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@waby38b waby38b commented Mar 1, 2023

  • gestion du Cache L1
  • cpufreq: l'histoire du multiplicateur
  • dt: sti: dwc3 activation du LPM
  • Switch from CONFIG_PM_SLEEP guards to pm_sleep_ptr()
    => dwc3, sdhci-st, st_spi_fsm:, st-ahci:, stmmac:, st-asc, thermal-st
  • thermal/doc: cleanup
  • somes alias
  • Prise en charge des "thermal zone" pour le driver thermal st + DT
    => en gros, ca baisse la frequence des CPUs (via CPUfreq) a l'approche des 85°C, et ca fait un shutdown à 95°C

sudeep-holla and others added 16 commits March 1, 2023 23:26
This patch adds support for cacheinfo on ARM platforms.

On ARMv7, the cache hierarchy can be identified through Cache Level ID
register(CLIDR) while the cache geometry is provided by Cache Size ID
register(CCSIDR).

On architecture versions before ARMv7, CLIDR and CCSIDR is not
implemented. The cache type register(CTR) provides both cache hierarchy
and geometry if implemented. For implementations that doesn't support
CTR, we need to list the probable value of CTR if it was implemented
along with the cpuid for the sake of simplicity to handle them.

Since the architecture doesn't provide any way of detecting the cpus
sharing particular cache, device tree is used fo the same purpose.
On non-DT platforms, first level caches are per-cpu while higher level
caches are assumed system-wide.

This is based on the newly introduced generic cacheinfo infrastructure
through the commit 246246c ("drivers: base: support cpu cache
information interface to userspace via sysfs")

Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Stephen Boyd <[email protected]>
Cc: Russell King <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Needed after 4b92d4a:
drivers: base: cacheinfo: Get rid of DEFINE_SMP_CALL_CACHE_FUNCTION()

DEFINE_SMP_CALL_CACHE_FUNCTION() was usefel before the CPU hotplug rework
to ensure that the cache related functions are called on the upcoming CPU
because the notifier itself could run on any online CPU.

Signed-off-by: Jerome AUDU <[email protected]>
Enable USB3 LPM support and also enable u1/u2 quirk
to keep gadget working with lpm

Signed-off-by: Jerome AUDU <[email protected]>
Letting the compiler remove these functions when the kernel is built
without CONFIG_PM_SLEEP support is simpler and less error prone than the
use of #ifdef based kernel configuration guards.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jerome AUDU <[email protected]>
Letting the compiler remove these functions when the kernel is built
without CONFIG_PM_SLEEP support is simpler and less error prone than the
use of #ifdef based kernel configuration guards.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jerome AUDU <[email protected]>
Letting the compiler remove these functions when the kernel is built
without CONFIG_PM_SLEEP support is simpler and less error prone than the
use of #ifdef based kernel configuration guards.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jerome AUDU <[email protected]>
Letting the compiler remove these functions when the kernel is built
without CONFIG_PM_SLEEP support is simpler and less error prone than the
use of #ifdef based kernel configuration guards.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jerome AUDU <[email protected]>
Letting the compiler remove these functions when the kernel is built
without CONFIG_PM_SLEEP support is simpler and less error prone than the
use of #ifdef based kernel configuration guards.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jerome AUDU <[email protected]>
Letting the compiler remove these functions when the kernel is built
without CONFIG_PM_SLEEP support is simpler and less error prone than the
use of #ifdef based kernel configuration guards.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jerome AUDU <[email protected]>
Letting the compiler remove these functions when the kernel is built
without CONFIG_PM_SLEEP support is simpler and less error prone than the
use of #ifdef based kernel configuration guards.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

Signed-off-by: Jerome AUDU <[email protected]>
"st,passive_cooling_temp" is not part of kernel sources

Signed-off-by: Jerome AUDU <[email protected]>
this is needed for futur thermal-zones patches

Signed-off-by: Jerome AUDU <[email protected]>
this is needed for futur thermal-zones patches

Signed-off-by: Jerome AUDU <[email protected]>
- Need to add #cooling-cells entry for earch CPUs
- thermal-zones rely on thermal alias for T° sensor
- cooling will be done on CPUs using cpufreq framework

Signed-off-by: Jerome AUDU <[email protected]>
replace thermal_zone_device_register() by devm_thermal_of_zone_register()
and remove ops st_thermal_get_trip_type, st_thermal_get_trip_temp

Signed-off-by: Jerome AUDU <[email protected]>
@waby38b waby38b force-pushed the iso/jau/stih418-b2264-v6.2 branch from 640aeec to aa5b7e9 Compare March 2, 2023 22:22
avolmat pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 7, 2023
WED is supported just for mmio devices, so do not check it for usb or
sdio devices. This patch fixes the crash reported below:

[   21.946627] wlp0s3u1i3: authenticate with c4:41:1e:f5:2b:1d
[   22.525298] wlp0s3u1i3: send auth to c4:41:1e:f5:2b:1d (try 1/3)
[   22.548274] wlp0s3u1i3: authenticate with c4:41:1e:f5:2b:1d
[   22.557694] wlp0s3u1i3: send auth to c4:41:1e:f5:2b:1d (try 1/3)
[   22.565885] wlp0s3u1i3: authenticated
[   22.569502] wlp0s3u1i3: associate with c4:41:1e:f5:2b:1d (try 1/3)
[   22.578966] wlp0s3u1i3: RX AssocResp from c4:41:1e:f5:2b:1d (capab=0x11 status=30 aid=3)
[   22.579113] wlp0s3u1i3: c4:41:1e:f5:2b:1d rejected association temporarily; comeback duration 1000 TU (1024 ms)
[   23.649518] wlp0s3u1i3: associate with c4:41:1e:f5:2b:1d (try 2/3)
[   23.752528] wlp0s3u1i3: RX AssocResp from c4:41:1e:f5:2b:1d (capab=0x11 status=0 aid=3)
[   23.797450] wlp0s3u1i3: associated
[   24.959527] kernel tried to execute NX-protected page - exploit attempt? (uid: 0)
[   24.959640] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff88800c223200
[   24.959706] #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode
[   24.959788] #PF: error_code(0x0011) - permissions violation
[   24.959846] PGD 2c01067 P4D 2c01067 PUD 2c02067 PMD c2a8063 PTE 800000000c223163
[   24.959957] Oops: 0011 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[   24.960009] CPU: 0 PID: 391 Comm: wpa_supplicant Not tainted 6.2.0-kvm torvalds#18
[   24.960089] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.1-2.fc37 04/01/2014
[   24.960191] RIP: 0010:0xffff88800c223200
[   24.960446] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000ff7698 EFLAGS: 00010282
[   24.960513] RAX: ffff888028397010 RBX: ffff88800c26e630 RCX: 0000000000000058
[   24.960598] RDX: ffff88800c26f844 RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI: ffff888028397010
[   24.960682] RBP: ffff88800ea72f00 R08: 18b873fbab2b964c R09: be06b38235f3c63c
[   24.960766] R10: 18b873fbab2b964c R11: be06b38235f3c63c R12: 0000000000000001
[   24.960853] R13: ffff88800c26f84c R14: ffff8880063f0ff8 R15: ffff88800c26e644
[   24.960950] FS:  00007effcea327c0(0000) GS:ffff88807dc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   24.961036] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   24.961106] CR2: ffff88800c223200 CR3: 000000000eaa2000 CR4: 00000000000006b0
[   24.961190] Call Trace:
[   24.961219]  <TASK>
[   24.961245]  ? mt76_connac_mcu_add_key+0x2cf/0x310
[   24.961313]  ? mt7921_set_key+0x150/0x200
[   24.961365]  ? drv_set_key+0xa9/0x1b0
[   24.961418]  ? ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel+0xd9/0x240
[   24.961485]  ? ieee80211_key_replace+0x3f3/0x730
[   24.961541]  ? crypto_shash_setkey+0x89/0xd0
[   24.961597]  ? ieee80211_key_link+0x2d7/0x3a0
[   24.961664]  ? crypto_aead_setauthsize+0x31/0x50
[   24.961730]  ? sta_info_hash_lookup+0xa6/0xf0
[   24.961785]  ? ieee80211_add_key+0x1fc/0x250
[   24.961842]  ? rdev_add_key+0x41/0x140
[   24.961882]  ? nl80211_parse_key+0x6c/0x2f0
[   24.961940]  ? nl80211_new_key+0x24a/0x290
[   24.961984]  ? genl_rcv_msg+0x36c/0x3a0
[   24.962036]  ? rdev_mod_link_station+0xe0/0xe0
[   24.962102]  ? nl80211_set_key+0x410/0x410
[   24.962143]  ? nl80211_pre_doit+0x200/0x200
[   24.962187]  ? genl_bind+0xc0/0xc0
[   24.962217]  ? netlink_rcv_skb+0xaa/0xd0
[   24.962259]  ? genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
[   24.962300]  ? netlink_unicast+0x224/0x2f0
[   24.962345]  ? netlink_sendmsg+0x30b/0x3d0
[   24.962388]  ? ____sys_sendmsg+0x109/0x1b0
[   24.962388]  ? ____sys_sendmsg+0x109/0x1b0
[   24.962440]  ? __import_iovec+0x2e/0x110
[   24.962482]  ? ___sys_sendmsg+0xbe/0xe0
[   24.962525]  ? mod_objcg_state+0x25c/0x330
[   24.962576]  ? __dentry_kill+0x19e/0x1d0
[   24.962618]  ? call_rcu+0x18f/0x270
[   24.962660]  ? __dentry_kill+0x19e/0x1d0
[   24.962702]  ? __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x70/0x90
[   24.962744]  ? do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x80
[   24.962796]  ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1b/0x70
[   24.962852]  ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
[   24.962913]  </TASK>
[   24.962939] Modules linked in:
[   24.962981] CR2: ffff88800c223200
[   24.963022] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[   24.963087] RIP: 0010:0xffff88800c223200
[   24.963323] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000ff7698 EFLAGS: 00010282
[   24.963376] RAX: ffff888028397010 RBX: ffff88800c26e630 RCX: 0000000000000058
[   24.963458] RDX: ffff88800c26f844 RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI: ffff888028397010
[   24.963538] RBP: ffff88800ea72f00 R08: 18b873fbab2b964c R09: be06b38235f3c63c
[   24.963622] R10: 18b873fbab2b964c R11: be06b38235f3c63c R12: 0000000000000001
[   24.963705] R13: ffff88800c26f84c R14: ffff8880063f0ff8 R15: ffff88800c26e644
[   24.963788] FS:  00007effcea327c0(0000) GS:ffff88807dc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   24.963871] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   24.963941] CR2: ffff88800c223200 CR3: 000000000eaa2000 CR4: 00000000000006b0
[   24.964018] note: wpa_supplicant[391] exited with irqs disabled

Fixes: d1369e5 ("wifi: mt76: connac: introduce mt76_connac_mcu_sta_wed_update utility routine")
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Bianconi <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Felix Fietkau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/c42168429453474213fa8244bf4b069de4531f40.1678124335.git.lorenzo@kernel.org
avolmat pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 7, 2023
If md_run() fails after ->active_io is initialized, then percpu_ref_exit
is called in error path. However, later md_free_disk will call
percpu_ref_exit again which leads to a panic because of null pointer
dereference. It can also trigger this bug when resources are initialized
but are freed in error path, then will be freed again in md_free_disk.

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000038
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Workqueue: md_misc mddev_delayed_delete
RIP: 0010:free_percpu+0x110/0x630
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __percpu_ref_exit+0x44/0x70
 percpu_ref_exit+0x16/0x90
 md_free_disk+0x2f/0x80
 disk_release+0x101/0x180
 device_release+0x84/0x110
 kobject_put+0x12a/0x380
 kobject_put+0x160/0x380
 mddev_delayed_delete+0x19/0x30
 process_one_work+0x269/0x680
 worker_thread+0x266/0x640
 kthread+0x151/0x1b0
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

For creating raid device, md raid calls do_md_run->md_run, dm raid calls
md_run. We alloc those memory in md_run. For stopping raid device, md raid
calls do_md_stop->__md_stop, dm raid calls md_stop->__md_stop. So we can
free those memory resources in __md_stop.

Fixes: 72adae2 ("md: Change active_io to percpu")
Reported-and-tested-by: Yu Kuai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Xiao Ni <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <[email protected]>
avolmat pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 7, 2023
…kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD

KVM/arm64 fixes for 6.3, part #1

A single patch to address a rather annoying bug w.r.t. guest timer
offsetting. Effectively the synchronization of timer offsets between
vCPUs was broken, leading to inconsistent timer reads within the VM.
avolmat pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 7, 2023
Commit 0c80f9e ("ACPI: PPTT: Leave the table mapped for the runtime usage")
enabled to map PPTT once on the first invocation of acpi_get_pptt() and
never unmapped the same allowing it to be used at runtime with out the
hassle of mapping and unmapping the table. This was needed to fetch LLC
information from the PPTT in the cpuhotplug path which is executed in
the atomic context as the acpi_get_table() might sleep waiting for a
mutex.

However it missed to handle the case when there is no PPTT on the system
which results in acpi_get_pptt() being called from all the secondary
CPUs attempting to fetch the LLC information in the atomic context
without knowing the absence of PPTT resulting in the splat like below:

 | BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/semaphore.c:164
 | in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 0, name: swapper/1
 | preempt_count: 1, expected: 0
 | RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0
 | no locks held by swapper/1/0.
 | irq event stamp: 0
 | hardirqs last  enabled at (0): 0x0
 | hardirqs last disabled at (0): copy_process+0x61c/0x1b40
 | softirqs last  enabled at (0): copy_process+0x61c/0x1b40
 | softirqs last disabled at (0): 0x0
 | CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 6.3.0-rc1 #1
 | Call trace:
 |  dump_backtrace+0xac/0x138
 |  show_stack+0x30/0x48
 |  dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0xb0
 |  dump_stack+0x18/0x28
 |  __might_resched+0x160/0x270
 |  __might_sleep+0x58/0xb0
 |  down_timeout+0x34/0x98
 |  acpi_os_wait_semaphore+0x7c/0xc0
 |  acpi_ut_acquire_mutex+0x58/0x108
 |  acpi_get_table+0x40/0xe8
 |  acpi_get_pptt+0x48/0xa0
 |  acpi_get_cache_info+0x38/0x140
 |  init_cache_level+0xf4/0x118
 |  detect_cache_attributes+0x2e4/0x640
 |  update_siblings_masks+0x3c/0x330
 |  store_cpu_topology+0x88/0xf0
 |  secondary_start_kernel+0xd0/0x168
 |  __secondary_switched+0xb8/0xc0

Update acpi_get_pptt() to consider the fact that PPTT is once checked and
is not available on the system and return NULL avoiding any attempts to
fetch PPTT and thereby avoiding any possible sleep waiting for a mutex
in the atomic context.

