit 49147be ("x86/xen: allow nesting of same lazy mode") but as far as I can tell, this breaks its support for preemption. In short, it's all a mess; the semantics for arch_[enter|leave]_lazy_mmu_mode() are not clearly defined and as a result the implementations all have different expectations, sticking plasters and bugs. arm64 is aiming to start using these hooks, so let's clean everything up before adding an arm64 implementation. Update the documentation to state that lazy mmu regions can never be nested, must not be called in interrupt context and preemption may or may not be enabled for the duration of the region. And fix the generic implementation of set_ptes() to avoid nesting. arch-specific fixes to conform to the new spec will proceed this one. These issues were spotted by code review and I have no evidence of issues being reported in the wild. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: bcc6cc8 ("mm: add default definition of set_ptes()") Signed-off-by: Ryan Roberts <[email protected]> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Acked-by: Juergen Gross <[email protected]> Cc: Andreas Larsson <[email protected]> Cc: Borislav Betkov <[email protected]> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <[email protected]> Cc: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]> Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: Juegren Gross <[email protected]> Cc: Matthew Wilcow (Oracle) <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Gleinxer <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 378677eb8f44621ecc9ce659f7af61e5baa94d81 ] After ieee80211_do_stop() SKB from vif's txq could still be processed. Indeed another concurrent vif schedule_and_wake_txq call could cause those packets to be dequeued (see ieee80211_handle_wake_tx_queue()) without checking the sdata current state. Because vif.drv_priv is now cleared in this function, this could lead to driver crash. For example in ath12k, ahvif is store in vif.drv_priv. Thus if ath12k_mac_op_tx() is called after ieee80211_do_stop(), ahvif->ah can be NULL, leading the ath12k_warn(ahvif->ah,...) call in this function to trigger the NULL deref below. Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address dfffffc000000001 KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f] batman_adv: bat0: Interface deactivated: brbh1337 Mem abort info: ESR = 0x0000000096000004 EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000 CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 [dfffffc000000001] address between user and kernel address ranges Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] SMP CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 978 Comm: lbd Not tainted 6.13.0-g633f875b8f1e #114 Hardware name: HW (DT) pstate: 10000005 (nzcV daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : ath12k_mac_op_tx+0x6cc/0x29b8 [ath12k] lr : ath12k_mac_op_tx+0x174/0x29b8 [ath12k] sp : ffffffc086ace450 x29: ffffffc086ace450 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 1ffffff810d59ca4 x26: ffffff801d05f7c0 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 000000004000001e x23: ffffff8009ce4926 x22: ffffff801f9c0800 x21: ffffff801d05f7f0 x20: ffffff8034a19f40 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: ffffff801f9c0958 x17: ffffff800bc0a504 x16: dfffffc000000000 x15: ffffffc086ace4f8 x14: ffffff801d05f83c x13: 0000000000000000 x12: ffffffb003a0bf03 x11: 0000000000000000 x10: ffffffb003a0bf02 x9 : ffffff8034a19f40 x8 : ffffff801d05f818 x7 : 1ffffff0069433dc x6 : ffffff8034a19ee0 x5 : ffffff801d05f7f0 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000001 x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : dfffffc000000000 x0 : 0000000000000008 Call trace: ath12k_mac_op_tx+0x6cc/0x29b8 [ath12k] (P) ieee80211_handle_wake_tx_queue+0x16c/0x260 ieee80211_queue_skb+0xeec/0x1d20 ieee80211_tx+0x200/0x2c8 ieee80211_xmit+0x22c/0x338 __ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0x7e8/0xc60 ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0xc4/0xee0 __ieee80211_subif_start_xmit_8023.isra.0+0x854/0x17a0 ieee80211_subif_start_xmit_8023+0x124/0x488 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x160/0x5a8 __dev_queue_xmit+0x6f8/0x3120 br_dev_queue_push_xmit+0x120/0x4a8 __br_forward+0xe4/0x2b0 deliver_clone+0x5c/0xd0 br_flood+0x398/0x580 br_dev_xmit+0x454/0x9f8 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x160/0x5a8 __dev_queue_xmit+0x6f8/0x3120 ip6_finish_output2+0xc28/0x1b60 __ip6_finish_output+0x38c/0x638 ip6_output+0x1b4/0x338 ip6_local_out+0x7c/0xa8 ip6_send_skb+0x7c/0x1b0 ip6_push_pending_frames+0x94/0xd0 rawv6_sendmsg+0x1a98/0x2898 inet_sendmsg+0x94/0xe0 __sys_sendto+0x1e4/0x308 __arm64_sys_sendto+0xc4/0x140 do_el0_svc+0x110/0x280 el0_svc+0x20/0x60 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x104/0x138 el0t_64_sync+0x154/0x158 To avoid that, empty vif's txq at ieee80211_do_stop() so no packet could be dequeued after ieee80211_do_stop() (new packets cannot be queued because SDATA_STATE_RUNNING is cleared at this point). Fixes: ba8c3d6 ("mac80211: add an intermediate software queue implementation") Signed-off-by: Remi Pommarel <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/ff7849e268562456274213c0476e09481a48f489.1742833382.git.repk@triplefau.lt Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

commit 424eafe65647a8d6c690284536e711977153195a upstream. When i2c-cros-ec-tunnel and the EC driver are built-in, the EC parent device will not be found, leading to NULL pointer dereference. That can also be reproduced by unbinding the controller driver and then loading i2c-cros-ec-tunnel module (or binding the device). [ 271.991245] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000058 [ 271.998215] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 272.003351] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 272.008485] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 272.011022] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 272.015207] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 3859 Comm: insmod Tainted: G S 6.15.0-rc1-00004-g44722359ed83 #30 PREEMPT(full) 3c7fb39a552e7d949de2ad921a7d6588d3a4fdc5 [ 272.030312] Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC [ 272.034233] Hardware name: HP Berknip/Berknip, BIOS Google_Berknip.13434.356.0 05/17/2021 [ 272.042400] RIP: 0010:ec_i2c_probe+0x2b/0x1c0 [i2c_cros_ec_tunnel] [ 272.048577] Code: 1f 44 00 00 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 53 48 83 ec 10 65 48 8b 05 06 a0 6c e7 48 89 44 24 08 4c 8d 7f 10 48 8b 47 50 4c 8b 60 78 <49> 83 7c 24 58 00 0f 84 2f 01 00 00 48 89 fb be 30 06 00 00 4c 9 [ 272.067317] RSP: 0018:ffffa32082a03940 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 272.072541] RAX: ffff969580b6a810 RBX: ffff969580b68c10 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 272.079672] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000282 RDI: ffff969580b68c00 [ 272.086804] RBP: 00000000fffffdfb R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 272.093936] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffffc0600000 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 272.101067] R13: ffffffffa666fbb8 R14: ffffffffc05b5528 R15: ffff969580b68c10 [ 272.108198] FS: 00007b930906fc40(0000) GS:ffff969603149000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 272.116282] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 272.122024] CR2: 0000000000000058 CR3: 000000012631c000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 [ 272.129155] Call Trace: [ 272.131606] <TASK> [ 272.133709] ? acpi_dev_pm_attach+0xdd/0x110 [ 272.137985] platform_probe+0x69/0xa0 [ 272.141652] really_probe+0x152/0x310 [ 272.145318] __driver_probe_device+0x77/0x110 [ 272.149678] driver_probe_device+0x1e/0x190 [ 272.153864] __driver_attach+0x10b/0x1e0 [ 272.157790] ? driver_attach+0x20/0x20 [ 272.161542] bus_for_each_dev+0x107/0x150 [ 272.165553] bus_add_driver+0x15d/0x270 [ 272.169392] driver_register+0x65/0x110 [ 272.173232] ? cleanup_module+0xa80/0xa80 [i2c_cros_ec_tunnel 3a00532f3f4af4a9eade753f86b0f8dd4e4e5698] [ 272.182617] do_one_initcall+0x110/0x350 [ 272.186543] ? security_kernfs_init_security+0x49/0xd0 [ 272.191682] ? __kernfs_new_node+0x1b9/0x240 [ 272.195954] ? security_kernfs_init_security+0x49/0xd0 [ 272.201093] ? __kernfs_new_node+0x1b9/0x240 [ 272.205365] ? kernfs_link_sibling+0x105/0x130 [ 272.209810] ? kernfs_next_descendant_post+0x1c/0xa0 [ 272.214773] ? kernfs_activate+0x57/0x70 [ 272.218699] ? kernfs_add_one+0x118/0x160 [ 272.222710] ? __kernfs_create_file+0x71/0xa0 [ 272.227069] ? sysfs_add_bin_file_mode_ns+0xd6/0x110 [ 272.232033] ? internal_create_group+0x453/0x4a0 [ 272.236651] ? __vunmap_range_noflush+0x214/0x2d0 [ 272.241355] ? __free_frozen_pages+0x1dc/0x420 [ 272.245799] ? free_vmap_area_noflush+0x10a/0x1c0 [ 272.250505] ? load_module+0x1509/0x16f0 [ 272.254431] do_init_module+0x60/0x230 [ 272.258181] __se_sys_finit_module+0x27a/0x370 [ 272.262627] do_syscall_64+0x6a/0xf0 [ 272.266206] ? do_syscall_64+0x76/0xf0 [ 272.269956] ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x79/0x90 [ 272.274836] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x55/0x5d [ 272.279887] RIP: 0033:0x7b9309168d39 [ 272.283466] Code: 5b 41 5c 5d c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d af 40 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 8 [ 272.302210] RSP: 002b:00007fff50f1a288 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139 [ 272.309774] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000058bf9b50f6d0 RCX: 00007b9309168d39 [ 272.316905] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000058bf6c103a77 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 272.324036] RBP: 00007fff50f1a2e0 