Fixes: 0c80f9e ("ACPI: PPTT: Leave the table mapped for the runtime usage")
Reported-by: Aishwarya TCV <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Pierre Gondois <[email protected]>
Cc: 6.0+ <[email protected]> # 6.0+
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
avolmat pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 7, 2023
The following LOCKDEP was detected:
		Workqueue: events smc_lgr_free_work [smc]
		WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
		6.1.0-20221027.rc2.git8.56bc5b569087.300.fc36.s390x+debug #1 Not tainted
		------------------------------------------------------
		kworker/3:0/176251 is trying to acquire lock:
		00000000f1467148 ((wq_completion)smc_tx_wq-00000000#2){+.+.}-{0:0},
			at: __flush_workqueue+0x7a/0x4f0
		but task is already holding lock:
		0000037fffe97dc8 ((work_completion)(&(&lgr->free_work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0},
			at: process_one_work+0x232/0x730
		which lock already depends on the new lock.
		the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
		-> #4 ((work_completion)(&(&lgr->free_work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}:
		       __lock_acquire+0x58e/0xbd8
		       lock_acquire.part.0+0xe2/0x248
		       lock_acquire+0xac/0x1c8
		       __flush_work+0x76/0xf0
		       __cancel_work_timer+0x170/0x220
		       __smc_lgr_terminate.part.0+0x34/0x1c0 [smc]
		       smc_connect_rdma+0x15e/0x418 [smc]
		       __smc_connect+0x234/0x480 [smc]
		       smc_connect+0x1d6/0x230 [smc]
		       __sys_connect+0x90/0xc0
		       __do_sys_socketcall+0x186/0x370
		       __do_syscall+0x1da/0x208
		       system_call+0x82/0xb0
		-> #3 (smc_client_lgr_pending){+.+.}-{3:3}:
		       __lock_acquire+0x58e/0xbd8
		       lock_acquire.part.0+0xe2/0x248
		       lock_acquire+0xac/0x1c8
		       __mutex_lock+0x96/0x8e8
		       mutex_lock_nested+0x32/0x40
		       smc_connect_rdma+0xa4/0x418 [smc]
		       __smc_connect+0x234/0x480 [smc]
		       smc_connect+0x1d6/0x230 [smc]
		       __sys_connect+0x90/0xc0
		       __do_sys_socketcall+0x186/0x370
		       __do_syscall+0x1da/0x208
		       system_call+0x82/0xb0
		-> #2 (sk_lock-AF_SMC){+.+.}-{0:0}:
		       __lock_acquire+0x58e/0xbd8
		       lock_acquire.part.0+0xe2/0x248
		       lock_acquire+0xac/0x1c8
		       lock_sock_nested+0x46/0xa8
		       smc_tx_work+0x34/0x50 [smc]
		       process_one_work+0x30c/0x730
		       worker_thread+0x62/0x420
		       kthread+0x138/0x150
		       __ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x58
		       ret_from_fork+0xa/0x40
		-> #1 ((work_completion)(&(&smc->conn.tx_work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}:
		       __lock_acquire+0x58e/0xbd8
		       lock_acquire.part.0+0xe2/0x248
		       lock_acquire+0xac/0x1c8
		       process_one_work+0x2bc/0x730
		       worker_thread+0x62/0x420
		       kthread+0x138/0x150
		       __ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x58
		       ret_from_fork+0xa/0x40
		-> #0 ((wq_completion)smc_tx_wq-00000000#2){+.+.}-{0:0}:
		       check_prev_add+0xd8/0xe88
		       validate_chain+0x70c/0xb20
		       __lock_acquire+0x58e/0xbd8
		       lock_acquire.part.0+0xe2/0x248
		       lock_acquire+0xac/0x1c8
		       __flush_workqueue+0xaa/0x4f0
		       drain_workqueue+0xaa/0x158
		       destroy_workqueue+0x44/0x2d8
		       smc_lgr_free+0x9e/0xf8 [smc]
		       process_one_work+0x30c/0x730
		       worker_thread+0x62/0x420
		       kthread+0x138/0x150
		       __ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x58
		       ret_from_fork+0xa/0x40
		other info that might help us debug this:
		Chain exists of:
		  (wq_completion)smc_tx_wq-00000000#2
	  	  --> smc_client_lgr_pending
		  --> (work_completion)(&(&lgr->free_work)->work)
		 Possible unsafe locking scenario:
		       CPU0                    CPU1
		       ----                    ----
		  lock((work_completion)(&(&lgr->free_work)->work));
		                   lock(smc_client_lgr_pending);
		                   lock((work_completion)
					(&(&lgr->free_work)->work));
		  lock((wq_completion)smc_tx_wq-00000000#2);
		 *** DEADLOCK ***
		2 locks held by kworker/3:0/176251:
		 #0: 0000000080183548
			((wq_completion)events){+.+.}-{0:0},
				at: process_one_work+0x232/0x730
		 #1: 0000037fffe97dc8
			((work_completion)
			 (&(&lgr->free_work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0},
				at: process_one_work+0x232/0x730
		stack backtrace:
		CPU: 3 PID: 176251 Comm: kworker/3:0 Not tainted
		Hardware name: IBM 8561 T01 701 (z/VM 7.2.0)
		Call Trace:
		 [<000000002983c3e4>] dump_stack_lvl+0xac/0x100
		 [<0000000028b477ae>] check_noncircular+0x13e/0x160
		 [<0000000028b48808>] check_prev_add+0xd8/0xe88
		 [<0000000028b49cc4>] validate_chain+0x70c/0xb20
		 [<0000000028b4bd26>] __lock_acquire+0x58e/0xbd8
		 [<0000000028b4cf6a>] lock_acquire.part.0+0xe2/0x248
		 [<0000000028b4d17c>] lock_acquire+0xac/0x1c8
		 [<0000000028addaaa>] __flush_workqueue+0xaa/0x4f0
		 [<0000000028addf9a>] drain_workqueue+0xaa/0x158
		 [<0000000028ae303c>] destroy_workqueue+0x44/0x2d8
		 [<000003ff8029af26>] smc_lgr_free+0x9e/0xf8 [smc]
		 [<0000000028adf3d4>] process_one_work+0x30c/0x730
		 [<0000000028adf85a>] worker_thread+0x62/0x420
		 [<0000000028aeac50>] kthread+0x138/0x150
		 [<0000000028a63914>] __ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x58
		 [<00000000298503da>] ret_from_fork+0xa/0x40
		INFO: lockdep is turned off.
===================================================================

This deadlock occurs because cancel_delayed_work_sync() waits for
the work(&lgr->free_work) to finish, while the &lgr->free_work
waits for the work(lgr->tx_wq), which needs the sk_lock-AF_SMC, that
is already used under the mutex_lock.

The solution is to use cancel_delayed_work() instead, which kills
off a pending work.

Fixes: a52bcc9 ("net/smc: improve termination processing")
Signed-off-by: Wenjia Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jan Karcher <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Karsten Graul <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tony Lu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
avolmat pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 7, 2023
The naming of space_info->active_total_bytes is misleading. It counts
not only active block groups but also full ones which are previously
active but now inactive. That confusion results in a bug not counting
the full BGs into active_total_bytes on mount time.

For a background, there are three kinds of block groups in terms of
activation.

  1. Block groups never activated
  2. Block groups currently active
  3. Block groups previously active and currently inactive (due to fully
     written or zone finish)

What we really wanted to exclude from "total_bytes" is the total size of
BGs #1. They seem empty and allocatable but since they are not activated,
we cannot rely on them to do the space reservation.

And, since BGs #1 never get activated, they should have no "used",
"reserved" and "pinned" bytes.

OTOH, BGs #3 can be counted in the "total", since they are already full
we cannot allocate from them anyway. For them, "total_bytes == used +
reserved + pinned + zone_unusable" should hold.

Tracking #2 and #3 as "active_total_bytes" (current implementation) is
confusing. And, tracking #1 and subtract that properly from "total_bytes"
every time you need space reservation is cumbersome.

Instead, we can count the whole region of a newly allocated block group as
zone_unusable. Then, once that block group is activated, release
[0 ..  zone_capacity] from the zone_unusable counters. With this, we can
eliminate the confusing ->active_total_bytes and the code will be common
among regular and the zoned mode. Also, no additional counter is needed
with this approach.

Fixes: 6a921de ("btrfs: zoned: introduce space_info->active_total_bytes")
CC: [email protected] # 6.1+
Signed-off-by: Naohiro Aota <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
avolmat pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 7, 2023
Commit 718a18a ("veth: Rework veth_xdp_rcv_skb in order
to accept non-linear skb") introduced a bug where it tried to
use pskb_expand_head() if the headroom was less than
XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM.  This however uses kmalloc to expand the head,
which will later allow consume_skb() to free the skb while is it still
in use by AF_XDP.

Previously if the headroom was less than XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM we
continued on to allocate a new skb from pages so this restores that
behavior.

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __xsk_rcv+0x18d/0x2c0
Read of size 78 at addr ffff888976250154 by task napi/iconduit-g/148640

CPU: 5 PID: 148640 Comm: napi/iconduit-g Kdump: loaded Tainted: G           O       6.1.4-cloudflare-kasan-2023.1.2 #1
Hardware name: Quanta Computer Inc. QuantaPlex T41S-2U/S2S-MB, BIOS S2S_3B10.03 06/21/2018
Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x48
  print_report+0x170/0x473
  ? __xsk_rcv+0x18d/0x2c0
  kasan_report+0xad/0x130
  ? __xsk_rcv+0x18d/0x2c0
  kasan_check_range+0x149/0x1a0
  memcpy+0x20/0x60
  __xsk_rcv+0x18d/0x2c0
  __xsk_map_redirect+0x1f3/0x490
  ? veth_xdp_rcv_skb+0x89c/0x1ba0 [veth]
  xdp_do_redirect+0x5ca/0xd60
  veth_xdp_rcv_skb+0x935/0x1ba0 [veth]
  ? __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x671/0x920
  ? veth_xdp+0x670/0x670 [veth]
  veth_xdp_rcv+0x304/0xa20 [veth]
  ? do_xdp_generic+0x150/0x150
  ? veth_xdp_rcv_one+0xde0/0xde0 [veth]
  ? _raw_spin_lock_bh+0xe0/0xe0
  ? newidle_balance+0x887/0xe30
  ? __perf_event_task_sched_in+0xdb/0x800
  veth_poll+0x139/0x571 [veth]
  ? veth_xdp_rcv+0xa20/0xa20 [veth]
  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x39/0x70
  ? finish_task_switch.isra.0+0x17e/0x7d0
  ? __switch_to+0x5cf/0x1070
  ? __schedule+0x95b/0x2640
  ? io_schedule_timeout+0x160/0x160
  __napi_poll+0xa1/0x440
  napi_threaded_poll+0x3d1/0x460
  ? __napi_poll+0x440/0x440
  ? __kthread_parkme+0xc6/0x1f0
  ? __napi_poll+0x440/0x440
  kthread+0x2a2/0x340
  ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
  ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
  </TASK>

Freed by task 148640:
  kasan_save_stack+0x23/0x50
  kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30
  kasan_save_free_info+0x2a/0x40
  ____kasan_slab_free+0x169/0x1d0
  slab_free_freelist_hook+0xd2/0x190
  __kmem_cache_free+0x1a1/0x2f0
  skb_release_data+0x449/0x600
  consume_skb+0x9f/0x1c0
  veth_xdp_rcv_skb+0x89c/0x1ba0 [veth]
  veth_xdp_rcv+0x304/0xa20 [veth]
  veth_poll+0x139/0x571 [veth]
  __napi_poll+0xa1/0x440
  napi_threaded_poll+0x3d1/0x460
  kthread+0x2a2/0x340
  ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888976250000
  which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048
The buggy address is located 340 bytes inside of
  2048-byte region [ffff888976250000, ffff888976250800)

The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page:00000000ae18262a refcount:2 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x976250
head:00000000ae18262a order:3 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
flags: 0x2ffff800010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1ffff)
raw: 002ffff800010200 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 ffff88810004cf00
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080080008 00000002ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffff888976250000: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
  ffff888976250080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
> ffff888976250100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                                                  ^
  ffff888976250180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
  ffff888976250200: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb

Fixes: 718a18a ("veth: Rework veth_xdp_rcv_skb in order to accept non-linear skb")
Signed-off-by: Shawn Bohrer <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Lorenzo Bianconi <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Toshiaki Makita <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
avolmat pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 7, 2023
Since the blamed commit, phy_ethtool_get_wol() and phy_ethtool_set_wol()
acquire phydev->lock, but the mscc phy driver implementations,
vsc85xx_wol_get() and vsc85xx_wol_set(), acquire the same lock as well,
resulting in a deadlock.

$ ip link set swp3 down
============================================
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
mscc_felix 0000:00:00.5 swp3: Link is Down
--------------------------------------------
ip/375 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff3d7e82e987a8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: vsc85xx_wol_get+0x2c/0xf4

but task is already holding lock:
ffff3d7e82e987a8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: phy_ethtool_get_wol+0x3c/0x6c

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0
       ----
  lock(&dev->lock);
  lock(&dev->lock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

 May be due to missing lock nesting notation

2 locks held by ip/375:
 #0: ffffd43b2a955788 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x144/0x58c
 #1: ffff3d7e82e987a8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: phy_ethtool_get_wol+0x3c/0x6c

Call trace:
 __mutex_lock+0x98/0x454
 mutex_lock_nested+0x2c/0x38
 vsc85xx_wol_get+0x2c/0xf4
 phy_ethtool_get_wol+0x50/0x6c
 phy_suspend+0x84/0xcc
 phy_state_machine+0x1b8/0x27c
 phy_stop+0x70/0x154
 phylink_stop+0x34/0xc0
 dsa_port_disable_rt+0x2c/0xa4
 dsa_slave_close+0x38/0xec
 __dev_close_many+0xc8/0x16c
 __dev_change_flags+0xdc/0x218
 dev_change_flags+0x24/0x6c
 do_setlink+0x234/0xea4
 __rtnl_newlink+0x46c/0x878
 rtnl_newlink+0x50/0x7c
 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x16c/0x58c

Removing the mutex_lock(&phydev->lock) calls from the driver restores
the functionality.

Fixes: 2f987d4 ("net: phy: Add locks to ethtool functions")
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
avolmat pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 7, 2023
| BUG: Bad page state in process kworker/u8:0  pfn:5c001
| page:00000000bfda61c8 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x20001 pfn:0x5c001
| head:0000000011409842 order:9 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:1
| anon flags: 0x3fffc00000b0004(uptodate|head|mappedtodisk|swapbacked|node=0|zone=0|lastcpupid=0xffff)
| raw: 03fffc0000000000 fffffc0000700001 ffffffff00700903 0000000100000000
| raw: 0000000000000200 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
| head: 03fffc00000b0004 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff00000a809dc1
| head: 0000000000020000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
| page dumped because: nonzero pincount
| CPU: 3 PID: 9 Comm: kworker/u8:0 Not tainted 6.3.0-rc2-00001-gc6811bf0cd87 #1
| Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
| Workqueue: events_unbound io_ring_exit_work
| Call trace:
|  dump_backtrace+0x13c/0x208
|  show_stack+0x34/0x58
|  dump_stack_lvl+0x150/0x1a8
|  dump_stack+0x20/0x30
|  bad_page+0xec/0x238
|  free_tail_pages_check+0x280/0x350
|  free_pcp_prepare+0x60c/0x830
|  free_unref_page+0x50/0x498
|  free_compound_page+0xcc/0x100
|  free_transhuge_page+0x1f0/0x2b8
|  destroy_large_folio+0x80/0xc8
|  __folio_put+0xc4/0xf8
|  gup_put_folio+0xd0/0x250
|  unpin_user_page+0xcc/0x128
|  io_buffer_unmap+0xec/0x2c0
|  __io_sqe_buffers_unregister+0xa4/0x1e0
|  io_ring_exit_work+0x68c/0x1188
|  process_one_work+0x91c/0x1a58
|  worker_thread+0x48c/0xe30
|  kthread+0x278/0x2f0
|  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

Mark reports an issue with the recent patches coalescing compound pages
while registering them in io_uring. The reason is that we try to drop
excessive references with folio_put_refs(), but pages were acquired
with pin_user_pages(), which has extra accounting and so should be put
down with matching unpin_user_pages() or at least gup_put_folio().

As a fix unpin_user_pages() all but first page instead, and let's figure
out a better API after.

Fixes: 57bebf8 ("io_uring/rsrc: optimise registered huge pages")
Reported-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/10efd5507d6d1f05ea0f3c601830e08767e189bd.1678980230.git.asml.silence@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
avolmat pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 7, 2023
ice_qp_dis() intends to stop a given queue pair that is a target of xsk
pool attach/detach. One of the steps is to disable interrupts on these
queues. It currently is broken in a way that txq irq is turned off
*after* HW flush which in turn takes no effect.

ice_qp_dis():
-> ice_qvec_dis_irq()
--> disable rxq irq
--> flush hw
-> ice_vsi_stop_tx_ring()
-->disable txq irq

Below splat can be triggered by following steps:
- start xdpsock WITHOUT loading xdp prog
- run xdp_rxq_info with XDP_TX action on this interface
- start traffic
- terminate xdpsock

[  256.312485] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000018
[  256.319560] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[  256.324775] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[  256.329994] PGD 0 P4D 0
[  256.332574] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[  256.337006] CPU: 3 PID: 32 Comm: ksoftirqd/3 Tainted: G           OE      6.2.0-rc5+ torvalds#51
[  256.345218] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WFT/S2600WFT, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0008.031920191559 03/19/2019
[  256.355807] RIP: 0010:ice_clean_rx_irq_zc+0x9c/0x7d0 [ice]
[  256.361423] Code: b7 8f 8a 00 00 00 66 39 ca 0f 84 f1 04 00 00 49 8b 47 40 4c 8b 24 d0 41 0f b7 45 04 66 25 ff 3f 66 89 04 24 0f 84 85 02 00 00 <49> 8b 44 24 18 0f b7 14 24 48 05 00 01 00 00 49 89 04 24 49 89 44
[  256.380463] RSP: 0018:ffffc900088bfd20 EFLAGS: 00010206
[  256.385765] RAX: 000000000000003c RBX: 0000000000000035 RCX: 000000000000067f
[  256.393012] RDX: 0000000000000775 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8881deb3ac80
[  256.400256] RBP: 000000000000003c R08: ffff889847982710 R09: 0000000000010000
[  256.407500] R10: ffffffff82c060c0 R11: 0000000000000004 R12: 0000000000000000
[  256.414746] R13: ffff88811165eea0 R14: ffffc9000d255000 R15: ffff888119b37600
[  256.421990] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8897e0cc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  256.430207] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  256.436036] CR2: 0000000000000018 CR3: 0000000005c0a006 CR4: 00000000007706e0
[  256.443283] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[  256.450527] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[  256.457770] PKRU: 55555554
[  256.460529] Call Trace:
[  256.463015]  <TASK>
[  256.465157]  ? ice_xmit_zc+0x6e/0x150 [ice]
[  256.469437]  ice_napi_poll+0x46d/0x680 [ice]
[  256.473815]  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x1b/0x40
[  256.478863]  __napi_poll+0x29/0x160
[  256.482409]  net_rx_action+0x136/0x260
[  256.486222]  __do_softirq+0xe8/0x2e5
[  256.489853]  ? smpboot_thread_fn+0x2c/0x270
[  256.494108]  run_ksoftirqd+0x2a/0x50
[  256.497747]  smpboot_thread_fn+0x1c1/0x270
[  256.501907]  ? __pfx_smpboot_thread_fn+0x10/0x10
[  256.506594]  kthread+0xea/0x120
[  256.509785]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[  256.513597]  ret_from_fork+0x29/0x50
[  256.517238]  </TASK>

In fact, irqs were not disabled and napi managed to be scheduled and run
while xsk_pool pointer was still valid, but SW ring of xdp_buff pointers
was already freed.