R08: 00007fff50f19218 R09: 0000000021ec4150 [ 272.331166] R10: 000058bf9b50f7f0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 272.338296] R13: 00000000fffffffe R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 000058bf6c103a77 [ 272.345428] </TASK> [ 272.347617] Modules linked in: i2c_cros_ec_tunnel(+) [ 272.364585] gsmi: Log Shutdown Reason 0x03 Returning -EPROBE_DEFER will allow the device to be bound once the controller is bound, in the case of built-in drivers. Fixes: 9d230c9 ("i2c: ChromeOS EC tunnel driver") Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> # v3.16+ Signed-off-by: Andi Shyti <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit d54d610243a4508183978871e5faff5502786cd4 upstream. Communicating with the hypervisor using the shared GHCB page requires clearing the C bit in the mapping of that page. When executing in the context of the EFI boot services, the page tables are owned by the firmware, and this manipulation is not possible. So switch to a different API for accepting memory in SEV-SNP guests, one which is actually supported at the point during boot where the EFI stub may need to accept memory, but the SEV-SNP init code has not executed yet. For simplicity, also switch the memory acceptance carried out by the decompressor when not booting via EFI - this only involves the allocation for the decompressed kernel, and is generally only called after kexec, as normal boot will jump straight into the kernel from the EFI stub. Fixes: 6c32117 ("x86/sev: Add SNP-specific unaccepted memory support") Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: Dionna Amalie Glaze <[email protected]> Cc: Kevin Loughlin <[email protected]> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]> Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] # discussion thread #1 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] # discussion thread #2 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] # final submission Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit 8ec0fbb28d049273bfd4f1e7a5ae4c74884beed3 upstream. Fix an oops in ttm_bo_delayed_delete which results from dererencing a dangling pointer: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x6b6b6b6b6b6b6b7b: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 1082 Comm: kworker/u65:2 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc4-00267-g505460b44513-dirty #216 Hardware name: LENOVO 82N6/LNVNB161216, BIOS GKCN65WW 01/16/2024 Workqueue: ttm ttm_bo_delayed_delete [ttm] RIP: 0010:dma_resv_iter_first_unlocked+0x55/0x290 Code: 31 f6 48 c7 c7 00 2b fa aa e8 97 bd 52 ff e8 a2 c1 53 00 5a 85 c0 74 48 e9 88 01 00 00 4c 89 63 20 4d 85 e4 0f 84 30 01 00 00 <41> 8b 44 24 10 c6 43 2c 01 48 89 df 89 43 28 e8 97 fd ff ff 4c 8b RSP: 0018:ffffbf9383473d60 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffffbf9383473d88 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffffbf9383473d78 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b R13: ffffa003bbf78580 R14: ffffa003a6728040 R15: 00000000000383cc FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa00991c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000758348024dd0 CR3: 000000012c259000 CR4: 0000000000f50ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die_body.cold+0x19/0x26 ? die_addr+0x3d/0x70 ? exc_general_protection+0x159/0x460 ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x27/0x30 ? dma_resv_iter_first_unlocked+0x55/0x290 dma_resv_wait_timeout+0x56/0x100 ttm_bo_delayed_delete+0x69/0xb0 [ttm] process_one_work+0x217/0x5c0 worker_thread+0x1c8/0x3d0 ? apply_wqattrs_cleanup.part.0+0xc0/0xc0 kthread+0x10b/0x240 ? kthreads_online_cpu+0x140/0x140 ret_from_fork+0x40/0x70 ? kthreads_online_cpu+0x140/0x140 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 </TASK> The cause of this is: - drm_prime_gem_destroy calls dma_buf_put(dma_buf) which releases the reference to the shared dma_buf. The reference count is 0, so the dma_buf is destroyed, which in turn decrements the corresponding amdgpu_bo reference count to 0, and the amdgpu_bo is destroyed - calling drm_gem_object_release then dma_resv_fini (which destroys the reservation object), then finally freeing the amdgpu_bo. - nouveau_bo obj->bo.base.resv is now a dangling pointer to the memory formerly allocated to the amdgpu_bo. - nouveau_gem_object_del calls ttm_bo_put(&nvbo->bo) which calls ttm_bo_release, which schedules