To fix this, call ice_qvec_dis_irq() after ice_vsi_stop_tx_ring(). Also
while at it, remove redundant ice_clean_rx_ring() call - this is handled
in ice_qp_clean_rings().

Fixes: 2d4238f ("ice: Add support for AF_XDP")
Signed-off-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Larysa Zaremba <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Chandan Kumar Rout <[email protected]> (A Contingent Worker at Intel)
Acked-by: John Fastabend <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
avolmat pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 7, 2023
Because headroom is not passed to page_to_skb(), this causes the shinfo
exceeds the range. Then the frags of shinfo are changed by other process.

[  157.724634] stack segment: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[  157.725358] CPU: 3 PID: 679 Comm: xdp_pass_user_f Tainted: G            E      6.2.0+ torvalds#150
[  157.726401] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/4
[  157.727820] RIP: 0010:skb_release_data+0x11b/0x180
[  157.728449] Code: 44 24 02 48 83 c3 01 39 d8 7e be 48 89 d8 48 c1 e0 04 41 80 7d 7e 00 49 8b 6c 04 30 79 0c 48 89 ef e8 89 b
[  157.730751] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000178b48 EFLAGS: 00010202
[  157.731383] RAX: 0000000000000010 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000
[  157.732270] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: ffff888100dd0b00
[  157.733117] RBP: 5d5d76010f6e2408 R08: ffff888100dd0b2c R09: 0000000000000000
[  157.734013] R10: ffffffff82effd30 R11: 000000000000a14e R12: ffff88810981ffc0
[  157.734904] R13: ffff888100dd0b00 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: 0000000000002310
[  157.735793] FS:  00007f06121d9740(0000) GS:ffff88842fcc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  157.736794] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  157.737522] CR2: 00007ffd9a56c084 CR3: 0000000104bda001 CR4: 0000000000770ee0
[  157.738420] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[  157.739283] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[  157.740146] PKRU: 55555554
[  157.740502] Call Trace:
[  157.740843]  <IRQ>
[  157.741117]  kfree_skb_reason+0x50/0x120
[  157.741613]  __udp4_lib_rcv+0x52b/0x5e0
[  157.742132]  ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0xaf/0x190
[  157.742715]  ip_local_deliver_finish+0x77/0xa0
[  157.743280]  ip_sublist_rcv_finish+0x80/0x90
[  157.743834]  ip_list_rcv_finish.constprop.0+0x16f/0x190
[  157.744493]  ip_list_rcv+0x126/0x140
[  157.744952]  __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x29b/0x2c0
[  157.745602]  __netif_receive_skb_list+0xed/0x160
[  157.746190]  ? udp4_gro_receive+0x275/0x350
[  157.746732]  netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0xf2/0x1b0
[  157.747398]  napi_gro_receive+0xd1/0x210
[  157.747911]  virtnet_receive+0x75/0x1c0
[  157.748422]  virtnet_poll+0x48/0x1b0
[  157.748878]  __napi_poll+0x29/0x1b0
[  157.749330]  net_rx_action+0x27a/0x340
[  157.749812]  __do_softirq+0xf3/0x2fb
[  157.750298]  do_softirq+0xa2/0xd0
[  157.750745]  </IRQ>
[  157.751563]  <TASK>
[  157.752329]  __local_bh_enable_ip+0x6d/0x80
[  157.753178]  virtnet_xdp_set+0x482/0x860
[  157.754159]  ? __pfx_virtnet_xdp+0x10/0x10
[  157.755129]  dev_xdp_install+0xa4/0xe0
[  157.756033]  dev_xdp_attach+0x20b/0x5e0
[  157.756933]  do_setlink+0x82e/0xc90
[  157.757777]  ? __nla_validate_parse+0x12b/0x1e0
[  157.758744]  rtnl_setlink+0xd8/0x170
[  157.759549]  ? mod_objcg_state+0xcb/0x320
[  157.760328]  ? security_capable+0x37/0x60
[  157.761209]  ? security_capable+0x37/0x60
[  157.762072]  rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x145/0x3d0
[  157.762929]  ? ___slab_alloc+0x327/0x610
[  157.763754]  ? __alloc_skb+0x141/0x170
[  157.764533]  ? __pfx_rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10
[  157.765422]  netlink_rcv_skb+0x58/0x110
[  157.766229]  netlink_unicast+0x21f/0x330
[  157.766951]  netlink_sendmsg+0x240/0x4a0
[  157.767654]  sock_sendmsg+0x93/0xa0
[  157.768434]  ? sockfd_lookup_light+0x12/0x70
[  157.769245]  __sys_sendto+0xfe/0x170
[  157.770079]  ? handle_mm_fault+0xe9/0x2d0
[  157.770859]  ? preempt_count_add+0x51/0xa0
[  157.771645]  ? up_read+0x3c/0x80
[  157.772340]  ? do_user_addr_fault+0x1e9/0x710
[  157.773166]  ? kvm_read_and_reset_apf_flags+0x49/0x60
[  157.774087]  __x64_sys_sendto+0x29/0x30
[  157.774856]  do_syscall_64+0x3c/0x90
[  157.775518]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
[  157.776382] RIP: 0033:0x7f06122def70

Fixes: 18117a8 ("virtio-net: remove xdp related info from page_to_skb()")
Signed-off-by: Xuan Zhuo <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
avolmat pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 7, 2023
iucv_irq_data needs to be 4 bytes larger.
These bytes are not used by the iucv module, but written by
the z/VM hypervisor in case a CPU is deconfigured.

Reported as:
BUG dma-kmalloc-64 (Not tainted): kmalloc Redzone overwritten
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
0x0000000000400564-0x0000000000400567 @offset=1380. First byte 0x80 instead of 0xcc
Allocated in iucv_cpu_prepare+0x44/0xd0 age=167839 cpu=2 pid=1
__kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x166/0x450
kmalloc_node_trace+0x3a/0x70
iucv_cpu_prepare+0x44/0xd0
cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x156/0x2f0
cpuhp_issue_call+0xf0/0x298
__cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x136/0x338
__cpuhp_setup_state+0xf4/0x288
iucv_init+0xf4/0x280
do_one_initcall+0x78/0x390
do_initcalls+0x11a/0x140
kernel_init_freeable+0x25e/0x2a0
kernel_init+0x2e/0x170
__ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x58
ret_from_fork+0xa/0x40
Freed in iucv_init+0x92/0x280 age=167839 cpu=2 pid=1
__kmem_cache_free+0x308/0x358
iucv_init+0x92/0x280
do_one_initcall+0x78/0x390
do_initcalls+0x11a/0x140
kernel_init_freeable+0x25e/0x2a0
kernel_init+0x2e/0x170
__ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x58
ret_from_fork+0xa/0x40
Slab 0x0000037200010000 objects=32 used=30 fp=0x0000000000400640 flags=0x1ffff00000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=0|
Object 0x0000000000400540 @offset=1344 fp=0x0000000000000000
Redzone  0000000000400500: cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc  ................
Redzone  0000000000400510: cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc  ................
Redzone  0000000000400520: cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc  ................
Redzone  0000000000400530: cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc  ................
Object   0000000000400540: 00 01 00 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
Object   0000000000400550: f3 86 81 f2 f4 82 f8 82 f0 f0 f0 f0 f0 f0 f0 f2  ................
Object   0000000000400560: 00 00 00 00 80 00 00 00 cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc  ................
Object   0000000000400570: cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc  ................
Redzone  0000000000400580: cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc                          ........
Padding  00000000004005d4: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a  ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ
Padding  00000000004005e4: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a  ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ
Padding  00000000004005f4: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a              ZZZZZZZZZZZZ
CPU: 6 PID: 121030 Comm: 116-pai-crypto. Not tainted 6.3.0-20230221.rc0.git4.99b8246b2d71.300.fc37.s390x+debug #1
Hardware name: IBM 3931 A01 704 (z/VM 7.3.0)
Call Trace:
[<000000032aa034ec>] dump_stack_lvl+0xac/0x100
[<0000000329f5a6cc>] check_bytes_and_report+0x104/0x140
[<0000000329f5aa78>] check_object+0x370/0x3c0
[<0000000329f5ede6>] free_debug_processing+0x15e/0x348
[<0000000329f5f06a>] free_to_partial_list+0x9a/0x2f0
[<0000000329f5f4a4>] __slab_free+0x1e4/0x3a8
[<0000000329f61768>] __kmem_cache_free+0x308/0x358
[<000000032a91465c>] iucv_cpu_dead+0x6c/0x88
[<0000000329c2fc66>] cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x156/0x2f0
[<000000032aa062da>] _cpu_down.constprop.0+0x22a/0x5e0
[<0000000329c3243e>] cpu_device_down+0x4e/0x78
[<000000032a61dee0>] device_offline+0xc8/0x118
[<000000032a61e048>] online_store+0x60/0xe0
[<000000032a08b6b0>] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x150/0x1e8
[<0000000329fab65c>] vfs_write+0x174/0x360
[<0000000329fab9fc>] ksys_write+0x74/0x100
[<000000032aa03a5a>] __do_syscall+0x1da/0x208
[<000000032aa177b2>] system_call+0x82/0xb0
INFO: lockdep is turned off.
FIX dma-kmalloc-64: Restoring kmalloc Redzone 0x0000000000400564-0x0000000000400567=0xcc
FIX dma-kmalloc-64: Object at 0x0000000000400540 not freed

Fixes: 2356f4c ("[S390]: Rewrite of the IUCV base code, part 2")
Signed-off-by: Alexandra Winter <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
avolmat pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 7, 2023
While adding and removing the controller, the following call trace was
observed:

WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 623596 at kernel/dma/mapping.c:532 dma_free_attrs+0x33/0x50
CPU: 3 PID: 623596 Comm: sh Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.14.0-96.el9.x86_64 #1
RIP: 0010:dma_free_attrs+0x33/0x50

Call Trace:
   qla2x00_async_sns_sp_done+0x107/0x1b0 [qla2xxx]
   qla2x00_abort_srb+0x8e/0x250 [qla2xxx]
   ? ql_dbg+0x70/0x100 [qla2xxx]
   __qla2x00_abort_all_cmds+0x108/0x190 [qla2xxx]
   qla2x00_abort_all_cmds+0x24/0x70 [qla2xxx]
   qla2x00_abort_isp_cleanup+0x305/0x3e0 [qla2xxx]
   qla2x00_remove_one+0x364/0x400 [qla2xxx]
   pci_device_remove+0x36/0xa0
   __device_release_driver+0x17a/0x230
   device_release_driver+0x24/0x30
   pci_stop_bus_device+0x68/0x90
   pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device_locked+0x16/0x30
   remove_store+0x75/0x90
   kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x11c/0x1b0
   new_sync_write+0x11f/0x1b0
   vfs_write+0x1eb/0x280
   ksys_write+0x5f/0xe0
   do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x80
   ? do_user_addr_fault+0x1d8/0x680
   ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x80
   ? exc_page_fault+0x62/0x140
   ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x8/0x30
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

The command was completed in the abort path during driver unload with a
lock held, causing the warning in abort path. Hence complete the command
without any lock held.

Reported-by: Lin Li <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Lin Li <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Nilesh Javali <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Reviewed-by: Himanshu Madhani <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Meneghini <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
GallaisPoutine pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 27, 2025
…saction abort

If while we are doing a direct IO write a transaction abort happens, we
mark all existing ordered extents with the BTRFS_ORDERED_IOERR flag (done
at btrfs_destroy_ordered_extents()), and then after that if we enter
btrfs_split_ordered_extent() and the ordered extent has bytes left
(meaning we have a bio that doesn't cover the whole ordered extent, see
details at btrfs_extract_ordered_extent()), we will fail on the following
assertion at btrfs_split_ordered_extent():

   ASSERT(!(flags & ~BTRFS_ORDERED_TYPE_FLAGS));

because the BTRFS_ORDERED_IOERR flag is set and the definition of
BTRFS_ORDERED_TYPE_FLAGS is just the union of all flags that identify the
type of write (regular, nocow, prealloc, compressed, direct IO, encoded).

Fix this by returning an error from btrfs_extract_ordered_extent() if we
find the BTRFS_ORDERED_IOERR flag in the ordered extent. The error will
be the error that resulted in the transaction abort or -EIO if no
transaction abort happened.

This was recently reported by syzbot with the following trace:

   FAULT_INJECTION: forcing a failure.
   name failslab, interval 1, probability 0, space 0, times 1
   CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5321 Comm: syz.0.0 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc5-syzkaller #0
   Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
   Call Trace:
    <TASK>
    __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
    dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120
    fail_dump lib/fault-inject.c:53 [inline]
    should_fail_ex+0x3b0/0x4e0 lib/fault-inject.c:154
    should_failslab+0xac/0x100 mm/failslab.c:46
    slab_pre_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4072 [inline]
    slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4148 [inline]
    __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4297 [inline]
    __kmalloc_noprof+0xdd/0x4c0 mm/slub.c:4310
    kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:905 [inline]
    kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1037 [inline]
    btrfs_chunk_alloc_add_chunk_item+0x244/0x1100 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:5742
    reserve_chunk_space+0x1ca/0x2c0 fs/btrfs/block-group.c:4292
    check_system_chunk fs/btrfs/block-group.c:4319 [inline]
    do_chunk_alloc fs/btrfs/block-group.c:3891 [inline]
    btrfs_chunk_alloc+0x77b/0xf80 fs/btrfs/block-group.c:4187
    find_free_extent_update_loop fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:4166 [inline]
    find_free_extent+0x42d1/0x5810 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:4579
    btrfs_reserve_extent+0x422/0x810 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:4672
    btrfs_new_extent_direct fs/btrfs/direct-io.c:186 [inline]
    btrfs_get_blocks_direct_write+0x706/0xfa0 fs/btrfs/direct-io.c:321
    btrfs_dio_iomap_begin+0xbb7/0x1180 fs/btrfs/direct-io.c:525
    iomap_iter+0x697/0xf60 fs/iomap/iter.c:90
    __iomap_dio_rw+0xeb9/0x25b0 fs/iomap/direct-io.c:702
    btrfs_dio_write fs/btrfs/direct-io.c:775 [inline]
    btrfs_direct_write+0x610/0xa30 fs/btrfs/direct-io.c:880
    btrfs_do_write_iter+0x2a0/0x760 fs/btrfs/file.c:1397
    do_iter_readv_writev+0x600/0x880
    vfs_writev+0x376/0xba0 fs/read_write.c:1050
    do_pwritev fs/read_write.c:1146 [inline]
    __do_sys_pwritev2 fs/read_write.c:1204 [inline]
    __se_sys_pwritev2+0x196/0x2b0 fs/read_write.c:1195
    do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
    do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
   RIP: 0033:0x7f1281f85d29
   RSP: 002b:00007f12819fe038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000148
   RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f1282176080 RCX: 00007f1281f85d29
   RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020000240 RDI: 0000000000000005
   RBP: 00007f12819fe090 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000003
   R10: 0000000000007000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000002
   R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007f1282176080 R15: 00007ffcb9e23328
    </TASK>
   BTRFS error (device loop0 state A): Transaction aborted (error -12)
   BTRFS: error (device loop0 state A) in btrfs_chunk_alloc_add_chunk_item:5745: errno=-12 Out of memory
   BTRFS info (device loop0 state EA): forced readonly
   assertion failed: !(flags & ~BTRFS_ORDERED_TYPE_FLAGS), in fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c:1234
   ------------[ cut here ]------------
   kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c:1234!
   Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
   CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5321 Comm: syz.0.0 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc5-syzkaller #0
   Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
   RIP: 0010:btrfs_split_ordered_extent+0xd8d/0xe20 fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c:1234
   RSP: 0018:ffffc9000d1df2b8 EFLAGS: 00010246
   RAX: 0000000000000057 RBX: 000000000006a000 RCX: 9ce21886c4195300
   RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000080000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
   RBP: 0000000000000091 R08: ffffffff817f0a3c R09: 1ffff92001a3bdf4
   R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff52001a3bdf5 R12: 1ffff1100a45f401
   R13: ffff8880522fa018 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: 000000000006a000
   FS:  00007f12819fe6c0(0000) GS:ffff88801fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
   CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
   CR2: 0000557750bd7da8 CR3: 00000000400ea000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0
   DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
   DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
   Call Trace:
    <TASK>
    btrfs_extract_ordered_extent fs/btrfs/direct-io.c:702 [inline]
    btrfs_dio_submit_io+0x4be/0x6d0 fs/btrfs/direct-io.c:737
    iomap_dio_submit_bio fs/iomap/direct-io.c:85 [inline]
    iomap_dio_bio_iter+0x1022/0x1740 fs/iomap/direct-io.c:447
    __iomap_dio_rw+0x13b7/0x25b0 fs/iomap/direct-io.c:703
    btrfs_dio_write fs/btrfs/direct-io.c:775 [inline]
    btrfs_direct_write+0x610/0xa30 fs/btrfs/direct-io.c:880
    btrfs_do_write_iter+0x2a0/0x760 fs/btrfs/file.c:1397
    do_iter_readv_writev+0x600/0x880
    vfs_writev+0x376/0xba0 fs/read_write.c:1050
    do_pwritev fs/read_write.c:1146 [inline]
    __do_sys_pwritev2 fs/read_write.c:1204 [inline]
    __se_sys_pwritev2+0x196/0x2b0 fs/read_write.c:1195
    do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
    do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
   RIP: 0033:0x7f1281f85d29
   RSP: 002b:00007f12819fe038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000148
   RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f1282176080 RCX: 00007f1281f85d29
   RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020000240 RDI: 0000000000000005
   RBP: 00007f12819fe090 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000003
   R10: 0000000000007000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000002
   R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007f1282176080 R15: 00007ffcb9e23328
    </TASK>
   Modules linked in:
   ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
   RIP: 0010:btrfs_split_ordered_extent+0xd8d/0xe20 fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c:1234
   RSP: 0018:ffffc9000d1df2b8 EFLAGS: 00010246
   RAX: 0000000000000057 RBX: 000000000006a000 RCX: 9ce21886c4195300
   RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000080000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
   RBP: 0000000000000091 R08: ffffffff817f0a3c R09: 1ffff92001a3bdf4
   R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff52001a3bdf5 R12: 1ffff1100a45f401
   R13: ffff8880522fa018 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: 000000000006a000
   FS:  00007f12819fe6c0(0000) GS:ffff88801fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
   CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
   CR2: 0000557750bd7da8 CR3: 00000000400ea000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0
   DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
   DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400

In this case the transaction abort was due to (an injected) memory
allocation failure when attempting to allocate a new chunk.

Reported-by: [email protected]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/[email protected]/
Fixes: 52b1fdc ("btrfs: handle completed ordered extents in btrfs_split_ordered_extent")
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
GallaisPoutine pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 3, 2025
Fix deadlock in job submission and abort handling.
When a thread aborts currently executing jobs due to a fault,
it first locks the global lock protecting submitted_jobs (#1).

After the last job is destroyed, it proceeds to release the related context
and locks file_priv (#2). Meanwhile, in the job submission thread,
the file_priv lock (#2) is taken first, and then the submitted_jobs
lock (#1) is obtained when a job is added to the submitted jobs list.

       CPU0                            CPU1
       ----                    	       ----
  (for example due to a fault)         (jobs submissions keep coming)

  lock(&vdev->submitted_jobs_lock) #1
  ivpu_jobs_abort_all()
  job_destroy()
                                      lock(&file_priv->lock)           #2
                                      lock(&vdev->submitted_jobs_lock) #1
  file_priv_release()
  lock(&vdev->context_list_lock)
  lock(&file_priv->lock)           #2

This order of locking causes a deadlock. To resolve this issue,
change the order of locking in ivpu_job_submit().

Signed-off-by: Karol Wachowski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Maciej Falkowski <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jacek Lawrynowicz <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jacek Lawrynowicz <[email protected]>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected]
avolmat pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 9, 2025
On some systems, the same CPU (with the same APIC ID) is assigned a
different logical CPU id after commit ec9aedb ("x86/acpi: Ignore
invalid x2APIC entries").

This means that Linux enumerates the CPUs in a different order, which
violates ACPI specification[1] that states:

  "OSPM should initialize processors in the order that they appear in
   the MADT"

The problematic commit parses all LAPIC entries before any x2APIC
entries, aiming to ignore x2APIC entries with APIC ID < 255 when valid
LAPIC entries exist. However, it disrupts the CPU enumeration order on
systems where x2APIC entries precede LAPIC entries in the MADT.

Fix this problem by:

 1) Parsing LAPIC entries first without registering them in the
    topology to evaluate whether valid LAPIC entries exist.

 2) Restoring the MADT in order parser which invokes either the LAPIC
    or the X2APIC parser function depending on the entry type.

The X2APIC parser still ignores entries < 0xff in case that #1 found
valid LAPIC entries independent of their position in the MADT table.

Link: https://uefi.org/specs/ACPI/6.5/05_ACPI_Software_Programming_Model.html#madt-processor-local-apic-sapic-structure-entry-order
Cc: All applicable <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Jim Mattson <[email protected]>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
Fixes: ec9aedb ("x86/acpi: Ignore invalid x2APIC entries")
Signed-off-by: Zhang Rui <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Jim Mattson <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
avolmat pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 9, 2025
Add read memory barrier to ensure the order of operations when accessing
control queue descriptors. Specifically, we want to avoid cases where loads
can be reordered:

1. Load #1 is dispatched to read descriptor flags.
2. Load #2 is dispatched to read some other field from the descriptor.
3. Load #2 completes, accessing memory/cache at a point in time when the DD
   flag is zero.
4. NIC DMA overwrites the descriptor, now the DD flag is one.
5. Any fields loaded before step 4 are now inconsistent with the actual
   descriptor state.

Add read memory barrier between steps 1 and 2, so that load #2 is not
executed until load #1 has completed.

Fixes: 8077c72 ("idpf: add controlq init and reset checks")
Reviewed-by: Przemek Kitszel <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sridhar Samudrala <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Lance Richardson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Emil Tantilov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Krishneil Singh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]>
avolmat pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 9, 2025
When testing the atomic write fix patches, the f2fs_bug_on was
triggered as below:

------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/inode.c:935!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 257 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.13.0-rc1-00033-gc283a70d3497 #5
RIP: 0010:f2fs_evict_inode+0x50f/0x520
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 ? __die_body+0x65/0xb0
 ? die+0x9f/0xc0
 ? do_trap+0xa1/0x170
 ? f2fs_evict_inode+0x50f/0x520
 ? f2fs_evict_inode+0x50f/0x520
 ? handle_invalid_op+0x65/0x80
 ? f2fs_evict_inode+0x50f/0x520
 ? exc_invalid_op+0x39/0x50
 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
 ? __pfx_f2fs_get_dquots+0x10/0x10
 ? f2fs_evict_inode+0x50f/0x520
 ? f2fs_evict_inode+0x2e5/0x520
 evict+0x186/0x2f0
 prune_icache_sb+0x75/0xb0
 super_cache_scan+0x1a8/0x200
 do_shrink_slab+0x163/0x320
 shrink_slab+0x2fc/0x470
 drop_slab+0x82/0xf0
 drop_caches_sysctl_handler+0x4e/0xb0
 proc_sys_call_handler+0x183/0x280
 vfs_write+0x36d/0x450
 ksys_write+0x68/0xd0
 do_syscall_64+0xc8/0x1a0
 ? arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x11/0x60
 ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x7e/0xa0

The root cause is: f2fs uses FI_ATOMIC_DIRTIED to indicate dirty
atomic files during commit. If the inode is dirtied during commit,
such as by f2fs_i_pino_write, the vfs inode keeps clean and the
f2fs inode is set to FI_DIRTY_INODE. The FI_DIRTY_INODE flag cann't
be cleared by write_inode later due to the clean vfs inode. Finally,
f2fs_bug_on is triggered due to this inconsistent state when evict.

To reproduce this situation:
- fd = open("/mnt/test.db", O_WRONLY)
- ioctl(fd, F2FS_IOC_START_ATOMIC_WRITE)
- mv /mnt/test.db /mnt/test1.db
- ioctl(fd, F2FS_IOC_COMMIT_ATOMIC_WRITE)
- echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches

To fix this problem, clear FI_DIRTY_INODE after commit, then
f2fs_mark_inode_dirty_sync will ensure a consistent dirty state.

Fixes: fccaa81 ("f2fs: prevent atomic file from being dirtied before commit")
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jianan Huang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
avolmat pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 9, 2025
…g_info

syz reported:

(syz-executor404,5313,0):ocfs2_truncate_log_append:5874 ERROR: bug
expression: tl_count > ocfs2_truncate_recs_per_inode(osb->sb) ||
tl_count == 0
(syz-executor404,5313,0):ocfs2_truncate_log_append:5874 ERROR: Truncate
record count on torvalds#77 invalid wanted 39, actual 2087
------------[ cut here  ]------------
kernel BUG at fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:5874!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5313 Comm: syz-executor404 Not tainted
6.12.0-rc5-syzkaller-00299-g11066801dd4b #0
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS
1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:ocfs2_truncate_log_append+0x9a8/0x9c0 fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:5868
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000cf16f40 EFLAGS: 00010292
RAX: b4b54f1d10640800 RBX: 0000000000000027 RCX: b4b54f1d10640800
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000080000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffffc9000cf17070 R08: ffffffff8174a14c R09: 1ffff11003f8519a
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed1003f8519b R12: 1ffff110085f5f58
R13: ffffff3800000000 R14: 000000000000004d R15: ffff8880438f0008
FS:  00005555722df380(0000) GS:ffff88801fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000000002000f000 CR3: 000000004010e000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
ocfs2_remove_btree_range+0x1303/0x1860 fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:5789
ocfs2_remove_inode_range+0xff3/0x29f0 fs/ocfs2/file.c:1907
ocfs2_reflink_remap_extent fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c:4537 [inline]
ocfs2_reflink_remap_blocks+0xcd4/0x1f30 fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c:4684
ocfs2_remap_file_range+0x5fa/0x8d0 fs/ocfs2/file.c:2736
vfs_copy_file_range+0xc07/0x1510 fs/read_write.c:1615
__do_sys_copy_file_range fs/read_write.c:1705 [inline]
__se_sys_copy_file_range+0x3f2/0x5d0 fs/read_write.c:1668
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fd327167af9
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 61 17 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89
f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01
f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffe6b8e22e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000146
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fd3271b005e RCX: 00007fd327167af9
RDX: 0000000000000006 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 00007fd3271de610 R08: 000000000000d8c2 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000020000640 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: 00007ffe6b8e24b8 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001
</TASK>

The fuzz image has a truncate log inode whose tl_count is bigger than
ocfs2_truncate_recs_per_inode() so it triggers the BUG in
ocfs2_truncate_log_append().

As what the check in ocfs2_truncate_log_append() does, just do same check
into ocfs2_get_truncate_log_info when truncate log inode is reading in so
we can bail out earlier.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Su Yue <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Liebes Wang <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/ocfs2-devel/CADCV8souQhdP0RdQF1U7KTWtuHDfpn+3LnTt-EEuMmB-pMRrgQ@mail.gmail.com/T/#u
Reported-by: [email protected]
Tested-by: [email protected]
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <[email protected]>
Cc: Joel Becker <[email protected]>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]>
Cc: Changwei Ge <[email protected]>
Cc: Jun Piao <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
avolmat pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 9, 2025
In "one-shot" mode, turbostat
1. takes a counter snapshot
2. forks and waits for a child
3. takes the end counter snapshot and prints the result.

But turbostat counter snapshots currently use affinity to travel
around the system so that counter reads are "local", and this
affinity must be cleared between #1 and #2 above.

The offending commit removed that reset that allowed the child
to run on cpu_present_set.

Fix that issue, and improve upon the original by using
cpu_possible_set for the child.  This allows the child
to also run on CPUs that hotplug online during its runtime.

Reported-by: Zhang Rui <[email protected]>
Fixes: 7bb3fe2 ("tools/power/turbostat: Obey allowed CPUs during startup")
Signed-off-by: Len Brown <[email protected]>
avolmat pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 9, 2025
libtraceevent parses and returns an array of argument fields, sometimes
larger than RAW_SYSCALL_ARGS_NUM (6) because it includes "__syscall_nr",
idx will traverse to index 6 (7th element) whereas sc->fmt->arg holds 6
elements max, creating an out-of-bounds access. This runtime error is
found by UBsan. The error message:

  $ sudo UBSAN_OPTIONS=print_stacktrace=1 ./perf trace -a --max-events=1
  builtin-trace.c:1966:35: runtime error: index 6 out of bounds for type 'syscall_arg_fmt [6]'
    #0 0x5c04956be5fe in syscall__alloc_arg_fmts /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:1966
    #1 0x5c04956c0510 in trace__read_syscall_info /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:2110
    #2 0x5c04956c372b in trace__syscall_info /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:2436
    #3 0x5c04956d2f39 in trace__init_syscalls_bpf_prog_array_maps /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3897
    #4 0x5c04956d6d25 in trace__run /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:4335
    #5 0x5c04956e112e in cmd_trace /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:5502
    #6 0x5c04956eda7d in run_builtin /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:351
    #7 0x5c04956ee0a8 in handle_internal_command /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:404
    #8 0x5c04956ee37f in run_argv /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:448
    #9 0x5c04956ee8e9 in main /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:556
    #10 0x79eb3622a3b7 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58
    #11 0x79eb3622a47a in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360
    torvalds#12 0x5c04955422d4 in _start (/home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf+0x4e02d4) (BuildId: 5b6cab2d59e96a4341741765ad6914a4d784dbc6)

     0.000 ( 0.014 ms): Chrome_ChildIO/117244 write(fd: 238, buf: !, count: 1)                                      = 1

Fixes: 5e58fcf ("perf trace: Allow allocating sc->arg_fmt even without the syscall tracepoint")
Signed-off-by: Howard Chu <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
avolmat pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 9, 2025
This fixes the following hard lockup in isolate_lru_folios() during memory
reclaim.  If the LRU mostly contains ineligible folios this may trigger
watchdog.

watchdog: Watchdog detected hard LOCKUP on cpu 173
RIP: 0010:native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x255/0x2a0
Call Trace:
	_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x31/0x40
	folio_lruvec_lock_irqsave+0x5f/0x90
	folio_batch_move_lru+0x91/0x150
	lru_add_drain_per_cpu+0x1c/0x40
	process_one_work+0x17d/0x350
	worker_thread+0x27b/0x3a0
	kthread+0xe8/0x120
	ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50
	ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30

lruvec->lru_lock owner:

PID: 2865     TASK: ffff888139214d40  CPU: 40   COMMAND: "kswapd0"
 #0 [fffffe0000945e60] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffffa567a555
 #1 [fffffe0000945e68] nmi_handle at ffffffffa563b171
 #2 [fffffe0000945eb0] default_do_nmi at ffffffffa6575920
 #3 [fffffe0000945ed0] exc_nmi at ffffffffa6575af4
 #4 [fffffe0000945ef0] end_repeat_nmi at ffffffffa6601dde
    [exception RIP: isolate_lru_folios+403]
    RIP: ffffffffa597df53  RSP: ffffc90006fb7c28  RFLAGS: 00000002
    RAX: 0000000000000001  RBX: ffffc90006fb7c60  RCX: ffffea04a2196f88
    RDX: ffffc90006fb7c60  RSI: ffffc90006fb7c60  RDI: ffffea04a2197048
    RBP: ffff88812cbd3010   R8: ffffea04a2197008   R9: 0000000000000001
    R10: 0000000000000000  R11: 0000000000000001  R12: ffffea04a2197008
    R13: ffffea04a2197048  R14: ffffc90006fb7de8  R15: 0000000003e3e937
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
    <NMI exception stack>
 #5 [ffffc90006fb7c28] isolate_lru_folios at ffffffffa597df53
 #6 [ffffc90006fb7cf8] shrink_active_list at ffffffffa597f788
 #7 [ffffc90006fb7da8] balance_pgdat at ffffffffa5986db0
 #8 [ffffc90006fb7ec0] kswapd at ffffffffa5987354
 #9 [ffffc90006fb7ef8] kthread at ffffffffa5748238
crash>

Scenario:
User processe are requesting a large amount of memory and keep page active.
Then a module continuously requests memory from ZONE_DMA32 area.
Memory reclaim will be triggered due to ZONE_DMA32 watermark alarm reached.
However pages in the LRU(active_anon) list are mostly from
the ZONE_NORMAL area.