ttm_bo_delayed_delete. - ttm_bo_delayed_delete runs and dereferences the dangling resv pointer, resulting in a general protection fault. Fix this by moving the drm_prime_gem_destroy call from nouveau_gem_object_del to nouveau_bo_del_ttm. This ensures that it will be run after ttm_bo_delayed_delete. Signed-off-by: Chris Bainbridge <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Christian König <[email protected]> Fixes: 22b33e8 ("nouveau: add PRIME support") Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/amd/-/issues/3937 Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit 5858b687559809f05393af745cbadf06dee61295 upstream. Kernel will hang on destroy admin_q while we create ctrl failed, such as following calltrace: PID: 23644 TASK: ff2d52b40f439fc0 CPU: 2 COMMAND: "nvme" #0 [ff61d23de260fb78] __schedule at ffffffff8323bc15 #1 [ff61d23de260fc08] schedule at ffffffff8323c014 #2 [ff61d23de260fc28] blk_mq_freeze_queue_wait at ffffffff82a3dba1 #3 [ff61d23de260fc78] blk_freeze_queue at ffffffff82a4113a #4 [ff61d23de260fc90] blk_cleanup_queue at ffffffff82a33006 #5 [ff61d23de260fcb0] nvme_rdma_destroy_admin_queue at ffffffffc12686ce #6 [ff61d23de260fcc8] nvme_rdma_setup_ctrl at ffffffffc1268ced #7 [ff61d23de260fd28] nvme_rdma_create_ctrl at ffffffffc126919b #8 [ff61d23de260fd68] nvmf_dev_write at ffffffffc024f362 #9 [ff61d23de260fe38] vfs_write at ffffffff827d5f25 RIP: 00007fda7891d574 RSP: 00007ffe2ef06958 RFLAGS: 00000202 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055e8122a4d90 RCX: 00007fda7891d574 RDX: 000000000000012b RSI: 000055e8122a4d90 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007ffe2ef079c0 R8: 000000000000012b R9: 000055e8122a4d90 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000004 R13: 000055e8122923c0 R14: 000000000000012b R15: 00007fda78a54500 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 CS: 0033 SS: 002b This due to we have quiesced admi_q before cancel requests, but forgot to unquiesce before destroy it, as a result we fail to drain the pending requests, and hang on blk_mq_freeze_queue_wait() forever. Here try to reuse nvme_rdma_teardown_admin_queue() to fix this issue and simplify the code. Fixes: 958dc1d ("nvme-rdma: add clean action for failed reconnection") Reported-by: Yingfu.zhou <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Chunguang.xu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Yue.zhao <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <[email protected]> [Minor context change fixed] Signed-off-by: Feng Liu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: He Zhe <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d63527e109e811ef11abb1c2985048fdb528b4cb ] syzbot reported: tipc: Node number set to 1055423674 Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 6017 Comm: kworker/3:5 Not tainted 6.15.0-rc1-syzkaller-00246-g900241a5cc15 #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events tipc_net_finalize_work RIP: 0010:tipc_mon_reinit_self+0x11c/0x210 net/tipc/monitor.c:719 ... RSP: 0018:ffffc9000356fb68 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000000003ee87cba RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8dbc56a7 RDI: ffff88804c2cc010 RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000007 R13: fffffbfff2111097 R14: ffff88804ead8000 R15: ffff88804ead9010 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888097ab9000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000f720eb00 CR3: 000000000e182000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> tipc_net_finalize+0x10b/0x180 net/tipc/net.c:140 process_one_work+0x9cc/0x1b70 kernel/workqueue.c:3238 process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3319 [inline] worker_thread+0x6c8/0xf10 kernel/workqueue.c:3400 kthread+0x3c2/0x780 kernel/kthread.c:464 ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:153 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 </TASK> ... RIP: 0010:tipc_mon_reinit_self+0x11c/0x210 net/tipc/monitor.c:719 ... RSP: 0018:ffffc9000356fb68 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000000003ee87cba RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8dbc56a7 RDI: ffff88804c2cc010 RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000007 R13: fffffbfff2111097 R14: ffff88804ead8000 R15: ffff88804ead9010 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888097ab9000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000f720eb00 