Reproduce:
Terminal 1: Construct to continuously increase pages active(anon).
mkdir /tmp/memory
mount -t tmpfs -o size=1024000M tmpfs /tmp/memory
dd if=/dev/zero of=/tmp/memory/block bs=4M
tail /tmp/memory/block

Terminal 2:
vmstat -a 1
active will increase.
procs ---memory--- ---swap-- ---io---- -system-- ---cpu--- ...
 r  b   swpd   free  inact active   si   so    bi    bo
 1  0   0 1445623076 45898836 83646008    0    0     0
 1  0   0 1445623076 43450228 86094616    0    0     0
 1  0   0 1445623076 41003480 88541364    0    0     0
 1  0   0 1445623076 38557088 90987756    0    0     0
 1  0   0 1445623076 36109688 93435156    0    0     0
 1  0   0 1445619552 33663256 95881632    0    0     0
 1  0   0 1445619804 31217140 98327792    0    0     0
 1  0   0 1445619804 28769988 100774944    0    0     0
 1  0   0 1445619804 26322348 103222584    0    0     0
 1  0   0 1445619804 23875592 105669340    0    0     0

cat /proc/meminfo | head
Active(anon) increase.
MemTotal:       1579941036 kB
MemFree:        1445618500 kB
MemAvailable:   1453013224 kB
Buffers:            6516 kB
Cached:         128653956 kB
SwapCached:            0 kB
Active:         118110812 kB
Inactive:       11436620 kB
Active(anon):   115345744 kB
Inactive(anon):   945292 kB

When the Active(anon) is 115345744 kB, insmod module triggers
the ZONE_DMA32 watermark.

perf record -e vmscan:mm_vmscan_lru_isolate -aR
perf script
isolate_mode=0 classzone=1 order=1 nr_requested=32 nr_scanned=2
nr_skipped=2 nr_taken=0 lru=active_anon
isolate_mode=0 classzone=1 order=1 nr_requested=32 nr_scanned=0
nr_skipped=0 nr_taken=0 lru=active_anon
isolate_mode=0 classzone=1 order=0 nr_requested=32 nr_scanned=28835844
nr_skipped=28835844 nr_taken=0 lru=active_anon
isolate_mode=0 classzone=1 order=1 nr_requested=32 nr_scanned=28835844
nr_skipped=28835844 nr_taken=0 lru=active_anon
isolate_mode=0 classzone=1 order=0 nr_requested=32 nr_scanned=29
nr_skipped=29 nr_taken=0 lru=active_anon
isolate_mode=0 classzone=1 order=0 nr_requested=32 nr_scanned=0
nr_skipped=0 nr_taken=0 lru=active_anon

See nr_scanned=28835844.
28835844 * 4k = 115343376KB approximately equal to 115345744 kB.

If increase Active(anon) to 1000G then insmod module triggers
the ZONE_DMA32 watermark. hard lockup will occur.

In my device nr_scanned = 0000000003e3e937 when hard lockup.
Convert to memory size 0x0000000003e3e937 * 4KB = 261072092 KB.

   [ffffc90006fb7c28] isolate_lru_folios at ffffffffa597df53
    ffffc90006fb7c30: 0000000000000020 0000000000000000
    ffffc90006fb7c40: ffffc90006fb7d40 ffff88812cbd3000
    ffffc90006fb7c50: ffffc90006fb7d30 0000000106fb7de8
    ffffc90006fb7c60: ffffea04a2197008 ffffea0006ed4a48
    ffffc90006fb7c70: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
    ffffc90006fb7c80: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
    ffffc90006fb7c90: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
    ffffc90006fb7ca0: 0000000000000000 0000000003e3e937
    ffffc90006fb7cb0: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
    ffffc90006fb7cc0: 8d7c0b56b7874b00 ffff88812cbd3000

About the Fixes:
Why did it take eight years to be discovered?

The problem requires the following conditions to occur:
1. The device memory should be large enough.
2. Pages in the LRU(active_anon) list are mostly from the ZONE_NORMAL area.
3. The memory in ZONE_DMA32 needs to reach the watermark.

If the memory is not large enough, or if the usage design of ZONE_DMA32
area memory is reasonable, this problem is difficult to detect.

notes:
The problem is most likely to occur in ZONE_DMA32 and ZONE_NORMAL,
but other suitable scenarios may also trigger the problem.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: b2e1875 ("mm, vmscan: begin reclaiming pages on a per-node basis")
Signed-off-by: liuye <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Yang Shi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
avolmat pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 9, 2025
devm_platform_profile_register() expects a pointer to the private driver
data but instead an address of the pointer variable is passed due to a
typo. This leads to the crashes later:

BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00000000fe0d0044
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 1284 Comm: tuned Tainted: G        W          6.13.0+ #7
Tainted: [W]=WARN
Hardware name: LENOVO 21D0/LNVNB161216, BIOS J6CN45WW 03/17/2023
RIP: 0010:__mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x6bf/0x7f0
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dytc_profile_set+0x4a/0x140 [ideapad_laptop]
 _store_and_notify+0x13/0x40 [platform_profile]
 class_for_each_device+0x145/0x180
 platform_profile_store+0xc0/0x130 [platform_profile]
 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x13e/0x1f0
 vfs_write+0x290/0x450
 ksys_write+0x6c/0xe0
 do_syscall_64+0x82/0x160
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org).

Fixes: 249c576 ("ACPI: platform_profile: Let drivers set drvdata to the class device")
Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Borja <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen <[email protected]>
avolmat pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 9, 2025
…t/tnguy/net-queue

Tony Nguyen says:

====================
ice: fix Rx data path for heavy 9k MTU traffic

Maciej Fijalkowski says:

This patchset fixes a pretty nasty issue that was reported by RedHat
folks which occurred after ~30 minutes (this value varied, just trying
here to state that it was not observed immediately but rather after a
considerable longer amount of time) when ice driver was tortured with
jumbo frames via mix of iperf traffic executed simultaneously with
wrk/nginx on client/server sides (HTTP and TCP workloads basically).

The reported splats were spanning across all the bad things that can
happen to the state of page - refcount underflow, use-after-free, etc.
One of these looked as follows:

[ 2084.019891] BUG: Bad page state in process swapper/34  pfn:97fcd0
[ 2084.025990] page:00000000a60ee772 refcount:-1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x97fcd0
[ 2084.035462] flags: 0x17ffffc0000000(node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
[ 2084.041990] raw: 0017ffffc0000000 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
[ 2084.049730] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 2084.057468] page dumped because: nonzero _refcount
[ 2084.062260] Modules linked in: bonding tls sunrpc intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common intel_uncore_frequency intel_uncore_frequency_common i10nm_edac nfit libnvdimm x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp kvm_intel kvm mgag200 irqd
[ 2084.137829] CPU: 34 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/34 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.14.0-427.37.1.el9_4.x86_64 #1
[ 2084.147039] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R750/0216NK, BIOS 1.13.2 12/19/2023
[ 2084.154604] Call Trace:
[ 2084.157058]  <IRQ>
[ 2084.159080]  dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x48
[ 2084.162752]  bad_page.cold+0x63/0x94
[ 2084.166333]  check_new_pages+0xb3/0xe0
[ 2084.170083]  rmqueue_bulk+0x2d2/0x9e0
[ 2084.173749]  ? ktime_get+0x35/0xa0
[ 2084.177159]  rmqueue_pcplist+0x13b/0x210
[ 2084.181081]  rmqueue+0x7d3/0xd40
[ 2084.184316]  ? xas_load+0x9/0xa0
[ 2084.187547]  ? xas_find+0x183/0x1d0
[ 2084.191041]  ? xa_find_after+0xd0/0x130
[ 2084.194879]  ? intel_iommu_iotlb_sync_map+0x89/0xe0
[ 2084.199759]  get_page_from_freelist+0x11f/0x530
[ 2084.204291]  __alloc_pages+0xf2/0x250
[ 2084.207958]  ice_alloc_rx_bufs+0xcc/0x1c0 [ice]
[ 2084.212543]  ice_clean_rx_irq+0x631/0xa20 [ice]
[ 2084.217111]  ice_napi_poll+0xdf/0x2a0 [ice]
[ 2084.221330]  __napi_poll+0x27/0x170
[ 2084.224824]  net_rx_action+0x233/0x2f0
[ 2084.228575]  __do_softirq+0xc7/0x2ac
[ 2084.232155]  __irq_exit_rcu+0xa1/0xc0
[ 2084.235821]  common_interrupt+0x80/0xa0
[ 2084.239662]  </IRQ>
[ 2084.241768]  <TASK>

The fix is mostly about reverting what was done in commit 1dc1a7e
("ice: Centrallize Rx buffer recycling") followed by proper timing on
page_count() storage and then removing the ice_rx_buf::act related logic
(which was mostly introduced for purposes from cited commit).

Special thanks to Xu Du for providing reproducer and Jacob Keller for
initial extensive analysis.

* '100GbE' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tnguy/net-queue:
  ice: stop storing XDP verdict within ice_rx_buf
  ice: gather page_count()'s of each frag right before XDP prog call
  ice: put Rx buffers after being done with current frame
====================

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
avolmat pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 9, 2025
Filesystems can write to disk from page reclaim with __GFP_FS
set. Marc found a case where scsi_realloc_sdev_budget_map() ends up in
page reclaim with GFP_KERNEL, where it could try to take filesystem
locks again, leading to a deadlock.

WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.13.0 #1 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
kswapd0/70 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff8881025d5d78 (&q->q_usage_counter(io)){++++}-{0:0}, at: blk_mq_submit_bio+0x461/0x6e0

but task is already holding lock:
ffffffff81ef5f40 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: balance_pgdat+0x9f/0x760

The full lockdep splat can be found in Marc's report:

https://lkml.org/lkml/2025/1/24/1101

Avoid the potential deadlock by doing the allocation with GFP_NOIO, which
prevents both filesystem and block layer recursion.

Reported-by: Marc Aurèle La France <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250129104525.0ae8421e@fangorn
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
GallaisPoutine pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 28, 2025
Since commit 6037802 ("power: supply: core: implement extension API")
there is the following ABBA deadlock (simplified) between the LED trigger
code and the power-supply code:

1) When registering a power-supply class device, power_supply_register()
calls led_trigger_register() from power_supply_create_triggers() in
a scoped_guard(rwsem_read, &psy->extensions_sem) context.
led_trigger_register() then in turn takes a LED subsystem lock.
So here we have the following locking order:

* Read-lock extensions_sem
* Lock LED subsystem lock(s)

2) When registering a LED class device, with its default trigger set
to a power-supply LED trigger (which has already been registered)
The LED class code calls power_supply_led_trigger_activate() when
setting up the default trigger. power_supply_led_trigger_activate()
calls power_supply_get_property() to determine the initial value of
to assign to the LED and that read-locks extensions_sem. So now we
have the following locking order:

* Lock LED subsystem lock(s)
* Read-lock extensions_sem

Fixing this is easy, there is no need to hold the extensions_sem when
calling power_supply_create_triggers() since all triggers are always
created rather then checking for the presence of certain attributes as
power_supply_add_hwmon_sysfs() does. Move power_supply_create_triggers()
out of the guard block to fix this.

Here is the lockdep report fixed by this change:

[   31.249343] ======================================================
[   31.249378] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[   31.249413] 6.13.0-rc6+ torvalds#251 Tainted: G         C  E
[   31.249440] ------------------------------------------------------
[   31.249471] (udev-worker)/553 is trying to acquire lock:
[   31.249501] ffff892adbcaf660 (&psy->extensions_sem){.+.+}-{4:4}, at: power_supply_get_property.part.0+0x22/0x150
[   31.249574]
               but task is already holding lock:
[   31.249603] ffff892adbc0bad0 (&led_cdev->trigger_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: led_trigger_set_default+0x34/0xe0
[   31.249657]
               which lock already depends on the new lock.

[   31.249696]
               the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[   31.249735]
               -> #2 (&led_cdev->trigger_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}:
[   31.249778]        down_write+0x3b/0xd0
[   31.249803]        led_trigger_set_default+0x34/0xe0
[   31.249833]        led_classdev_register_ext+0x311/0x3a0
[   31.249863]        input_leds_connect+0x1dc/0x2a0
[   31.249889]        input_attach_handler.isra.0+0x75/0x90
[   31.249921]        input_register_device.cold+0xa1/0x150
[   31.249955]        hidinput_connect+0x8a2/0xb80
[   31.249982]        hid_connect+0x582/0x5c0
[   31.250007]        hid_hw_start+0x3f/0x60
[   31.250030]        hid_device_probe+0x122/0x1f0
[   31.250053]        really_probe+0xde/0x340
[   31.250080]        __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x110
[   31.250105]        driver_probe_device+0x1f/0xa0
[   31.250132]        __device_attach_driver+0x85/0x110
[   31.250160]        bus_for_each_drv+0x78/0xc0
[   31.250184]        __device_attach+0xb0/0x1b0
[   31.250207]        bus_probe_device+0x94/0xb0
[   31.250230]        device_add+0x64a/0x860
[   31.250252]        hid_add_device+0xe5/0x240
[   31.250279]        usbhid_probe+0x4dc/0x620
[   31.250303]        usb_probe_interface+0xe4/0x2a0
[   31.250329]        really_probe+0xde/0x340
[   31.250353]        __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x110
[   31.250377]        driver_probe_device+0x1f/0xa0
[   31.250404]        __device_attach_driver+0x85/0x110
[   31.250431]        bus_for_each_drv+0x78/0xc0
[   31.250455]        __device_attach+0xb0/0x1b0
[   31.250478]        bus_probe_device+0x94/0xb0
[   31.250501]        device_add+0x64a/0x860
[   31.250523]        usb_set_configuration+0x606/0x8a0
[   31.250552]        usb_generic_driver_probe+0x3e/0x60
[   31.250579]        usb_probe_device+0x3d/0x120
[   31.250605]        really_probe+0xde/0x340
[   31.250629]        __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x110
[   31.250653]        driver_probe_device+0x1f/0xa0
[   31.250680]        __device_attach_driver+0x85/0x110
[   31.250707]        bus_for_each_drv+0x78/0xc0
[   31.250731]        __device_attach+0xb0/0x1b0
[   31.250753]        bus_probe_device+0x94/0xb0
[   31.250776]        device_add+0x64a/0x860
[   31.250798]        usb_new_device.cold+0x141/0x38f
[   31.250828]        hub_event+0x1166/0x1980
[   31.250854]        process_one_work+0x20f/0x580
[   31.250879]        worker_thread+0x1d1/0x3b0
[   31.250904]        kthread+0xee/0x120
[   31.250926]        ret_from_fork+0x30/0x50
[   31.250954]        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[   31.250982]
               -> #1 (triggers_list_lock){++++}-{4:4}:
[   31.251022]        down_write+0x3b/0xd0
[   31.251045]        led_trigger_register+0x40/0x1b0
[   31.251074]        power_supply_register_led_trigger+0x88/0x150
[   31.251107]        power_supply_create_triggers+0x55/0xe0
[   31.251135]        __power_supply_register.part.0+0x34e/0x4a0
[   31.251164]        devm_power_supply_register+0x70/0xc0
[   31.251190]        bq27xxx_battery_setup+0x1a1/0x6d0 [bq27xxx_battery]
[   31.251235]        bq27xxx_battery_i2c_probe+0xe5/0x17f [bq27xxx_battery_i2c]
[   31.251272]        i2c_device_probe+0x125/0x2b0
[   31.251299]        really_probe+0xde/0x340
[   31.251324]        __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x110
[   31.251348]        driver_probe_device+0x1f/0xa0
[   31.251375]        __driver_attach+0xba/0x1c0
[   31.251398]        bus_for_each_dev+0x6b/0xb0
[   31.251421]        bus_add_driver+0x111/0x1f0
[   31.251445]        driver_register+0x6e/0xc0
[   31.251470]        i2c_register_driver+0x41/0xb0
[   31.251498]        do_one_initcall+0x5e/0x3a0
[   31.251522]        do_init_module+0x60/0x220
[   31.251550]        __do_sys_init_module+0x15f/0x190
[   31.251575]        do_syscall_64+0x93/0x180
[   31.251598]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[   31.251629]
               -> #0 (&psy->extensions_sem){.+.+}-{4:4}:
[   31.251668]        __lock_acquire+0x13ce/0x21c0
[   31.251694]        lock_acquire+0xcf/0x2e0
[   31.251719]        down_read+0x3e/0x170
[   31.251741]        power_supply_get_property.part.0+0x22/0x150
[   31.251774]        power_supply_update_leds+0x8d/0x230
[   31.251804]        power_supply_led_trigger_activate+0x18/0x20
[   31.251837]        led_trigger_set+0x1fc/0x300
[   31.251863]        led_trigger_set_default+0x90/0xe0
[   31.251892]        led_classdev_register_ext+0x311/0x3a0
[   31.251921]        devm_led_classdev_multicolor_register_ext+0x6e/0xb80 [led_class_multicolor]
[   31.251969]        ktd202x_probe+0x464/0x5c0 [leds_ktd202x]
[   31.252002]        i2c_device_probe+0x125/0x2b0
[   31.252027]        really_probe+0xde/0x340
[   31.252052]        __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x110
[   31.252076]        driver_probe_device+0x1f/0xa0
[   31.252103]        __driver_attach+0xba/0x1c0
[   31.252125]        bus_for_each_dev+0x6b/0xb0
[   31.252148]        bus_add_driver+0x111/0x1f0
[   31.252172]        driver_register+0x6e/0xc0
[   31.252197]        i2c_register_driver+0x41/0xb0
[   31.252225]        do_one_initcall+0x5e/0x3a0
[   31.252248]        do_init_module+0x60/0x220
[   31.252274]        __do_sys_init_module+0x15f/0x190
[   31.253986]        do_syscall_64+0x93/0x180
[   31.255826]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[   31.257614]
               other info that might help us debug this:

[   31.257619] Chain exists of:
                 &psy->extensions_sem --> triggers_list_lock --> &led_cdev->trigger_lock

[   31.257630]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

[   31.257632]        CPU0                    CPU1
[   31.257633]        ----                    ----
[   31.257634]   lock(&led_cdev->trigger_lock);
[   31.257637]                                lock(triggers_list_lock);
[   31.257640]                                lock(&led_cdev->trigger_lock);
[   31.257643]   rlock(&psy->extensions_sem);
[   31.257646]
                *** DEADLOCK ***

[   31.289433] 4 locks held by (udev-worker)/553:
[   31.289443]  #0: ffff892ad9658108 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: __driver_attach+0xaf/0x1c0
[   31.289463]  #1: ffff892adbc0bbc8 (&led_cdev->led_access){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: led_classdev_register_ext+0x1c7/0x3a0
[   31.289476]  #2: ffffffffad0e30b0 (triggers_list_lock){++++}-{4:4}, at: led_trigger_set_default+0x2c/0xe0
[   31.289487]  #3: ffff892adbc0bad0 (&led_cdev->trigger_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: led_trigger_set_default+0x34/0xe0

Fixes: 6037802 ("power: supply: core: implement extension API")
Cc: Thomas Weißschuh <[email protected]>
Cc: Armin Wolf <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Weißschuh <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Reichel <[email protected]>
GallaisPoutine pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 28, 2025
…faces

Robert Morris created a test program which can cause
usb_hub_to_struct_hub() to dereference a NULL or inappropriate
pointer:

Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
0xcccccccccccccccc: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC PTI
CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 117 Comm: kworker/7:1 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc3-00017-gf44d154d6e3d torvalds#14
Hardware name: FreeBSD BHYVE/BHYVE, BIOS 14.0 10/17/2021
Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event
RIP: 0010:usb_hub_adjust_deviceremovable+0x78/0x110
...
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 ? die_addr+0x31/0x80
 ? exc_general_protection+0x1b4/0x3c0
 ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30
 ? usb_hub_adjust_deviceremovable+0x78/0x110
 hub_probe+0x7c7/0xab0
 usb_probe_interface+0x14b/0x350
 really_probe+0xd0/0x2d0
 ? __pfx___device_attach_driver+0x10/0x10
 __driver_probe_device+0x6e/0x110
 driver_probe_device+0x1a/0x90
 __device_attach_driver+0x7e/0xc0
 bus_for_each_drv+0x7f/0xd0
 __device_attach+0xaa/0x1a0
 bus_probe_device+0x8b/0xa0
 device_add+0x62e/0x810
 usb_set_configuration+0x65d/0x990
 usb_generic_driver_probe+0x4b/0x70
 usb_probe_device+0x36/0xd0

The cause of this error is that the device has two interfaces, and the
hub driver binds to interface 1 instead of interface 0, which is where
usb_hub_to_struct_hub() looks.

We can prevent the problem from occurring by refusing to accept hub
devices that violate the USB spec by having more than one
configuration or interface.

Reported-and-tested-by: Robert Morris <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-usb/95564.1737394039@localhost/
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
GallaisPoutine pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 28, 2025
Protected mode assumes that at minimum vgic-v3 is present, however KVM
fails to actually enforce this at the time of initialization. As such,
when running protected mode in a half-baked state on GICv2 hardware we
see the hyp go belly up at vcpu_load() when it tries to restore the
vgic-v3 cpuif:

  $ ./arch_timer_edge_cases
  [  130.599140] kvm [4518]: nVHE hyp panic at: [<ffff800081102b58>] __kvm_nvhe___vgic_v3_restore_vmcr_aprs+0x8/0x84!
  [  130.603685] kvm [4518]: Cannot dump pKVM nVHE stacktrace: !CONFIG_PROTECTED_NVHE_STACKTRACE
  [  130.611962] kvm [4518]: Hyp Offset: 0xfffeca95ed000000
  [  130.617053] Kernel panic - not syncing: HYP panic:
  [  130.617053] PS:800003c9 PC:0000b56a94102b58 ESR:0000000002000000
  [  130.617053] FAR:ffff00007b98d4d0 HPFAR:00000000007b98d0 PAR:0000000000000000
  [  130.617053] VCPU:0000000000000000
  [  130.638013] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 4518 Comm: arch_timer_edge Tainted: G         C         6.13.0-rc3-00009-gf7d03fcbf1f4 #1
  [  130.648790] Tainted: [C]=CRAP
  [  130.651721] Hardware name: Libre Computer AML-S905X-CC (DT)
  [  130.657242] Call trace:
  [  130.659656]  show_stack+0x18/0x24 (C)
  [  130.663279]  dump_stack_lvl+0x38/0x90
  [  130.666900]  dump_stack+0x18/0x24
  [  130.670178]  panic+0x388/0x3e8
  [  130.673196]  nvhe_hyp_panic_handler+0x104/0x208
  [  130.677681]  kvm_arch_vcpu_load+0x290/0x548
  [  130.681821]  vcpu_load+0x50/0x80
  [  130.685013]  kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x30/0x868
  [  130.689498]  kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x2e0/0x974
  [  130.693293]  __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xb4/0xec
  [  130.697174]  invoke_syscall+0x48/0x110
  [  130.700883]  el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0
  [  130.705540]  do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28
  [  130.708818]  el0_svc+0x30/0xd0
  [  130.711837]  el0t_64_sync_handler+0x10c/0x138
  [  130.716149]  el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c
  [  130.719774] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
  [  130.723660] Kernel Offset: disabled
  [  130.727103] CPU features: 0x000,00000800,02800000,0200421b
  [  130.732537] Memory Limit: none
  [  130.735561] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: HYP panic:
  [  130.735561] PS:800003c9 PC:0000b56a94102b58 ESR:0000000002000000
  [  130.735561] FAR:ffff00007b98d4d0 HPFAR:00000000007b98d0 PAR:0000000000000000
  [  130.735561] VCPU:0000000000000000 ]---

Fix it by failing KVM initialization if the system doesn't implement
vgic-v3, as protected mode will never do anything useful on such
hardware.

Reported-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/kvmarm/[email protected]/
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
GallaisPoutine pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 28, 2025
…/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD

KVM/arm64 fixes for 6.14, take #1

- Correctly clean the BSS to the PoC before allowing EL2 to access it
  on nVHE/hVHE/protected configurations

- Propagate ownership of debug registers in protected mode after
  the rework that landed in 6.14-rc1

- Stop pretending that we can run the protected mode without a GICv3
  being present on the host

- Fix a use-after-free situation that can occur if a vcpu fails to
  initialise the NV shadow S2 MMU contexts

- Always evaluate the need to arm a background timer for fully emulated
  guest timers

- Fix the emulation of EL1 timers in the absence of FEAT_ECV

- Correctly handle the EL2 virtual timer, specially when HCR_EL2.E2H==0
GallaisPoutine pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 28, 2025
commit c8347f9 ("gpu: host1x: Fix boot regression for Tegra")
caused a use of uninitialized mutex leading to below warning when
CONFIG_DEBUG_MUTEXES and CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCK_ALLOC are enabled.

[   41.662843] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[   41.663012] DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(lock->magic != lock)
[   41.663035] WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 794 at kernel/locking/mutex.c:587 __mutex_lock+0x670/0x878
[   41.663458] Modules linked in: rtw88_8822c(+) bluetooth(+) rtw88_pci rtw88_core mac80211 aquantia libarc4 crc_itu_t cfg80211 tegra194_cpufreq dwmac_tegra(+) arm_dsu_pmu stmmac_platform stmmac pcs_xpcs rfkill at24 host1x(+) tegra_bpmp_thermal ramoops reed_solomon fuse loop nfnetlink xfs mmc_block rpmb_core ucsi_ccg ina3221 crct10dif_ce xhci_tegra ghash_ce lm90 sha2_ce sha256_arm64 sha1_ce sdhci_tegra pwm_fan sdhci_pltfm sdhci gpio_keys rtc_tegra cqhci mmc_core phy_tegra_xusb i2c_tegra tegra186_gpc_dma i2c_tegra_bpmp spi_tegra114 dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod
[   41.665078] CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 794 Comm: (udev-worker) Not tainted 6.11.0-29.31_1538613708.el10.aarch64+debug #1
[   41.665838] Hardware name: NVIDIA NVIDIA Jetson AGX Orin Developer Kit/Jetson, BIOS 36.3.0-gcid-35594366 02/26/2024
[   41.672555] pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[   41.679636] pc : __mutex_lock+0x670/0x878
[   41.683834] lr : __mutex_lock+0x670/0x878
[   41.688035] sp : ffff800084b77090
[   41.691446] x29: ffff800084b77160 x28: ffffdd4bebf7b000 x27: ffffdd4be96b1000
[   41.698799] x26: 1fffe0002308361c x25: 1ffff0001096ee18 x24: 0000000000000000
[   41.706149] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000002 x21: ffffdd4be6e3c7a0
[   41.713500] x20: ffff800084b770f0 x19: ffff00011841b1e8 x18: 0000000000000000
[   41.720675] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0720072007200720
[   41.728023] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000001 x12: ffff6001a96eaab3
[   41.735375] x11: 1fffe001a96eaab2 x10: ffff6001a96eaab2 x9 : ffffdd4be4838bbc
[   41.742723] x8 : 00009ffe5691554e x7 : ffff000d4b755593 x6 : 0000000000000001
[   41.749985] x5 : ffff000d4b755590 x4 : 1fffe0001d88f001 x3 : dfff800000000000
[   41.756988] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff0000ec478000
[   41.764251] Call trace:
[   41.766695]  __mutex_lock+0x670/0x878
[   41.770373]  mutex_lock_nested+0x2c/0x40
[   41.774134]  host1x_intr_start+0x54/0xf8 [host1x]
[   41.778863]  host1x_runtime_resume+0x150/0x228 [host1x]
[   41.783935]  pm_generic_runtime_resume+0x84/0xc8
[   41.788485]  __rpm_callback+0xa0/0x478
[   41.792422]  rpm_callback+0x15c/0x1a8
[   41.795922]  rpm_resume+0x698/0xc08
[   41.799597]  __pm_runtime_resume+0xa8/0x140
[   41.803621]  host1x_probe+0x810/0xbc0 [host1x]
[   41.807909]  platform_probe+0xcc/0x1a8
[   41.811845]  really_probe+0x188/0x800
[   41.815347]  __driver_probe_device+0x164/0x360
[   41.819810]  driver_probe_device+0x64/0x1a8
[   41.823834]  __driver_attach+0x180/0x490
[   41.827773]  bus_for_each_dev+0x104/0x1a0
[   41.831797]  driver_attach+0x44/0x68
[   41.835296]  bus_add_driver+0x23c/0x4e8
[   41.839235]  driver_register+0x15c/0x3a8
[   41.843170]  __platform_register_drivers+0xa4/0x208
[   41.848159]  tegra_host1x_init+0x4c/0xff8 [host1x]
[   41.853147]  do_one_initcall+0xd4/0x380
[   41.856997]  do_init_module+0x1dc/0x698
[   41.860758]  load_module+0xc70/0x1300
[   41.864435]  __do_sys_init_module+0x1a8/0x1d0
[   41.868721]  __arm64_sys_init_module+0x74/0xb0
[   41.873183]  invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0xdc/0x1e8
[   41.877997]  do_el0_svc+0x154/0x1d0
[   41.881671]  el0_svc+0x54/0x140
[   41.884820]  el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x130
[   41.889285]  el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8
[   41.892960] irq event stamp: 69737
[   41.896370] hardirqs last  enabled at (69737): [<ffffdd4be6d7768c>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x44/0xe8
[   41.905739] hardirqs last disabled at (69736): [<ffffdd4be59dcd40>] clk_enable_lock+0x98/0x198
[   41.914314] softirqs last  enabled at (68082): [<ffffdd4be466b1d0>] handle_softirqs+0x4c8/0x890
[   41.922977] softirqs last disabled at (67945): [<ffffdd4be44f02a4>] __do_softirq+0x1c/0x28
[   41.931289] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Inside the probe function when pm_runtime_enable() is called,
the PM core invokes a resume callback if the device Host1x is
in a suspended state. As it can be seen in the logs above,
this leads to host1x_intr_start() function call which is
trying to acquire a mutex lock. But, the function
host_intr_init() only gets called after the pm_runtime_enable()
where mutex is initialised leading to the use of mutex
prior to its initialisation.

Fix this by moving the mutex initialisation prior to the runtime
PM enablement function pm_runtime_enable() in probe.

Fixes: c8347f9 ("gpu: host1x: Fix boot regression for Tegra")
Signed-off-by: Rupinderjit Singh <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jon Hunter <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Jon Hunter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thierry Reding <[email protected]>
Link: https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/linux-tegra/patch/[email protected]/
GallaisPoutine pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 28, 2025
vxlan_init() must check vxlan_vnigroup_init() success
otherwise a crash happens later, spotted by syzbot.

Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000002c: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000160-0x0000000000000167]
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 7313 Comm: syz-executor147 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc1-syzkaller-00276-g69b54314c975 #0
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
 RIP: 0010:vxlan_vnigroup_uninit+0x89/0x500 drivers/net/vxlan/vxlan_vnifilter.c:912
Code: 00 48 8b 44 24 08 4c 8b b0 98 41 00 00 49 8d 86 60 01 00 00 48 89 c2 48 89 44 24 10 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 4d 04 00 00 49 8b 86 60 01 00 00 48 ba 00 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000cc1eea8 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffffffff8672effb
RDX: 000000000000002c RSI: ffffffff8672ecb9 RDI: ffff8880461b4f18
RBP: ffff8880461b4ef4 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000020000
R13: ffff8880461b0d80 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: dffffc0000000000
FS:  00007fecfa95d6c0(0000) GS:ffff88806a600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fecfa95cfb8 CR3: 000000004472c000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
  vxlan_uninit+0x1ab/0x200 drivers/net/vxlan/vxlan_core.c:2942
  unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x12d6/0x1f30 net/core/dev.c:11824
  unregister_netdevice_many net/core/dev.c:11866 [inline]
  unregister_netdevice_queue+0x307/0x3f0 net/core/dev.c:11736
  register_netdevice+0x1829/0x1eb0 net/core/dev.c:10901
  __vxlan_dev_create+0x7c6/0xa30 drivers/net/vxlan/vxlan_core.c:3981
  vxlan_newlink+0xd1/0x130 drivers/net/vxlan/vxlan_core.c:4407
  rtnl_newlink_create net/core/rtnetlink.c:3795 [inline]
  __rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3906 [inline]

Fixes: f9c4bb0 ("vxlan: vni filtering support on collect metadata device")
Reported-by: [email protected]
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/T/#u
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Roopa Prabhu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
GallaisPoutine pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 28, 2025
bch2_nocow_write_convert_unwritten is already in transaction context:

00191 ========= TEST   generic/648
00242 kernel BUG at fs/bcachefs/btree_iter.c:3332!
00242 Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
00242 Modules linked in:
00242 CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 2593 Comm: fsstress Not tainted 6.13.0-rc3-ktest-g345af8f855b7 #14403
00242 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
00242 pstate: 60001005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT +SSBS BTYPE=--)
00242 pc : __bch2_trans_get+0x120/0x410
00242 lr : __bch2_trans_get+0xcc/0x410
00242 sp : ffffff80d89af600
00242 x29: ffffff80d89af600 x28: ffffff80ddb23000 x27: 00000000fffff705
00242 x26: ffffff80ddb23028 x25: ffffff80d8903fe0 x24: ffffff80ebb30168
00242 x23: ffffff80c8aeb500 x22: 000000000000005d x21: ffffff80d8904078
00242 x20: ffffff80d8900000 x19: ffffff80da9e8000 x18: 0000000000000000
00242 x17: 64747568735f6c61 x16: 6e72756f6a20726f x15: 0000000000000028
00242 x14: 0000000000000004 x13: 000000000000f787 x12: ffffffc081bbcdc8
00242 x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000003 x9 : ffffffc08094efbc
00242 x8 : 000000001092c111 x7 : 000000000000000c x6 : ffffffc083c31fc4
00242 x5 : ffffffc083c31f28 x4 : ffffff80c8aeb500 x3 : ffffff80ebb30000
00242 x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : 0000000000000a21 x0 : 000000000000028e
00242 Call trace:
00242  __bch2_trans_get+0x120/0x410 (P)
00242  bch2_inum_offset_err_msg+0x48/0xb0
00242  bch2_nocow_write_convert_unwritten+0x3d0/0x530
00242  bch2_nocow_write+0xeb0/0x1000
00242  __bch2_write+0x330/0x4e8
00242  bch2_write+0x1f0/0x530
00242  bch2_direct_write+0x530/0xc00
00242  bch2_write_iter+0x160/0xbe0
00242  vfs_write+0x1cc/0x360
00242  ksys_write+0x5c/0xf0
00242  __arm64_sys_write+0x20/0x30
00242  invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x54/0xe8
00242  do_el0_svc+0x44/0xc0
00242  el0_svc+0x34/0xa0
00242  el0t_64_sync_handler+0x104/0x130
00242  el0t_64_sync+0x154/0x158
00242 Code: 6b01001f 54ffff01 79408460 3617fec0 (d4210000)
00242 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
00242 Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception

Signed-off-by: Alan Huang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kent Overstreet <[email protected]>
GallaisPoutine pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 28, 2025
We have several places across the kernel where we want to access another
task's syscall arguments, such as ptrace(2), seccomp(2), etc., by making
a call to syscall_get_arguments().

This works for register arguments right away by accessing the task's
`regs' member of `struct pt_regs', however for stack arguments seen with
32-bit/o32 kernels things are more complicated.  Technically they ought
to be obtained from the user stack with calls to an access_remote_vm(),
but we have an easier way available already.

So as to be able to access syscall stack arguments as regular function
arguments following the MIPS calling convention we copy them over from
the user stack to the kernel stack in arch/mips/kernel/scall32-o32.S, in
handle_sys(), to the current stack frame's outgoing argument space at
the top of the stack, which is where the handler called expects to see
its incoming arguments.  This area is also pointed at by the `pt_regs'
pointer obtained by task_pt_regs().

Make the o32 stack argument space a proper member of `struct pt_regs'
then, by renaming the existing member from `pad0' to `args' and using
generated offsets to access the space.  No functional change though.

With the change in place the o32 kernel stack frame layout at the entry
to a syscall handler invoked by handle_sys() is therefore as follows:

$sp + 68 -> |         ...         | <- pt_regs.regs[9]
            +---------------------+
$sp + 64 -> |         $t0         | <- pt_regs.regs[8]
            +---------------------+
$sp + 60 -> |   $a3/argument #4   | <- pt_regs.regs[7]
            +---------------------+
$sp + 56 -> |   $a2/argument #3   | <- pt_regs.regs[6]
            +---------------------+
$sp + 52 -> |   $a1/argument #2   | <- pt_regs.regs[5]
            +---------------------+
$sp + 48 -> |   $a0/argument #1   | <- pt_regs.regs[4]
            +---------------------+
$sp + 44 -> |         $v1         | <- pt_regs.regs[3]
            +---------------------+
$sp + 40 -> |         $v0         | <- pt_regs.regs[2]
            +---------------------+
$sp + 36 -> |         $at         | <- pt_regs.regs[1]
            +---------------------+
$sp + 32 -> |        $zero        | <- pt_regs.regs[0]
            +---------------------+
$sp + 28 -> |  stack argument #8  | <- pt_regs.args[7]
            +---------------------+
$sp + 24 -> |  stack argument #7  | <- pt_regs.args[6]
            +---------------------+
$sp + 20 -> |  stack argument #6  | <- pt_regs.args[5]
            +---------------------+
$sp + 16 -> |  stack argument #5  | <- pt_regs.args[4]
            +---------------------+
$sp + 12 -> | psABI space for $a3 | <- pt_regs.args[3]
            +---------------------+
$sp +  8 -> | psABI space for $a2 | <- pt_regs.args[2]
            +---------------------+
$sp +  4 -> | psABI space for $a1 | <- pt_regs.args[1]
            +---------------------+
$sp +  0 -> | psABI space for $a0 | <- pt_regs.args[0]
            +---------------------+

holding user data received and with the first 4 frame slots reserved by
the psABI for the compiler to spill the incoming arguments from $a0-$a3
registers (which it sometimes does according to its needs) and the next
4 frame slots designated by the psABI for any stack function arguments
that follow.  This data is also available for other tasks to peek/poke
at as reqired and where permitted.

Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <[email protected]>
GallaisPoutine pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 28, 2025
This makes ptrace/get_syscall_info selftest pass on mips o32 and
mips64 o32 by fixing the following two test assertions:

1. get_syscall_info test assertion on mips o32:
  # get_syscall_info.c:218:get_syscall_info:Expected exp_args[5] (3134521044) == info.entry.args[4] (4911432)
  # get_syscall_info.c:219:get_syscall_info:wait #1: entry stop mismatch

2. get_syscall_info test assertion on mips64 o32:
  # get_syscall_info.c:209:get_syscall_info:Expected exp_args[2] (3134324433) == info.entry.args[1] (18446744072548908753)
  # get_syscall_info.c:210:get_syscall_info:wait #1: entry stop mismatch

The first assertion happens due to mips_get_syscall_arg() trying to access
another task's context but failing to do it properly because get_user() it
calls just peeks at the current task's context.  It usually does not crash
because the default user stack always gets assigned the same VMA, but it
is pure luck which mips_get_syscall_arg() wouldn't have if e.g. the stack
was switched (via setcontext(3) or however) or a non-default process's
thread peeked at, and in any case irrelevant data is obtained just as
observed with the test case.

mips_get_syscall_arg() ought to be using access_remote_vm() instead to
retrieve the other task's stack contents, but given that the data has been
already obtained and saved in `struct pt_regs' it would be an overkill.

The first assertion is fixed for mips o32 by using struct pt_regs.args
instead of get_user() to obtain syscall arguments.  This approach works
due to this piece in arch/mips/kernel/scall32-o32.S:

        /*
         * Ok, copy the args from the luser stack to the kernel stack.
         */

        .set    push
        .set    noreorder
        .set    nomacro

    load_a4: user_lw(t5, 16(t0))		# argument #5 from usp
    load_a5: user_lw(t6, 20(t0))		# argument #6 from usp
    load_a6: user_lw(t7, 24(t0))		# argument #7 from usp
    load_a7: user_lw(t8, 28(t0))		# argument #8 from usp
    loads_done:

        sw	t5, PT_ARG4(sp)		# argument #5 to ksp
        sw	t6, PT_ARG5(sp)		# argument #6 to ksp
        sw	t7, PT_ARG6(sp)		# argument #7 to ksp
        sw	t8, PT_ARG7(sp)		# argument #8 to ksp
        .set	pop

        .section __ex_table,"a"
        PTR_WD	load_a4, bad_stack_a4
        PTR_WD	load_a5, bad_stack_a5
        PTR_WD	load_a6, bad_stack_a6
        PTR_WD	load_a7, bad_stack_a7
        .previous

arch/mips/kernel/scall64-o32.S has analogous code for mips64 o32 that
allows fixing the issue by obtaining syscall arguments from struct
pt_regs.regs[4..11] instead of the erroneous use of get_user().

The second assertion is fixed by truncating 64-bit values to 32-bit
syscall arguments.

Fixes: c0ff3c5 ("MIPS: Enable HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK.")
Signed-off-by: Dmitry V. Levin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <[email protected]>
GallaisPoutine pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 28, 2025
This fixes the following trace by reworking the locking of l2cap_conn
so instead of only locking when changing the chan_l list this promotes
chan_lock to a general lock of l2cap_conn so whenever it is being held
it would prevents the likes of l2cap_conn_del to run:

list_del corruption, ffff888021297e00->prev is LIST_POISON2 (dead000000000122)
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:61!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5896 Comm: syz-executor213 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc1-next-20250204-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 12/27/2024
RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x12c/0x190 lib/list_debug.c:59
Code: 8c 4c 89 fe 48 89 da e8 32 8c 37 fc 90 0f 0b 48 89 df e8 27 9f 14 fd 48 c7 c7 a0 c0 60 8c 4c 89 fe 48 89 da e8 15 8c 37 fc 90 <0f> 0b 4c 89 e7 e8 0a 9f 14 fd 42 80 3c 2b 00 74 08 4c 89 e7 e8 cb
RSP: 0018:ffffc90003f6f998 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 000000000000004e RBX: dead000000000122 RCX: 01454d423f7fbf00
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000080000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: ffffffff819f077c R09: 1ffff920007eded0
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff520007eded1 R12: dead000000000122
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff8880352248d8 R15: ffff888021297e00
FS:  00007f7ace6686c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b8700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f7aceeeb1d0 CR3: 000000003527c000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __list_del_entry_valid include/linux/list.h:124 [inline]
 __list_del_entry include/linux/list.h:215 [inline]
 list_del_rcu include/linux/rculist.h:168 [inline]
 hci_chan_del+0x70/0x1b0 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:2858
 l2cap_conn_free net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:1816 [inline]
 kref_put include/linux/kref.h:65 [inline]
 l2cap_conn_put+0x70/0xe0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:1830
 l2cap_sock_shutdown+0xa8a/0x1020 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1377
 l2cap_sock_release+0x79/0x1d0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1416
 __sock_release net/socket.c:642 [inline]
 sock_close+0xbc/0x240 net/socket.c:1393
 __fput+0x3e9/0x9f0 fs/file_table.c:448
 task_work_run+0x24f/0x310 kernel/task_work.c:227
 ptrace_notify+0x2d2/0x380 kernel/signal.c:2522
 ptrace_report_syscall include/linux/ptrace.h:415 [inline]
 ptrace_report_syscall_exit include/linux/ptrace.h:477 [inline]
 syscall_exit_work+0xc7/0x1d0 kernel/entry/common.c:173
 syscall_exit_to_user_mode_prepare kernel/entry/common.c:200 [inline]
 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:205 [inline]
 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x24a/0x340 kernel/entry/common.c:218
 do_syscall_64+0x100/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:89
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f7aceeaf449
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 41 19 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f7ace668218 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a
RAX: fffffffffffffffc RBX: 00007f7acef39328 RCX: 00007f7aceeaf449
RDX: 000000000000000e RSI: 0000000020000100 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 00007f7acef39320 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000003
R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 00007f7ace668670 R15: 000000000000000b
 </TASK>
Modules linked in:
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x12c/0x190 lib/list_debug.c:59
Code: 8c 4c 89 fe 48 89 da e8 32 8c 37 fc 90 0f 0b 48 89 df e8 27 9f 14 fd 48 c7 c7 a0 c0 60 8c 4c 89 fe 48 89 da e8 15 8c 37 fc 90 <0f> 0b 4c 89 e7 e8 0a 9f 14 fd 42 80 3c 2b 00 74 08 4c 89 e7 e8 cb
RSP: 0018:ffffc90003f6f998 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 000000000000004e RBX: dead000000000122 RCX: 01454d423f7fbf00
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000080000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: ffffffff819f077c R09: 1ffff920007eded0
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff520007eded1 R12: dead000000000122
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff8880352248d8 R15: ffff888021297e00
FS:  00007f7ace6686c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b8600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f7acef05b08 CR3: 000000003527c000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400

Reported-by: [email protected]
Tested-by: [email protected]
Fixes: b4f82f9 ("Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix slab-use-after-free Read in l2cap_send_cmd")
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
GallaisPoutine pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 28, 2025
The behaviour of kthread_create_worker() was recently changed to align
with the one of kthread_create(). The kthread worker is created but not
awaken by default. This is to allow the use of kthread_affine_preferred()
and kthread_bind[_mask]() with kthread workers. In order to keep the
old behaviour and wake the kthread up, kthread_run_worker() must be
used. All the pre-existing users have been converted, except for UVC
that was introduced in the same merge window as the API change.

This results in hangs:

	INFO: task UVCG:82 blocked for more than 491 seconds.
	Tainted: G                T  6.13.0-rc2-00014-gb04e317b5226 #1
	task:UVCG            state:D stack:0     pid:82
	 Call Trace:
	 __schedule
	 schedule
	 schedule_preempt_disabled
	 kthread
	 ? kthread_flush_work
	 ret_from_fork
	 ret_from_fork_asm
	 entry_INT80_32

Fix this with converting UVCG kworker to the new API.

Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-lkp/[email protected]
Fixes: f0bbfbd ("usb: gadget: uvc: rework to enqueue in pump worker from encoded queue")
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Grzeschik <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
GallaisPoutine pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 28, 2025
tcf_exts_miss_cookie_base_alloc() calls xa_alloc_cyclic() which can
return 1 if the allocation succeeded after wrapping. This was treated as
an error, with value 1 returned to caller tcf_exts_init_ex() which sets
exts->actions to NULL and returns 1 to caller fl_change().

fl_change() treats err == 1 as success, calling tcf_exts_validate_ex()
which calls tcf_action_init() with exts->actions as argument, where it
is dereferenced.

Example trace:

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
CPU: 114 PID: 16151 Comm: handler114 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.14.0-503.16.1.el9_5.x86_64 #1
RIP: 0010:tcf_action_init+0x1f8/0x2c0
Call Trace:
 tcf_action_init+0x1f8/0x2c0
 tcf_exts_validate_ex+0x175/0x190
 fl_change+0x537/0x1120 [cls_flower]

Fixes: 80cd22c ("net/sched: cls_api: Support hardware miss to tc action")
Signed-off-by: Pierre Riteau <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michal Swiatkowski <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
GallaisPoutine pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 28, 2025
When trying to mmap a trace instance buffer that is attached to
reserve_mem, it would crash:

 BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffe97bd00025c8
 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
 #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
 PGD 2862f3067 P4D 2862f3067 PUD 0
 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT_RT SMP PTI
 CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 981 Comm: mmap-rb Not tainted 6.14.0-rc2-test-00003-g7f1a5e3fbf9e-dirty torvalds#233
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
 RIP: 0010:validate_page_before_insert+0x5/0xb0
 Code: e2 01 89 d0 c3 cc cc cc cc 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 <48> 8b 46 08 a8 01 75 67 66 90 48 89 f0 8b 50 34 85 d2 74 76 48 89
 RSP: 0018:ffffb148c2f3f968 EFLAGS: 00010246
 RAX: ffff9fa5d3322000 RBX: ffff9fa5ccff9c08 RCX: 00000000b879ed29
 RDX: ffffe97bd00025c0 RSI: ffffe97bd00025c0 RDI: ffff9fa5ccff9c08
 RBP: ffffb148c2f3f9f0 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 0000000000000004
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000200 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 00007f16a18d5000 R14: ffff9fa5c48db6a8 R15: 0000000000000000
 FS:  00007f16a1b54740(0000) GS:ffff9fa73df00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: ffffe97bd00025c8 CR3: 00000001048c6006 CR4: 0000000000172ef0
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  ? __die_body.cold+0x19/0x1f
  ? __die+0x2e/0x40
  ? page_fault_oops+0x157/0x2b0
  ? search_module_extables+0x53/0x80
  ? validate_page_before_insert+0x5/0xb0
  ? kernelmode_fixup_or_oops.isra.0+0x5f/0x70
  ? __bad_area_nosemaphore+0x16e/0x1b0
  ? bad_area_nosemaphore+0x16/0x20
  ? do_kern_addr_fault+0x77/0x90
  ? exc_page_fault+0x22b/0x230
  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x2b/0x30
  ? validate_page_before_insert+0x5/0xb0
  ? vm_insert_pages+0x151/0x400
  __rb_map_vma+0x21f/0x3f0
  ring_buffer_map+0x21b/0x2f0
  tracing_buffers_mmap+0x70/0xd0
  __mmap_region+0x6f0/0xbd0
  mmap_region+0x7f/0x130
  do_mmap+0x475/0x610
  vm_mmap_pgoff+0xf2/0x1d0
  ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x166/0x200
  __x64_sys_mmap+0x37/0x50
  x64_sys_call+0x1670/0x1d70
  do_syscall_64+0xbb/0x1d0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

The reason was that the code that maps the ring buffer pages to user space
has:

	page = virt_to_page((void *)cpu_buffer->subbuf_ids[s]);

And uses that in:

	vm_insert_pages(vma, vma->vm_start, pages, &nr_pages);

But virt_to_page() does not work with vmap()'d memory which is what the
persistent ring buffer has. It is rather trivial to allow this, but for
now just disable mmap() of instances that have their ring buffer from the
reserve_mem option.