CR3: 000000000e182000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 There is a racing condition between workqueue created when enabling bearer and another thread created when disabling bearer right after that as follow: enabling_bearer | disabling_bearer --------------- | ---------------- tipc_disc_timeout() | { | bearer_disable() ... | { schedule_work(&tn->work); | tipc_mon_delete() ... | { } | ... | write_lock_bh(&mon->lock); | mon->self = NULL; | write_unlock_bh(&mon->lock); | ... | } tipc_net_finalize_work() | } { | ... | tipc_net_finalize() | { | ... | tipc_mon_reinit_self() | { | ... | write_lock_bh(&mon->lock); | mon->self->addr = tipc_own_addr(net); | write_unlock_bh(&mon->lock); | ... | } | ... | } | ... | } | 'mon->self' is set to NULL in disabling_bearer thread and dereferenced later in enabling_bearer thread. This commit fixes this issue by validating 'mon->self' before assigning node address to it. Reported-by: [email protected] Fixes: 46cb01e ("tipc: update mon's self addr when node addr generated") Signed-off-by: Tung Nguyen <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 461f24bff86808ee5fbfe74751a825f8a7ab24e0 ] Intel Merrifield SoC uses these endpoints for tracing and they cannot be re-allocated if being used because the side band flow control signals are hard wired to certain endpoints: • 1 High BW Bulk IN (IN#1) (RTIT) • 1 1KB BW Bulk IN (IN#8) + 1 1KB BW Bulk OUT (Run Control) (OUT#8) In device mode, since RTIT (EP#1) and EXI/RunControl (EP#8) uses External Buffer Control (EBC) mode, these endpoints are to be mapped to EBC mode (to be done by EXI target driver). Additionally TRB for RTIT and EXI are maintained in STM (System Trace Module) unit and the EXI target driver will as well configure the TRB location for EP #1 IN and EP#8 (IN and OUT). Since STM/PTI and EXI hardware blocks manage these endpoints and interface to OTG3 controller through EBC interface, there is no need to enable any events (such as XferComplete etc) for these end points. Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]> Tested-by: Ferry Toth <[email protected]> Acked-by: Thinh Nguyen <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9b044614be12d78d3a93767708b8d02fb7dfa9b0 ] Running lib_ubsan.ko on arm64 (without CONFIG_UBSAN_TRAP) panics the kernel: [ 31.616546] Kernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: test_ubsan_out_of_bounds+0x158/0x158 [test_ubsan] [ 31.646817] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 179 Comm: insmod Not tainted 6.15.0-rc2 #1 PREEMPT [ 31.648153] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) [ 31.648970] Call trace: [ 31.649345] show_stack+0x18/0x24 (C) [ 31.650960] dump_stack_lvl+0x40/0x84 [ 31.651559] dump_stack+0x18/0x24 [ 31.652264] panic+0x138/0x3b4 [ 31.652812] __ktime_get_real_seconds+0x0/0x10 [ 31.653540] test_ubsan_load_invalid_value+0x0/0xa8 [test_ubsan] [ 31.654388] init_module+0x24/0xff4 [test_ubsan] [ 31.655077] do_one_initcall+0xd4/0x280 [ 31.655680] do_init_module+0x58/0x2b4 That happens because the test corrupts other data in the stack: 400: d5384108 mrs x8, sp_el0 404: f9426d08 ldr x8, [x8, #1240] 408: f85f83a9 ldur x9, [x29, #-8] 40c: eb09011f cmp x8, x9 410: 54000301 b.ne 470 <test_ubsan_out_of_bounds+0x154> // b.any As there is no guarantee the compiler will order the local variables as declared in the module: volatile char above[4] = { }; /* Protect surrounding memory. */ volatile int arr[4]; volatile char below[4] = { }; /* Protect surrounding memory. */ There is another problem where the out-of-bound index is 5 which is larger than the extra surrounding memory for protection. So, use a struct to enforce the ordering, and fix the index to be 4. Also, remove some of the volatiles and rely on OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR() Signed-off-by: Mostafa Saleh <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

Update build.config.rpi5

5881bb1

There is bcm2712-rpi-5-b.dts no bcm2711-rpi-5-b.dts in arch/arm/boot/dts same in arch/arm64/boot/dts/broadcom/ bcm2712-rpi-5-b.dts which includes "../../../../arm/boot/dts/bcm2712-rpi-5-b.dts"

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Update build.config.rpi5 #1

Update build.config.rpi5 #1

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Update build.config.rpi5 #1

Update build.config.rpi5 #1

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