If an mmap() is performed on a persistent buffer it will return -ENODEV
just like it would if the .mmap field wasn't defined in the
file_operations structure.

Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <[email protected]>
Cc: Vincent Donnefort <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/[email protected]
Fixes: 9b7bdf6 ("tracing: Have trace_printk not use binary prints if boot buffer")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]>
GallaisPoutine pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 28, 2025
Syzkaller reports the following bug:

BUG: spinlock bad magic on CPU#1, syz-executor.0/7995
 lock: 0xffff88805303f3e0, .magic: 00000000, .owner: <none>/-1, .owner_cpu: 0
CPU: 1 PID: 7995 Comm: syz-executor.0 Tainted: G            E     5.10.209+ #1
Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 11/12/2020
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x119/0x179 lib/dump_stack.c:118
 debug_spin_lock_before kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:83 [inline]
 do_raw_spin_lock+0x1f6/0x270 kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:112
 __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:117 [inline]
 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x50/0x70 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:159
 reset_per_cpu_data+0xe6/0x240 [drop_monitor]
 net_dm_cmd_trace+0x43d/0x17a0 [drop_monitor]
 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x22f/0x330 net/netlink/genetlink.c:739
 genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:783 [inline]
 genl_rcv_msg+0x341/0x5a0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:800
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x14d/0x440 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2497
 genl_rcv+0x29/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:811
 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1322 [inline]
 netlink_unicast+0x54b/0x800 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1348
 netlink_sendmsg+0x914/0xe00 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1916
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:651 [inline]
 __sock_sendmsg+0x157/0x190 net/socket.c:663
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x712/0x870 net/socket.c:2378
 ___sys_sendmsg+0xf8/0x170 net/socket.c:2432
 __sys_sendmsg+0xea/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2461
 do_syscall_64+0x30/0x40 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x62/0xc7
RIP: 0033:0x7f3f9815aee9
Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f3f972bf0c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f3f9826d050 RCX: 00007f3f9815aee9
RDX: 0000000020000000 RSI: 0000000020001300 RDI: 0000000000000007
RBP: 00007f3f981b63bd R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 000000000000006e R14: 00007f3f9826d050 R15: 00007ffe01ee6768

If drop_monitor is built as a kernel module, syzkaller may have time
to send a netlink NET_DM_CMD_START message during the module loading.
This will call the net_dm_monitor_start() function that uses
a spinlock that has not yet been initialized.

To fix this, let's place resource initialization above the registration
of a generic netlink family.

Found by InfoTeCS on behalf of Linux Verification Center
(linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.

Fixes: 9a8afc8 ("Network Drop Monitor: Adding drop monitor implementation & Netlink protocol")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ilia Gavrilov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
GallaisPoutine pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 28, 2025
A softlockup issue was found with stress test:
 watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#27 stuck for 26s! [migration/27:181]
 CPU: 27 UID: 0 PID: 181 Comm: migration/27 6.14.0-rc2-next-20250210 #1
 Stopper: multi_cpu_stop <- stop_machine_from_inactive_cpu
 RIP: 0010:stop_machine_yield+0x2/0x10
 RSP: 0000:ff4a0dcecd19be48 EFLAGS: 00000246
 RAX: ffffffff89c0108f RBX: ff4a0dcec03afe44 RCX: 0000000000000000
 RDX: ff1cdaaf6eba5808 RSI: 0000000000000282 RDI: ff1cda80c1775a40
 RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 00000011620096c6 R09: 7fffffffffffffff
 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000100 R12: ff1cda80c1775a40
 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ff4a0dcec03afe20
 FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ff1cdaaf6eb80000(0000)
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000025e2c2a001 CR4: 0000000000773ef0
 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
 PKRU: 55555554
 Call Trace:
  multi_cpu_stop+0x8f/0x100
  cpu_stopper_thread+0x90/0x140
  smpboot_thread_fn+0xad/0x150
  kthread+0xc2/0x100
  ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50

The stress test involves CPU hotplug operations and memory control group
(memcg) operations. The scenario can be described as follows:

 echo xx > memory.max 	cache_ap_online			oom_reaper
 (CPU23)						(CPU50)
 xx < usage		stop_machine_from_inactive_cpu
 for(;;)			// all active cpus
 trigger OOM		queue_stop_cpus_work
 // waiting oom_reaper
 			multi_cpu_stop(migration/xx)
 			// sync all active cpus ack
 			// waiting cpu23 ack
 			// CPU50 loops in multi_cpu_stop
 							waiting cpu50

Detailed explanation:
1. When the usage is larger than xx, an OOM may be triggered. If the
   process does not handle with ths kill signal immediately, it will loop
   in the memory_max_write.
2. When cache_ap_online is triggered, the multi_cpu_stop is queued to the
   active cpus. Within the multi_cpu_stop function,  it attempts to
   synchronize the CPU states. However, the CPU23 didn't acknowledge
   because it is stuck in a loop within the for(;;).
3. The oom_reaper process is blocked because CPU50 is in a loop, waiting
   for CPU23 to acknowledge the synchronization request.
4. Finally, it formed cyclic dependency and lead to softlockup and dead
   loop.

To fix this issue, add cond_resched() in the memory_max_write, so that it
will not block migration task.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: b6e6edc ("mm: memcontrol: reclaim and OOM kill when shrinking memory.max below usage")
Signed-off-by: Chen Ridong <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: Shakeel Butt <[email protected]>
Cc: Muchun Song <[email protected]>
Cc: Wang Weiyang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
GallaisPoutine pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 28, 2025
The namespace percpu counter protects pending I/O, and we can
only safely diable the namespace once the counter drop to zero.
Otherwise we end up with a crash when running blktests/nvme/058
(eg for loop transport):

[ 2352.930426] [  T53909] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000005: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
[ 2352.930431] [  T53909] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000028-0x000000000000002f]
[ 2352.930434] [  T53909] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 53909 Comm: kworker/u16:5 Tainted: G        W          6.13.0-rc6 torvalds#232
[ 2352.930438] [  T53909] Tainted: [W]=WARN
[ 2352.930440] [  T53909] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-3.fc41 04/01/2014
[ 2352.930443] [  T53909] Workqueue: nvmet-wq nvme_loop_execute_work [nvme_loop]
[ 2352.930449] [  T53909] RIP: 0010:blkcg_set_ioprio+0x44/0x180

as the queue is already torn down when calling submit_bio();

So we need to init the percpu counter in nvmet_ns_enable(), and
wait for it to drop to zero in nvmet_ns_disable() to avoid having
I/O pending after the namespace has been disabled.

Fixes: 74d1696 ("nvmet-loop: avoid using mutex in IO hotpath")

Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nilay Shroff <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sagi Grimberg <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Chaitanya Kulkarni <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Shin'ichiro Kawasaki <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <[email protected]>
GallaisPoutine pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 28, 2025
The delayed work item function nvmet_pci_epf_poll_sqs_work() polls all
submission queues and keeps running in a loop as long as commands are
being submitted by the host. Depending on the preemption configuration
of the kernel, under heavy command workload, this function can thus run
for more than RCU_CPU_STALL_TIMEOUT seconds, leading to a RCU stall:

 rcu: INFO: rcu_sched self-detected stall on CPU
 rcu:   5-....: (20998 ticks this GP) idle=4244/1/0x4000000000000000 softirq=301/301 fqs=5132
 rcu:   (t=21000 jiffies g=-443 q=12 ncpus=8)
 CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 82 Comm: kworker/5:1 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc2 #1
 Hardware name: Radxa ROCK 5B (DT)
 Workqueue: events nvmet_pci_epf_poll_sqs_work [nvmet_pci_epf]
 pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
 pc : dw_edma_device_tx_status+0xb8/0x130
 lr : dw_edma_device_tx_status+0x9c/0x130
 sp : ffff800080b5bbb0
 x29: ffff800080b5bbb0 x28: ffff0331c5c78400 x27: ffff0331c1cd1960
 x26: ffff0331c0e39010 x25: ffff0331c20e4000 x24: ffff0331c20e4a90
 x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000001 x21: 00000000005aca33
 x20: ffff800080b5bc30 x19: ffff0331c123e370 x18: 000000000ab29e62
 x17: ffffb2a878c9c118 x16: ffff0335bde82040 x15: 0000000000000000
 x14: 000000000000017b x13: 00000000ee601780 x12: 0000000000000018
 x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000001 x9 : 0000000000000040
 x8 : 00000000ee601780 x7 : 0000000105c785c0 x6 : ffff0331c1027d80
 x5 : 0000000001ee7ad6 x4 : ffff0335bdea16c0 x3 : ffff0331c123e438
 x2 : 00000000005aca33 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff0331c123e410
 Call trace:
  dw_edma_device_tx_status+0xb8/0x130 (P)
  dma_sync_wait+0x60/0xbc
  nvmet_pci_epf_dma_transfer+0x128/0x264 [nvmet_pci_epf]
  nvmet_pci_epf_poll_sqs_work+0x2a0/0x2e0 [nvmet_pci_epf]
  process_one_work+0x144/0x390
  worker_thread+0x27c/0x458
  kthread+0xe8/0x19c
  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

The solution for this is simply to explicitly allow rescheduling using
cond_resched(). However, since doing so for every loop of
nvmet_pci_epf_poll_sqs_work() significantly degrades performance
(for 4K random reads using 4 I/O queues, the maximum IOPS goes down from
137 KIOPS to 110 KIOPS), call cond_resched() every second to avoid the
RCU stalls.

Fixes: 0faa0fe ("nvmet: New NVMe PCI endpoint function target driver")
Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sagi Grimberg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <[email protected]>
GallaisPoutine pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 28, 2025
Brad Spengler reported the list_del() corruption splat in
gtp_net_exit_batch_rtnl(). [0]

Commit eb28fd7 ("gtp: Destroy device along with udp socket's netns
dismantle.") added the for_each_netdev() loop in gtp_net_exit_batch_rtnl()
to destroy devices in each netns as done in geneve and ip tunnels.

However, this could trigger ->dellink() twice for the same device during
->exit_batch_rtnl().

Say we have two netns A & B and gtp device B that resides in netns B but
whose UDP socket is in netns A.

  1. cleanup_net() processes netns A and then B.

  2. gtp_net_exit_batch_rtnl() finds the device B while iterating
     netns A's gn->gtp_dev_list and calls ->dellink().

  [ device B is not yet unlinked from netns B
    as unregister_netdevice_many() has not been called. ]

  3. gtp_net_exit_batch_rtnl() finds the device B while iterating
     netns B's for_each_netdev() and calls ->dellink().

gtp_dellink() cleans up the device's hash table, unlinks the dev from
gn->gtp_dev_list, and calls unregister_netdevice_queue().

Basically, calling gtp_dellink() multiple times is fine unless
CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST is enabled.

Let's remove for_each_netdev() in gtp_net_exit_batch_rtnl() and
delegate the destruction to default_device_exit_batch() as done
in bareudp.

[0]:
list_del corruption, ffff8880aaa62c00->next (autoslab_size_M_dev_P_net_core_dev_11127_8_1328_8_S_4096_A_64_n_139+0xc00/0x1000 [slab object]) is LIST_POISON1 (ffffffffffffff02) (prev is 0xffffffffffffff04)
kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:58!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1804 Comm: kworker/u8:7 Tainted: G                T   6.12.13-grsec-full-20250211091339 #1
Tainted: [T]=RANDSTRUCT
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
Workqueue: netns cleanup_net
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff84947381>] __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x141/0x200 lib/list_debug.c:58
Code: c2 76 91 31 c0 e8 9f b1 f7 fc 0f 0b 4d 89 f0 48 c7 c1 02 ff ff ff 48 89 ea 48 89 ee 48 c7 c7 e0 c2 76 91 31 c0 e8 7f b1 f7 fc <0f> 0b 4d 89 e8 48 c7 c1 04 ff ff ff 48 89 ea 48 89 ee 48 c7 c7 60
RSP: 0018:fffffe8040b4fbd0 EFLAGS: 00010283
RAX: 00000000000000cc RBX: dffffc0000000000 RCX: ffffffff818c4054
RDX: ffffffff84947381 RSI: ffffffff818d1512 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffff8880aaa62c00 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffffbd008169f32
R10: fffffe8040b4f997 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: a1988d84f24943e4
R13: ffffffffffffff02 R14: ffffffffffffff04 R15: ffff8880aaa62c08
RBX: kasan shadow of 0x0
RCX: __wake_up_klogd.part.0+0x74/0xe0 kernel/printk/printk.c:4554
RDX: __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x141/0x200 lib/list_debug.c:58
RSI: vprintk+0x72/0x100 kernel/printk/printk_safe.c:71
RBP: autoslab_size_M_dev_P_net_core_dev_11127_8_1328_8_S_4096_A_64_n_139+0xc00/0x1000 [slab object]
RSP: process kstack fffffe8040b4fbd0+0x7bd0/0x8000 [kworker/u8:7+netns 1804 ]
R09: kasan shadow of process kstack fffffe8040b4f990+0x7990/0x8000 [kworker/u8:7+netns 1804 ]
R10: process kstack fffffe8040b4f997+0x7997/0x8000 [kworker/u8:7+netns 1804 ]
R15: autoslab_size_M_dev_P_net_core_dev_11127_8_1328_8_S_4096_A_64_n_139+0xc08/0x1000 [slab object]
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888116000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000748f5372c000 CR3: 0000000015408000 CR4: 00000000003406f0 shadow CR4: 00000000003406f0
Stack:
 0000000000000000 ffffffff8a0c35e7 ffffffff8a0c3603 ffff8880aaa62c00
 ffff8880aaa62c00 0000000000000004 ffff88811145311c 0000000000000005
 0000000000000001 ffff8880aaa62000 fffffe8040b4fd40 ffffffff8a0c360d
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 [<ffffffff8a0c360d>] __list_del_entry_valid include/linux/list.h:131 [inline] fffffe8040b4fc28
 [<ffffffff8a0c360d>] __list_del_entry include/linux/list.h:248 [inline] fffffe8040b4fc28
 [<ffffffff8a0c360d>] list_del include/linux/list.h:262 [inline] fffffe8040b4fc28
 [<ffffffff8a0c360d>] gtp_dellink+0x16d/0x360 drivers/net/gtp.c:1557 fffffe8040b4fc28
 [<ffffffff8a0d0404>] gtp_net_exit_batch_rtnl+0x124/0x2c0 drivers/net/gtp.c:2495 fffffe8040b4fc88
 [<ffffffff8e705b24>] cleanup_net+0x5a4/0xbe0 net/core/net_namespace.c:635 fffffe8040b4fcd0
 [<ffffffff81754c97>] process_one_work+0xbd7/0x2160 kernel/workqueue.c:3326 fffffe8040b4fd88
 [<ffffffff81757195>] process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3407 [inline] fffffe8040b4fec0
 [<ffffffff81757195>] worker_thread+0x6b5/0xfa0 kernel/workqueue.c:3488 fffffe8040b4fec0
 [<ffffffff817782a0>] kthread+0x360/0x4c0 kernel/kthread.c:397 fffffe8040b4ff78
 [<ffffffff814d8594>] ret_from_fork+0x74/0xe0 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:172 fffffe8040b4ffb8
 [<ffffffff8110f509>] ret_from_fork_asm+0x29/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:399 fffffe8040b4ffe8
 </TASK>
Modules linked in:

Fixes: eb28fd7 ("gtp: Destroy device along with udp socket's netns dismantle.")
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
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